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CH&P?ER VIIi THE INVASION SCARE	 1909 AND ITS AFTERMATH
Whil, the CILD. had pursued its inquiry into the contingency of a
Oerun invasion, public clamour over the possibility bad reached new heights.
Once again, apprehension of sudden overseas attack bad its roots in a $enes
international scene. On 25th Spt.mber 1908 matters had taken a turn for
the worse when the French had forcibly reoaptured three German deserters
from the Fr.nch Foreign Legion, who were being assisted in their escape by
the German oonailtat. in Casablanca. The ensuing Casablanca Incident was
not resolved until mid-November, when the Germans dropped their demands
for an apology and accepted the French proposal for arbitration, and for
a time it seemed that the two powers would go to war, with a good chance
of British participation. The situation was not improwed when dersany's
ally, Austria, suddenly annexed two Turkish provinces in the Balkans.
British public opinion favoured the new "Young Turk" regime in Constanti-
nople, and th. resulting Bosnian Crisis continued throughout the winter of
19081909.
By th. lat. summer of 1908, invasion conjecture. in the British press
ha4 reached epidemic proportions, s*v•ral of which seemed to be based on
R.pington's hypothesis presented to th. C.I.D. liaise continued to print
monthly warnings of German attack in the National Review, and Lt.-Col.
R.S.S. Baden-Povell, the hero of feking and founder of the Boy Scout
movement, d.liv.red an alarming speech w)ioh forecast a German descent on
England during the August Bank Holiday Week-end. Questions regarding his
speech were wade in the House of Commons and Ealdane was asked to pledge
that "at such unreported, but virtually public, meetings officers of the
1. A.J. harder. From the Dreadnought to Soaps T1ow The Road to
1904-1914. o.u. p:,Ti, pp. 149-.l5.
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Army shall not indulge in language calculated to set up unfriendly relations
between this country and foreign Powers."
	 d.n-Powefl, however, was
unchastened, and later published a book describing "Gsrmany' s Plan for
Invading igland.	 Invasion warning. were, in addition, coming from
several sources, and from opposite ends of the political spectrum.
From July 30 to September 5 the high Tory Morning Poet published a
series of eight closely-reasoned articles by its naval correspondent,
examining the prospects of German invasion. A lead editorial observed
that the naval strategists had mad. themselves ridiculous by drawing con-
clusions from imaginary premises and assuming an attitud. of papal
infallibility. The Admiralty's "excessive optimism" would not suffice, for
British military weakness would remain a temptation to militarily-powerful
Continental Anglophobee: the only remedy was a etr anger Navy and the
institution of universal military servioe. Admiral l.A. Close wrote to the
paper that the incidence of fog. end gales in the North Sea made a mobile
army on shore an absolute necessity: "Tears ago I was the first to hoist
the danger signal in your columns, when I said 'ws want another Portland
harbour on the East Coast'; now I say wi want another Aldarshot on the East
Coast." Re raised the prospect of flat-bottom steamers oo'i 'i.g directly
from enemy herbours to British beaches, spewing out men, horses, end guns over
a wide nway as soon as they touched shore. At the same time, LZt.
Byndniann, the rxist founder of the Social Democratic Fsderation, and
1. Natjonal Review. September 1908, pp. 3, 6, 19; July 1908. p. 880; E.3.
Reynolds. Baden-.Povell. 0.U.P., 1942. p. 134. Hanserd. (Ccxmaons) 13
y 1908. oo1s 11a2-23; 25 y 1908. cola. 742-745; June 1908, col. 1546.
Sir Robert Baden-Powell. 	 Adventures as j
	
. Pearson, London, 1915.
pp . 51-76. S.. also: "The German Peril." Quarterly Review. July 1908,
p. 295; Cal. Lonsdale Halo. "The Insecurity of our H0m. Defence Today."
Nineteenth Century. August 1908. pp. 877-889; "General Staff." j
Writ Ing on the Wall. Reinemann, London, 1908.
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Federation, aM Robert Blatchford, the socialist publicist, published in
theik Socialist weekly, the Clarion, a succession of alarming prophecies on
almost identical lines, 1 which attracted much attention.
Even the Admiralty, in spits of Fisher's brave front at the C.I.D.,
seemed to be entertaining secret reservations. The 1908 naval manoeuvres,
held to test the fleet's ability to prevent a Cerman force from landing -
resulted in a. smell detachment of raiders coming ashore at Wick, in the
extreme north of Scotland. The Times complained that "for reasons which
have not been clearly explained, the Admiralty elected to cast a .il of
secrecy over the operations." The lack of hard informetion from the naval
authorities naturally encouraged rumours. Unconfirmed reports from Paris
indicated that the naval defences had been found wanting, even though the
exercises bad involved a huge force of 270 British vessels, the largest
fleet of warships Europe had 7.t seen. In December a report circulated that
a large naval force had succeeded in evading the defending fleet and had
landed 70,000 men. This was emphatically repudiated by MoXenna, the First
Lord, in the House of Commons.
Jo such incident ... ocourred in the menoeuvxes, nor did anything
happen which could in the smallest degre. give the slightest
foundation for such a statement. I trust that with this inform-
ation the ublio alarm which my hon. friend apprehended may be
prevented.
1. "Iva.aton." Morning Poet. 30 July l908,p.7; 5 August 1908 , p. 5; 14
August 1908, p.6; 18 August 1908, p.7; 31 August 1908, p.4; 5 Bsptemb.r
1908, pp. 4-5; R.L Hyndmann. "The Coming Tar Against eat Britain."
Clarjn. 31 July 1908. p1; Robert Blatchford. "The nger of Wax."
Ibid. 7 August 1908, p.1; "England and Germanyr The Case for the Soar..-
mongers." Ibid. 21 August 1908. p. 5. S•e alsor	 Nation	 Arms.
October 1908, pp. 257 ff.
2. "The Naval Uanoeuvres." Times. 30 June 1908 , p . 9; 25 July 1908, p.9;
"The British Naval Manoeuvr.ss French Opinion." Ibid.31 July 1908, p.9.
Eli. Halevy. The Rule of	 1go5-1lA. Benn, London, 1961, pp.
393-394. "AdmTls Adasjon." DejIail. 3 Deoembe l9O8 p. 5; "Navy
and Invasion." Ibid. 8 December 1908,	 i neard.(Ccemons) 7 December
1908. aol.. 56-7,
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The War Office also was testing its arrangements against invasion, and
specifically, the reaction-time of the Territorial Force. A dress rehearsal
in early December established that it took the Territorials three hours frcus
the first alarm to transport themselves and begin their deployment on the
beach. This was the first occasion in which motor care had been used for a
test mobilization, and 120 men with full equipment w•re conveyed 14 miles,
using two motor buses and a steam oar.1
The activities of the military and naval authorities were paralleled
by th. efforts of various novelists and writers, who continued to exploit
the invasion theme. One story, 	 Admira1t	 the Atlantic, attracted
attention in Germany as well as England, and prompted Prince Henry of Prussia,
an Admiral in the German Fleet, to write to Sir John Fisher, assuring him
that "he who tries to prove that Germany is, or ill be, a menace to England,
or that Germany intends to be agessive, ii certainly quite in the wrong
and (pardon me) a lunatic!" Fisher, obviously mindful of the Twsedmonth
letter incident of the month befor•, passed the letter on to the King with-
out comment. 2
 Further coinmnnications from Berlin were not as reassuring.
Colonel ?rench, the British Military Attache, reported to his superior, on
April 27, 1908 that a German navel,	 Offeneiv-Invaston gegen England,
also publicised the possibility of a surprise attack on the British fleet
that would cripple it in its harbours. Although th. book was "quits valu-
1. 9ehearsal of Invasion."
	 Mail. 7 December 1 908. p. 7.
2. A. 3. Marder •Fear Cod and Dread Boughts The Correspondence of Admiral
of	 Fl.t Lord Fisher of Xjlverstone.Vl. II. Cape, London, 1956.
p. 171. Prince Henry of Prussia to Fisher, 24 larch 1908; Percival
Hielam. The Admiraltj of
	 Atlantic. Longmans Green, London, 1908.
P. 333.
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less either as a strategic study or as an .xpr.ssion of intention", it was
nonetheless "one of the numerous straws which show the direction of the
wind" in German public opinion, and as "an expression of views and hopes
which I believe to be those of no small number of persona." 1 Evidently
invasion was being Mooted with enthusiasm in Germany, whil, public dread
in England increased. Even King Edwaxd himself was reported to be anxious
that
Wilhelm, as soon as he ii ready for it, will throw a corps
d' sines or two into England, making proclariati on that he has
corns, not as an eneuy to the King, but as andson to Queen
Victoria, to delive? him from the socialist ng which is
ruining the country. He will then with the King dissolve
Parliament, and re-establish the King's sutocratie rul, as
feudatory of the German &ipixs.2
Invasion stories, in reality props.nda for various hams defence progras,
proliferated throughout 1908. Sir Alan Hughes Bizrgoyne, Editor of the Navy
Legue Annual, published a story in October in which he described a German
attack on England s	 War Inevita, and called for a larger fleet and
horns ara. A corresponding effort by "General Staff", ominously entitled
"'j	!. Wall, outlined the perilous consequences of failing to
adopt conscriptions ten German Ar Corps are madi to land and enter London,
departing only after exacting a hige indennity of £500 million. 3 Simi1a
stories were beginning to appear as serials in illustrated penny weeklies
dseiged for the mass market.
1. C.P. Cooch and H.V. Temp.rly. British Documents on the Origins of
!. 1898-1914. Vol. VI. H.LS.O. London, 1930. pp. T7-49. Co]. F.
Trench to iz F. Imsoelles, 27 April 1908.
2. William Soaw.n Blunt. y Diaries. Vol. II. Becker, London, 1920. p. 218.
7 August 1908.
3. Sir Alan Thaghes Burgoyn.. , Inevitable. Oriffithe, London, 1908;
"The Invasion of Britain." The Spectator. 29 September 1908. pp. 438.'
440.
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Such was the state of British public opinin as the invasion inquiry
dr.w to a close in October 1908. Roberts and Repington were hoping to take
advantags of th. public alarm and publish their various statement in
svtdence. 1 As soon as they learned that th. inquiry had completed it.
report, they bsgan to stert pressure on the Government to make it public.
itktn a week of the acceptance of the sub-committee's report, they yen
planning to present their entirs case for German invasion, in the form of a
Resolution in the Rou.s of Lord. to he moved by Roberts. They thereby hop.d
to force the Government to announce th. findings of the inquiry. Baif our,
hour.vsr, advised them that a general statement
could not be mad. nov without bringing the naval and military
relations of Germany and eat Britain into prominence that
I was convinced that the Government would think this higily
inexpedient *t th. present moment; and that, personally, I was
entirely of this opinion.
Balfour, howv.r, advised Asquith, that Roberts and Repington would be
satisfied by the Government aimoxctng 70,000 as the official •stimate as
to the sis of a possible invading foros, and did not demand an inmediste
general survey of the question. (, th. other hand, they had not concealed
their intention of using any figures the Government might mak public for
2
their ovn purposes of propaganda. R.pington anticipated that Asquith would
announce the results of the inquiry in the course of his traditional Guild-
hail speech in early Jovembsr. Instead, the Prime Minister delivered a
series of generalitie, which, Repington bitterly obs.rved, "practically
igeorse all our military interests" and "appears to hypoth.oat. a
1. Balfour	 (49725) Roberts to Balfour, 2 July 1908; Robert. S.
Yr. 62/51. R.pington to Roberts, 6 June 1908. Case X20927. Box R.1
2. Balfou MSS. Balfour to Asquith, 5 Joveaber 1908. Roberts	 . Case
120931 . Box B.l R8/26. Balfour to Robert., 27 October 1908.
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Lord B. talking under the ling' a Regulation.." Nothing came of the proposal,
apparently because the Government was fearful of provoking embarrassing
questions in the House)
Roberts' speech, delivered in the Rouse of Lorda on 23 November 1908,
spared no details, for it made specific r.ference to invasion from Germany,
and called upon the Government to "state de'initely the conclusions arrived
at as the result of the recent inquiry by the Committee of Imperial Defenoe"
Robert. stated his beli.f that there were 80,000 trained German soldiers
already in the United ringdoin, soms of them working at strategic railway
stations. The inference was that they would serve as saboteurs and
provooateus in the evsnt of a German landing in England. He also quoted
von Sah.11endorf's Duties of . General Staff to the effect that to gain
temporary oaM of the sea would be worth the sacrifice of the German
flet, and concluded with an appeal for a oitiien hom. defence force of one
million men.3 His fellow conspirator, Lord Lovat, inin.diately followed,
pointing out that the case for invasion ma. by no means dependent upon the
"bolt train the blue" hypothesi. which had been pr.aent.d to the C.I.D, and
emphasizing that the Royal Navy bad not a single safe anohorags in the North
Sea at a time when the German army was openly praotècing amphibious embark-
ationa on the Baltio coast nearby.4
As intended, the speech.. of Roberts and Lovat had an electrifying
effect on their audience. The gallerise had been crowded in anticipation,
1. (e7	 . 10/800/101. Seeley to Gr.y, 25 October 1912.
2. Raneard. (Lords) 23 November 1908. cola. 1679-80.
3. Ibid. Cola. 1687-92.
4. Ibid. cola. 1696-1704.
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and .Lsquith and Raldane were in attendance as spectators. 1
 Roberts' motion,
calling for "an Army so strong in numbers and so efficient in quality, that
the most formidable foreiga nation would hesitate to attempt a landing on
the.. shores", wa supported by speeches from Lord Middleton (formerly St.
John Brodriok, Secretary of State for War, 1901 to 1903), Cawdor, Weqe.,
•and Mimer. It was passed with a strong majority of 74 to 32, after Roberts
aeed to withdraw his demand fox an immediate Government statement on the
invasion question in deference to the sensitivity of the international
situation. 2 The speeches were widely reported in the pres. the next day,
and th. Daily Mail described the sitting as "the most remarkabls assembly
this session." The Daily Express, MorninR Poet, Spectator, Satur4 y Reviews
and National Review also printed prominent articles and. provided editorial
support for Roberts. 3 Even the Mines, which Roberts believed was sold out
to the Blue Water School, 4 published a handsome leader hailing Roberts'
"patriotic task of raining" and called upon the Government to provid, at
least a general statement regarding the invasion inquiry and official
policy. 5 Only a fey Liberal papers were critical. The Westminster (eett•
asserted that fear of invasion need never "fever our imagination, so long as
we can rely on our naval strength", while The Star deplored "the tactless
1. Daily Express. 24 November 1908. p. 4.
2. Rensard. (Lords) 23 November 1908. col. 1679; 1707-1714; 1737-1743.
3, Col. Lonsdale Hale. 'Watc1inan, What of th. Night?" Nineteenth Century.
December 1908. pp. 924-933; "The Danger of Invasion." Spectator. 28
November 1908. pp. 865-66, 861-62; "Invasion by Surprise."	 fl•
24 November 1908. p. 7 Daily Express. 24 November 1 908. pp. 1,4; "Lord
Robert.' Warning." Saturday leview. December 1908. pp. 521-525;
Morning Poet. 24 November 1 908. p. 6.
4. S. Box C. 23. Roberts to Amery, 14 November 1908.
5. "The Dangers of Invasion." Times. 24 November 1908. p. 11.
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indiscretion which appears to, be thpecu1iar gift of r.tired generals."
Interest in Roberts' speech was not confined to England, and reaction to it
was especially strong in Germany and Austria, where it was protested that
invasion was impossible. Colonel (dke of the Berliner Pageblatt thought
that complete oond of the sea and a force of 280,000 men were pre-
requisites for the conquest of Britain, while Roberts' pictur, of German
invasion was denounced in the Reicheta as a frivolous fantasy. But German
denials only reinforced English apprehension., and the very unanimity of
German disclaimers ve rise to suspicions that they were inspired by an
official central source, 2 All the invasion publicity naturally r.dounded
to th. benefit of the National Service League.
Repington assured Roberts that he f.lt "convinced that your shaft ha.
gone home", and did all be could to fe•d the flames of controversy in the
pages of the Times. He published a three-oolux special articl. supporting
Roberts, arguing that Ieadnoughts miit prove useless in the North Sea
ceing to the operations of German aurines, and endorsing the call for a
million men for horns defence. The "million man standard", he claimed, would
end the nation's r.]iance on untested machinery foi iti defence, and instead
giv, to British uhood a new and uplifting responsibility, which would
force foreign military staffs to tear up their plans for the invasion of
England. Predictably, a ga].axy of naval authorities, including Admirals
Richard Viesy Hamilton and Cyprian Bridge, were simultaneously attacking
-a
1. "Badical Sneers". Daily Eprees. 25 November 1908. p. 1.
2. Times. 26 November 1908. p. 5; Daily )iil. 7 December 1908. p . 7. See also
Time.. 25 November 1908, p.7; 27 November 1908, p.7.
- 389 -
Roberts and Repington, and reasserting th. claims of the Senior Servic. in
the Times correspondenc. columns. Haldane as well protested that Roberta'
proposals would prove a rival to the Territorial scheme, which had not yet
been granted a fair trial. 1 But Lord Roberts gained a powerful ally early
in December when Lord Rosebery, the former Liberal Prime ).niater, delivered
a speech in his support, stating that Britain could not afford to run the
risk of invasion trots a foreign foe. According to Rosebery, Continental
militaiy circles were full of plans for surprise attacks and apprehensions
over Gsrnan invasion were "well grounded" indeed, owing to the recent
expansion of their fleet. Re claimed that Balf our's 1905 statement on
invasion was based upon "obsolete and untrustworthy" trtfornntion, and asserted
that no stable policy was possible "either at home or abroad, unless they
were convinced that they were territorially free from invasion." Roaeb.ry
later repeated his allegations, which were widely circulated..2
Roberts' and Repington's campaign to publicise the perils of a Osrman
invasion also received valuabls support frøm journalists and writers, who in
the early month, of 1909 produced six new invasion prophesies as an indication
of the national alarm. L. Quoux published Spies of the aissr. which
described. th. elaborate efforts of Gsrme.n aliens in ng1aM to prepare for an
impending Oerun landing, including hidden wireless stations, elaborate
reconnaissance procedures, and hidden anition dumps. Ii. Queux "revealed"
1. Roberta S. Case X20927. Box R.1 R62/59. Repington to Roberts, 30
Xovembsi108; "Lord Roberts and His Critics." Times. 2 December 1908, p.6;
25 November 1908, Ps8; 27 November 1908, p.6; 30 November 1908, pp. 6, 12.
2. "Lord Roeebsry on National Defenos." Times. 5 December 1908. p.12; "Lord
Roeeb.ry on Our Defences." Times. 12 December 1908. p.l2; Jational_ Review.
January 1909. pp. 69 9-705.
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that Cerman street bends often played to mask the sound of Germans working
underground, mapping city water mains for the purpo.. of sabotage. Punch
hailed Li Queuz's "admirable partiality", which had "lid both a German and a
Ruseo-Prsnoh army into th. heart of hi. 1and."
Besides the productions of Li Queux and his imitators, the new maca-
circulation illustrated penny weeklies vied with one another in publishing
serials depicting German attack. Their enthusiastio exploitation of the
invasion thein mirrored public opinion, and the greatest outpouring of in-
vasion aerials coincided with the cltx of the agitation in the country at
large during the month of Maxch, 1909, as the Army and Navy Eatim&tee were
announced for the coming year. In that month Black	 White was presenting
a story called "The Great Raid", in the hop. that "the present outburst of
public interest in the subject will lead to a general filling up of the
ranks of the Territorial Army". "The Great Raid", which had includ•d a
doubl-pags drawing of enemy troops marching in to take possession of London
whil, the Union Jack was lowered in public building., was a coarnercial
success, and was re-issued later in the year in book form. The rival PgarCofl's
!.Iz began another serial in mid-March, entitled "Thu. England Slept - £
Story That Will Stir England to Its Depths", extracts of which sex. also
published in the Newnes weekly tbits. Northoliffe was not to be outdone,
and that same week a patriotic serial called "The Invaders - a Story of the
'Coming lax'", began in his periodical, Answers.2
1. William Li Queuz. Spies of the Taieers Plottin g the	 England.
Burst & Blackstt, London, 1909; "Tb. Invaders." Punch. 17 March 1909,
187; 26 May 1909, p. 366.
2. Lloyd Williams.	 Great Raid. Black and White. London, 1909; "While
England Slept." Titbits. 13 March 1909, p. 645; "The Invaders." Answers.
13 March 1909. pp. 455-458 to 19 June 1909, pp. 181-82; Times Litexari
9up lement. 21 October 1909, p. 391; I.?. Clarke. Voices Proyeeyjng
O.U.P., 1966. p. 154.
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British youth was even more suscetib1e to invasion stories, for
boys' magazines were prone to indoctrinate their readership in the
dangers of German attack. In March 1909, Chums was concluding a "Fine
Patriotic Tarn" written by a retired navy oaptain entitled "The Vengeance
of the Motherland." One Sexton Blake in Union Jack was describing alter-
nate German plans to sail up the Thames and capture London or to arrive
"the unexteoted way from the North." The Boy's Friend was introducing
"The Peril to Come" as "a powerful new invasion story which will stir
the heart of •very British boy and patriot", while the Boy's Friend Library
was advertising a book, Britain in Arms, describing a Franoo-Ruso-German
attack on England, written by Bamilton Edwarde, the paper's editor.1
Othew tories employed violent xenophobia invective in deoIanoing
Germany for anticipated wax crimes in Britain. James Blyth's The Swoop
of the Vu1tze was a lurid and sensational account of future German
aggr.aaion which described the enemy as "brutalized bragarte", "con-
temptibla Teutonic abortions" and "jeering Prussian sausage muncher.",
approving of th lynching of German aliens in the event of invasion.2
The invasion theme also inspired a poetic epic by Charles L Doughty
entitled The Clouds, which portrayed a German landing in England in blank
verse *ith the usual political inoraliems.
How is deooyed so great sea-faring nation thus?
They're governed now by loose-brained demagogues
The dusty feet rule England, not the head
All carries now the irrational Parliament vote,
of a brain-addled crooked populace.3
1. LS Purnex. Boys Will be Boys. Iilichael Joseph, London, 1948. pp. 17-77WThe Peril to Come." Th Boy's Friend. 27 March 1909. p. 688 to 17
.Ttaly 1909, p.111, 1 May 1909, p.783) Capt. Frank R. Shaw. "Vengeance
of the Motherland." Chums. September 1908 to March 1909.
2. James Blyth. The Swoop of the Vulture. Digby, London, 1909.
3. Charles M. Doughty. The Cliffs. Duckworth, London, 1909. p. 22.
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Other invasion stories, such as When En glani. Sle pt and "An Eddy of
described the perfidy of German waiters and the hozzors of German
occupation in more orthodox prose. Often the appeal of the paper
invasions was largely neutralized by sensational language and improbable
plot. In The Invasion that Did Not Come Off, the British Admiral who
frustrates the invading flotilla is described as having "died gloriously
on his quarter-deck; and was embalmed, and placed in a glass case in the
British Museum, amid the tears of a grateful people."
The excesses of the invasion stories continued to inspire parodies
and satire. Punch published a couplet which mocked both Baif our's
affection for golf and his insouciance in the face of threatened
invasions
I was playing golf the day that the Germans landed
All our troops had run away
All our ships had stranded
And the thought of England' shame
Altogether spoiled my game.'
Full-page cartoons appeared in 	 Sketob ridiculing the invasion
proph.eies and suggesting that Prussian troops could be captured by
impaling their spiked helmets on hug. blocks of wood. 4 Punch presented
an inversion of the German invasion theme describing a treacherous English
desoent on a peaceful and unsuspecting Berlin, in which Leo Maze. and
Le Queux penetrate the Kaiser's palace and succeed in destroying the
1. Captain Henry Curtiss. When England Slept. Everett, London, 109.
"01. Luk-Ote." (Sir Ernest Swinton) The Green Curve and Other
Stories. Blaokwood, Edinburgh, 1909. pp. 236-250. Napier Hawks.
The Invasion That Did Not Come	 . Drane, London, 1909.
"The Englishman." Punch. August 1909. p. 136. The couplet was published
in book form later that year in Harry Graham's Ruthless Rhymes
£.r Ujtless jlqmj. Edward Arnold, London, 1909.
4 3. I, Claik2. Cit. pp. 156-57.
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Ki.l Canal and. Nigh Seas	 &it the best satire of th. invasion stories
was P. G. lodehouse' s The Swçop, which described th simultaneous landing of
nins different enemy armies on British soil on the earns day, unknown to each
other. Chines, forces land in Isles while the Young Turks setas Scarborough,
and the Mad Mulish of the Sudan storms ashore at Portemouth. A horde of
Moroccan brigands occupy Brighton, while the Swiss Navy bombards L.yme Regis,
and a pack of carmibals come ashore at Margate. However, the Carmen and
Russian armies take control of the situation, only to begin fighting among
themeelv.e at the instigation of a bespectacled Boy Scout. The Germans and
Russians virtually annihilat, each other, and the survivors are captui•d by
a force of Boy Scouts wielding catapults. lodehouss mocked the self—pro-
claimed patriotism of the invasion novelists and in a foreword protested
that his story was also "written purely from a feeling c patriotism ad
duty" and that his publisher's "sensitive soul will be jarred to it. found-
ations if it is a financial success. So will mine." Vodehous.'s satire waø
$ welcome r.ii.f from the crudity and sensationalism of most of the invasion
prophesies, and was favourably reviewed even by journals which took the
qusation quit. seriously, such as the Times Literary Sup,lement and Iatjonsl
Defence, the monthly journal of the National Defence Association.2
It was inevitable that th. flood of invasion novelettea, usually aimed
at the mess audience, often inspired only by journalistic opportunism and
devoid of literary merit, should come to alienat, the more articulate and
1. "The Invaders." Punch. 17 March 1909. pp. 187-88.
2. P.C. lodehouse. The SwoopZ or Bow Clarence Saved	 a Tale
Great Invasion. Aiston Rivers, London, 1909.
Tim	 t.raz Supplement. 22 April 1909. p. 155; "Soaxee and Serious
?ersonii[onal Defence. Jun. 1909, p . 734.
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reflective section of the British public. Most of them were discreditable
from both the political and literary points of view, owing to their improbable
plots, extravagant language, lurid anticipation of German atrocities and
messacres, and indiscriminate abuse of German and British public figures and
policies; and after 1909 the genre rapidly declined. However, while the
products of an irresponsible journalism began to undergo a well-merited
criticism and ridicule, the invasion controversy was continued in serious
journals of opinion with articles appearing in unprecedented quantities.1
Pamphlets continued to appear, giving various detailed technical arguments
for the likelihood of a German attack, as well as tactical texts which out..
lined the progress of a future campaign fought in Britain. But the propaganda
did not go unchallenged. J.A. Farrer published "Letters to a famous General
from a mere civilian" in which he charged that the "ignominious panic of
invasion" was being employed by the forces of Jingoism to erode ancient
English liberties. Fairer accused the conscription enthusiasts of using
invasion cynically as a propaganda device in order to build up a large
Bxitih army, using the methods of continental militarism for the purposes
of military agitation and adventurism. 2
 Lord Roberts and the LS.L. were
1. "The Value of the erritoria1 Force.N uarterl Review. January 1909. pp.
1-21; Maj-G.n. F.S. Russell. "Is Invasion Possible?" Nineteenth
January 1909. pp. 1-10; 1?. Cord. "The Lost Empire of &gland." Nine-
teenth Century. February 1909. pp. 230-240; "Master Mariner." "Invasion
onsidersd From The Nautical Standpoint." Contemporary Review. February
1909. pp. 136-144 (probably by Corbett and quoted by Haldane in the House
of Coimnons); "Prussian Waterways." National Review. March 1909. pp.
64-77; H.W. Wilson. "A Plea for a Comprehensive Policy of National
Defence." National Review. y 1909. pp. 390-404; Ccl. Lonedale Bale.
"Forewarned But Not Forearmed." Nineteenth 	 June 1909. pp.936-943;
J.G. x:nox. "A Glance at a War Rorison." Ibid. pp . 925-35; National Review.
April 1909. pp . 173, 176, 180, 181, 183. Hulaire Belloc. "The Critia1
Attitudes Blue Water and the Thin Red Line." English Review. April 1909.
pp. 135-145." "Germany's Plan of Attack." Jatjonal Defence. April 1909.
pp. 529-35.
2. James Fairer. Invasion and Conscriptjon. Unain, London, 1909; "Pabius".
(contd. next page)
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widely suspected of wishing to build up a large army in order to intervene
in a European war, and of being insincere in their advocacy of home defence.
at a study of Roberts' correspondence and the LS.L. journal, Nation
Arms, does riot corroborate these chaxgee. Roberts and his compatriot. give
every appearance of sincerity of their concern for British national security,
and in many ways their proposals were in direct competition with the eventual
plane of the lar Office to place an Expeditionary Force at the side of Franc.
against Germany on the Continent.
British publio apprehensions of German invasion were extensive enough
to attract attention in Germany. 	 rine Rundechau, a. semi-official monthly
for German naval offiseis, published a long article analyzing British
anxieties on this point. It concluded
These nuaberlee c. newspaper articles about invasion are beooming
a regular zraez they are written chiefly by laymen, and, what
is worse, they are written with the express intention of
deceiving other laymen who do not know the facts. May these
expert opinions penetrate England through and through, so that
the imaginary danger of German espionage arid German invasion
may be entirely removed. Germany, with its 34 times weaker
fleet, does not dxeam of an invasion of England, her soldiers
would be at too great a disadvantage in such an attempt
Raids would burst like soap-bubbles pitted against the
marvellous imperturbability of the British nation.1
Sir Edward Grey was prevailed upon to giv, advice to the British ambassador
in Berlin on the subject. Grey explained that the British man in the street
' believed that
with 21 of the most powerful aggressive vessels ira the world
concentrated at Wilhelmhaven and looking straight at our shores,
there wai a risk of invasion should there be any unfavourabi.
2. (contd. from previous page) Invasion 	 Defence. ?xsherne, London, 1909;
Lt. Alfred C. Dewaz, R.I. (Ret.) Ta Invasion Impossible? Griffin, London
1909; Rome Defence. National Service league, 1909.
1. v.R. "Di. Invasion England. in .nglischer Beleuohtung." Marine Rundschsu.
November 1908. pp. 1246-1258; translated as "The Invasioc of England from
English point of view." by Capt. NJ. Anatruther, LI. for the Unjt4
Service	 February 1909. pp. 486-499.
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turn in the relations between this country and Germany.
Invasion, for us, meant conquest. It was quits impossible
to avoid such apprehension on th. part of the people in this
country; just as it would be impossible to avoid a scare in
Germany if one of her land-neighbours were to collect an Arn
more powerful than the German Army. 1
Orey's analysis of public opinion was undoubtedly correct, for fear of German
naval power in relation to the British fleet was th. basis of English
anxi.ties.
But the invasion scare entered a new dimension when it became known
that Rudolf rtin, author of ^L i.i e
 j	 Luften and President of
the German Airship Navigation League, had outlined a plan for the conquest
of England using a fleet of airship.. In a eries of articles and lectures,
Martin called upon the German government to construct 10,000 Zeppelin., each
capable of carrying 20 soldiers, as well as artillery and cavalry. 2	 rtin'I
speeche. caused peat trepidation in England, for it now appeared that German
airpower could conceivably bypass the defensiv, bulwark of the fleet. The
British inventor and experimenter Sir Hiram xim propounded the theory that
England could be invaded in the course of a single night by an aerial armada,
declaring that "100,000 men may be transported by a kind of aerial ferry of
5,000 aeroplanes between sunset and sunrise. Each aeroplane is to carry six
men and to make four trips in, say, 12 hours." Skeptics argued that no
plane existing carried more than two people, and that ther. was much more
involved in such an invasion than the personnel: "The uoet 5,000 plan..
could do would be to eprinkle driblets of five or six men with rifles but
1. G.P. Gooch & LV. ?emperly. .
	
p. 240. Sir Edward Cey to Sir F.
Leeceliss, 3 February 1909.
2. "Invasion by Airship." Daily Mail. 9 October 1908, p.5; ?imee. 23December 1908, p.7.
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without supplies at various intervals in the midst of a dense and hostile
population." Night landings would also present insuperable probleina)
	
rt
conjecture regarding invasion from the air did. not cease. A writer in the
Nineteenth Century asked
that valid reason is there why, within a few years' time, a
for.ign nation should not be abla to despatch a fleet of a
thousand aerial machines, each carrying two or thre• armed men
and abi. to come across to our shores and laud, not necessarily
on the coast, but at any desired inland plao.? The majority of
these men could be landed while the flyers could be sent back
for further supplies. No defence seems possible against in-
vasion by such a fleet, since, like a swarm of locusts, its
destination cannot be guessed, and, after settling, it may rise
again arid swoop dn on some fresh place, whili an hour later
it may have returned to its base ... 10,000 such machines would
probably not cost mor• than one modern battleship.2
A correspondent to the Pines pointed out, however, that invasion
involvsd the landing of a large and fully equipped armed force, complete with
cavalry and artillery. Yet the largest dirigibi. then built bad a lifting
capacity of only a few tons, and was too cramped to convey even a single
horse or field gun. Until carrying capacities were improved, it was obvious
that airships would be limit•d in application to raids and demonstrations.
Pitnge was another factor, for overseas expeditions still severely taxed the
capabilities of the beet available airships, and the troublesome winds of
the North Sea and Channel could prov. disastrous. The conjectures contained
in th. serials of the illustrated magazines were in fact visionary. 3
 An
ar captain sstimatsd that such an invasion of 100,000 would r.quir. at
least a thousand ships, each carrying 100 men. Svsn if such hugs ships could
1. "A.roplan.a and Invasion." rises. 21 December 1908. p . 6.
2. *ajor 3. Bsden-Pow•ll. "The Probl.m of Aerial Navigation." Iineteeth
Century. November 1908. p. 784.
3.'L•r oneutios: The Problem of Invasion." ?imss. 15 February 1909. p. 19.
- 398 -
be constructed, they would prove extremely difficult to manoeuvre and it would
be almost impossible to manufacture the ixmnense quantities of gas required to
fill them) In December 1908 the Admiralty considered the possibility that
Germany might use their aerial fleet to bamb the British fleet as a prelia.-
mazy to invasion, but it was decided that this was technically impossible,
although the situation required watching. 2 Although it was Obvious that
invasion by air would be technically impossible for same years, the first
air crossing of the channel by Louis Bleriot on July 25, 1909, served notioe
that the q.stion could not be iiored and, as Esher noted, marked "the
beginning of a new era'.' 3 Perceptive englishmen were beginning to realise
that air power, rather than sea power, would eventually become the ultimate
deterrent against invasion attempts, and that the fleet's role as the
nation's first line of defence would ultimately be displaced. .zt this was
still a matter for the future.
Invasion by sea and air had been prophesied in prose and poetry; cm
January 27, 1909 it ascended the stage as wsll. Guy du Maurier, a Major in
the Royal Fusilters, had written a play called 'in Englishman!j flome, which
adapted the themes of th. invasion novelists for the purpose of patriotic
melodrama. In dramatizing the invasion of &g1an4 by "Jearlandere" led by
the "peror of the Joxth", du Maurier employed the cl1oh. of Le Queux and
hi. imitator. the sudden and overwhelming landing in Essex, the perfidy of
resident aliens, acting as spies and saboteur., and the mnoompetenc. of th.
ill-prepared and poorly-led Volunteer defenders. The middle-class hams




2. A.J. Mara.r. Prom the Dreadnoudit to Soaps Flow. p. 181.
3. Eaher.	 ! Lettr. Vol. II. p. 396.
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owner of the title quotes the conventional homilies that the fleet will
prevent invasion, and that the various home defence organizations are a form
of militarism and slavery. As th. enaq nears, however, he takas up his
rifle to defend hi. home, and ii caught and shot by the invaders as a r&nc
tireu.r. Th. plot was certainly ordinary, if not devoid of dramatio merit;
but in th. charged atmosphere of the time, the play case to enjoy an un-
pr.o.dented success.
3ich of its popularity was due to the fact that it was iamedi.taly
adopted by the County of London Territorial Force, led by Lord Eaher, who
was impressed by its theme after attending on opening night. 1 A second
powerful ally appeared in the form of the Harmsworth Press, which mobilised
it. considerable resouroes to publici.. the play in order to stimulate
reoruiting for the Territorial.. Within a week after it had opened,
En glishman's Home was sold out for a month in advance, and the theatrs
manager was quoted es saying that the demand for seats was unprewedented.
The Ijli Ijl published a series of articles by Colonel Lonedale Hale,
calling attention to the play, and to the parlous condition of the home
defences, whil. a leader called upon the Goverim*nt to strengthen the
Territorial Force. 2' The papr warned that in real life no British army
would arrive to save the situation as it had on stage.
There would be nothing but mere mobs of unarmed young men
and helpless old men to confront Pri• Yoland's perfectly
ornized invaders. The play would close with the dishonour
of a national oataatrophe imposed upon the horror of desolated
homes and civilians shot for daring to nee arms in igland'.
defence. With the statesmen it rests to speak out and prevent
1. Saber. Journals	 Letters. Vol. II. p. 367. 27 January 1909; "A
Patriot." (Mjor Guy du uxi.r)	 EnRlishman'e Rome, Edw*rd irnold,
London, 1909.
2. Deil.y 1]. 2 February 1909. pp. 4, 5, 6; "The Horrors Of War. ThU.
3 Pebrunry 1909, p.4; "St..l Bolts and rs (Hom.-l.d.)w 5 February1909. p.4.
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such a national tragedy from being •naoted.
The pap.r published a condensation of "The Play All London is discussing",
ooeplste with photographs of various scenes, in the hop. that it would
"revolutionize th. national attitude to defence." The Spectator
observed that "at the present moment th. country, or at any rate a large
part of it, is in a stats of wild. excitement" over th. dramatization of
"the physical horrors of invasion", and referr.d to th. many articles
in the press discussing the play's social and. p.litioal significanc..
Although the Spectator was critical of this "crude and, sensational
method" of calling attention to the consequences of invasion, it was
grateful for this argument for adequate defensive prsparation which
would, in the future make invasion panics obsolete. The National Review
praised this "Play With A Purpose" and predicted that the National
Service League as well as the Territorial Force would. rsc.ivs converts
and. recruits as a result of du *auriers drama.2
The Drama critic of the Times was more perceptive, describing it
as "crude and amateurish" and a "grotesque, rather squalid faros." B.
rather saw its true significance as a mirror of contemporary anxiety
over German invasion, noting that An ngliehman's Rome was "not a good
play in itself, hardly, indeed, a work of art, but of real importance
as a fact, as a 'sign of the times'."3 By fortuitous timing, this
mediocre melodrama appeared at a time when the British public mind was
1. "The Duty of Our Leaders." Daily Xail 2 February 1909. p.4.
2. "Th. Play All London Is Disoussing." Ibid.. 3 February 1909. p.9;
5peotator. 6 February 1909, pp. 208-9; "A Play with A Purpose."
National Review. larch 1909. p. 32.
3. "Wyn(haa's Theatre." Times. 28 J*nuary 1909. p. 10.
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worked up over invasion as it had not been since 1900 and would not be
again until the outbreak of war in 1914. For a number of years the
National Service League and the Jational Defence Aesooiation b.ad been
pointing to the parlous condition of the nation's defences on land.
Now these organizations were joined by the Imperial Jaritim. Association
and the Bevy League, who were beginning to suspect that German naval
•xpansion was proceeding with a hitherto unsuspected speed. By the
winter of 1908-1909 both the J.S.L. and the LD.A. were exploiting the
invasion issue as never before. Until thie time their propaganda had
been moderated by the traditional faith in British naval supremacy. But
during the winter the Cabinet, and •ventually the public, learned that
German naval construction promised to surpass 	 within five
years. The ensuing naval panic and. the agitation to embark on the con-
struction of sight new Dreadnoughte was a powerful factor contributing
to the invasion scare of 1909. Although the pro.oters of the navy
scare did. riot explicitly refer to invasion, their argument that British
sea supremacy was gravely threatened implied that invasion was more
likely, if not inevitable.
The Liberal Westminster Gazette, a strong supporter of the Govern-
merit, suspected a possible alliance of "conscriptioniets" and. the Big
Navy party. Its leader of February 5th observed that "there are
symptoms, in London certainly, of a. revival of military agitation" and
pronounced that
1. The best account of' the 1909 naval soars is to be found in A.J.
Yarder's From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow. pp. 15 1-170.
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it is a chief part of the duty of the present Government
to stand firm against this delusion and the military
agitation which is behind it ... At the present moment the
promoters of the oonscriptioniat movement are waiting their
opportunity to join hands with the party which is promoting
a scare about the Navy. It is, of course, impossible to
satisfy fanatics, either naval or military, but no possible
•ZOUS• must be given to ordinary sober-judging people for
joining the militarist. in a panic about the Iavy.4
There was a third body promoting the invasion soars to which the news-
paper did not refer, for Haldane and the War Office were deeply involved
in using An englishman'. Home as a form of publicity for the Territorial
Force. A booth had been set up in the theatre, complete with forms and
recruiting sergeant, with great success. Although the i.plioations of
these activities escaped the Westminster Gazette, they were not lost
on Members of the Opposition in the House of Commons. Haldane, in
presenting the Army Estimates on March 4, acknowledged that the publicity
of the Daily Mail and "modern methods of recruiting" had produced "a
great boos" in the Territorial Forces since the beginning of the year.
From January 1 to February 23, 30,000 recruits had joined the Force,
and the London area, formerly backward, was leading all other districts.
But the Secretary of Stat. for War was strongly criticised on both
sides of the House for his methods. In his last speech in the Common.,
Arnold-Forster deplored "the dragging in of the drama". 2 Liberal
Members criticised this instigation of "spurious enthusiasm" in which
"the stalls were firmly convinoed. that the pit and th. gallery should
immediately join the Territorial Army, 3" and. termed it "one of the
most unsorupulous agitations ever initiated in this country."4 lie-
giving. over the semi-official sponsorship of the play were reinforced.
when the Lord Chamberlain informed a London theatre management that
1. "The Government and. the Problem of Defence." Westminster Gazette
5 February 1909. p. 1..
2. Eansard.. (Commons) 4 March 1909. cole. 1596-97, 1629-30. Arnold-
Forster died shortly thereafter of a heart attack.
3. mid. 8 March 1909. cole. 105-106.
4. Ibid. col. 104.
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"no skit on An Englishman's gome will be licensed fox representation."
Further oontroversy fol1ved the Coverrnnerit's use of censorship to
1
repress ridicule of its invasion recruiting propaganda. Esher, Chairman
of the London Territorial Association, hoped "the ferment will do good,"
although Haldane in a later speech, disavowed himself by observing that
"one hoaxd and one saw on the stage a good deal of gloomy apprehension"
directed towards Britain'. poweraof defence against invasion.2
Aa Mauxier's patriotic melodrama illustrates the characteristic
ambivalenc, of the invasion propaganda. Although various special interest
gioups all publicized the danger. of invasion, they differed strongly on
the means to meet it. The appropriation of An Englishman's Home by the
War Office on behalf of the Territorial Force put the LD.A. and the
N.S.L., with their own competitive panaceas for home defence, in a
somewhat embarrassing position. The N.D.A., although it welcomed the
alarm produced by the play, described it as "a melodramatic, highly
satirical, and somewhat eragg3rated presentation" and regarded its
success with envy in its journal National Defence.
What speeches by soldiers and statesmen, backed by an almost
unanimous Press, have failed to do, what powerful organizations
like the National Service League have striven after for seven
long year. and almost in vain, the mimic shells at Wyndham
Theatre have done roused the Londonex from self oompaoency
and lethaxr and set him asking what he ought to do.-
Yet the only result was that they were joining the Territorial., which
1. "The Censor of Plays." Times. 27 February 1909, p . 13. See also
2 March 1909, pp. 4, l3 4 March 1909, p . 13.
2. Esher. Journals and Letters. Vol. II. p. 369. 12 February 1909.
"National Defence". Times. 3 May 1909. p. 4.
3. "The Moral of 'An Englishman's Home" National Defence. March 1909.
pp . 417-19.
-404-
the playwright had argued were useles. in real war. National
suspected that the play was in reality a satin, poking fun at the entire
nation, and oonfessd perplexity as to its real message. The Earl of Errol
in a later issue attacked Haldans and Esher for indulging l.a "hysterical
r.cruiting", asserting that the Territorial goai of 300,000 partly trained
silitary asateurs out of a nation of 40 .illion hardly rçpr.aented Haldane's
professed ideal of a "Nation in Aims".
What we want is not a fleeting and hysterical rush to arms du•
to press advertisement and a play that has 'caught on', but a
deep and lasting public opinion based on the pninoipi. that it
is th. duty of every adult &iglishn*n to fit himself for the
defence of his country.
Errol recosmiended a dlfferent,and more r.alistio, de'noueanent to the diana,
which would have prssent.d Britain occupied, oening under a heavy indemn-
ity, and with ene troupe bill.t.d in households and her industry ruined.1
The National Service League was even more embarrassed by Du Maurier's
uocess. When the play first appeared, A Nation j Arms represented that it
presented the ideas of the League, even though the LS.L. bad not bad a part
in its production, and ooended it to the public. 2 &at once it bad become
obvious that An Englihinan's Home had been appropriated as a recruiting
vehicl, by the War Office, the LS.L. restricted itself to sardonic criticism
of this "Recruiting Extraordinary" and the opportunism of Haldane. Lord
Roberts expressed his agreement with the th. of the play, although he
added that hi. flesh did not necessarily creep at the sight of a Gersan
waiter. 3 Eventually the League attempted to counteract the success of the
1. Col. the Earl of Errol. "Hysterical Recruiting." National Defence.
April 1909. pp. 536-38.
2. "An Englishman's Home". Nation	 Arms. February 1909. p. 71.
3. "Recruiting Extraordinary." Ibid. March 1909. Pp. 81, 87-88j
National Review. May 1909. p. 37]..
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play, by producing its n version of a future invasion in four acts,
entitled A Nation In Arms. Wher. An Enljshman's Home was used to bolster
the Territorial., A Nation
	
Arms ridiculed them. It was obviously prodiiOed
to correct the erroneous impressions given by the earlier play, and its
introduction honestly admitted that it was "a deliberate attempt to present
on the stage certain arguments for the introduction of national military
training." Lord Roberts in a preface wrote
I can confidently assert that the scenes in the play are by no
means an exaggerated picture of the scenes which would occur in
England - more especially in the peat coemerotal and industrial
centres - were an invading aruy to effect a landing on our shores.
The hopeless inefficiency of our gallant and patriotic but inadequately
trained Territorial. against fully—trained soldiers is only too truly
portrayed.
Under the patronage of the League, the pl&y toured Lancashire and Yorkshire,
the locale of its supposed campaigu scenes, proclaiming the gospel of niver-
sal military service. Unlike the optimistic ending of it. archetype, Nation
Arms ended with a British defeat and the invaders advancing South tards
London.'
The Westminster Gazette, highly cxitical of the invasion agitation,
expressed its puzzlement over the divided counsels of the home defence
enthusiasts, Lord Esher encouraged men to join the Territorial., while
Colonel Kale attacked the Force as a sham, and advocated the two years'
training programne of the LS.L. The General Staff were believed to be of
this opinion also, although the Cabinet were committed to the voluntary
principle. There was an immense division of opinion as to what must be
done, and the producers of An Englishman's Home had made the confusion worse
1. 3.3. ?ownroe. A Nation In Armsz £ Play in Pour Acts. Simpkin, Marshall,
London, 1910.
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Oonfoimd.d,. Tha Iurier, it transpired, had originally written the melodrans
as a hcne dsfenos morality play, but it had been converted into a n.ar-faxoe
in rehearsal by substituting it. originally tragic ending for one which would
"bring a litti. hop. in the end." This attempt to please the public turned
the homily into a satire which ridiaulsd the thvaeton panic. The (zstte
therefor. dsemett it best to look bsyond the home defence enthusiasts fox
a solution of the question, noting that "if we confine our study of the
military probl.zs to ... sealous military or'nks, it dosa seem to be rather
1
a chaos."
The public at larg. found it equally difficult to take the play
seriously for long. A witnss of the xch 25 p.rfori.nce ccplained that
the audience burst into laughter at it. most solenn moments, even when the
bcm&ner of the titl. was taken out to be shot by the invadeZs.2
Enthusiastic parodi•s quickly app.ar.d in spite of the Lord Chamberlain's
ban, which applied only to theatres, and mueio-halle were free to present
semi-satirical "patriotic interlude.". One sketch represented "England
Invaded - As It lould Be And As It eught To Be." Th. first scene featured
the sudden &pparance of a foreign arrzy on an English golf course, followed
by the execution of the defanceless golf.rs and the "rough handling of wn
by bsrb.roua offio.re got up to represent wilitarists abc az• on. half
CoSsack and one half Imperial Bodyguard!" The second version had th. harm-
less golfers change into Ternitoxial uniform. and extract rifles ftom
their golf-bag., defeating the intruders. Another mueio-hall skit portrayed
1. B.P.S. "The Military Ferment." 'Westninet9r (aette. 2. xcb 1909 r.l;
"Tb. Patriotis Play."_Ibtd.,2 Pbafy	 p.lr "Th n4.tng of an
•'Englisn'• B.." Ibid. 13 February 1909, p.3,
2. Review 2 Revieu April 1909. p. 318.
401 —
* Lord Roberta—type figure drilling the cooks, gardener., and footmen on
his estate with the aid of bugl. calls. These were routed by the appsaranoe
of a German officer brandishing his sword, who in turn was captured by a
squad of disguised Boy Scouts. 1 Not all Engliahm.n took the invasion SCare
as seriously as Lord Roberts and Repington.
The Cov.rrinent, hcsver, could not afford the appearance of neglecting
the nation's defences. Raldane, in announcing the Aruy Estimates, proposed
that hom. d.f.nc. mobilization should be tested by using motorcars to
despatch regular troops to the coast. The ex•roise took plac. on roh 17,
when 286 motorcars conveyed a battalion of Guards to Hastings, a distance
of 54 miles, in 3 hours. Coverent spokesmen proclaimed the trial a
great success, which testified to the speed and reliability of care as
alternative transport if the railways were destroyed by saboteurs. The
exercise also had the incidental advantage of conferring a great deal of
publicity upon Haldane's efforts to reform the home defences: crowds lined
the route from London to Rastine, and local villages were hung with bunting
as th. troops were "rushed" to the coast. The National Service League
published a peevish report of the proceedings, whioh intimated that the
experiment was "more interesting than dependable" and had been planned fox
the purpose. of publicity rather than defence.2
Although Haldane continued to protest that invasion was unlikely, he
announced additional measures in the House of Comeons which indicated that
the Government was not negligent. The coast was being surveyed and sub-
1. Rilaire Belloc, "The Critical Attitude: Blue later and the Thin Red
Red Line." English Review. April 1909. pp. 142-43.
2, Hansarct. (oerncna) 4 1roh 1909. col. 1608; "Motor—car ?ranepozt."
18 arch 1909, p. 11, 10; "Motor—Car Test." Standard. 6 3.rch 1909, p.4;
"Ar Motor Run." Ibid. 17 xoh 1909, p.9; 18 roh 1909, p.10; Review
.2g. Reviews. April 1909, p.326; A Nation
	
April 1909. pp. 136-38.
£ silent film recording this opertion has be.n vieweá at the Jational
lila Archiws.
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divided into 100 yard. units which would be assigned to Territorial formations.
Mox. important, the War Office was busy oxgnizing a Central Force, made up
of Regulars and selscted Territorials, which would provide a mobile force
ae the backbone of home defence. Raldane also created a stir, and appeased
the home defenci lobby, by stating that the principle of universal liability
to e.rvs in home defence rested on a strong historical precedent, as well
as "on the comon law of the land." H. predicted that
Were the national in deadly peril, everybody would come forward,
and not only so, but nobody would be concerned to dispute that
if this country were invaded, it would be the legal as well as i
the moral duty of every man to bear arms and repel the invader.
In coming to terms with the invasion scare, Haldane was criticised for
encouraging the panic. L!r. Wyndham, a former Conservative Under-Secretary
of Wax, accused him of making alarmist pronouncements.
the trend of his speeches in the country, the trend of the
preparation he is making; his experiments in conducting
troop. rapidly to the coast in motor cars - what does all
that mean, unises h. believes it ncc*ry to make some
provision against a raal iaininent national danger, against
the attempt he thinks would be mad. to strike at the heart
of the Empire.2
Similar suspicions were expressed by a Liberal member, Mr. Harold Cox, who
inferred that Haldane was exploiting invasion as an issue to build up
recruitment in the Territoriale. 3 Mr. G.E. Roberts, of the Labour party,
rejoiced that Ealdana was being oensor.d by members of his own party, and
denounced any "demand for a large increase in our Army, based upon the
danger, or assumed danger, of foreign invasion, which emanates entirely from
Army sources", and would eventually lead to conscription. He asserted that
1. Haneard. (Commons) 4 .rch 1909. col. 1625, 1615.
2. Ibid. 8 Irch 1909, cole. 48-49.
3, i4. col. 79, see also 83-84.
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"the ferocity of the jingoism" which currently prevailed obscured the
dominant role of the fleet in national defence. 1 Arthur Lee, Balfour's
assistant in defence questions, feared that public opinion might prevent
the Expeditionary Force from leaving Britain in time of emergency, if the
invasion question was not clarified, and successfully prevailed upon Aequith
to set aside time for a debate on home defence,2
A new storm broke on Irch 16, when the long—emouldering controversy
over increased German ship-.building facilities, which bad absorbed the
attention of the Cabinet all during the previous winter, finally broke out
into the open. MoKenna and Aequith both made grave speeches in the House
of Cosmons which indicated that Germany might be able to l*iild as fast as
England and could, within four years, possess a naval strength perilously
aloes to that of Creat Britain. The sudden awareness that England might
losi the command of the sea brought a renewed urgency to the invasion con-
troversy. This was to be expected, for the experts of the Blue Water School
had for twenty years successfully contended that the Fleet was the first
lin, of defence against invasion. Now for the first time in nearly a
generation, the •fficacy of that defence was in doubt. The Navy scare and
the invasion scare thus mutually reinforced one another, and the public
clamour reached a new pitch. Newspapers and journals were flooded with
articles and letters. Women were urged to join the National Service League
and the London Chamber of Commerce held a public meeting to discuss
national defences, whili Lords Cawdor and Curson delivered speeches .zprese-
jug anxiety over the nation's security. 3 The Prime Minister intervened in
1. Ransard (Commons) 8 March 1909. col.102-104.
2. Ibid. cole. 207-208.
3. (se. next page).
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the naval debate in the Cccons on Maxch 22 to condemn in unchaxaotezistio..
ally strong language
th. absurd and mischievous l.gends, to which currency is being
given at this moment, as to the supposed naval unpreparedness
of this country. A more unpatriotic, a more unscrupulous,
misrepresentation ... I have never experienced.'
¶e Times published a three-column letter from Frederick
Harrison, the celebrated Positivist philosopher, which asserted that Britain's
policy of depending on a predominant fleet would eventually break down. The
two power standard was already being challenged by more populous nations,
such as Germany and the United States. Either a great expansion of the
Territorial Force or the institution of conscription was necessary to secure
Britain from catastrophe, for it was notorious that she possessed the
smallest standing arc in Euzope. Harrison's letter was later published and
circulated by the National Service League as conscription propaganda.2
Harrison was refuted the next day by John Xnox Laughton, Professor of History
at ling's College, London and a close collaborator of the Colombe, who
pointed out th. fallacies in his argument. Devid Hannay, a naval propagand-
jet, cried out, not for more Territoriale, but a larger fleet. Lord Bosebery
and Alfred Austin, the Poet laureate, called for an enlargement of the
Territoxials. Repington, for his part, contributed a special article which
proclaimed that British naval supremacy was now for the first time a matter
of grave doubt, and that Blue Water pedagogue. had been revealed as "drowning
3. (from previous page): Times. 22 March 1909, p.9; Standard. 23 March 1909,
p. 5; "Advantages of Invasion." Dail y Mail. 23 March 1909, p.6; "National
Defence". Times. 24 March 1909. pp. 8; 25 March 1909, p.9, 26 March
1909, p.4; 27 March 1909, p.11; Earl of Errol. "A Rude Awakening."
Nineteenth Centur.y. April 1909. pp. 565-69; "The Naval Policy of Germany."
Spectator. 27iroh 1909. pp. 484-85.
1. Ranaard (Commons) 22 March 1909. col. 1504.
2.11atjonal Defence." TImes. 18 March 1909, p. 9; Rome Defence. LS.L.,
London. 1909.
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doctrinaire. who clutch at the straws of an •xploded heresy." He argued
that "to ruin England an enen intact land in England and subdue hsr. So long
as no enemy can occupy with his land forces, every defeat can be retrieved
and naval resurrection is always possible." The present naval crisis showed
more than ever the need fox Lord Roberts' "Million Man Standard"s England
had only five years' grace to create a true "Ration in Arms" on the basis
1
of the Territorial Force.
The National Service League was also quick to capitalize on the navy
scare, and sent an official communication to the Times which declared that
the only argument against compulsory service had been the security of the
fleet. Now it appeared that this security would be gone in four years' time.
Sir John Colomb caustically replied that this was an argument better fit for
a lunatic asylumi if the fleet was not sufficient, make it	 But the
N.S.L. doubtlessly gained recruits as a result of th. public'. shaken faith
in sea supremacy. Lord Roberta txi.d to take advantage of the situation and
wrote a 10—page letter to Baif our, asking him to take the leadership in
"this time of national awakening" to bring home to the people the supreme
importance of securing the safety of the country without delay, for the
present panic showed the folly of relying solely on the fleet. Roberts
announced that he would soon introduce a bill for conscription in the House
of Lords, and asked Balf our to assume the leadsrship of the movement for
universal military training, 3
 Be.lf our declined this honour, but Roberts
1. Times. 19 March1909, p . 9; 24 March 1909, p.9; 25 Aarch 1909, p.9;
18 March 1909, p.9.
2. Ibid. 26 March 1909, p .4; 29 March 1909, p.9.
3. Balfoux S. (49725) Roberts to BalfouX, 7 April 1909.
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gained an important convert and powerful ally on April 10, when Straohey
his
published a leading artiole in the Spectator which announced/espousal of
conscription. 1
 Repington wrote to Roberts, rejoicing that the "cause of
national Training has received an unexpected fillip by the revelations made
by government speakers on the naval estimates."
There has been a pretty hullabaloo, and I have driven the lesson
hom. as well as I could, and am now enged in oombats with the
sxtrems navalists who are attacking me with all their customary
venom and inaccuracy ... It was all very well for the navalist.
to talk when they boasted a supreme navy, but now they admit that
the Navy may not be supreme and will oppose national Training!
it Repington was disappointed in the Times, which had "joined the Navy mono-
maniacs and can think of nothing but 1)readnoughts."2
The N.S.L. campaign gathex.d momentum during May. The alarm spread to
the Rouse of Commons, where Sir George Doughty asked McKenna whether the
Admiralty hues' of a recent German invasion practice:
that two large steamers were suddenly cosndeered at Eamburg
and a number of soldiers were marched on board; that these
steamers at once set out across the North Sea, steamed into
the River Thaiber, and returned again to Rambuxg; this manoeuvr•
was carried out completely without being observed by any British
guardship or other authority?
MoKenna replied that the Admiralty would be grateful for any detaile of this
operation. 3 A Liberal LP., Captain Ltncaid-Smith, resigned hi. seat to run as
a. conscription candidate in opposition to Government policy, and Lord Mimer
delivered a powerful speech in support of th. league. 4 On hay 17th, Lord
lemyss tntro4uced another Risulution into the Rouse of Lords to the effect
that the Territorial. were an insufficient deterrent to foreign invasion,
1. "A New Hay of Life." Spectator. 10 April 1909. pp. 564-65.
2. Robets S. Case X20927. Box Li R62/60. Repington to Roberts, 26 March
1909; R7 'l. Repington to Roberta, 14 April 1909.
3. Hansard. (Commons) 12 hay 1909. col. 1805.
4. peetator. 1 May 1909. pp. 690-91.
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calling upon the Government to meke additional steps for the defence of the
country on land. Jemys. read a letter from Roberts, who represented that
we have no Army to speak of ... if the expeditionary force, ox
even the first four divisions of that force, were sent abroad,
our land forces are, in my judgment, in such a deplorable
condition that we should be at the mercy of any Invader who
could land any number approaching to 100,000 men on these
shores.l
Thu opinion, Roberts asserted, was óhaxed by all British Field—Marshals, as
well as by every soldier of note in the country. In the debate which followed
all the old criticisms formerly applied to the Volunteers were transferred
to the Territorialas they were insufficient in organization and numbers and
were not equal to picked Continental troops. The one new contention was that
the corid of the sea was in question, which had not been true even during
the crisis of 1900. But Lord Lucas, the Government spokeeman, pointed out
that a new mobilization scheme for home defence was being worked out by the
War Office, and that the entire question was being studied TMin a far more
minute and thoroughgoing manner than ever before in the history of the
British Army." Weizras' Resolution was narrowly defeated, 28 to 24.2
The conscriptionists were not discouraged, however, and the next day,
the Lords considered an inquiry into the Army Special Reserve, in which Lord
Roberts played a prominent part. As previously, he bore down heavily on
the consequence. for home defence, once four divisions of the expeditionary
force bad left the country. 3	The day following (May 19), the National
Service (Training and Home Defence) Bill was introduced into the Lords,4
1. Hansaxd (Lord.) 17 May 1909. cole. 897-98; 901.
2. Ibid. cole. 903, 908, 905, 916, 922.
3. Ibid. 18 .y 1909. col. 997.
4. Ibid, 19 May 1909. col. 1054.
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and the invasion peril rae frequently invoked in the major debate on the
Bill which followed on July 12, Roberts stressed that such an attack was
possible on "a far larger scale than has usually been assumed", and declared
that 315,000 partially-trained and widely dispersed Territorials could hardly
"withstand the concentrated onset of possibly 150,000 of the eost highly-
trained and beet organized troops in the world." At the time of Trafalgar,
when the population had been a third of that of 1909, Britain had had almost
twios as many men under arms. 1
 Roberts had powerful support for the Bill
from the I*ike of Bedford and Lords Lout, Mimer, and Curton, who agreed with
Roberts that "the real pivot of this debate is the question of invasion."
Curon went beyond the usual prophesies to forecast that a German landing
would unchain "the forces of crime and disorder" and lead to "not only the
destruction of all our material resources but the crumbling and collaps, of
society itself ... the utter subversion of the old order of things to which
we are accustomed."2 In spite of such counsels, the Bill was eventually
detsated after two days of debate, by 123 to 103, on the grounds that it was
not consistent with the policy of the Cabinet and the House of Cosinons. The
division was along party lines: 98 Tories, 4 Liberals, and the Bishop of
Oxford supported Roberts. 3 This crude attempt to legislate conscription
alienated several important peopie. axt, the Director of Military Operation.
wonder,d
What ii the use of an Army which can only be used on the
aesumptio that the Gerns have defeated our Ilavy and
gained a footing in this country ... 'Home Defence' is the
1. Rarisad (Lords). 12 July 1909. cola. 256-257, 259.
2. Ibid. 13 July 1909. col. 460.
3. Devid James. Lord Roberts. Hollie and Carter, London, 1954. p. 438.
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most poisonous strategloal fallacy ver propounded by man.
The only true defence ii offence ... Loxd Roberts and hi.
henchn are out of date. The ideal of the future is
Imperial Cooperation by land and sea.l
Repington Publib ahed a sharp rebuke in the Times, contending that there was
not "on• single military opinion of value ... in favour of the thesis
expounded by Lord Roberts and the band of disappointed er-Militia Colonels
in the Lords." They had represented that the army had been a sham; in fact,
it had never been stronger: the first and second lines were b4tter than ever
before, and the Establishment of 300,000 for the new mobile Central Tore.
would certainly suffice to defeat 100,000 Invaders. Roberts was disheartened
by the loss of his former ally, and wrote to a friend that "Bepington be-
wilder. me with his figures, and it would be useless to aner him I suppose."
It was not necessary to accept Raldane' a word for it that only 70,000 to
100,000 invader, need be expected. Roberts said: why not double that number?
Th. Regular. would almost certainly be out of the country and no trained
troop. would be on hand. 3 The involved arguments of the C.I.D. regarding
the physical problems of invasion, and the danger of naval interception,
had completely gon. over the Ti.ld-irshal'a head. Roberts wrote an .i&it
page letter to Esher a&dng for hi. support, but the latter replied that
British eupreicy would be the first casualty of conscription.
an armed force at home, able, beyond much doubt, to hold it.
oun against any probable invading enesy, would gradually but
surely lead to the weakening of the Fleet ... What •zmbles
the Admiralty to maintain the Fleet I. fear of invasion -
which every man understands. 4
1. Ewart 
.2izz. 12 July 1909.
2. "Our 'Sham' Army." Times. 1 June 1909. p. 4.
3.&rner 1S. Box C. 41. Roberts to Amery, 1 June 1909.
4. Roberts I53. Case 120930. R29/51. Esher to Roberts, 6 June 1909.
sh.r. Journale and Letters. Vol. II. pp. 390-91.
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.sides encouraging the coziacription.teta, the invasion scare also
fostered a widespread suspicion thai Cerman aliens in England might serve
as a "fifth column" of eaboteur in the event of an attack by that country.
Yellowing Ia Queux's sensational "revelations" in such works as Spies
the atser, the press was full of letters from agitated readers reporting
the "espionage" activities of resident foreigners. Ewart, the Director of
Military Operations, believed the Germans were "systematically reconnoitering
the United Zingdoin" and was convinced that "the country 1. full of undasi?-
able, and suspicious aliens who .iight be a real danger in War." Similar
premonitions •xiated in the House of Commons, where Haldane was asked
whether he has any information showing that there are 66,000
trained German soldiers in England, or that there ars, in a
cellar within a quarter of a mu, of Chazing Cross, 50,000
stands of Mauser rifles and 7 millions of Mauser cartridges,
that is, 150 rounds per rifle?
Although Haldan. expressed hi. gratitude that this story had been .xpoeed
to the ridicul, it deserved, 2 official circles were in reality disturbed
over the question of espionage. On July 24, the C.I.D. considered the
report of a sub-committee which had investigated the problem of foreign
espionage, and learned through a sap of known German agents in England that
"the attention of these agents is being mainly confined to those portion.
of the United Kingdom which would be of special interest to Germany in the
event of her having in contemplation the invasion of this country." The
1
General Staff .xpr.esed concern over the increased amount of German espionage,
and adyocat.d that a Secret Service Bureau be established to counter their
activities. It was also recommended that strategic points such as dockyrds
and magazines be made secure against possible attacks by "disaffected
1. Cab 3/2/1/ 474 "Report of a sub-Committee ... appointed ... to oonsider
the question of foreign espionage in the United Kingdom." 24 July 1909.
Cab 2/2/1 Minutes of lG3xd Meeting, C.I.D. 24 ffuly 1909; "Eurart
24 July 1909.
2. Baneard. (Coanone) 24 May 1909. aol. 812.
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elements.
3y the summer of 1909 the invasion scare had run its full course.
Lloyd George's introduction of the "People'. Budget" on April 29 and the
enterprising activities of the Suffragette. were notable distractions. At
the sane time the Anglo—German tension of the previous winter had abated.
Asquith Judged that conditions were propitious for an announcement of the
invasion inquiry conclusions of the previous year, which he divulged in the
House of Commons on July 29. He was much more circumaect than lf our
had been in 1905 and his speech , in fact, was more notable for what it
cmmitted than what it contained. It contained not a single reference to
the ease of invasion from Germany as eampared with one from France, although
this had been the original reason for convening the inquiry. Aequith
explained that his reticence was due to the "highly confidential nature" of
the report; be was also unwilling to "import any element of controversy
into the debate. 
,,2 
The Prime Minister had obviously been impressed by the
force of the invasion scare, and wished to avoid aggravating public feare
and anti—German feeling.
Baif our, ininediately following the Prime Minister, stated that be was
in complete agreement with him on the invasion question, thus insuring that
it would not become a political issue between the two main parties. His
further comments were more enlightening than those of Asqutth, for he
admitted that the conclusions of 1908 wese "in a sense somewhat less eatis-
factory" and "more anxious" than those of 1903. The 70,000 man scale of
1. Cab 3/2/1. p. 3. -
2. Hansard. 29 July 1909. cola. 1385-90.
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attack would greatly aid the War Office planners, but it remained a point of
contention between the two parties "whether either the Fleet or the Borne
Defence Army i. up to the standard which the Prime Minister and the Committee
of Defence think necessary". 1 Sir Charles Duke, in the debate which
followed,did make reference to the relative prospects of a French and Gern
invasion, declaring that the danger was less because the Germane, unlike the,
French, could not cross in one night. Duke condemned Baldane's recent in-
crease of the Territorial establishment to 40,000 men, and charged that it
was extravagant to appropriate funds on this scale for "this most unlikely
and most improbable bare possibility." Instead of being expanded, the Force
should be reduced. 2 Another Liberal LP., Rilaire Belloc, agreed that
invasion was impossible, 3 while Carylon Bellaira, one of Beresford's chief
disciples, proclaimed that the C.I.D. had been "hypnotised" by invasion and
asked that the money appropriated for the Territorials should go instead to
the Navy.4
Press reaction to Asguith's speech was more favourable. The Times
first leader congratulated the Prime Minister on having "oertainly advanced
considerably beyond the point at which MR. BAIPOUB left the subject in
1905" and we]ccined the 	 main conclusion a that home defence was
an interservice responsibility.
It is not on the Navy alone, nor on the Army alone, that we must
rest for the security of these shores against invasion, but on
the due co-ordination of both forces, each discharging its proper
and characteristic function and sufficiently strong and adequately
equipped for the purpose ... as a result of the investigations of
the Committe of Defenoe, oonducted without interruption or
1, Haneard • 29 July 1909. cola. 1394-95.
2. Ibid. cola. 1396-1400.
3. Ibid. cola. 1414-15.
4. Ibid. cola. 1406-07.
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diacorCance under two euoo.ssive Governments, the responsible
leaders of both parties axe now substantially agreed not only
as to the general standard at which our defensiv. forces axe
to be meintained, but as to the correlation of function to be
henceforth established btween them.1
Other leading London papers agreed. The Morning Poet saluted. this "return
to sound doctrine",which rejected the idea of an Admiralty monopoly in home
d.f.nc., while the Westminster (ksette congratulated Asquith on this new
policy. 2 The ]1l Express, however, warned that no political rhetoria
would convince the nation that invasion was impracticable, for the Govern-.
msnt could giv, no assurance that the fleet was adequate in strength. It
called upon every ab].e-bodtsd men to join the ariry.3
Until the outbreak of wax in 1914, invasion never again attracted
public attention as it bad during the winter of 1908-1909. In the years
following, other domestic controversieB — such as the rejection of the
'Psople's Budget", the General Elections of 1910 and 1911, the House of Lords
contention which led to the Parliament Act of 1911, the growing Suffragette
agitation, and the question of Irish Home Rule — absorbed the attention of
the general public. But the question of national defence remeined a source
of concern to the po1icy-kers and the Agadir Crisis Of July-November 1911,
involving a further Pranco-German quarrel in Morocco, brought about a general
tuning up of defence measures by both services and the C.I.D. But for
three years, from mid-1909 to mid-1912, public discussion of the invasion
question reoedM to the small competing coteries of "experts" who carried
on their running debate in the service periodicals and various correspondence
1. "The Ccximittee of Impexiil	 fence." Times. 30 July 1909. p. 11.
2. "Defence against Invasion." Morning Poet. 30 July 1909, p.6;3l July 1909.p.6
"The Policy of the Island Empire", Public Opinion. 6 August 1909. p.127.
3. "Th. Ostrich." Iilx Erees. 30 July 1909, p.4.
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oolunms.
Invasion persisted as a theme in British fiction and mazine serials,
though not in the quantities that had persisted from 1906 to 1909. Efforts
such as The Cen Invasion of Englan4 (1910) and The Shadow of
The Great	 1910-1911 (1910) follo'*ed the well-worn pattern, while
Charles L Doughty's epic poem
	 Clouds was his second attempt to empi '7
inaeion as the subject for a blank verse patriotic saga, in which pagan
gods and Christian ainta jostled together in patriotic allegory. It
predicted that soon -
A people of harsh speech, our Adversaries,
Shall mount up glittering, from Th7 blood-stained shore;
And thence, like to vast folding Wave, begin
To Whelm on Thy fair Plain, 0 unieady Britain.
Another indication of the spirit of the time was J.T. Moate's The Doom of
Britajnt A Divint Wanjng, The German Conguest of EnR1a Par etol IlL i.
Scriptures, which described a future German invasion in 543 closely-printed
pages, using the •xotio apocalyptic imagery of the Book of Revelation.
England rae LM.xpx.ted as the Great Whore oe by1on, while the raiser
appeared as the Beast of the Last Days.2
Not all the immediately prewar invasion novels were so extravagant
in character. In 1912 Edga: Wallace, a former writer for the Harmsvorth
pr.se, adopted the theme of a campaign in Britain from the viewpoint of a
private soldier. In the next year "Saict" (RJ. Monro) produced easily the
beet of the genre, When William Came, which adopted a German conquest of
England as a means of social criticism. Monro's story began with the battles
already over, th. British Crown removed to Delhi, with carpet-baggers inovin
1. Arthur Wellesley Ltpling. The Shadow of Glory. Alston Rivers, London,
1910. "A French Staff Offioez."The German Invasion of England. David
Nutt, London, 1910; Charles L Doughty. The Clouds. Izckwozth, London.
1912.
2. Joba Thoeas Moats. The Doom of Britain. Biblical Times Publishing
Company, London, 1911.
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in , and collaboration beginning between the British and their conquerors.
01. description of lit, in Cernan London, with "the altrstiona on stamps
and coinage, the intrusive Teutonic element, the alien tmiforms cropping
up everywhere, the new orientation of social life" was in fact an indictment
of the contemporary "decadence" of national lit.. Monxo's glooy chronicle
of life in occupied England ended, however, on a hopeful note as British
youth, assiduously cultivated by the German authorities, boycott a highly -
publicised review before the gaiser. Although this generation of English-.
men bad lost the martial arts, the coning generation, by refusing to become
German Tanissari.s, contained a promise for the future.1
t.D. Newton'. 1914 story Tar represented another subtle modification
of the invasion theme, which avoided the usual home defence homily and
instead attempted to counter the prevailing romanticization of war. Newton
transpoe.d to a British locale all the sordid horrors of modern total wars
barbed-wire, trench warfare, poisoning of water supplies, and refuge.—
choked roads,which were soon to become a reality on the Continent. His
horrifying descriptions of guerilla warfare in Great Britain, with the
occupying power hunting down and torturing to death British irregular bands,
were far removed in spirit from the naive and enthusiastic conjectures of
German invasion of a few years before. 2 at the implications of modern
war had not yet penetrated to the boy's magazines, which continued to
publish invasion serials such as "Britain Invaded", "The Plying Armada",
"Peril of the Motherland", "Britain At Bay", and "The Swoop of the Eagle",
1. dgar B. Wallace. Private Se]by. Ward, London, 1912; Margaret Wallace.
!dgar W1lace. The Bjoçaphi 2L Phenomenon. Heinennn, London, 1938;
H.H. Munro. ("Saki") When William Cam.. Lane, London, 1913.
2. 1. Douglas New'toh.	 : A Tale. thuen, London, 1914.
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with monotonous regularity.1
The relative decline of the invasion tben in fiotion in the last
year. before the war was paralleled by a wave of pamphlets, articles, and
books ,debunking the pictur. of invasion presented in the novels and home
defence propaganda. Hilaire Be]loc, the Liberal LP. end author, produced
a skeptical study of Warfare In En1and, which emphasised thatEng1and had
not been invaded sinos the el•venth csntury, and had always enjoyed a
ra.onabl. imwzity from attack by ornised armies, Belloc pointed out
that London was now too large in extent ever to be successfully besieged.
F.W. Rust, the Editor of	 Economist, mocked the "invasion-.icmgers" in
Six Panics and Other Essays (1913) which drew parallels betw•en the invasion
scare of 1909 and its ancestors of the preceding century. !. Contemporary
Review and the En1ish Review both published articles analysing the epidemic
of invasion novels and plays, attacking their crudity of conception and
charging that
the pernicious publications referrid to, as well as the vamped-
up and unscrupulous spy sensations of our Yellow Press, con-
stitute acts of criminal levity against the peace of two kindred
nation. - a poisoning of the wells of public truth.
"Islander" (who was probably Lord Eaher) published a series of onslaugtits
against Lord Roberts, describing the LS.L'e exploitation of the invasion
issue as a "ho1lo sham" and a conspiracy to frighten the British people
into conscription by easy stages," and the first step of ailitary
Conspiracy" to fling England "into the maelstrom of militarism." Other
articles and pamphlets, while supporting the Coveranent case on invasion,
1. LS. 'Purner. ys Will Be Boys. Michael Joseph, London, 1948. pp.
176-79. "The Swoop of the Eagl.." Chums. September 16, 1912 to rch
29, 1913.
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did 50 to urge that Britain turn from home defence in order to prepare for
participation in war on the Continent. 1 The Government itself intervened
in the pamphieteering war in 1911, when Lieutenant-General Ian Hamilton was
encouraged by the lax Office to write a book outlining the remoteness of
invasion and the fallacies of the LS.L. case. The book, C ompulsori Service
was given additional weight by virtue of a lengthy introduction written by
Raldane and an appendix by the First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Pl..t A.K.
Wilson, which together set out the views of both services as formulated in
th. course of the 1908 invasion inquiry. Lord Roberts was stung into reply
and produced his own version of the home defenos situation in a pamphlet
entitled Fallacies	 FSCtB.2
Th. continuing invasion controversy was not confined to the printed
page. In June 1914 invasion was sdapt.d for the first time for the cinema,
when the London Film Company released an epic entitled EnRlan4'e lenace.
Its advertisements proclaimed
This is the greatest national drama yet produced and is not a
mers romance. It has something of the gift of prophecy and
stirs the blood as only war alarms can. It shows the perils
of wireless a. well ae its safeguards. It illuatratee how the
1. General H. Langlois. The British Army In a European War. Hugh Bees,
London, 1910; Gerard Firmes. The Ocean Fmpir.* It. Dangers and Defeno.
Trshsrns, London, 1911. p. ii6?; çol. E.B. Hanna. ,
	 Germany Invade
Engand? Methuen, London, 1912; Prof. Char lee Sarolea.	 Anglo-
Geimn Problem. Nelson, London, 1912, pp. 15, 43; Hector C. Bywater.
"Possible Peaturss of a North Sea Campaign." Navy League Annual. igii-
pp. 197-209; A Is ?ar1."Th. British Army and a Continental War."
R.U.S.I. Jouna1. Irch 1913. pp. 384-396 ; Henry Sewill. A German
Invasion. P.s. ring & Co., London, 1913; Lt. Col. Alsager Pollock.
ckpit of Europe. nith, Elder & Co., London, 1913; P.1. Rixst.
The	 Panic. and Other Eeea. Methuen, London, 1913; "A French Staff
?Eiosi." The German Invasion of En1and. avid Nutt, London, 1910;
Charles Lowe. "About German Spies. " Contemporary Review. January 1910.
pp. 42-56 luau. Belloc, LP. '"l'he Critical Attitudez Blue Water and,
the Thin Red Line."
	
1ieh Review. April 1909. pp. 135-45; lslander".
Th. Military Conspiracy." Fortnigtitly Review. January 1913. pp. 450-
463; Ibid. Jun. 1913. pp. G40-53. "A Biitish Army of Adventure?" Ibid.,
January 1914. pp. 20-34; lustre Belloo, LP. Warfare i! K1and. -
Williams and Jorgate, London. 1912.
, (so. next page).
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invader's warships might approach whilst England sleeps.
IT IS MORE TELLING THAN ANT NEWSPAPER ARTICLE.1
A 'still' depicted the enemy Cabinet "planning the invasion of England".
The plot is discovered by two children, who rush throu,gh the streets of
London on their motorcycle to warn the Government. A contemporary reviewer
described the results.
The British Government acts at once. Orders are issued with
swift decision. The fleets get up steam and the troops begin
to srch. By a clever use of the enemy's code, the Prime
nister sends out a wireless message which turns back the
enemy's fleet and transports. The danger is past. Th.
British Government breathes a sigh of relief and the English
peopl. go placidly about their daily business without real-
ising how narrowly a dangerous menace has been averted.2
Enjland'u Menace was especially praised for its skill in dramatleing the
invasion peril, which was conveyed by alternating scenes of the enemy war-
ships sweeping silently and relentlessly through th. sea with those
portraying an innocent, sleeping, and unsusp.ctinj London. The film became
a great cocm.xcial success, as it became suddenly opical after the out
break of the First World Wax.3
With this one exception, which saw the issue of invasion transposed
to $ new media, the invasion agitation had all but died out in the last
yea before the wax. Articles and pamphlets critical of the scare out-
weighed in volume the invasion propaganda, and it was apparent that the
public had, in general, grown weary of the issue. The authorities, however,
could not afford to iore the appearance of new factors bearing on the
situation. Although the agitators and publicists were no longer heeded by
2. (trcin p.423): Lieutenant-General Sir Ian Hamilton. Cpulsory Service.
Murray, London, 1911. Lord Roberts. Fallacies 	 Facts. Ifurray,
London, 1911.
1. The Bioscope. 11 June 1914. p. 1148.
2. Ibjd;25 June 1 914. pp. 1319-20.
3. The Talbot Tattler. 2 September 1914, p.110; Rachael Lou. History of
British Film: 1906-1914. Allen & tJnwin, London, 1949. p. 178.
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the general public, this by no means disposed of the complicated problem
of home defence. New information was always coming to light. In October
1911 Italy had attacked arid 000upied the Turkish province of Tripoli by
despatobing an expeditionary force across the Mediterranean. Blue Water
advocates seized upon the incident as a conclusive vindication of their
theories. Blue water writers pointed out that although the Italians bad
prepared seoretely for the landing in the best "Bolt from the Blue" tradition
and had enjoyed harbour facilities vastly superior to those the Germans would
have available for a descent on England, the interval between the issue of
mobilization telegrams in Italy and the disembarkation had been thx.. weeks,
not the three days predicted by invasion alarmists. The incident provided
other important leesones the Italian transport flotilla had been very lar€e
and difficult to manoeuvre, its movements had been slow and irregular, and
it bad crossed in perpetual apprehension of a Turkish destroyer attack,
even though the Turkish Navy was nearly a negligibl, quantity. The
indications were obvious, if not new:
If it takes 35,000 troops almost three weeks to carry out an
ovsrsea attack, with no opposition whatever, bow long would
200,000 or even 70,000, take in the face of some very danger-
ous opposition, even if the bulk of the defending fleet is
out of the way.
Surely this suggested that the Territorial Force was in excess of home
defence requirements and that effort should instead be diverted to building
up the Expeditionary Force. 1 Fisher, now in retirement, drew the same
conclusion from the Tripoli operation and wrote to Balf our that the CSI.D.
Li -	------	 --	 --
1. "Master Mariner." "The Invasion of Tripoli: A Re-assuring Lesson for
Great Britain." Contempoiary Review. January 1912 .
 pp . 49-55; see also
Archibald fluid. "The Death-LZnell of the National Service Scherzo."
Fortnightly Review. January 1912. pp. 52-56. "The Peril of Invasion;
Italy's Bolt from the Blue." Ibid. December 1911. p . 1044-55.
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studies had now received "a lovely corroboration!". He noted that the first
group alone of the Italian transports had been five miles in length.1
The gauntlet was picked up by home defence advocates. Colonel C.E.
Cal].well, a military tactician of some rsputatioh, repli.d through the pages
of the National Review that there was no true analog between the Tuzki.h
defence of Tripoli and the defence of the United Kingdom. Britain was
densely populated, had well-developed comnninicatious, and its close country
permitted an invader to dispense with most of his cavalry and artillery.
Tripoli in comparison was open and even unmapped territory with few roads,
which required an expedition of all arms and with oomprehensiv. supplies.
There never had been a question of surprise, for the Italians, encumbered
with equipment, bad been forced to land at the one serviceable harbour in
the colony and had made no attempt to mask their intent to do so. The n•ws
that the Italians were preparing such a. descent hid, however, taken the
Sultan and the British Press with equal surpris.. The Germans would not be
restricted to a single harbour and could land on any beach they chose. To
compare the two campaign. was really "inappropriate and unprofitable."2
Another military writer contended that the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 provided
a powerful argument for national service as opposed to the Territorial
Force, for the national armies of Bulgaria and Serbia bad inflicted sever.
defeats on the Turks, whose ill-organised force resembled the Territorial.
in it. deficiency of offioers, scattered distribution, and slow mobilization
1. Balfour USS. (49712) Fisher to Balfour, 14 October 1911.
2. Col. Charles E. Callwell. "Some Current Isconoeptions on Invasion."
National Review. April 1912. pp. 254-264; see also P.R. Smith. Ibi4.
"National Service." pp. 241-253.
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Itime.
Matters boam. further complicated by the results of the 1912 naval
manoeuvres whiob tested the power of the fleet to prevent a raid on the
British ooaet. Surprisingly, the "German" fleet, oornn*nded by Admiral
Louis Batt.nb.rg, succeeded in evading d.teotion and was judged to have
landed 25,000 troop. in the Hurnber Estuary. Moreover, the invasion trans..
ports r.tuxn.d successfully to their ports throui the sacrifice of six
older battleships which had been serving as •eoorts. The Admiralty, a1thou
it had thrown a veil of secrecy over the purpose and results of the
manoeuvree, was powerless to prevent the spread of rtours and conjectures,
which gr.w in volume with the paseags of time. 2 The unsettling conclusion
of the naval manoeuvxes coincided with a cowing chorus of criticism dir.ot.d
towards th. Territorial Force, which was now 50,000 men short of its
establishment, and did not seem to be ,owing in size. Many of it. iufluen
tial former supporters, like Esher and Repingtcn, were now considering
conscription. 3 The 1•eaons of Tripoli, as well as the naval manoeuvres
invested th. T.rritorial Force with a new importanc. and responsibility,
yet it was obvious that it was not fulfilling it. earlier promise. By the
summer of 1912 even Liberal LP.s were asking
When the Expeditionary Force had gone, bow were thee. shores
to be defended? How was an at.ux force, widely-scattered,
ill-equ.tpp.d, badly offioer.d, and with no war training at
all to deal with a compact fiiting wedge invasion of 70,000
trained Continental troops? 4
1. Major-General H.B. Jeffrey.. "Invasion and National Safety." Nineteenth
Century. March 1913. pp. 473-487.
2. "The Naval Uano.uvres." Time p . l July 1912. p. 8; Balfour	 .
S.lborn. to Balfour, 22 July 1912. A.3. Marder. From	 Owtht j,
Soa	 pp. 352-353.
3. Wilson pjaiy. 18 January 1910; Repington, "Military Policy." i!!.
6F.bzuary 1913. pp. 7.8.
4. Mx. Arthur Lee. quoted in Times. 17 July 1912. p.12; See also 5 July
1912. p.12.
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The new czitical attitude regarding the Territorials derived weight from
the growing awareness that the Expeditionary Force would almost certainly
leav, for France in the early stages of a European War. Although the
Territorial. represented a momentous improvement over the old Volunteers,
arid had made great progress in their training and general military
•ffioienoy, the public tended to compare them with the Regular troops w1m,
they feared, would be absent when the time of testing cams.
Tb. Government could not afford to ignor. these various developments.
By the beginning of 1913 five years bad passed winoe the C.I.D. had last
investigated the problem of invasion. Although the excesses of the in-
vasion propagandists had fostered a new skepticism on the part of the
informed public, the military authorities were now almost completely taken
up by a continental etrate, based on British intervention at the 9ide
of the French in a war against Germany. The General Staff'e enthusiasm for
the continental etrate' revived old anxieties that the Regular divisions
would be abroad in the event of a German landing, and the condition of the
Territorial. did not inspire confidence that they would prevail against
a highly trained enemy expeditionary force. At the same time, the Italian
invasion of Tripoli and the sugsstive events of the 1912 naval manoeuvres
revealed that there were also new developments in the naval sphere. Al-
though public opinion might be diverted to other issues, the Cabinet could
not r•nounoe its responsibility for the security of the Island Kingdom,
and at the C.I.D. meeting of 7 January 1913 the Prim. Minister announced
that the invasion inquiry would be re-opened for a third time within a
decade.
CHLPTRVIII: TH ThIRD IBTASIOIIJQUIRY 0? 1913-1914
The aotual reason for th. re-opening of th. invasion qus.ti.n
is not oo.pl.tel.y clear. lajor-Genexal Sir Henry Wilson, the Director
of lilitary Operations, suspected that the Cabinet would use the
inquiry to decrease th. scale of •xpeot.d attaok to "about 5000:" t.
cask the failure of the Territorial ?oroe.1 His misgivings in time
came to b. shared by a number if influential peopie, including
R.pington, sher, and a number if member. of Parliament. But the
tenor of Asquith's •pening statement indicates that the inquiry was
initiated by the Admiralty, for he called attention te recent develop-
cents in the naval spher. only: the progress of navsl architecture,
aircraft, and wireless, and the growing naval strength of other powers
in the Iorth Sea and Mediterranean. The military aspect of the
invasion problem entered into disoussion such later. Fa from being
a plot on the part ofthe Cabinet to reduce the oommitments of the
Territorials to ooixioie with their small else, oiraumstantial
evidence indicates that Churchill was the eminence grise behind the
inquiry. Since he had taken office as First Lord in Ootob•r 1911,
Churchill had brought a new vigour and direction to the Admiralty, and
his drive arid initiative are evident in the transcript of th. inquiry's
proceedings. Churchill had personally prepared a report for the Prime
Minister en the 1912 manoeuvres, was planning an additional exercise
to investigate the problem of a German landing later in 1913, and
took an active role in selecting the personnel for the inquiry. 2 His
1. Wilson Diary. 7 January 1913.
2. Cab 38/23/2 Minutes of C.I.D. Meeting. 7 January 1913; Cab 38/23/9.
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role as initiator seems a].most beyond. doubt,
As the C.I.D. prepared. for a third. investigation within a
the home defence propagandists were astir. In early February R.pington
launched a campaign in favour of compulsion for the Territorial Force.
H. declared. that the "voluntary principle" had failed: Th. Territorial.
were still 50,0CC short of their 300,000 Establishment, which was
ridiculously short of actual r.quir.aents. Repington disclosed that
the Tsrritorial Establishment of 30C,000 had. been fixed prior to th.
1908 invasion inquiry: this figure was now even mars suspect owing to
the results of the 1912 naval aanosuvres, 'whiok had. been conosa.lsd.
tra th. public. His own calculations indioatsd. that this figur. should.
be doubled - to 500,000 or 600,C0c. Repington alleged that th. only
means to raise such a forc. was to resort to some form of conscription,
for "the liability of every man to train for the defence of his country
mUst be accepted as an axiom of •ur national life." Robinson, the new
diter of the Times, echoed. this argument in a strong first leader;
the nation had concentrated too much on the fleet to the detriment of
the land forces.1
These arguments were beginning to prevail in other important
circles. L.S. Asery prepared a secret policy paper for the Cons•rvative
2. (contd. from previous page): Xinutes of C.I.D. Xeeting. 6 February
1913; Balfour XSS. (49703) Eankey to Balfour,7 February 1913; Eankey
to Churchill, 14 January 1913, Rankey to Seeley, 15 January 1913;
Winston Churchill. j World Crisis li-l914. utterworth, London
1923. p. 151. "Jotes on aaoeuvrs." W.S.C. 17 October 1912 is A.J.
Kaider. From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, pp. 352-53.
1. 9ttlitary Policy". Times. 6 February 1913. pp. 7-8; "The Kilitary
Problem." Ibid. 7 February 1913. pp. 7-8.
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Party which pointed out th. weaknesses of the Territorials as a
definding foroe against invasion and suggested sean. by which the
Conservatives could institute national service for hose defence onos
they attained	 In a v.11-attended debate in the Rouse .f Lards
on February 10th, Lard Roberts declared that the Govirneent had triad
everything to solve the silitary probi.. except conscription, and that
everything else had. failed. The Thake .f Bedford and Lord.. Niddleton,
Levat and Jewton supported his contention that universal training was
the only way to solve the debacle in hose defence. Ealdan. oounterd
that conscription would lead to neglect of the fleet. When Lord. Crewe,
th. official Governsent spokessan, announced that a further invasion
inquiry was about to begin, The Tines observed.
Whatever the Consittee finds, it cannot be expected to
find., with the growth of Modern facilities and the lessons
of recent naval aanoeuvres before it, that the danger is
less serious than in 1908. Our present preparations a1
inadequate even to the requiresents laid. down in l9O.
Repington wrote a special article in support of the agitators, and
noted that the Oovernnent had. given no satisfactory assurance that the
T.rritorials were ready to take the field in the event of invasion
when the £xpeditionary Force was out of the country. The Governnent
had. evaded the issue as te whether the Force could sect an invasion
.f 70,0CC trained troops, and. this evaaion of publio duty would be
punished. The coning invasion inquiry sight elisinate the 70,000
standard. which was beooeing an embarrassnent to the Qovernaent, for
the General Staff were so engrossed. in preparing for a Continental
1. A..ry KSS. liotes on the Military Situation.
f. "Military Training." Tines. 11 February 1913. pp. 9-10, 12-13.
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campaign that they would provid.. unthinking assurances that Britain
was invulnerable. The Governs.nt, R.pington predicted, would stress
all the factors aiding the defence, whils ignoring disquisting d.v.lop-
mints, such as improvements in rival armies and tb. recent failure in
the naval manosuvres. It would require strong arguments to oonvincs
him that th. invasion danger had. receded, since 1909.1
R.pington informed. Esher of his suspicions that the General Staff
had initiated tb. invasion inquiry in order to free the &zpeditionary
Force from boss defence duties by r.duoing th. established seals of
attack, for they were
.ntirsl.y .ngross.d. with tb. idea of fighting on the Xese
and are ready to sacrifics everything to this idea
Their .bj.ot ... is to show that invasion is impossible and
that therefore the ne.d to provid, against a raid of the
magnitude of 70,000 men is illusory."
Zsher was initially skeptical, but after irrv.sti'gation came to shari
2
Repington's tiepidations. But these allegations an only partially
substantiated by the evidence. Kajor-General Sir Eenry Wilson, the
D.L0., who had engineered Repington 1 s retirement from the army and
was now th. major architect of the Continental strategy, would have
been at the centre of any such plot. But Wilson als. described "this
last move of Asquith's to reduce the scale of attaok so as to enable
1. "The Debate on Defences A Policy of Proorastination," Tia. 12
February 1913. p.8.
2. Esber. Journals and Letters. Vol. III. pp. 118-119. 14 F.bruary,
1913. pp. 124-125. Esh.r to Asquith, 25 June 1913; Ba1fou 155.
(49719) Eaher to Balfour, 25 June 1913.
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the T(.rritorial) F(eroe) to drop another 30,000" a. th. "most
flagrant thing of all.' 1 In spit. of .11 th. mistrust ther. doss not
appear to have been any Gen.ral Staff plot to stage an invasion inquiry
to rel.ase th. tzpeditionary Force from r.sponsibi].ity for home def.ns.
Th. available •vid.nc. suggests that the Admiralty iniat.d th. inquiry
as a r.sult of th. 1912 manoeuvzes, for the General Staff played a
rather passiv. role in its •arli.r delib.rations. Later th. General
Staff did employ th. argua.nt antioipat.d by R.pington, but there is
no evidence to sugg.st this was th. motivation behind. th. inquiry.
Wilson, in faot, lobbied ucoessfully to be •zouss& from serving on
2
the committee.
Onc. formed, the membership of the inquiry constituted one of
the greatest gatherings of British military and political talent in
the twentieth century. It included the three great war leaders of the
oenturys Asquith, Lloyd Osorge, and Churchill, in their respective
capacities as Prime Minister and. Chairman, Chancellor of the Exchequer,
and First lard of the Admiralty, as well air/fourth Prime Minister,
Balfour. There was an eminent greup of Liberal Ministers, Haldane,
now Lord. Chancellor, MoKenna, now Rome Secretary, Grey, Raroourt, the
Colenial S.orstary, Lord Crew•, S.cr.tary for India, and Lord Norl.y,
Lord President of the Council. Th. military and naval members of the
C..aitte. were equally distinguished, inoludizig Prtho. louis Ait t.nberg,
the First Sea Lord, Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Jackson, Chief of the Adairaltp
_fl-fleeeO	 pe_en	 -_____
1. Wilsin Diary. 21 February 1913, 23 February 1913.
2. Thid. 4 March l9l3 13, 14 April 1914.
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War Staff, Colonel Se.l.y, Secretary of State for Wax, General Sir
John French, C.I.G.S., Brigadier-General D. Henderson, Direotor of
Kilitary Training, Esher, Admiral of the F1..t Sir A.L Wilson, the
former First Sea lord., Fielil-Karshal Lord. Nicholson, the former C.I.G.S.,
Lieutenant-General James Orierson, C-in-C, Eastern Cemmand, and Captan
laurice Hankey, C.I.D. Secretary) Other famous figures, such a.s Lord.
Roberts, itajor Generals William Robertson and Sir Henry Wilson, and
Admirals J.R. Jellioos, LR. lay, and Callaghan gave •viclence. But
th. very sic. of the Committee tended to distraot from its efficiency
and the full membership of 20 was rarely present. The discussion was
generally dominated by th. two service chiefs and thur professional
advisers (the soldiers outnumbered the sailors, three to five,) with
the Cabinet ministers serving as an appreciative audience.
La might be expected with such a large assembly, the first seven
meetings were rambling and discursive in char;oter, concentrating
mainly on the probl.m of raids. The first papers from the General Staff
lent some substance to Repington's contention that they were more
concerned. with the Continental strategy than hems defence, and feoused.
en the problem of a German raid designed to prevent or delay the
embarkation of the Expeditionary Force. They argued that so sound
strategist would mount a xaic merely to cause physical damage, forits
psyckol.gioal effect would be far more telling by putting pubilo
pressure on the Cabinet for the retention of the six Regular divisions.
1. Cab 16/28A "Attack on the British Isles from Overseas. Report,
Proceedings, and Appendices." p. iii.
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It was "far easier to render dockyard. •r arsenals reasonably secure
against attaok than it is to render public opinion proof against
scares." Therefore, "Popular terror" might lead to a diversion of
the army or th. Fleet from its legitimate strategical obeotiv.,bsoause
5,000, or even 1,000 raiders might hold back a foroe from the decisive
point. Such a raid would occur in the early days of the war before
the Rxp.ditiouary Foro. had left the country. German air supremacy,
which could prevent the raiding force from being intercepted by the
Royal Javy, would increase the element of surpris, and no warning
would be forthcoming as had. been thought in 1905. The General Staff
estimated that 10,000 men, complete with ancillary artillery, horses,
and transport, could. be thrown across the Jorth Sea using only 25,000
tons of shipping (half Balfour's estimate of 1905) although even a
thousand men might suffioe to start an invasion panic that would
impede the employment of the xp.ditiouary FOrce overseas.1
Rank.y, the C.I.D. Secretary, prepared a paper which outlined
the prospects of a surprise G.rman raid. on Voolvich. A "harmless
tramp steamer" might ascend the Thames in time of p.ac., crammed buoy
dsoks with a small raiding force of 200 men. Only a steel fenoe and
a small police force stood betw.en the river and the arsenal at
oolwiohs if th. raiders arrived at dawn they oould cause considerable
damage before they were apprehended. The power generating station
could be destroyed, as well as th. lyddite-filling establishment and
1. Cab 26/28A. Appendix I. "Jot.. by the General Staff on ir. Balfour's
X.aorandum." 1913. pp. 329-36.
the powder res.rves. Two hundred men could achiev, as much as ten or
twenty thousand if sabotage was their ala, and there were oth.r
valuable objeotives besides Woolviob Arsenal. 	 nkey had been informed
by Sir Charles Ottl.y, his immediate predecessor as C.I.D. S.oretary,
that the Armstrong munitions works (of which Ottl.y was now a lanaging
Direot) were particularly vulnerable. An enemy raiding oeluan
could disrupt the production of heavy guns for months by destroying
certain heavy presses which were .ssetial for the forging of their
barrels. There were only a few of these essential aqohimes in the
country and they would take months to replace. The important
dynamos in the lewoastle electrical works oould. likewise b. quickly
destroyed by an sxp.rt,ev.n without the benefit of explosives. A
small saootage unit ef technioally-train.d saboteurs could achieve
results out of all proportion to their numbers. The situation could
be retrieved only if the nation had aspi. stocks of guns and shell
on hand.1
The trend of War Office thinking was confirmed in paper
delivered by Seel.y on April 8. Re argued that the Territorial Fire.
would suffer if two divisions of the army were permanently retained
in the United ingdoa to deal with raids. If the Regular Army were
thus given the responsibility for home defence, Territorial organis-
ation and. recruiting difficulties would increase, because the prestige
of defending the nation against attacks was a strong moral factor
19 April 1913. pp. 356-90.
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behind, the forces. SeelØy asked the Coaittee to overturn the two
division stipulation of 1908 and to accept Balfour's former argument
that the ho.. defence forces had. sufficient efficiency to deal with
th. threat of invasion. H. asked
That no part of our Regular Army should be allotted to
the dutie. of Home Defence, except such small portion of
it a. may be required to maintain the Royal dignity and
to preserve internal order in so far as it cannot be
assured by the Police authorities ... the whole duty of
Home Defence ... should be threwn upon th. second line
Army, to be maintained. in adequat. strength and efficiency
to ensure national safety.
S..ljly cited the many improvements mad.. in hosts defence since 1909*
a coast defence system had. be.n developed and was operating, and. the
mobile Central Force had been brought into being. This consisted of
a flying column •f 11,000 Regulars to stiffen th. three Armies and
a cavalry division of Territorials stationed near London tsr its
preteotion. S.e1ys arguments for th. efficiency ef the home defence
force were, however, more concerned. with maintaining th. full strength
1
and freedom of movement of the Zxpeditionary Force.
In •rder to come closer to a solution of the problem, the General
Staff were directed. to provide the Committee with an estimate of the
smallest force which could eccupy London successfully. Th. soldiers
were quick to point out that the question was difficult to answer
conclusively owing to the many variables invelved, but assumed. that
under the worst possible conditions, including a complete collapse
of British morale, that an invading General could begin with as few
as 60,c00 to 65,000 troops for the conquest of Britain. Assuming
1. Cab 16/28A. Appendix V. "Jeaoraridua by the Ssoretary of State
for War, April 1913." J.S. 8 April 1913. pp. 362-66.
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that the population remained quiescent, the General Staff belived London
could be invested by 35,000 to 36,000 men, if they avoided built-up areas
and the possibility of street-fghting. Woolwioh and it. docks could be
secured by a force of 5,000, while two columns of 10,000 men .aoh would
otrol. round through the suburbs to the North and the South of London,
destroying the railways and cutting communications. Although this operation
could be accomplished within 24 to 36 hours, the investment of London need
not signal th. end of hoetiliti.s,for this force could not safely occupy
the city oentrs and eiz.able forces and much manufacturing capacity would
still be availabi. to the North. Se.ley emphasized that this estimate
repres.nt.d the worst conditions imaginable, but Balf our noted that this
estimat. of 60,000-65,000 was very close to Lord. Roberts' figure of 70,000
made in 1903.1
The Admiralty, for their part, under the impetus of Winston Churchill,
had also modified certain of their attitudes since 1908. *lthough
Churchill frequently annoyed senior naval offioers by his aseertlys opinions
and pr.tension4o teohnical knowledge, his open-mbded approach to the
invasion problem was in strong contrast to the obstinate dotism of
Fisher, the guid.in spirit at the Admiralty for most of the preoeding
deoade. Churchill's freedom from conm2itment to the Blue Water School and
his'on-a1igrinent in the previous oontxov.rsi.s was a great asset, for an
1. Cab 16/28A. Appendix II. "Estimate of the smallest number of foreign
troops with which, suppose these were landed in England, the Occupation
of London could be attempted." about 4 April 1913. pp . 343-47;
"Minute. of 7th meeting, 10 June 1913. pp. 68-69.
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open mind could beet appreciate the rapidly changing tactical conditions
of the time. In January 1912, two months after he had become First Lords
he had become convinced that submarines conferred a great advantage upon
the British defence, for they made "invasion even more difficult than before.
They are the most formidable defence for their own coasts. All that suite
us, increases our security, and frees our battle fleet.'1 	 But this
development cut both ways and during 1912 the Admiralty was forced to
abandon its traditional policy of close blockade of enemy ports in time of
war out of respect for tbe new oftssive powers of the su%xnaxine and
torpedo. The contentious naval manoeuvres of that year had been held to
test the efficacy of a distant blockade under the new conditions.2
Churchill, in his first C.I.D. paper printed on 1arch 29, admitted
that it would now be much harder to stop a German invasion than it would
have been to stop a French invasion fifteen years before. Over the oentu-
ries,, ng1and's Southern coast had been built up with fortifications and.
bases against Prance and her three main centres of military strength were
also in the South. However, Churchill warned, the opposite was true regard-
ing the coast facing Germany: here there were no forts, naval bases, or
sizeable military establishments (with the single exception of Chathem)
in spite of the fact that there were many extensive and widely distribut
landing-pisces. ven the strategic Orkney and Shetlands were without
1. Ba1fouS. (49694) Churchill to Balfour, 6 January 1912; see also
Balfour to Churchill, 9 January 1912.
2. "Notes on the Manoeuvres: Prepared for the Prime Minister by the First
Lord." 17 October 1912. quoted by A.J. Mardar. From the Dreadnouat
to _____ Flow. pp. 352-53.
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garrisons or naval defences. The O.raan coast, aers.'vsr, ac compared
with the French, also was more advantageous as a bas. for invasion.
Where the French ports were close to the British iii.. and op.n to
attack fro. the sea, the distant German ports were protected y
wintricate navigation, shifting and •ztensive sand banks, strong tide.,
frequent mist and storms" and were in addition defended by a powerful
system of coast forts. The Germans had large ocean liners available
for invasion transports, which the French had never had. Juserous
test eabarkations had taken place in German ports, news of which had
taken several days to come to the notice of the Admiralty. Information
regarding German naval activity was in general extremely difficult tO
obtain, as German survei].lanoe of British agents had. become especially
severe in the last five years. Admiralty information regarding
ovesents of the German fleet was culled from German newspaper clippings
several days old. Churchill suggested that the Government establish
a confidential coast watch in peaoe-time, which could be expanded
to a permanent organisation in the event of war with Germany)
Churchill next outlined various German plans of attack. H.
believed a raid of 20,000 was likely early in the war to prevent the
despatoh of the Expeditionary Force. A second, more appalling possi-
bility was that
after the war has been declared, the Germans will assemble
a large number of suitable transports at Hamburg, Enden,
1. Cab 37/115/23 "Admiralty Notes." U.S.C. 14 April 1913.
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Wilhelmshaven, or Kid ... they may in the course of a
month find. opporti.nities of accumulating on British soil
upwards of jO,000 or 80,000 men, end maintain all the ti..
the menace of a still larger number; that they will use
their battle fleet in oonjunotion with some movements of
transports so as to take advantage of the fact that the
emergence of the German battl, fleet would. produce an
immediate British naval concentration with consequent
denudatiqn in other quarters; and. that a variety of combin-
ations Suit which it would be open to the German. to adopt
for executing the above design.l
This theory of invasion through a series of "driblets" or cumulative
raids was supplemented by two further papers by Churohill. The first
of these described. three additional forms which an overseas attack
from G.rmany might take and indicated Harwich as the best landing
place far a march on London. The second pa.er, sent to Battenbmrg
for his comments, assumed. that the Germans could mount surprise attacks
on the Fleet without noticeable preparation and asked for a consider-
ation .f peacetime arrangements to foil such attacks. Up to 20,000
tr.ope could be collected without information reaching Britain, and
it was probable that half this number could reach the British coast
without the alarm being given. British military resistance could.
begin im three to ix hours , aitnough enemy sabotage was not to be
ruled out. Churchill pred.ict.d that such a surprise attack was most
likely when the Fleet wa drawn away to the Southern or South-vest
coasts and concluded that "only the army can exact the conditions
which render naval Buocess oertain."2
A final Admiralty memorandum presented to the C.I.D. on June 25
1913 and signed by Churchill, Battenberg, and Jackson,
2. Cab 16/28A. Appendix XII. "Admiralty 3otes". W.S.C. 29 Xarch
1913j Cab 37/115/24 "lotes b7 the First Lord of the Admiralty."
18 April 1913.
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provided an authoritative restatement of the Admiralty position
as well as a critique of the General Staff's suggestion that the
Expeditionary Force should be divested of any responsibility for home
defence. Ph. Admiralty undertaking to intercept an invading force
of 70,000 was downgraded from an "absolute certainty or guarante."
to a "reasonable expeotation". The Admiralty triunverate employed
the "manacled fleet" argument so beloved of ths ho.. defence enthusi-
asts against the General Staff, stating that unless an
adequate military force is maintained in Great Britain,
naval operations sill be greatly hampered and complicated
There is a]se the grave danger that, at a tia when a
decisiv, naval battle ii impending or is in progress, the
Government or soms Board of Admiralty ray be led by the
anxiety of having a d.fsno.l.as country at its back to make
some fatal division of the forces necessary to secure
viotory. We therefore hold. at all times, until the naval
strength of Germany has been broken, the military force
retained in the British Islands should not fall below the
strength necessary to deal with a concentrated invasion
of 70,000	 1
In the five years since the last invasion inquiry, the position of
the two services had been completely reversed. The War Office, which
had built up the danger of invasion in order to expand a home army,
was now concerned with freeing the six R.gular divisions for service
abroad. Ph. Admiralty, which under Fisher had maintained that in-
vasion was solely a naval question, was now attempting to increase
as much as possible the War Office's responsibility for home def.nce.
Whil, the War Offioe was increasingly influenced by a new and ambitious
strategy, the Admiralty was motivated by a development in technology
1. Cab 37/115/24. Appendix XXII. "Landings from Overseas." Admiralty,
25 June 1913. W.S.C., L.B., LB.J. p. 449.
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which direotly affeoted. naval strategy and tactics.
Esber was d.s.ply oonoerried. over the revised. positions of the
two d.pa.rtmsnts, espeoially tb. Osneral. Staff proposal to give tb.
Territorial Force sole responsibility for homs dsfenos. Be wrots
a memorandum, based on his five year.' experience in recruiting for ths
Force in london, setting out his view that it wo3lld never have more
than 250,000 sen in peacetime under voluntary enlistment and. that the
main question to be decided by the inquiry was whether the Force was
adequat. in it. numbers and organization. 1 Saeley replied that this
"counsel of despair" was a complete mistake, which would make the
inquiry's work extremely difficult. 2 Esher prepared a further memo-
randus expressing his ressrvationa over the capacity of the Territer-
ials 3
 to defend England alons, and. in addition communioated his
suspicions privately to Balfour and. Asquith on June 25th, noting that
The War Office seem to be anxious to prove that a raid of
2C,COO son is the maximum hostile foroe against which it
is neosseary to prepare resistance, and that against such
a force the Tsrritorial Army and the Flying Column are
aspi. provision. Their object is, apparently, to free the
whole of the Expeditionary Force for immediate service
cvs nsa
This, however, would result in heavy pressure from the publie
to out the Army Estimates. On the other hand, the Admiralty now
were anxious
That two regular Divisions should always be kept in this
country, and yet they are reluctant to admit that even a
1. Cab 37/115/24 Appendix XVIII. "lots by Lord Laher." 6 Jun. 1913.
pp. 423-24.
2. IbId. Appendix XIX. "lemorandum by the Secretary of Stats for War."
16 Jun. 1913. pp. 424-25.
3. Ibid.. Apj.nd.iz XX. "Jots by Lord. Esher." 17 June 1913. p. 245..
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raid of 20,000 men can pierce th. naval guard. Their object
seems to be $ doubis onsi (a) To keep two Divisions at borne,
(b) Not to make admissions which would prevent them, the
Admiralty, from using two Divisions ovsrsea, for naval strateg-
jcal purposes.
To end the impass., Esher suggested to the Prime Minister that Lord Roberts
be called befor. the Committee
so that the case of invasion - in its most aggressive form -
can be laid before the Committee by its real protaoniet,
instead of by means of hypothetical oases, framed (one is forced
to conclude) in the interests of departmental proclivities.1
Eeher's suggestion was soon acted upon. In contrast with the situation of
1908, Roberts, Repington, Lovat, and Scott had bad nothing to do with the
initiation of the 1913 inquiry, which bad been sitting for four months before
they wers invited to giv. testimony. The quartet bad, however, presented
arguments in a memorandum in roh, which declared that the 1912 naval
manoeuvrss had corroborated their case of 1907-08, Circumstances natbxa].ly
favoured the invader, who possessed the initiative and knew exactly where
be was going, whil, the defending Admiral had to prepare for all possible
contingencies. The quartet argued that it was unwise to rely upon the
untried defensive capabilities of the submarine; however, when it came to
aircraft, their stand was completely revereedt they- represented that
Germany's great air power, represented by 28 dirigibles, would be a
decisive factor which would keep the British Fleet under observation and
protect the invading flotilla from interception. The quartet bore down
heavily on the Territorial. who, they claimed., bad no self-reliance or
resolution, owing to the shortages of officers and men, lack of rifle
1. Beher. Journals and Letters. Vol. III. pp. 124-25. Baher to Asquith,
25 June 1913. aT?ur S. (49719) Esher to Balfour, 25 June 1913.
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practiCe, and their restriction t eight days' training per year. In
contrast, German Forces had expanded vastly since 1908. The situation had
deteriorated since the last inquiry in five important aspects: the naval
defence bad become too arduous, Blue Water theory had been refuted by the
1912 manoeuvres, British air inferiority was serious, the Territorials were
inadequate in numbers and training, and could not be relied upon for home
defence during the six months' training period at the beginning of a war.1
Churchill was inclined to agree with this latter point, stating that
"dependenc. upon a crowd of Territorials in place of one good Regular
division might be compared with an attempt to stop a bullet by a mass of
cotton wool instead of quarter inch plate. What he hoped to gain was the
retention in this country of a small and compact Regular force." Seeley,
how•ver, held that it was impossible to prejudge the value of the Territor-
jals in advance. 2 Such were the positions of the two services when the
quartet appeared before the inquiry on 1 July 1913.
lfoux and Churchill tried to limit admission b•fore the Committee
to Roberts and Repington, who had held high official positions, but they
were over—ruled by Asquith, who admitted Lovat and Scott as well. After
the quartet entered, there was a long altercation as to whether they should
publish portions of their earlier memorandum, referring to contentious and
confidential matters. The following discussion centred on the deficienciss
of the T.rritoxial Force, which, Repington argued, should have a three to
one superiority over the invaders. Churchill thereupon asked Roberts if
1. Cab 16/28A. Appendix VI. "Memorandum by Lord Roberts, Lord Lovat, Sir
Samuel Scott, and Colonel Court Repington." 30 March 1913. pp.
371-8&
2. Ibid Minutes of 8th Meeting. 19 June 1913. p. 81.
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he th6ught that 210,000 T.rritoxials could defeat 70,000 invaders and was
told "As they are organised now and officered, they would not have a
chance." Repington added that the Force could not mov. in large bodies as
an'Axi' and Lovat noted that Territorial. took twice as long to manoeuvre
as the Regulars. But Roberta made his own prediction of a future campaign
i England which would make skill in manoeuvxthg unnecessary. 70,000
Germans would never be drawn up against 210,000 Territorial..
What would happen would be a sort of guerilla wax. If 70,000
men landed in Norfolk, as they advanced each town would be
captured and the inhabitants would be treated pretty roughly.
As regard. food, the invaders would take every thing they
wanted out of the town. They would feed themselves as they
ca along, no matter what happened to the people. The
populace would disappear and fly in all directions, and I
think at last the pressure would be so tremendously strong
on the oountry that the Government would be forced to make
terms at once with the invaders.
If the invaders ran out of ammunition and supplies, they could employ
captur.d British squipuient, as had the Boers. There miit not be any
standing battle at all.1
Balfour reminded Roberts that there was no precedent for a situation
in which
a large ar with no means of comunication, no means of
supplementing its ammunition, very likely most imperfectly
supplied with aiti]lery and with the adjuncts which an, now
regarded as necessary for a big ar, lands amid an enormous
ill-trained hostile population.
This was"a very new problem in military tactics and strater" which had
not been studied by the C.I.D. During the next four rreetings the quartet
focused with more telling effect on the weaknesses of the Terrttorial Force.
1. Cab 16/28A. Minutes of 11th Meeting. 1 July 1913. pp. 97-101, 117.
2. IbId. p. 116. See also Balfour MZS. (49725) Roberts to Balfour, 3July 1913.
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Asquith read a letter from Roberts, which constituted a formidable arraign-
ment: the Force was 2000 officers short, its N.C.O'e were undisciplined and
bad no control over the men, the absurdly email establishment was 50,000
men deficient, a sixth of the Force had not even passed a minimal musketry
teat, and the Territorial artillery was pronounced unfit for service.
The unwieldy and unpractised Force , Roberts charged, was more likely to
be a danger than an asset in the field. Asquith was unimpressed and
observed that this was 'a comprehensive indictment, but did not seem to
diaciose any new facts." The quartet attempted to sustain their oase by
calling a number of witnesses who testified as to the poor condition of
the Force. Hankey was favourably impressed with their .videno. and thouit
that R.pington especially had made several sound r.00mnmendations fox
improving the Territoriale. H. noted that both Roberts and French wire
agreed that the r.tention of one Regular division would insure the defeat
of 70,000 invaders, and thought this standard would be agreed upon by the
cover nment • 2
The statements of the quartet before the enquiry were accompanied by
a campaign in Parliament and the press throughout the spring and summer of
1913. The Opposition repeatedly asked Seeley in the Coanons for a guarantee
that the country would be safe in the absence of the Expeditionary Force
and when ha finally complied, Hapington and the Times leader assailed him
for pxejudging the results of the inquiry. Repington intimated that the
inquiry was the product of political intrigue, as it included nine Cabinet
1. Cab 16/28A. 1 July 1913. p. 119.
2. Balfour S. (49703) Hankey to Balfour, 27 August 1913.
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members and only three soldiers. (In fact, the Ccminitt.e included five
soldi.rs and. three naval officers, to whom Repington did not ref.r.) In
a series of article. in April, Repington asserted that Britain's position
had worsened in several respects since Napoleons att.mpt at invasion in
1804: then there had b.en a large citisen's army, now the greater power of
possible enemy naval concentrations owing to steam, the appearance of air
foro.i, and th. vast disproportion between British and Continental armies
all augur.d ill for future military security. The Central Fore., he
asserted, was practically non-existent and had no practice in mass mano•uv-
ring, while the General Staff was more anxious to participate in military
adventures on the Continent than to defend the United Xingdom. Repington
was supported by the Times, as well as by letters from Samuel Scott and
Colonel Lonadale Nale. Repington later went on to accuse Seeley of with
drawing his earlier statement that the nation would be safe in the absence
of the Regular. and of attempting to make the General Staff responsible
for his change of front. In his speech, Seeley had visualized 70,000 men
arriving in a series of "d.riblets" or raids, but Repington thundered that
this view of "Parcel post invasions and weekend raids" was not endorsed
by the C.I.D. 1 Repington continued the agitation through May with special
articles and leaders accusing the Government of enveloping the invasion
issue in a fog of partisanship.2
Lord Robrts also was aativ., and in a speech at Leeds claimed that
1. "National Srvice and It. Critics." Times 12 April 1913. p. 9.
"National Dsfencs: The General Staff and Invasion." Ibid.14 April 1913,
p. 7; "Public Opinion and Home Defence." Ibid., 15 April 1913. p.9,
"National Service." Ibid. p.6; 18 April 1913. pp . 8, 9, 10; "The
General Staff and Invasion." Ibid.19 April 1913. p . 9 "National Defence."
jd.2l April 1913. p. 11.
2. "Home Defence." Ibid. 5 May 1913. p . 6; "The Outlook fox National
Defence," Ib13. p.9; "National Defence." Ibid. 13 May 1913. p . 3.
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the invasion standard of 70,000 (for which he was responsible) was "purely
hypothetical", had "rfoundation", and was "utter nonsense". On April 22,
Batt.nb.rg unwittingly added to the mischief, in the course of a speeoh,
by alluding to developments which adversely affected the national security,
and proclaiming that to rely on the Fleet alone was "foolish and mischievous."
His remarks were immediately seized upon, drawn out of their context, and
widely publicized, bringing about any comments in the Commons. On the
same day, Lord Cuxzon, in the Rouse of Lords, suggested that the leaders
of both parties meet to settle the question of compulsion and home defence
in conference. The Time. gay, strong support to Cuxzon's proposal and ite
letters column was filled with contributions from N.S.L. advocate.. On
April 30, Mr. Long of the Opposition asked Seeley to permit a conference
of army officers to discuss the question openly at the R.U.S.I., but
permission was refused.'
A strongly hostile article in the National Review repeated Repington's
allegation (and almost certainly written by him) that the invasion inquiry
was being subverted in order "to acquit the Government of the charge of
neglecting the nation's safety." Of the 18 men on the committee, ten (it
was claimed) were Radical partisan politicians without any 1aowledge of
strategy. Esher was the only ind.ep.nd,nt, and the Opposition bad been
forestalled from criticism because Balfour had been inoluded on the
Committee. Twelve of the 18 wer, bound by previous statements that invasion
1. "National Defence." Ibld.22 April 1913. p . 8; "Lord Cureon'. Appeal."
Ibid. p. 9; "The Risk of Invasion." Ibid. p.5; See also "The Danger
of Invasion." Ibid.20 April 1913. p . 12; "The 1&tlitary Problem."
!.28 April 1913. Pp. 7-8; 1 May 1913, p. 11.
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was impossible. Tb. real aim of the inquiry, th. artiole asserted,
was to mask the failure .f the Territorial Force, and its report would
represent that "aS the British strength has diminished, the enemy will
b. so obliging as to reduce correspondingly the number. of his in-.
vasionary expedition or to come without guns and. land. in soattered.
detachments." But there was a growing German air menace when neither
the British army •r navy had a singl, airship, British relative
strength had fallen in relation to momentous German expansion in both
arms, and. the Territorials were a sham designed to deceiv, the nation,
a sob of men with rifles and antiquated guns, without
cohesion, without trained officers, worse in every respect
than the Turkish redifs who bolted from kirk Xilisee and
caused the fall of a once great Empire.
The only remedy was universal service, but Cabinet Xinisters would
continue to deny the dangers of invasion) Similar charges were
brought forward by Lord Roberts and his tilt., in an additional series
of articles in the SDectator, National Review, and the Nineteenth
Century.2
After the quartet had. completed its presentation before the
inquiry, Xajor-General Sir Henry Wilson, the Director of Xilitary
Operations, produced an important paper on "The Strength and Composition
-----------------------------------------------
1. "Navalis." "A )tarooni Enquiry on Invasion." National Review.
June 1913. pp. 743-755.
2. Lord Roberts. "How to Restore our Wilitary Effioienoy." Nineteenth
Century September 1913. pp. 453-6l Xajor-Oen.ral V.0. Xnox. The
Latest Comedy in Rome Defence." Ibid.April 1914. pp. 249-255; lord
Percy. "The Present Aspect of ationai Defence." Rational Review.
January 1913. pp. 751-56; "Some Naval Problems." Speotator. 21
3taroh 1914. pp. 469-471.
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of the Xilitary Poroes Which G.rman.y might dispatch against England
in certain oontinginoies". Wilson, although skeptical regarding the
likelihood of invasion, estimated that Germany could sind up to
60,000 troops, as well as 1,000 cavalry, 200 machine guns and 500
oyoliste as a surprise expedition without recourse to general sobili-
sation. This foro.,"of some 70,000 men of all arms in one trip
could be landed in England between Yarmouth and Clacton by 5 p.m. em
th. fifth day." After German mobilization had begun, 100,0CC could
be sent in one trip aM begin landing on the tenth day of mobilization.
Wilsen mad.e these calculations without reference to the naval situa-
tion, and presupposed that Britain was already deeply committed to a
campaign in India or Egypt, and that Fxanoe was neutral. 1
Wilson believed that Germany could get an 18 to 24 hour head-
start in general mobilization, owing to Government censorship of
communications, and, as head of the British Secret Service, was
impressed with the diffioulty of obtaining confidential information
from Germany. 2 Th.iring the Agadir crisis there had been ne irafersation
of what was taking place in German harbours for 24 hours, although
there had been a number of false reports regarding the movement of
ships and men. Aequith interrupted Wilson at this point, asserting
that ne information had oome because nothing was happening and asked
Wilson if he thought invasion would be worth its risk and cost to the
1. Cab l6/28A. Appendix XXVII. "The Strength and Composition of the
Military Forces which Germany might dispatch against England in
certain Contingencies." pp. 454-59.
2. Ibid. Minutes of 16th Jesting, 12 November 1913. p. 221.
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Germans Wilsen thought nets they o.rtainly could not send 90,000
to 120,000 men for invasion, because oonqu.st was impossible after
British nobilisation, assuming the Expeditionary Force remained at
hone. Th.re would be 150,000 Regulars in Britaini the 0.rmans could
ship only 80,000 owing to limited transport tonnage.
However, assaing the case of th. Triple Allianc, against the
and
Triple t.nts with Hel1and.1gium neutral (a situation quite olese
to that of August 1914), the Germans might attempt to delay the
Expeditionary Force by landing 10,0CC troops on the East Coast to
shake British nezve and put pr.asure on the Oovernaert. Owing to
their aoo.lerated nobilisation schedule, all the Germans would require
was one week's delay. It would be very difficult in these circum-
stances ror British authorities to know whether the German landing
constituted a raid. or an invasion, for the mayors of threatened East
Coast towns night dispatch exaggerated reports, mistaking a raid of
10,000 for an army of 100,000. Wilson went on to chart the tremendous
growth in the size of Continental armies, whioh had a tremendous
efføo on the Cabinet and "terrified Harcourt and Crew."z since 1908
the Germans had. increased their military foroes by 200,0CC and raised
their annual Army Estimates by £27 million.1
Wilson was followed by Xajor General William Robertson, now
Director of $ilitary Training. Robertson's views on invasion had.
changed little since he bad prepared pessimistic appreciations of
French and German invasion in 1901-02. In February 1913, speaking
1. Cab 16/2A. Appendix XXVII; Wilson Diary. 12 Joveaber 1913.
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at Commandant of the Army Staff College, Robertson delivered a
lecture which made use of the sane arguments he had employed a decade
before: the general uncertainty of naval operations, the historical
examples of invasion beirg carried out over contested sea., and th.
tradition of the offensive in German military plarning)' Robertson
affirmed befor. the committee that the aBt Coast would be endangered
once the Expeditionary Forcs was absent. Be r.iterated Churchill's
argument that the defensive system was still orientated, to an attack
from France: there were still twice as many guns on the South as on
the East Coast. Robertson advocated a network of garrisons, comprising
141,000 Territorial. to guard the Eastern harbour., and, called upon
the Admiralty arid War Office to determine the maximum scale of attack
for various localities which would serve as the basis for their di.-.
tribution. Nicholson attacked the Admiralty for its inconsistency in
welcoming this suggestion and proposing forte on the East Coast.
Churchill, seconded by Battenberg, maintained that the Navy only
wanted a suffcierit defenc. and that this repr.serted no break in
policy. But Asquith backed Nicholson, observing that this did con-
stitute "an absolute revolution of Admiralty policy" coarared with
the statements of the Fisher era. 2 Bankey was impressed with Robertson's
proposals, d.cicribing them as "the only construotive material we have
had from the War Office. 3
 However, he was holding baok his draft
1. Robertson MSS. 1/3/3. Lectur. at Glasgow, 4 February 1913.
2. Cab 16/28A. Kinutee of 17th Keeting, 19 November 1913. pp. 240-64.
Wilson Diary. 19 November 1913.
3. Balfour MSS. (49703) Han.key to Balfour, 5 November 1913.
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report of the inquiry until the results of the 1913 naval manosuvres
bsoams availab .
The purpos. of the manoeuvres had not rsmained ssoret, for th.
Times had published a description of the exercises in aid-July, which
r.vealed that a raiding party several thousands strong would again
att.mpt to lard. in the face of naval opposition. The differenc. from
the operation of the previous year would be the addition of an actual
foroe using actual trarsport., to give the proceedings a more real-
istic atmosphere. The Territorial. would not be mobiliisd, and. th.re
2
was to b. no testing of military resistance on shore. R.pingtom
oommendsd. ths Admiralty for its open and pragmatic approach to the
invasion problem, but he castigated Government Ministers for for.-
stalling and. d.iscr.iiitirig th. C.I.D. by dogmatic and. premature state-
aents on the subject. 3 In late August and early September he
published a series of commentaries on the manoeuvres under the pseudo-
nym of "Colonel von Donner und. BlitLen", to avoid trespassing on the
territory of the naval correspondent. The letters of the iotitioug
Prussi&n oolor.l, garnished with T.utonio asides, reasserted R.pington'.
old, charge.: becaus. sea supremanoy in the old sense had gore forever,
the Expeditionary Force could not be d.sjatohed and the Fleet would
b. tied to the shor. "1i• a goat to a peg" owing to the lack of a
1. Balfour KSS. (49703) Eanksy to Balfour, 27 August 1913.
2. "The Iava1 Manosuvr.s." Times.9 July 1913. p. 3; 11 July 1913,p.6.
3. "The Army Debate." Ibid. 1 August 1913. p. 8.
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British national army. According to Repington, the d.fenders had enjoyed
a two to one superiority in the 1912 manoeuvrea. Althotgh th. rules had,
restricted the landing to 500 men per hour p.r ship, 28,000 men had been
put ashor. in 41 hours. This accomplishment bad been improved upon in 1913,
in spits of the fact that seaplanes and the coast watch had been used in an
attempt to looste the invading flotilla. "Enemy" battleships had entered
the Thzber while 4,000 men bad been embarked frosi the transport. and had
suooeede4 in "destroying" local railways, docks, oil tanks, and a wireless
station. Reping'ton calculated that this was equal to a landing of 48,000
to 60,000 troops under war condition., while an estimated 18,000 were drowned
or lost. He concludeds "Was there ever in history a temptation so great as
the suoceseful invasion of Albion the rich, the proud, and the unprepared?
Nein. wabrhaftg nicht!"1
Repington continued to present his case in further articles, pointing
out that the Fleet was defenoeless against attacks by torpedoes and air-
craft. Its protective power, therefore, was not absolute bat relative.
The North Sea itself favoured surprise attacks, for its "inconstant and
unstable sea is a great, big, broad, rough, agitated euzface over which
night, mist, and fog continually hang their heavy veils." A real-life ene
could easily have landed a force three times larger than that landed in the
manoeuvree. The only aniwer was a national army, supplemented by British
command of the air and adequate coast defences. 2 A. usual, Repington was
taken to task in the letters colunsi for his "sweeping and donatio"
-	 -
1 "The Naval Manoeuvre.." Times. 2 September 1913. p. 5.
s Ibid. 8 S.pt.ab.x 1913. p.5.
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conclusions drawn from the nanoeuvrea. "These rather theatrisal operation."
had bun carried out, one naval authority replied, in very unrealistic
conditions even so, 45 of the invading force had been lost. The "damage"
carried out by raiders had involved merely the placing of chalk marks in
strategic sites. It was really unwise to n.nufactuxe such strong infereno.s
from sp.culative newspaper reports.1
Lord Sydenham (formerly Sir George Clarke, first Secretary of the
C.I.D.) denounced Repin$on as a "Strategist at Sea" who was amazingly
iiorant of the teachings of war. He declared that the 1912 and 1913 'iava1
manoeuvre. had not reflected actual war, for they had been carried out under
conditions which had heavily penalized the defending fleet and lid to mis-
conceptions and "fallacies of a peculiarly dangerous kind" on the part of
unauthorized observers. If all the facts were known, the lessons of the
manoeuvrse would be found to coincide "with the continuous and consistent
experiences of actual war." Sydenbam quoted Repington against himself to
the effect that "If there is one principle of naval strate' more preant
with meaning than another, it is that which affirms and reiterates the
danger of the dispatch of 'tlitary forces across waters not thoroughly
olearsd of hostile ships."2 Within the sub—committee, Churchill also
protested against such press conjectures as these and offered to eutinit a
fu1 report of the 1913 manoeuvres to the C.I.D. as soon as the exercise
had been completed and evaluated.3
1. "The Naval Manoeuvree. ?imes. 4 September 1913. p. 5
2. "The German Strategist at Sea." Ibid. 13 September 1913, p. 5; Lord
Sydenham.	 Working	 Murray, London, 1927. .
3. Cab l6/28A. Minutes of 10th Meeting. 26 Jun. 1913. p. 89.
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But Bptngton would hays been encouraged, had he ksowri of the contents
of these official reports. The Umpire-in-Chief, Admiral of the Fleet Sir
William May, found that the main lesson of the manoeuvre. was that surprise
attacks may be partially successful, especially in misty weather."
It therefore appears necessary to have fixed defences at th.
principal seaports in the United flngdcm and of sufficient
strength to be abl. to check a determined raid for acme hours
until a battle fleet can be concentrated on the spot and at
the same time give opportunity for the submarines to act.l
Admiral Sir George Callaghan, Commander of the Home Fleet, agreed.
It is no exaggeration to say that, whatever weaknesses the
Manoeuvree have shown in our present plans, they have shown
none greater than the defenoelessnees of our East Coast
harbours and, if the regular troops are out of the country,
of our coast. Naval ports, to be of any aomfort to the
fleet, must be secure; we have no port on the East coast
except the lore where this is so, and the lore only by its
peculiar situation in the sandbanks ... the Thames estuary,
Harwioh, the Tyne, the Forth, and Cromarty are so poorly
defended as hardly to deter any determined enemy from attack
fzcm seaward ... important seaports on the East coast should
have fixed defences, of such strength that they cannot be
rushed and are not wholly dependent on the Navy for their
safety. 2
Callaghan's conclusions were wholly unorthodox.
In my opinion the only proper defenos of the country against
Invasion and Raid is by Military Forces, and to make the
)avy responsible for this work is a grave strategic error,
which hands the initiative wholly to the enemy ... The
natural deduction to be drawn by the Service in general
is that the primary object of the British fleet is to
defend the country from attack by the enemy'. troop.; it
could hardly be otherwise, in view of the nature of the
most important exerelse of the year for two successive years.
As might be expected, Callaghan's views were a matter of contention
with the Admiralty War Staff, who were sevexs]y critical in their reply.
1. A.J. Marder. From Qe eadnougbt to Soapa Flow. p. 354.
2. Adm 116/3130. "Naval Manoeuvre., 1913." 28 August 1913. C-in-C, Howe
Fleet, . 10.
3. Ibid. p . 13.
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Such a view ignores altogether the fact that Great Britain
is an i.land. It controverts the whole teaching of our
past history ... It abandons the principle of attacking the
enemy on his way whils his troops are helpless, in favour of
waiting till they hav• landed and are able to defend them-
selves, lastly it must involv, an addition to our expenditure
on land forces which, if applied to an increase of our Navy,
would raise our position at sea to such strength that we could
face any ccipbination at sea that could reasonably be brought
against us.
They charged that Callaghan had been unduly influenced by the manoeuvres
and had not euffioiently discriminated between invasion proper and raids.
Callaghan had asked for a conference to clear up misunderstandings between
the Admiralty War Staff and officers serving at sea, but this request was
refused, on the grounds that existing oocimunioation arrangements v• ample
opportunities for ixohange of views. It was agreed that the shore defences
should be strengthened, but the War Staff believed that "the best assistance
that oan probably be given in this direction by the Government is by putting
the military defences of the oountry (into a state) ready to meet the
changed situation of the present century."2
Churchill forwarded his own aseesainent of the manoeuvre. to Asquith,
which was more pessimistic in tone than his report of the previous year.
However, Churchill pointed out that Callaghan, the defending Admiial , had
adopted tactics unsuited to the situation.
H. detached a very large number of vessels which would have been
useful on the East Coast, weakened his force considerably, and
yet did not provide a force suitable for dealing with the Red
ships in the Western theatre.
Chuzchill thought it would have been better to have ignored the Red, or
1. Adm 116/1214. "Reuerka on Cmente by the Cocunander-in- .Chief of the
1913 Manoeuvre.." War Staff. 29 September 1913. p . 1.
2. Ibid. pp. 2-6.
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"German" ships cm the West until the main decision had been obtained in the
Worth Sea. Although he admitted that "an element of unreality must p.svade
all such schemes", several important lessons had been brought boise.
Cenerally speaking, I find the mental picture I had formed and the
opinions I have expressed, confirmed by the manoeuvrea in many
important respects. The possibility of transports in twos and
threes slipping through our squadrons and flotillas	 they care
to run the riekz the uselessness of attempting to land on an open
beach ... above all the paralyeing effect produced on the British
Admiral by the feeling that he is the sole defence against raid-
ing expeditions which may be directed at any part of the British
coast ... the necessity of having a proper armed force to make
sure that even if a portion of the invading arny got here their
arrival would not produce any result worthy of the risk and
sacrifice.1
Churchill obviously did not share all the misgivings of his professional
advisors.
Th. question of the manoeuvres did not cone before the C.I.D. until
November 25, when May, the Umpire-in-Chief, Callaghan, the defending Admiral,
and Jellico., the "German" commander sutisitted their reports, Most of the
discussion turned on the insecurity of the East Coast. May suggested the
construction of sut*narine nets and underg2ouM stone walle at various ports,
while Churchill revealed that the Admiralty's experimental anti-submarine
nets were not proof against torpedoes. May testified that before the 1913
manoeuvzes, he had accepted the Admiralt dictum that any raid over 10,000
men could be stopped. But 43,750 bad been landed in the previous mininer
out of a total force of 108,000; 18,000 bad escaped and 46,70 were judged
to have been drowned or captured. The situation had obviously changed.
Asquith pointed out that this was "not a very hopeful situation" for the
invaders.
1. Aepuith JS. Box 13. Churchill to Asquith. 30 August 1913.
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But 3.11ico. countered that this raid had taken place in high summer,
when the defence had been aided by the fact that there were only three to
four hurs of darbess. During the winter over 14 hours of darkness would
prevail, leaving aside the question of fog and mist. Je]lioo. concluded
that •v.ry British harbour near a possible strategic objective should be
fortified. Rio own feat of landing 25,000 men in the Number the previous
summer could have been prevented if the river defences had been sited at
its mouth rather than far upstream. Undeterred, his raiding force had
destroyed two torpedo boat flotillas, some submarines, a wireless station,
and delayed the mobilization of the army by destroying countcations.
The committe. turned to the question of a raid using a captured harbour,
and Je].ljco. estimated that 1000 men could be landed every 15 minutes under
these conditions. He and the other Admirals repeatedly urged the fortifi-
oation of Rarwich, the Humber, the Tess, Tyn., and the Forth, which
Aequith fully authorized.1
At a further meeting of the coimnittee, Churchill •xplained that the
purpose of the manoeuvr.s had been "to test as far as possible the new
conditions which hav• arisen out of the abandonment of the close blockade,
which has been forced on us by the development of the submarine and above—
water torpedo craft by Germany." Although the operations had b.en "pervaded
by artificiality throughout", every effort had been made to make them as
realistic as possible. Churchill corroborated the gloomy piotur. of the
situation drawn by J.11icoe and Callaghan earlier, stressing th. fact that
the Royal Navy bad only thirty cruisers to patrol the 125,000 square miles
1. Cab l6/28A. Minutes of 17th Meeting, 25 Novembir 1913. pp . 271-298.
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of the Jortk Sea. The weather was thick and visibility poori
diminishing to two miles 25% of the ysar, with five days of fog p.r
month th. year round. Although Britaias principal deterrent was
torpscto boats and. ubaarines, it was obvious that fixed, defences on
shor were also required. at strategic Eastern ports. Churohill
estimated. that up to twelve transports could. cross safely and that
even larger numbers could b. prepared and. accommodated in British
ports without creating congestion. If the Germane used British
jetties, they could u*load, cavalry and. artillery as •aeily as infantry.2
Churchill and. Jelliooe later revealed that it had been "necessary to
stop the manoeuvrss on the third day lest we night teach the Germans
as well as ourselves' the •ase of a landing in England.2
An animated. discussion followed.. Asquith alleged. that such a
"Bolt from the Blue" would not be undertaken "with a light heart",
while See]ey suggested that the Ad.airalty employ its older battle-
ships as a coast defence force, for they had ten timös the firepower
of German submarines and. torpedo boats. Churchill replied. that this
polioy had been considered by the Admiralty, but that the commissioning
of "guardshpe" was impractical owing to their expensive upkeep and
lack of protection from torpedo attack. This was financially imposs-
ible in peace-time, but might prove necessary if war broke out.
Asquith was plainly perturbed. by the implications of the manoeuvies,
recalling that the 1908 inquiry had deoided that
1. Cab 16/28A. linutes of 19th Keetirig. 3 December 1913. pp. 301-05.
2. Churchill. World. Crisis 9ll-l4.p. 148; Ad.n. R.H. Baoon. The
Life of John Rushworth Jellicoe. Casell, London, 1936. p. 157.
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such an opr&tion as that suggestscl by the manoeuvres
was az- absouti a.mpoesibility, that is to say, a thing
that no rational soldier or sailor would •ver dream of
undertaking ... What are the oiroumstanoes which have
changed during these five years, so as to make a thing
which was then ruled by everybody - Admiralty represent-
atii-es as well as Xilitary representatives - as not only not
feasible, but unthinkable ... now reasonable to contemplate?
J.11iooe replied that this was du. to the technical development of
Qerms.n torpedo craft. But Churchill added a significant political
explanations The Admiralty in 1908, under Fisher's control, had wished
to cut down the Army etimates in order to obtain more funds for the
fleet.
The Admiralty arguments were all pitched in that tone from
beginning to end, and lots of statements were made which
re%uirsd oonsiderable modification. Truths were push.cl to
the point wher. they ceased really to carry a truthful
m.azing. The War Office, on th. other hand, took the
opposit. line.
low the Admiralty had no special axe to grind but had "merely tried
to trace the new conditions, and to indicate certain new preoautions
which have to be taken from them." 2 Nicholson, Fisher's ancient
foe, took his belated revenge, noting that at the tim. the War Office
had taken
grave exception to lord Fisher's conception of this fleet
of transports travelling, as he described it, like the
Children of Israel in the Wilderness, being a pillar of
firs by night and a pillar of smoke by day, because we
said th•y would use anthraoite ooal in the day time if
they knew arything about their business.3
Jellioos also contributed to the demolition of the Admiralty's former
case by confirming that an enemy force could. easily stealk at nigbt
1. Cab 16/28A. linutes of 19th leeting. 3 December 1913. p. 311.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid. p. 316.
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without lights; all that was xequir.d were trained, naval officers
to manage the transport flotilla. He himself had adopted, this oourse
as the invading commander during the manoeuvres, with a force of 40
destroyers and 14 torpedo boats. Admiral A.k. Wilson, Fisher's
former prot.4 vigorously defended his former chief and. prepared
p
his o*n report on the aanoeuvres which Churchill read to the Committee.
But the Old Guard did not prevail)'
Churchill, in explaining the veil of secrecy and imprecipitate
ending of the nanoeuvres, paid tribute to the power of the invasion
jesus in public opinion.
We have always been aooueed of trying to load, the dice
by the extremists on both sides of this controversy
it might go so far as to create a very ignorant state of
alarm in th. country generally if the statement could be
mad,. that all these ports on the west were liable to
attack and. so forth. I thought we had got quite enough to
see whit could be done for the purpose of this Sub-Committee,
and that it was no good creating a situation which would
have been used in certain quarters to create a panic in te -
country ... we did not want to make out an alarmist case.
Everything had gon. wrong at the Humber. The defending Admiral had
not received the proper orders and the defending flotillas had not
shown the proper vigour. The experience at least confirmed. that an
attack could only be carried out with tremendous losses, which
Churchill believed. no O.rman Admiral would accept. But it was undeni-
able that "the ehanoe of the enemy g.ttin into the open sea and being
able to lose you there and evading you is enormously increased", for
the Admiralty could no longer afford to station its ships close to
enemy port. and expos. them to torpedo attack. Owing to the
2. Tbid.p. 318. A different explanation is given in the World
Crisis, see p. 64.
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contentious nature of much of the reports and testimony, Churchill
suggested that t.7 should be given up and. destroyed. Asquith agreeds
"the larger the holocaust th. better."1
A. the subcommitte. moved. on to the preparation of its final
report, the C.I.D. and the two services began ar extensive and
significant general overhaul of the home defences and an examination
of many other problems connected with invasion. A C.I.D. sub-committee
reported in December 1913 on the feasibility of an official historical
section. It cited the French General Staff's history of the Japoleonio
invasion preparations as a great example of official history and
recommended that the new Historical Seotion prepare a work on "Tb.
naval Coast Defences during the threatened French invasions from 1793
to 1805". Churchill e.peoially favoured this project, as the Admiralty
was in the process of revising and reinforcing the contemporary coast
defences, and he believed th. past might afford some important lessons.
Accordingly, Hanksy, the C.I.D. Secr.taryf was assigned this project
and was at work upon it when war broke out.2
At the sam• tim. the coast atoh system was overhauled. Arrange-
ments were made for Territorial cyclist units to patrol the coast-
line and. to guard vulnerable points as soon as general mobilization
was ordered. But as an attack in p.ao.time was admitted as possible,
it was urged that preparations foiawaxtime coastal communications
network be extended to peacetime. It was decided that local authorities
1. Cab 16/281. inutes of 19th eeting. 3 December 1913. p. 318, 319,
325.
2. Cab 38/25/40 "Report of a Sub-Committee of the C.I.D. on the Future
Work of the Historical Section." 22 December 1913; Cab 38/26/U.
Xinut.s of 125th X.eting, C.I.D. 3 Xarch 1914. Lord Eankey,
Supreme Command. Vol. I. p. 216.
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in times of strained relations would traoe the movements of ships
of potentially hostil. nations in order to prevent .nemy landings.
It was reoomaended that the Admiralty take over coast communications
and that local polio, and customs officers be instructed to report
any attempted landings.	 Following Jioholson's suggestion, a confer-
moe of Admiralty and War Off ice r.prs.ntativ.s met in February 1914
to consider the scale of possible attack and the necessary d.fenc.s
for strategic East Coast ports. Neither smryioe would guarantee the
ports against submarine attacks, but both reoomm.nded. that anti-
aircraft installations be installed at various important sites. 2
 In
March 1914 the C.I.D. also recommended that a r.gistry of aliens be
established in coastal areas and called attention to the da.ngsr that
enemy cargo ships might be filled with bricks, cement or stone, and.
scuttled in i.portant harbour mouths at the beginning of war. Ships
carrying this type of cargo were therefore barred from certain
strategic ports.3
Another sub-comaittes recommended in )larch 1914 that wireless
communications be set up between major British cities and rail centres
to forestall sabotage of the telegraph wires. It was, however, sstia-
ated that any damage to the Byst.m could e repaired. in 24 hours. The
most vulnerable point of tb. network was the Central Telegraph Office
::77i;. ;;;:;;;;;;
the Admiralty and War Office." 23 December 1913.
2. Cab 37/24/19 "Coast Defenoes of the United kingd.om and the Question
ofa Coast Watch." 25 February 1914.
3. Cab 38/26/11. Minutes of C.I.D. Meeting Jo. 125. 3 )tarcb 1914.
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in London, which contained all wires going in and out of London.1
By aid-May, a revised, scheme 'was being developed to provid, for the
diversion of important coaaunioations such as the Admiralty and. cable
ocmpany wires. Xi. Charles Hobhouse, the Postmaster-General, testified.
that only 37 telegraph wires led out of London and that only 12 of
these were underground. Be believed that "thirty orforty men who 'were
teohnioal experts could. destroy the whole of tb. lines in one hour
or one-and-a-half hours, and so isolate london for a radius of some
215 miles in any direotion." A supplementary study disclosed that
such an operation would requir. the simultaneous destruction of 48
wires, which would "entail elaborate preparation, perfect organization,
and the employment of a large number of technically trained men."
Although this was technically feasible, it was not "practically
possible." The breaks oould. soon be repaired and emergency exped-
ients could be improvised, using wireless and motorcycle despatch
riders. But nothing was done to protect the vulnerable position of
the General Post Office.3
While these various defeno. probleme were being attended to, tb.
invasion sub-committee was hammering out the various cospromises
involved in its report, which was printed on 1, April 1914. Tb.
inquiry had been even more exhaustiv. than Its predecessor of 1908,
involving 21 meetings compared with 16, and. this was reflected in
its report, which was 20 longer, comprising altogether 491 pages
1. Cab 38/26/12 "Report of Sub-Committees The Establishment of
Radiotelegraphic Communication between Inland Stations." 23
March 1914.
2. Cab 3F3/27/23. Minutes of 126th Meeting. C.I.D. 14 May 1914, P.2.
3. Cab 38/28/30. "Additional Report of Sub-Committees Establishmentof
Radiotelegraphic Communications betwe•n inland stations." 2 July
1914. pp . 1-4.
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of small print. The first great advanos ov.r the earlier inquiry
had. be.n the consideration of possible enemy objectives, which had.
been completely ignored. by the sub-oommittee of 1908. It was decided
that the British army would. be the invader's first objective, taking
precedence over the city of London. 	 Regarding the possibility of $
German raid., the sub-oommitte. observed. that
We may probably dismiss the ides that it will ever be thought
worth whil. to run all th. risks which, as will presently b.
shown, are inevitably inoident to such an enterprise, in order
to rosa, for a brief space of time, undefeated. but impotent,
over an undefended oourttrysid..1
But if publio terror was to be mobilized, by the Germans at all, it
would have Uis definite objeot of impeding the xpeditiorary Force.
Besides this, raids would. also be aimed at the destruction of some
centre of naval or military strength, such as "an arsenal, dockyard.,
sanufaotory of war rat.rial, magazine or liquid fuel depot". Other
possible objectives were oommsroial ports, such as Hartlepool, d.in-
burgh, Scarborough, or Whitby.
Regarding the possibility of surprise attaok, the only new factor
bad. b..i the Hague Convention on the opev'iinj of hostilities, signed.
on 18 October 1907, in which Britaib, Germany, and other powers
pledged not to begin war without & previous explicit warning. The
committee noted, however, that the Convention still permitted a
sudden attack, as th. interval between the declaration of war and the
outbreak of hostilities might be so short as to forestall an effect-
ive defence. The 1908 conclusion on surprise attack therefore
1. Cab 3/2/5/62A "Report of Standing Sub-Committe. of the C.I.D.
Attack on the British Isles from overs.a."15 April 1914. p. 3.
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remained unchanged.
The corresponding oonolueion regarding the impossibility of a
surprise attack by Germany had been confirmed by the Italian failure
to keep their expedition to Tripoli secret in 1911, and in addition,
th. sources of information open to the British Government had. in-
p
creased. Althcugh warning of a raid. of less tan 20,000 men could
not b. guaranteed, a larger forc. would be large enough to conquer
the island. A raid to detain the Expeditionary Force would not come
as a "Bolt from the Blue", for the Expeditionary Poroes would be
preparing to leave th. country only if it were obvious that hositil-
itiss were imminent. A surpris, attack was possibl, only in a war
involving Britain and Germany alone and. its only possible objective
would be the destruction of a vulnerable strategic point. Such
points were few, but were liable to attack immediately on the out-
break of war. Th. sub-committee w•re impressed by Rankly's argument
that a raid by a small foro., conveyed in a single m.rohant ship
might be mounted during "profound peace" against arsenals, munitions
factories, magazin.s, and. oil tanks. As such installations were
very lightly guarded, they recommended that all such plao.e be
2guarded by armed contingents ready for immediate action.
Having dealt with the problem of surpris, raids, the committee
turned to examine th. problem of attack when the Expeditionary Force
wa. abroad. Under these conditions, the whole or at least part of
1. Cab. 3/2/5/62*. 15 April 1914. p. 4.
2. Ibid.op. 46.
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the Territorials would b. embodied and. the fleet would still be
availaole. Under these conditions an invasion would be more likely
than a "bolt from the blue". An attack after the outbreak of war,
with the 3xpeditionary Force gone and. the Territorials just having
finished their mobilization, would find. Britain in th. worst possible
military situation. There would be only 150,000 troops, including
10,000 Regular., to oppose invasion and. the overwhelming majority of
these would be praotioally untrained. The General Staff believed.
that an invading forc. of from 40,000 to 50,00C bad some chance of
success in this contingency. Tb. enemy's only possible objective
was London, which would have to be oaptur.d in a few days before hi.
ammunition ran out, and this necessitated. a landing as near as possible
to the capital.1
The oomaittee took note of the criticisms of Lord Roberts and
his colleagues, who called for a home defence establishment of 510,000
against the hypothetical ir.vaaicn force of 7C,000. The discrepancy
between this estimate and the existing home defence establishment
was explained by the fact that the General Staff calculated that only
50,000 of the hypothetical 70,000 would be combatants, owing to their
n•ed to guard lines of communications in a hostile country. The
10,000 Regulars in the Flying Column would certainly be equal in
fightLng value to the invaders, and Roberts also had not taken into
consideration cooperation between British local forces and the Central
1. Cab 3/2/5/62A. pp. 8-9.
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lore., whiob would oppose th. enemy's landing and threaten hi.
flanks. H. also had eliminated from British strength men under 19,
recruits, absents.s without leave, men liable to overseas service,
and those who had not passed the marksmanship test. 1 Although the
bulk of Rob.rts' oritioisms had. been directed. against the Territorial
!oroe, the general consensus was that the Territorial. were slowly
improving in all areas.2
!videnoe from the naval manoeuvres indicated that Roberts and.
his colleagues had. under-estimated the delays and difficulties in-
volved in assembling a large convoy, for the time r.quired to assemble
the ships and cross the North Sea made it "incredible that we should
be unable to seek out and. suooessfully attack the transports." But
the 1908 argument that the convoy was too large to escape detection
was rejected., on the basis that an observer's range of visibility
was limited in relation to the size of the North Sea. In the
manosuvres, it was recalled.,
Instances have occurred when fleets of considerable size,
sometimes favoured by fog which is prevalent in the North
Sea, have p.netrat.d through waters systematically patrolled
and watched. by large number. of the opposing v•eeels, without
being reported sufficiently soon to ensure their being brought
to action.
The prospects of successful evasion by the Osrmana would be improved
by their use of aircraft, and it was certain that their main fleet
would be used in such an event either to make a diversion or to force
a passage for the transports. Naking allowance for remote conting-
encies, "th. possibility of errors of judgment, bad luok, and
1. Cab 3/2/5/62A. pP. 940.
2. Ibid.. p0. 10-12.
- 471 -
unforeseen circumstances", evasion was not an impossibility. 1
 Its
likelihood was increased by the Admiralty's reoent abandonmsnt of
the close blockact. policy. This would. have led to a serious wastage
of valuable ships whiob, if prolonged., could. have materially altsred.
the naval balance of power. But there was some ground for future
optimism. The comaitt.s hoped that th.
development of submarines of ocean-going capacity may
modify th. situation in our favour, and. the use of air-
craft may also help in this direotion, but without
extended •xsrciss to ascertain their capbiliti.s this
cannot be counted on with any certainty.
The redistribution of the fleet in progress in 1908 was now
permanent and. Britain was mors fully prepared to meet a sudd.n German
attack on th. outbreak of war. This readiness constituted a powerful
deterrent against invasion. On th. other haud, th British margin
of wp.ricrity cver the German fleet was not as pronounoed as it had
be.n in 1908. although it was still suffioi.nt. The dev.lopa.rit of
th. torpedo now meant that it was more diffioult to use naval superi-
ority directly as an ima.diat. defence against invasion or raids. As
far as embarkation was concerned, the C.I.D. now oonclud.d, that a
beach landing would result in almost certain failure, with the
possible exception of a very mal1 raid. In the 191]. Tripoli oupeign
most b.ach landing. had taken several days, and. at the T.rritoral
manosuvres of 1910 and th. naval manoeuvres of 1913, they had.
ben completely thvart.d by bad. weather. Therefore, the committee
dsoid.d, that
V1. Cab 3/2/5/62A. pp. 15 - 16.
2. Ibid. p. 16.
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the uncertainty of scouring favourable wsathsr conditions,
th. delay which Light be caused by the oyolist patrols
allotted to watch the coast line, and th. probability of
being attaoked by the naval ooastal patrols before a land-
ing can be completed., combine to provide a very strong
deterrent to any attempt to land an invading army on an
op.n beaob.
All the more effort should therefore be diverted to prevent the
captur, of Eastern harbour., which would greatly facilitate the
invaders' most crucial operation, disembarkation. Unloading maobinery
would. readily be available to him in a port, where it would be also
muoh easier for a German escort foroe to prevent British interference
with the landing. At the Humber in 1913, the "German" escorts had.
destroyed the local defences at the cost of heavy lossee to them-
selves, and 1000 men had been landed in 15 minutes. The Admiralty
oaloulated that if the Germans oared to risk an invasicm exmy of
several divisione, they could escort them with older battleships
which could easily overwhelm the light defences at the Tees, the Tyrie,
or Harwich. Modern battleships were so much faster than these that
it would be difficult to work out their tactical deployment. The
greatest risk the older German ships would face would be from coastal
patrols during their crossing and from superior naval torcee there-
after. To equip every port on the East coast against such a force
would involve prohibitive cost: British efforts theretore would have
to be restricted to ports near objectives deemed worth the loss of
a raiding force, i.e. the Humber, the Tyne, and Harwich, where
garrisons of artillery and. infantry would be established)
In conclusion, the committee listed the various developments
1. Cab 3/2/5/62A. pp. 18-19.
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in the situation sinol 1908. A new home soheme bad been put into
•ff.ot and. a. War Book had. bun adopted, with special provisions to
prevent England from being caught unawares. The Territorial Force,
in •mbryo in 1908, was now more fully developed.. These improvements,
however, were ofs.t by an inorease in th. number of available
German troops and the amount of G.raan shipping tonnage. It was
difficult to &ecide who was the main beneficiary of new technical
improvements such as the mine, torpedo, submarine, and airplane, but
it was obvious that these changed the situation considerably. The
C.I.D. certainly had. more information about amphibious operation.
than ever before, owing to fuller r.ports on the Russo-Japanese War,
the Tripoli oampaign of 1911, end the 1912 and 1913 naval manoeuvres.1
In summary,
Germany in 1914 may .till be able to find, the men for an
invasion; sh. is in a slightly better position as regards
finding th. ships necessary as transports; the German main
fleets have no reasonable prospect of defeating our maii
f]..t, though their r.lativs strength is somewhat greater
in 1914 than in 1908; owing to the gradual withdrawal of
the British blockading line consequent on tschnioal progress
in torpedo warfare the transports conveying an invading army
would in 1914 hays a better prospeot of getting to sea un-
se.n and of •vading our main fisets in th. passage of tbe
North Sea than the Admiralty believed iey would. hav• in
19O8 th. dangers to b. encountered, by/invading fleet at
the landing plac. are greater in 1914 than in 1908 owing
to the establishment of tb. Coastal Patrols, and. thee.
dangers will become still greater if the recommendations
contained in this report are carried into effect; in
this inquiry more stress has been laid than in the past
on tb. possibility of utilizing mercantile herbours for
purposes of disembarkation; after effecting a landing the
invading army would hay. to caloulate on enoountering, in
addition to any regular troops left in the country, a
field army of Territorial troops 'whiob has in every respect
improved since 1908.
1. Cab 3/2/5/62&. p. 21.
2. Thid.. pp. 22-23.
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The standard of 1908 remained as the basis of calculattonsi the home
army should not be reduoed below a size necessary to defeat 70,000
invaders. Although the Admiralty would no longer provide an absolute
guarantee that it could intercept a force over this size, the risk
of interception was still so great as to constitute a considerable
deterrent. Both French and Roberts had agreed that the enemy must
bring at least 70,000 troops if one division of Regulars remained
in the country. The sub-oommittee doubled this margin of safety
and decided that it would be undesirable to leave less than two
divisions or their equivalent in the country in the early stages of
a war.
In spite of the ma'y developments in the home defence situation
since 1908, especially the reversed position of th two services,
the committee's oonclusiona were remarkably unohanged. Gains balanced
losses, and diminished• confidenoe at the Admiralty was compensated
by the General Staff's new-found appreciation of the difficulties
of invasion. The conclusion of 1908 that two divisions or their
equivalent should always be available in the United Kingdom
remained. But it was acoompanied by a series of further recommend-
ations which retleoted the current anxiety over the vulnerability of
the E1ast coastt there should be a war plan prepared so that the
Reu1ar Army might meet • sudden attack in an unmobilized dtate, the
Admiralty and War Office should perfect arrangements for the coast
communications network, and th3 armaments of East Coast ports should
be increased. Phe War Office should increase the efficiency of the
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Central Forc. and cooperate with the Admiralty in working out a
scale of possible attack for local districts. A guard system should
be established over vulnerabi. points. The Admiralty was asked to
assume responsibility for the defeno• of east coast harbour., while
the War Office should make provision 	 r the removal of transport
and strategically valuable material from coast areas in time of
threatened. invasion. 1
The General Staff was not compl.tsly satisfied with the report.
Wilson described it &5 "rubbishTM and tried to impress his opinions
- - - a a a
on Asquith in an interview. 2
 When this failed, the General Staff,
inspired by Rob.rtson and Wilson, produced a memorandum commenting
on the	 reoomm.ndations, asserting that if th•se were
carried out, a war betwsn Britain and G.rmany would see all six
Regular divisions tied to British soil. Th. most difficult and most
plausible contingency to provide against would be war bstw.en the
Tripls Alliance and the Triple gntente, and under these circumstances
the likelihood of a German invasion was extremely remote. The new
oonosrn for home defence threatened to disrupt more important strateglo
planning, but the General Staff had already prepared a plan for the
army in an unmobiliied state,bassd on th. assumption that four day.'
warning would be forthcoming. The two servioes had collaborated in
setting up a. coast watoh and had worded out a soa].s of attaok to be
expected at various strategic ports. The P'orth, Tyne, and Medway
were deemed liable to an attack of 10,000, and the Rumber, Rarwioh,
Portsmouth and. Plymouth to 5000. All other ports could expect pp to
1. Cab 3/2/5/62A. pp. 25-26.
2. Wilson Diary. 16, 20 April; 13 Yay 1914.
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2000 raiders. This excluded raids at the beginning of hostilities;
"an entirely new problem, and one that cannot possibly be solved
with full seouzity unless and until the necessary troops are stationed
in the threatened ports during peace time." Unless garrisons were
established and barracks built at the Forth, Tyne, Huznber, Harwich,
and the Medway, no military protection could be provided for these
ports until the seoond or third day of war. 1 The C.I.D. was perturbed
by the negative reaction of the General Staff to the invasion inquiry
report and at its meeting of May 14, approved the Report in principle
but deoided to defer "discussion of the action to be taken to give
effect to the recommendations contained in the Report.2
Thus the General Staff continued to protest against what it
considered to be 1 th unduly restrictive and pessimistic conclusions
of the inquiry, the Admiralty worked feverishly to work out a defence
in the li,ht ot the abandonment of the close blockade policy. Many
of the tenets of the Blue Water School were being abandoned by the
naval authorities out of respect fr the recently developed dsstsuot.
ive powers of the torpedo and submarine. The last peacetime revision
of Admiralty war plans against Germany, in July 1914, advised the
Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet that
As the security of the British Isles against serious
invasion is mainly dependent upon our maritime superiority,
occasions may arise in which the destruction of transports
conveying a large body of the enemy's troops is a
more pressing and urgent necessity than any other, in
which case the transports must receive prior attention
even if the enemy's main fleet happens to be within
1. Cab 3/2/l/72A "Attack on the British Isles from Oversea:
Memorandum by the General Staff on the Recommendations contained
in the Report." 9 Mar 1914. pp . 1-6; Winston Churchill, The
World Crisis 1911-1914. p. 151
2. Cab 16/28A. p. iv.
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reach of attack)
The classical Kahaniar. insistence upon closing with the eflsmys fleet
for the decisive sea battle had. been subverted. and. th. rapid progress
of naval technology had. led, the Ad.miralty to question and, modify many
of the Blue Water dogmas which had inspired its policy for the last
generation. On the eve of War, the Royal Navy faced the future with
a new uncertainty.
British domestic life during the spring and summer of 1914 was
dominated by th. question of Irish Home Rule and. the threat of
impendin civil war. But there were signs that the results of the
recent naval manoeuvree and th..reopening of the invasion inquiry- had
brought about a revival of the earlier apprehersion over a German
attack in some quarters. Throughout the first half of the year, the
Opposition repeatedly put pressure on Asquith in the Hous. of Commons
to announce the conclusions of the inquiry. On February 25tè the
Prime Kinister revealed that the investigation was finished, that the
general conclusions were agreed, and promised. to deliver a. statement
on the subject later in the current Parliamentary session. On this
and later occasions Asquith was urged to deliver his announcement
before th. introduction of the Army stimat.s in March so as to guide
the Rouse in its voting for military appropriations. The agitation
against the Government mour.ted during March with a series of aorimon-
ious attack. on Churchill and. Battenberg, who had intimated that the
Fleet alone could. not stop an invasion. Ph. campaign culminated in
Ad. 116/3096. "War Plans Home 1911-1914: War with Germany."
July 1914.
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an Imperial Defenc. resolution on )tarch 17 which directed. the Govern-
ment to provid, information on the home defence situation and. present
a full account of the invasion inquiry. However, the motion was
defeated by a division along party 1ine, 290 to 190. Although this
represented a set-back to those interested in the problem of national
defence, the Opposition persisted in pressing the Government first to
publish the inquiry's report and then to make an announcement of its
conclusions. Asquith eventually promised to deliver an exhaustive
statement on the invasion problem and. to permit a general discussion
of the question by the House, but war broke out before he had. an
opportunity of fulfilling his pledge.1
When Great Britain declared. war against Imperial Germany on
August 4, 1914, her peopi. and planners were perhaps better prepared.
for an attack on the home island ,Ø they were for a military campaign
on the european continent. o other contingency had been so thoroughly
•xamined. by the Governments counting the two investigations of the
strategic implications of a Channel Thnnel2 and the 1905 study of the
raid problem, th. problem of ovsrseas attack had been ecrutinised six
times since the formation of the C.I.D. is 1903. In order to under-
stand. the great importanc. of the invasion problem to the prewar
strategic planners, it is necessary to recall that they were always at
work in the twilight realm of the possible. It was their responsibil-
ity to devise a defence against all conceivable hostile combisations
1. Hansard (Commons) 25 February 1914, col. 1766 4 March 1914, cole.
431-33; 11 March 1914, col. 1268; 17 March 1914, cole. 1967-2014;
27 April 1914, ool. 1319; 11 June 1914, ccl. 492; 29 June 1914,
ccl.. 27-28; 27 July 1914, col. 919.
2. See Appendix C.
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and. th.y could. not know that the war would evolve in the way that it
did.. The contingency which gave such force to the case for invasion
- that of Britain alone against Germany alone - did not occur. When
Britain entered the war, Germany was alrea&y at war with France,
Russia and Belgium, and. was too deeply involved on her own frontiers
r
to detach an expeditionary forc. to Britain. Io,t was th. situation
favourable for a raid. or a siirprise attack. In the previous spring,
the Admiralty had decided, for reasons of economy, to hold a. test
mobilization instead. of the usual manoeuvres for the summer of 1914.
This had. come to a close and. the ships were dispersing on July 26th,
whsn news reached the Admiraity that Austria had. rejected. Serbiats
reply to her memorandum over the assassination of Archduke Franz
Ferdinand. Batt.rberg re-instituted. the mobilization of the Fleet
on his own initiativ, and. by July 31 the Fleet was at war stations.1
Britain therefore entered the war under conditions more favourable
for her home defenc, than had been foreseen, or even hoped..
On the afternoon of the first day of hostilities, August 5,a
War Council gathered at 10 Downing Street for am historic meeting
to decide the form of intervention in the war against Germany. It
was a strangely unbalanced. assembly to direct the war effort o a
maritime Empire. Only two "n.utral" Cabinet ministers, Asquith and
Grey, were present, while Churchill and. Batt.nberg r.pre.ent.d the
Admiralty. But two-thirds of the men in attendance were connected
with the War Offioe; Ra]clane, French, Murray, Baig, Grierson, Sir
Ian Hamilton, Kitchen.r, and. Roberts. The first qu.stio* to be
1. A.J. )Iarder. From the Dreadnought to SoaDa Flow. pp. 432-33.
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decided was the importance of invasion in relatiom to oth.r strategic
r.quir.mentes i.e. how many of the siz Regular divisions could be
permitted to leave the country? Churchill, speaking for the Admiralty,
ttcteC*
	 that th. situation was far more favourable than had be.n
assumed as th. basis of the last invasion inquiry. In contrast with
the contingezoies then examined, the Fleet was in a state of absolute
and complete readiness, the Territorials were fully embodied, and the
coastal fortifications were fully alerted. The urgent preparations of
the last few months had. justified themselves. Battenberg s.conded.
the oonfidenoe of his chief and "would not object if five divisions,
or perhaps even six were allowed to go." Even Lord. Roberts was buoyed
up by the hopeful strategic situation which had developed, observing
that "Germany was in a worse state than he had. ever dared to hope."
Invasion under the recert ciroumstarces was impossible.1
Putting aside the question of a massive invasion, Battenberg
asked whether a small raid to impe.e the Expeditionary Force was now
as possible as the General Staff had feared in the C.I.D. discussions
of the previous spring. Sir Charles Douglas, the C.I.G.S.,oaloulat.d
that the Germans could spar. only 10,0CC men for thi, purpose at
present. Hence the General Staff's
present arrangement was that five divisions should go at once.
The sixth division would be concentrated near Harrow ready fo
arty emergenoy in borne defence, and could be sent to 2 the Con-
tinent when the situation had. cleared sufficiently.
However when the War Council re-convened the following day, Xltohener,
who had just been appointed as Secretary of State for War, argued that
1. Cab 22/1/1 War Council, "Secretary's notes of a War Council h.ld
at 10 Downing Street, August 5, 1914."
2. Ibid.
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"under prevailing conditions, it was hardly politic to send more than
four divisions." French disagreed and pressed for five divisions to
be dispatched immediatelys one division at born. waê sufficient to
counter the risk of invasion. But the Prime Xinister cast the decisive
vote and backed itchener.
everything was to be said for retaining two divisions. The
domestic situation might be grave, and. colonial troops or
Territorials could not be called on to aid. the civil power.
Asquith's choice of words suggests that hi was mcxi concerned over
domestic security than the possibility of overseas attack, but it was
decided that two Reular divisions would remain behind to dial with
the possibility of a raid and the threat of an uprising)
Britain thersfors entered the long-anticipated war against Germany
on terms more favourable to her insular security than most of her
naval and militarr authorities had. dared to hop.. The surprise
attack or "Bolt from the Blue" which had featured so often in the
prewar conj.otur. 04. a-.-tim. polemics had been thwarted owing to
the alertness 'of the Fleet. Germany's military commitments elsewhere
precluded invasion. The Government saneioned the plan of th. General
Staff for a ontinental oampaign and Britain, for better or worse,
was committed to fight in France. But the oo.ing of war had hardly
resolved the invasion question, although it had diminished the range
of military possibilities. The months ahead would contain many un-
pleasant surprises and war experience would over-turn many cherished
predilections of peac.-tirne. The laat recommendations of' the C.I.D.
inquiry had not yet been discussed, nor had they been announced
1. Cab 22/1/1 War Councils "Secretary's Notes of a War Council held.
at 10 Downing Street, August 6 1914."
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to the House of Commons or the country. As a trateic situation
initially favoirable to 3reat Britain's security slowly deteriorated,
it remained to be seen whether the belief in her immunity from over-
seas invasion would become another obsolete superstition discredited
by the course of events.
CRAPPER IX. THE INVASION SCARE	 1914
AND TH SUPREME COMMAND
War with Germany had come at last; the contingency was transformed
to a conorets reality. The exhaustive preparations and recommendations
made by the authorities were put into action: the fleet was mobilized, PpS5
were arreet.d, the home defence army alerted, the coast defence activated,
and strategic objectives placed under guard. During the crucial first two
months of war the C.I.D. invasion inquiries proved their worth end the
strategic planners could watch the home defence situation evolv, along
previously antioipated paths laid out in the previous inquiries. As defence
problems arose, prearranged solutions were applied. The iisediate threat
on the outbreak .f ve was a German raid contrived to delay the Expedition-
ary Force. This possibility had been made extremely unlikely owing to the
mobilization of the Fleet and it became even more remote as the days passed.
By August 10th, Sydenharn was convinced that "if nothing is attempted soon
the possibility may disappear", for the Germans would need every trained
man they had on their own territory within three or four weeks. 1 By the
middle of August, the raid contingency had been circumvented: the four
desjatsd Begular divisions were safely landed in France and the fifth was
on its way.
According to the C.I.D., the situation sow presented th. optimum
conditions fox a and invasion: Only one Regular division, the sixth,
remained in ritain (it had been brought over from Ireland and was now con-
centrated and on the alert near Cambridge). The new Armies and Territorials
were at their lowest level of military efficiency, having only just begun
1. Ba.lfour
	
(49702) Sydenham to Balfour, 10 August 1914.
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their six months of training. Potential resistance against an invasion on
land was now at its lowest strength. The Admiralty redistributed its naval
forces to oompensata for the temporary military weakness. On AUgust 12th
Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, the new Comnndex of the Grand fleet, wa. ord.r.d
to bring hi. ships back to the East of the Orloieys into the "decisive
area" of the North Sea. through which it was believed an invasion flotilla
must pass. The Grand Fleet accordingly took up & mid-sea position on the
latitude of Aberdeen, while destroyers and cruisers made exploratory
reconnaissance sweeps further south.1
But th. anticipated invasion al-so failed to materialize. By August
22, Churchill was convinced that the danger was past and informed ICitchener
that
The Admiralty are confident of their ability to scours this
country against invasion or any serious raid. If you wish to
send the 6th Division abroad at once, we should not raiss any
objection train the naval standpoint. The situation, no that
both the Navy and Territorial. are mobilised and organized is
entirely different from those which have been disouseed on the
Invasion Coittee of the C.I.D., and if you want to send the
last Regular Division, the First Sea Lord and I are quite 	 2
ready to a&ee, and so tar as possible to accept responsibility.
The initially favourable strategic situation bad transformed Churchill's
approach to the invasion problem. His letter reflects not the caution vhh
he had expressed in the invasion inquiry the year before, but a confidence
in the power of the fleet which was more reminiscent of Fisher's regime
at the Admiralty. Kitchener, however, who had shunned the C.I.D. even when
his prsseno. was required, was not as confident, replying that he would be
in touch. Regarding the despatoh of the sixth division, Kitchener observed
1. Sir Juljan S. Cozbett. Naval Opaatjone. Vol. I. Longnane, Green & Co.,
London, 1920. p. 79.
2. Winston Cbuxohill.	 World Crisis 19l1-1914. Thornton Butterworth,
London 1923. p. 267. Churchill to itchener, 22 August 1914.
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pessimistically that "If I send it we have practically nothing left" for
home defence.1
The balance of the Government, however, continued to deal with the
invasion problem in the patient and oonsidered tradition of the C.I.D.
Hankey later recalled that
Early in the war ... as a matter of common prudence, and in no
alarmist spirit, Asquith asked me to keep in close touch on
the state of our home defence arrangements with the Staffs of
the two Services and with Ian Hamilton, who commanded the Hone
Dfence Forces, and to keip him informed of the position.2
As a result of this policy Hanicey produced an il-page athute in mid-September,
which compared the situation after six weeks of war with that projected by
the last invasion inquiry six months before. The lessons were inetructivs,
as Hankey stressed.
One factor which it i. important not to lose sight of is the
absolute disregard of human lif, by the German leaders in the
recent fighting. Time after time prepared positions have been
captured on land in frontal attacks by sheer weight of numbers,
notwithstanding terrific losses. Whether this policy will
succeed in the long rwi remains to be eeen, but up to the
present time it has succeeded tactically, and A feat, which
most of' our leading military men believed to be impossible,
has been a000mplihed repeatedly. The naval parallel to such
attacks would be the launching of an iumens. expedition, or
of a series of expeditions against our coast. Heavy losses
might be faced, as they have been on land, in the hope of
dealing a crushing blow. It may be assumed that the whole
strength of the German navy would be devoted to the task. It
might be employed •ither in a mass, every ship being included,
to force home the expedition, or part of it might be used to
make diversions to draw off our deep sea fleet. In any case
it may be assumed that at the selected moment every German
warship would have its allotted role.3
- - -
1. Winston Churchill.	 World Crisis	 .l-l94. Thornton Butterworth,
London 1923. . 267. Philip Zgnus. Kichener Portrait of an
Irnperialist.Ibzray, London. 1 958. p. 279.
2. Lord Hankey.	 Suprene Coininanti 1914-1918. Vol. I. Allen & Unwin,
London, 1961.
3. Cab 38/28/40 "Attack on the British Isles from oversea." 14 September
1914. p. 2.
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There was no iuminent danger of attack, as Germany had at present no
troops available for such an enterpris axspt third-line fortress levies.
But the collapse of the French in the West or the end of the Russian
offensive in the East could transform the situation. If Germany could
find troops for the invasion of England, the only factor limiting the size
of the expedition would be sea transport. Hankey calculated that the
available tonnage in German ports (289 British and German eiips) could
carry over six fully-equipped Army Corps, or "little abort of 300,000 men"
with cavalry, horses, artillery, and transport vehicles. However, this
involved the use of extremely slow ships and was only a theoretical maximums
and the expedition of four Army Corps, or from 185,000 to 195, 000 troops,
was more probable. This was still a formidable force several times larger
than the 70,000 men envisaged before the war.
Several aep.ots of th naval side of the operation had deteriorated
since the war had begun. Intelligence on German harbour. was now restricted
to unreliable scraps of information provided by n.utral ships and forwarded
from Copenhagen and Paris. Warning of a preparing invasion would therefore
be short, but thi. might partially be compensated for by deploying sub-
marines, torpedo bpats, and aircraft for r000nnalssanoe purposes. There
was a further disarming development which had not been foreseen. The
laid
Germans in late 4ugust had/down mines along the East Coast in such a
position that a German flotilla could sow additional mines to shield an
invasion convoy from British naval attack while it. landing proceeded.
Hankey therefore concluded that British naval strength should be conserved,
In tks event that the military situation on the continent worsened. Raids
aleo were always possible and must be provided against. 1
1. Cab 38/28/'à "Attack on the British Isles from oversea." 14 September
1 914. pp. 3-4.
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Another lesson of the war was the dependence of German infantry
upon heavy axtillerys this meant that it would be moat likely that invaders
would arrive with full equipment rather than as a stripped. "flying columa"
xelying on sped. The enemy therefore would have to seize a port to unload
their heavy weapons and •quipinent. All ports on the east coast except
Grimaby were defended, but with 6" guns which could easily be overaw.d by
the main armament of the German fleet. However, if the German fleet was
committed against harbour defences it would be threatened by British sub-.
marines and torpedo boats. A more likely course for the Germane to take
would be to land a email force on a beach which would capture a haxboux from
the land aide. But the slow and complicated operation of unloading an
expeditionary force with full equipment in a hostile county still remained,
the formidable difficulties of which were recently confirmed by the time
taken to land the B.E.F. in friendly French ports. Every hour's delay in
this most perilous phase of the oampaii increased the risk of attack from
the land and the sea.1
If his dependence on heavy ordnance greatly increased the enemy's
diffioultieø, the development by the British of an effectiv, coast defence
system since the outbreak of war constituted a further deterrent to
invasion. Hank.ey reported that every landing place on the South and East
ooasts was being watched by cyclists. Garrisons of varying else existed
at every port, whether defended or not, supplemented by local forces reads
to resist a landing. At most places on the East Coast, reinforcing
brigade, could arrive within hours and locomotives stood ready with steam
1. Cab 38/28/40 "Attack on the British Isles from Oversea." 14
Septimbsr 1914. pp. 4-5.
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up to carry troops from concentration points in the interior to the coast.
In most cases trench.. bad not yet been dug along the coastline but plans
were ready for this if it appeared that invasion was imminent. Piers at
possible landing place. bad been ordered to be prepared for demolition, but
no steps had been taken to close or block paths leading up cliffs from
likely beaches. Nor had a general scheme been prepared for destroying
cranes aM other disembarkation machinery at the larger ocsmercial ports.
Hankey added that "no land mines nor obstacles have been placed at landing-
places, and this is probably justified by the desire to avoid panic in the
height of the summer season."1
London remained the most likely objective, although attacks on Glasgow
and Edinburgh were also probable. Th. Thames would provide the best landing
place for a descent upon the capital, if the enemy committed a strong naval
force and could aooept heavy losses. He would have to run past a battery
of four 6-inch guns at ?ilbury, undergo bombardment by heavy une at long
range and face attack from sukinazines and torp.do boats. Harwich was the
only other harbour on the East Coast suitable for landing an expedition
and it was strongly defended against capture. A raid would most probably
be aimed at Woolwiob Arsenal, Glasgow, Barrow and the Tyneside dockyard.
/
and, if successful, would disrupt supplies of war materiel for months. No
effort should be spared to make these establishments secure. Hankey further
pointed out that a strong German fleet might force the Straits of Dover and
recommended that the defences of the South Coast, which had several ex-
ceptionally good landing places within fifty to sixty miles of London, be
improved up to the standard of those on the East Coast. 2
 Although Hankey
1. Cab 38/28/40 "Attack on the British Isles from Oversea." 14 September
1914. p. 5.
2. Ibid. pp . 5-6.
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did not make specific reference to the fact, it is likely that the advanos
of the German armies South into Prance made it seem prudent to provide against
a possible invasion from across the Channel.
Hankey's various suggestions for improving the half—formed defences
was based upon hi&ily mobile units of troops and equipment. Every military
centre, be argued, should hays an "ever ready column" which could move on
short notice. Where railways were not available, troops should be rushed
to the coast in oonvoye of motor aes. In addition,
Large numbers of armed and armoured motor cars should be kept
at places on the coast and at the military oonoentration places
behind the coast, ready to proceed at the shortest notice to
anyilanding place where the enemy is reported. Suitable con-
cealed earthworka oand.ing the landing places should be
prepared for their use.
His ide was to employ the armoured oars ("landships" still under th. control
of the Admiralty) as mobile artillery which would attack the Cerman ships
while the landing was in progress. In addition, the Central Force lay
ready under the cosxand of General Sir Ian Hamilton to provide the core of
resistance to any invasion. The Force now consisted of 130,000 Territorial.
organized into seven infantry and two mounted divisions and would shortly
be joined by two additional divisions, eventually reaching its full
establishment of 200,000 men. In the event of an attack, it would be con-
centrated "as far forward as is safe" to interpose between London and an
enemy column. 1
Hankey'e conclusions after six weeks of war generally confirme4 the
prewar evaluations of the C.I.D. He stressed that several day. would be
required to land a first—rate army in England, even with the resources of
1. Cab 38/28/40 14 September 1914. pp . 6 ,9. See Also WO 33/694 £1786
"Home Defences Central Force Scheme." August 1914.
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a major port such as Hull, Gximsby or London. Di.sembaxkation involved
formidable difficulties and the enemy would expose himself to every form
of naval and military attao*. But raids wexe by no means "improbabi." and
might be devised to lure the Grand Fleet onto a hidden minefield. Hankey
reoor!nended that blockahipe be made ready fox sinking at the entrance to
small ports and that trenches and barbed-wire be installed along the coast.1
H9nk.ey'e conclusions illustrate the fact that during the first two
months of wax the problem of overseas attack could be handled within the
context of the prewar C.I.D. studies. The home defence situation had not
yet evolved out of control or into unforeseen paths. However, by the
beginning of October 1914 two factors were beginning to emerg. which would
disrupt the continuity of home defenoe policy developed by the C.I.D. Thi
first of these was the German advance to and down the Channel coast during
Ootober, which modified the strategic situation beyond any of the contin-
gencies forecast by the C.I.D. The second disruptive force was th. niw
Secretary of State for War, Fie1d-rsha1 Horatio Herbert litchener.
Kitchener had been put in charge of the War Office by Asquith on the
first day of the war and one of his first acts was to appoint General Sir
Ian Hamilton, who had been his Chief of Staff in South Africa, Commander
of the Central Force. This was an odd choice, for Hamilton believed that
a German invasion of England wae "like trying to hurt a monkey by throwing
nute at him." Hamilton later testified that Kitchener in the War Office
was like a "poor untamed bull in a china shop", a solitary dictator who
distrusted organization and sabotaged systems. 2
 This was certainly true
l.Cab 38/28/40 14 September 1914. pp . 7-8.	 -
2. Sir Ian Hamilton. 	 Conmande. Hollis and Carter. London, 1957,
p. 128wGalliDoli Diary1. Vol.. T. Edward Arnold, London, 1920.
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insofar as Kitchener's handling of horns defence was concerned. In the
absence of te Gensral Staff which had gone to France with the B.E.F., the
established plans to engage the invader in the interior of England and
retreat slowly towards London and the Central Force were jettisoned, althoui
they were based on 30 years of staff woik. Kitchener reverted to the policy
of "meet them on the beaches", although his troops were of mediocre quality.
This etrate p had been r.psat.dly rejected by military authorities cmos
the 1880s on the grounds that it led to a fatal dispersion of force and
would permit the enemy to enjoy a local victory, out—flank the mass of'
immobiliz.d defending troops, and march on to London without enoountering
serious resistance.
In this and subsequent decisions bearing on invasion, Kitchener was
th. prisoner of inapplicable experience. He was the last in a long tradit.'
ion of British military heroes, such as Hamley, Woleeley, Baden—Pow•ll and
Roberts, who had made their reputations in a series of colonial campaigns.
Like them, Kitchener was grievously unequipped either by exp.ri.nce or
analytical capècity to deal with the intricate questions involved in a
German invasion of England. He had no experience of an opposed amphibious
landing, the most difficult operation b'own in war. The fact that large
bodies of Europ.an professional troops would be employed on both sides and
that the British would probably enjoy overall numerical superiority but
qualitative inferiority removed the question still further from Kitoherier's
frame of reference. He, like most veteran Generals of the old British
Regilar Army,had little appreciation of the naval aspect of the invasion
problem: the military strategic imagination ended at the coastline.
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ICitobener was the antithesis to everything the C.I.D. represented.
Autocratic, uncommunicative, and imperious in personality, improvising war
plans through a series of intuitive insights his method was diametrically
opposed to the C.I.D. tradition of collective decisions arrived at after
careful mutual study and discussion. In putting Kitobener in charge of
the War Office, A8quith introduced a 19th century atavism into the
councils of the supreme oomnndi an undoubting and charismatic equestrian
hero faced a modern policy-making committee, which shaped. strategy' on the
basis of group decisions. fltchener's awkwardness was further compounded
by the brilliance of his Cabinet colleagues. Surrounded by Asquith, Gr.y,
Haldane, Churchill, and Lloyd George, the taciturn and inarticulate itoh-
ener sat as a titan among the Olympians, a relic from another age.1
It was not long before the oon..quenoss of ICitchener's disruption of
the carefully-evolved home defence plans came to the attention of the
C,I,D.'s supporters. As early as September 11 Sydenham condemned Hamilton's
deployment of Territorials "in forward battl. array" as "very dangerous"
in the War Office I was given to understand that the policy
of the General Staff was to await an enewy in a prepared
position round London and not to meet him on the coast. The
plan appeared to rest upon the hypothesis that the Territoxials
were only adequate for purely defensive operations, and that It
would be necessary to bring part of the Expeditionary Force
back from France in order finally to finish the enemy off
I pursued the matter further and saw Sir Ian Hamilton, who
commands the Central Pcoe. Sir Ian told me that he bad
received two entirely contradictory sets of instructions from
the Wax Office. Loxd Kitohener's personal instructions were
that he was to meet an enemy at the beach immediately he landed,
push in all the forces he could, and worry him at every moment
until he was utterly crushed. This was the policy which
commended itself to Sir Ian Hamilton. The other policy, which
was communicated to him in an official letter from the Army
Council, was the ons favoured by the General Staff
1. A similar judnent is found in Robert Rhodes James. Callipoli. London,
1965. p. 20.
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Hankey was convinced that the problem "necessitates the intervention of
the C.I.D." and laid the whole matter befoxe Asquith sugge8tiflg that a
meeting of the Committee be called to solve the "muddle" in home defence)
As a result, the first wartime meeting of the C.I.D. on October 7 was
devoted entirely to questions connected with invasion. The Committee bad
to cop. not only with Lttohener'e dismantling of the established horns defence
dispositions, but.also with the rapid sweep of events on the continent. For
the first time the decisions facing the C.I.D. were not the products of the
slow and predictable pace of weapons development or diplomatic re-alignments;
they rather were beinf dictated by the forced march of German armies through
Belgium and Northern France. The strategical situation had now evolved
beyond any foreseen by the C.I.D. before the wax. The fall of Antwerp was
irmninent. Soon th. aearest German-held porte would no longer be Emden and
Hamburg, 300 miles distant, but Zeebrugge and Ostend, 60 miles from the
English coast. The 30 mile German foothold on the Channel coast also out-
flanked most of the horns defence preparations of the previous decade, which
had been centred on the East coast from the Thames to the Wash. The Germans
now possessed ports which aimed directly at Dover and the Thames Estuary.
The situatiob was a dangerous one and no one b'ew whether the German march
south along the coast could be brought to a h&lt; it was widely suspected
that the Germane were aiming at Dunkirk and Calais as bases for an attack
on England. For the first time since the home defence crisis of 1900 the
concern of the pianners and statesmen coincided with the anxieties of the
public over invasion. (see Chapter 10).
Asquith observed in his journal following the C.I.D. meeting of
1. Balfour M. (49703) Hankey to Balfour, 3 October 1914; (49702) Sydenham
to Balfoux, 11 September 1914.
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October 7, that German invasion had been discussed under
conditions being, of course, totally different from any we had
ever imagined in our long hypothetical inquiries. Everybody
agreed that nothing of the kind was likely to occur at the
pr.sent, which is just as well, as during the next fortnight
we shall kiavs fewer Regular troops in the country than has
happened for years. Much our weakest point i. deficiency in
guns and amiunition.1
As in 1900, the goverzinent's anxiety was rooted in the low number of Regulars
available in the country to oppose invasion. At one point in October only
four battalions remained in the country, instead of th. two divisions
stipulat.d by the CI.D. before the war. 2 Duiing the meeting Grey repeat-
edly called for the ritention of the two divisions until the anticipated
stalemate on the Continent 000u.rr.d.3
Kitchener's statement on the progress of the war had established an
apprehensiv, atmosphere. He stated that it might be anticipated that at a
later stage of the wax - by the coming of winter or by the Germans occupying
strong defensive positions - that a military deadlock would occur which
would rsleao. sufficient German troops for an invasion of England. He
believed that the defensive capacity of the country bad diminished since
the outbreak of wan the greater preparedness of the Tennitonials was more
than offset by stoppages in the supply of ammunition and the great drain on
the r.servoir of trained veterans. He prophesiedt
Should Russia fail to push home her attack, or should the French
Army go into winter quarters, this country might, so far as
military conditions are concerned, be seriously exposed to the
danger of invasion, not by 70,000 men but by 150,000-200,000.
-a--
1. H.H. Asquith. Memoni 	 and Reflections,. Vol. II. Cassell, London,
1928. p. 43.
2. Rankey. 
.22 . Cit. p. 219; Cab 38/28/44 "Attack on the British Isles from
Oversea". 5 October 1914.
3. Cab 38/28/47 "Minutes of 129th Meeting." C.I.D. 7 October 1914, pp. 5..
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Germany had ample shipping for the transport of these number.
and sh. would make her attempt under cover of a fleet action
and aided by her Zeppelins.l
With this one sentenoe ICitchener had almost trebled the expected seal. of
attack and overturned the conclusions of all of the various prewar in-
quiries. Kitchener made no reference to the fleet and repeated many of the
allegations of the prewar "invasioniets". But he was not directly challenged,
for the war had. already seen many things aocompliehed which the C.I.D. had
previously adjudged impossible.
Kitchener pointed out that the Germans had already violated with
success every rul. of war and theref ore to say that the operation of in-
vasion was unreasonable did not mean that it would not be attempted. A
general fleet action might involve the entire Navy and last several days
and while this was in progress German transports could reach British shores.
Churchill was more confident and replied that there was no manoeuvre he
would rather see the Germans take. Theii most promising course would be
to send 15,000 to 20,000 men to capture a port, laying mines in the vicinity
as a trap for the British Fleet. If this proved successful, the Germans
could engag. a reduced Grand Fleet on better terms and perhaps contain it
while reinforcements were landed. But the Germans would havi to seize a
port to support a massive invasion in view of their dependence on heavy
artillery and the Admiralty already had stationed older battleships in
certain ports as a precaution. But Churchill remained optimistic and
estimated that the present situation was even more discouraging to the
prospects of a raid or invasion than those examined by the C.I.D. in 1913-14.
1. Cab 38/28/47. "Minutes of 129th Meeting." CI.D. 7 October 1914. p. 3.
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But he, and Sir Charles Douglas, the c.t.G.S., wer. cono.rned over the
reduction of garrisons in the crucial Eastern ports. These garrisons were
now half the size they had been on the outbreak of war and were largely un-
trained and unarmed)
A general discussion followed on the possibility of rsoalling the
LE.1'. from the Continent in the event of a German invasion following a
military deadlock. Churchill quoted the "amphibian" philosophy of Sir John
Frenoh:"oux transports should b. regarded as a bridge for the purpose of
transferring troops from one theatre of war to another." Asquith believed
this to be necessary. But Churchill took full responsibility for preventing
the landing of more than 70,000 and asked Litchener, following C.I.D.
practice, to guarantee the defeat of that number once they were ashore.
fltchener replied evasively that the War Office had left nothing undone to
train sufficient men but mad. no definite commitment. He b3lieved that if
a deadlock occurred, the B.E.F. could be withdrawn if the Channel were
secure, for they constituted only a small part of the forces fighting
Germany. Kitchener warned that the danger of invasion would prevail until
January 1915, when he would have so many trained men available that invasion
would be defeated. But until then it would be necessary to follow the trend
of the campaign on the continent very closely, so as to have forewarning
of' a situation that would liberate German armies for an attack on England.
Chuxobill added that should the danger become extreme, the Royal Navy could
lay defensive minefield. parallel to the English coast.2
1. Cab 38/28/47. "Minutes of 129th Meeting." pp . 3-6.
2. Ibid. pp. 5-6.
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Churchill crittoized ICitohener's hypothesis in a letter written to
Jelliooe the next day. What Xitchener needed to do, he believsd, wa, to
study the invasion operation as had been done by the C.I.D.: "it is useless
to discuss such matters in general terms, and we are sure that a detailed
study of a conorete plan of landing, say, 150,000 men will prove fatal to
such ideas."1 If Kitchener'e case were developed to its ultimate conclusion
its weaIaess would be apparent.
we could transport our men baok across the Channel with the
command of the sea much more swiftly and surely than the
German. could bring theirs across th. much wider distances
of the North Sea in the face of a eatly superior naval
force. All that would have resulted from the suooess of
this most perilous operation on the part of Germany would
be to transfer the fighting of a certain number of AriIOr
Corp. from the Continent to the British Islands undsr circum-
stances unfavourable in the extreme to the Germans, and
favourable in every way to our troops; with th. certainty that
the Germans could not be reinforoed while we could be re-
inforced to almost any extent, and that unless the Germans
were immediately suoo..eful before their ammunition was
sxp.nded the whole force to the last man must be 1dlled or
mads prisoners of war.2
Churchill's confidence and lines of reasoning were directly influenced .till
by the C.I.D. inquiries before the war.
But as the war proessed, even Churchill's optimism began to fade.
He wrotefr.iiioo. a week later that the general aspect of the war was im
and that the pressure of Russian armies on Germany was not what it
expected to be. Churchill was evidently influenced by a further memorandum
by Hankey on the invasion problem, which was printed on October 15th and
reflected the deteriorating situation on th. continent. Han?r.ey began by
noting that th. prewar inquiries into invasion had provided a reasonable
1. Churchill. .22.. 21.t.. p. 386; J.11ioo.S. (48990) Churchill to aellicos,
8 October 1914.
2. Ibid. pp. 386-387.
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eis for Britisi military policy in peacetime. These. were of necessity
the product of various expert opinions, for there had not been sufficient
experience of modern war to provide accurate information. But they were
in
hardly an infallible guide to oonduct(vart peacetime hypotheses had been
exploded in a number of instances. Expenditure of axxtnunition and percent-
ages of casualties were far greater than had been expected. Frontal
attacks had been held to be impossible, but had frequently succeeded.
Attacks on trade routes had proven less successful than some experts had
predicted. Experts had said in 1909 and again in 1913 that airships
were useless, "one consequence being that we ourselves bad not a single
airship, though we live in daily apprehension of Zeppelin attacka."
The fluid and unpredictable course of war called into question,
Hankey asserted, the hypothetical peacetime conclusions of the C.I.D.
It had been decided that London was the only possible objective of a
mass invasion, but the coming of war had brought a new factor. The
formation of the ew Armies and the efforts to equip them had enhanced
the strategic value of the munitions factories in th North beyond a
point foreseen by the C.I.D. The destruction of the,Tyneside factories
alone would justify a gzeat effort and the taking of risks by the
enemy, as this would palalyBe the xeater part of the New Armies for
months or longer. Another wartime development was the difficulty of
attaining information as to what was occurring in German harbouxs. The
peacetime estimate was that only 20,000 German troops could embark
1. Cab 38/26/48 "Invasion." M.P.A.H. 15 Octobex 1914. p.2,
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vithout a warning reaching London; now the Government had little news
at any time. It was now known that Germany had more than a million
tons of shipping available for transport purpose, more than double the
peacetime estimate.1
ar experience also confirmed the difficulties of close blockade.
German submarines had driven the Royal Navy out of the North Sea.
British submarines could move into the Heligoland Bight for observation
purposes during calm weather but could not destroy more than one or
two transports proceeding at full speed, espeqily if these were
escorted. These would now have to be withdrawn with the onset of
winter. Unless some regular system of extended reconnaissance and
communication was established, "the invading force does not run much
risk of discovery until close to the British shores." Instead of 24
hours warning of invasion, only one or two hours could now be guaranteed.2
Disembarkation conditions bad therefore altered in favour of the Germans.
Diversions by the German fleet, the sowing of mines, and the actions
of German submarines might delay the arrival of the Grand Fleet on the
scene even further. British coast patrols could provide an early
warning of invasion, but miht be drawn off by false reports or an
urgent call from the Fleet. If the Germans succeeded in bringing
their transports into shallow water, they could not be sunk by
British submarineB. Running them aground would secure them from sinking
1. Cab 38/28/48 "Invasion" LP.AIH. 15 October 1914. pp. 2-3.
2. Ibid. pp . 3-5.
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from any source. There was always the eventuality that the entire German
High Seas Fleet would be risked in one supreme effort to effect a landing.
When it is remembered that their whole strength could be
converged at on. point suddenly and without warning, whereas
our force 1. scattered from one end of the coast to the other,
the difficulties of the defence become apparent.
The main British force would eventually arrive, but could it arrive in time
to thwart a landing?1
Although the C.I.D. in 1908 had admitted that an embarkation on a
beach was possible, the seizure of a harbour was far more likely. Wax
experience at .Lntwerp, Liege, and Namur indicated the power of German heavy
guns even #he the most heavily fortified ports would soon succumb to the
11" main armament of the High Seas Fleet. The defended ports bad been
designed to hold off the enemy until the arrival of the Royal Navy in
strength, but it was extremely doubtful whether any of the "exposed and
often conspicuous" defences could hold off a determined enemy, ready to
accept losses and run risks, for twenty—four hours. 2 The situation once
the invaders were ashore, was equally unpromising, for the War Office con-
sidered that the Territorial. were unfit to talc. the fie]d.If the German
preoccupation with two fronts ended, the War Office would have to consider
two unpalatable alternatives, the retention of two Regular divisions now
beiri prepared for the continental campaign or the withdrawal of part of the
force already there.
1. Cab 38/28/48 "Invasion" U.P.A.H. 15 October 1914. p.5:
2.
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So peat and so paramount ... is the importance of aecuxin
th. heart of the Fritish Empire that the War Office cannot take
the responsibility of running any risks. If Great Britain were
sucoesefully invaded it might be impossible to continue the
war. All the supplies of our own armies and many of those for
our Allies would cease. The Expeditionary Force might be de-
prived. of its means of continuing the wax, and it is by no means
unlikely that the whole campaign of the Allies would collapse.
Even a successful landing and a campaign of two or three weeks
in eat Britain would be a terrible shock to our presti., and
would probably result in bringing back the whole Expeditionary
Force - if it could be disengaged, which the enemy would do his
utmost to prevent by concentrating at this portion of the line.
rim avery point of view it is most important that a landing
should b rendered impoesibl..l
Hankey ended this most pessimistic appreciation of the situation by noting
that the only re4ssuring development of the war thus far had been the mining
of the Channel, which had secured the Southern coast from invasion. The
Admiralty had also decided to supplement the existing German minefields off
the Huinber, Pyn. and Suffolk,whidh constituted a new defence against a
German landing. The situation required careful and constant study, as its
main elements chaged almost daily.2
Kitchener, evidently influenced by this paper, wrote to Churchill
suggesting that it might be "a good thing to have some of the more powerful
modern ship. from the and fleet in the Eastern ports, so that they could
act quickly in cas• of emergency in the North Sea or Channel." 3 Xitchen.r's
foray into the deep waters, of naval strate' inspired a lengthy letter in
Churchill's awn hand the same day which catechised Kitchener in Admiralty
1. Cab 38/28/48 "Invasion" IL.P.A.E. 15 October 3.914. p. 6.
2. Ibid.
3. Aeguith	 Box 13. Kitohener to Churchill, 19 October 1914.
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doctrine.
My dear Kitohener -	 19.10.14.
The foundation of our policy is to keep intact and united
with Jslliooe a fleet able to beat the whole German Navy
There can be no question of dividing it ox dispersing it.
Churchill instead advised Kitohener to emulate the exhaustive methodolo'
of the CI.D.
You have at your dispoeal probably the best experts in the world.
Let them make a plan for the landing of 150,000 men (a) on a
beach, (b) at a port ... Let them work out the number of trane-.
ports, the number of men in Each, the number of horses, the
number of waggons, the tonnage of supplies and ammunition, eto.
eta. Let them select their beach ... Choose any day in the past
month. Assume (a large assumption) that yr Armada has reached
the English coast without being detected ... Leave out th. chance
of weather. Assume it all goes perfectly and that we only get
notice when yr ships are sighted frcri the shore. Assume that the
whole German Fleet supports this operation ... The Adiny will then
say what force we can bring to bear ... You will then be able to
see whether any, and if so what changes axe required in our
arrangements. It really is no use dealing with the subject in
general terms.'
History unhappily does not record Kitohener's reaction to Churchill's
letter. But it was inevitable that misunderstanding should evolve between
the two men, for their approach to strategic problems were diametrically
opposed. Xitohener was the last of the old-style Generals relying on
intuitive insights to solve strate,to have a voice in the supreme coinnnd.
Churchill was the outstanding representative of the C.I.D. tradition, in-
sisting on an open-minded and flexible attitude to strategio problems until
decisions had been made as the result of a rigorou, analysis of detailed
hypotheses. Their divergent philosophies slowly led to a breakdown of
communications between the two men and the departments which they controlled.
1. Aeguith MSS. Churchill to ttohener, 19 October 1914.
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By the end of the year Chuzohill was complaining to Aequith that "cooper-
ation between the Admiralty and the War Office is difficult, owing to causes
of which you are fully aware."
The divided counsels of the two men were apparent in a Cabinet inesting
which conven•d the next day. Both Kitohener and Churchill outlined their
v.rsion of the invasion problem ax* described the defensive preparations
of their respective departments. Lttohener reported that another two
Regular divisions would be in th. United Kingdom within a month, that the
Territorial. were now armed with rifles, and that "the process of entrench-
ing the lzokground of possible landing places is in full operation."
Churchill was yet confident that any German incursion was "doomed to Disaster"
but the Cabinet approved his proposal to secure a line of torpedo-proof
harbouxs along the coast for capital ships and a scheme to close the North
Sea to all but licenced British ships. The Cabinet also aeed to intern
the 23,000 German and Austrian males in England "in view of the nearer
approach of the German forces."2 By this time British armies were heavily
engaged against a German Southward advance near the Channel coast and even
Ministers who were veterans of the C.I.D. inquiries were impre8sed by the
enemy's military achievements. Grey wrote to Xitohener after the Cabinet
meeting asking that the Elewick works on the Tyne, "our greatest single
souxo. of supply of field guns and ammunition", be protected against German
raiders. Grey believed "it would well be worth while for the Germans
l.Asguit	 5. Box 13. Churchill to Asquith, 29 December 1914; See also
Aaquith.	 Cit. pp.
2. Cab 41/35/54 Asquith to George V, 22 October 19 14. (report of Cabinet
meeting, 20-21 October 1914).
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deliberately to sacrifice 30 or 40 thousand men or more, if they could
disable Elewiok before their men were stopped or taken." Kttchener in
reply described the measures he had already taken for the defence of the
area: Elawick was within the defences of Newcastle and was guarded by a
division of Territortals as well as by seven strong battalions of infantry
and eight heavy guns) This oontinenoy, at any rate, was well provided
against.
The German advance towards and down the Channel coast was paralleled
by an even more unsettling development in the North Sea. On October 26
the C.I.D. printed a paper by Balfour which enlarged upon Hankey's observa .-
tions of the week before and called attention to the revolutionary con-
ditions at sea produced by the advent of the sea-going submarine.
the North Sea i. neither commanded by the British Fleet nor
by the German fleet, it is in the joint occupation by (sic)
the submarines of both countries .., From this it would seem
that our fleet has been couipelled by the threat of submarines
to occupy stations almost as far from the coasts they have to
defend as if wax had broken out suddenly and they had been
caught carrying out manoeuvres to the west of Ireland.
The newly-discovered offensiv, power of the submarine made nonsense of the
concept of "command of the sea" and had rendered permanent a situation
suggested only as a temporary possibility by invasion "alaxmiata" before
the war. If the doctrine of "command of the sea" was an absurdity in the
presence of German submarine., they also made a mockery of the Mabanian
insistence on the capital ship,and the culminating naval battle was a thing
of the past. Balf our stated that fear of invasion was not removed, but
only "materially diminished" if the German fleet were wholly destroyed in
a general engagement.
1. ithenerS. PRO 30/57/77 Grey toitcbenar, 21 October 19 14;	 -
Kitoheer to Grey, 23 October 1914.
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It is not the German battl. fleet but the German submarines
which are causing moat of th. trouble; and the German submarines
would be as numerous and effective after a new ?rafalger as
befor. it. If there wsre no German battle fleet in existence
our own bs.ttl. fleet would have to remain thirty-six hours away
from the threatened coast ... In these circumstances, ought we
not to endeavour to throw additional difficulties in the way
of a German landing other than those presented by "a fls•t in
being."
Tb. situation now approzimat.d that foreseen by th. C.I.D. the previous
April: British defensiv. capabilities were no longer sufficient to meet
th. d.iwds made on them and the Governmsnt would hays to taks risks some-
where. Balfour rejected fltoh.n.r's crud. hypoth.eis of invasion by
150,000 to 200,000 and instead forecast that invasion might be attempted
in a form mentioned earlier by Hankey, but never contemplated by the C.I.D.
through 'tb. invading force	 j against our attacking ships,
and thus being enabled to effect disembarkation in comparative security.
Balfour's brilliant mind was among the first to grasp th. radical
transformation of naval strategy and tactics wrought by the submarine and
his was th. best and meet lucid analysis of the situation at the time. But
when it cams to suggesting a r.m.dy, Balfour could only suggest that naval
weakness be counter-balanced by aunenting the military and shor• defences.
Balfour, who saw the problem more clearly than any of is cont.mporari.s,
was reduced to recommending piecemsal expedients already suggested by
Hankey and Kitohen.ri camouflaged mobil, howitzers to cover landing beach.s,
blockehips, the mining of piers and jetties, and the formation of a s.00nd-
ary coastal force of obsolete battleships. Balfour understood the radical
natux• of the probism at sea, but even he had no answer to meet it. He
1. Cab 38/28/50 "Attack on th. British Isles train Oversee." 26 October
1914. pp . 2-4.
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cono.ded that "a email turn of Fortune's wheel might put the Germane in
possession of Thankirk and Calais" but all he could suggest was the demolition
of the ports before capture.1
Vice-Admiral Frederick Sturdee, Chief of the Admiralty War Staff,
also recognized the revolution brought about by the submarine in a manu-
script note written two days later (October 28), ominously headed "flj
Fleet cannot prevent a rtdin." But where Balfour in the C.I.D. tradition
had given all the benefits of the doubt to the enemy, Stuzdee observed that
the newly-proved powers of the torpedo and submarine did "io1ce caution
on both sides." German submarines could now be watched only by submarines,
whose wireless was only of limited range. Early warning of invasion could
not therefore be guaranteed. Sturdee calculated that owing to the German
submarin. menaces "Our fl..t may be from 300-500 miles from point of
tnvaion and will take some 20 houie to reach the danger point." In
addition, the Admiralty had
to deal with an exceptional man, who is impulsive, imperative,
and all pow.rful in hi. country and must be ready for a real
flash of hi. geniu. in his present hatred of England and
everything may be risked to strik, a crushing blow at England.
Stuxdee, however, realized that the submarins danger preserved the 1ntegxiy
of coasts everywhere. 2 The problem, li• seems to have seen, contained its
own solutions he had therefore gone one step further than Balfour. Un-
happily, 5turd.. could not work with Fisher, and when the latter came to
the Admiralty at the end of October, the Admiralty had to dispense with his
services, 3 at a tim when Sturdee's services and strategic insights could
hay, provided a crucial contribution.
1. Balfour	 . (49692) Aequith to Balf our, 28 October 1914.
2. Adni 137/965/107-08 "The Fleet cannot prevent a landing." in Sturdee 's
hand. 28 October 1914.
3. Sturdee had been Bereeford's C.O.S. in 1907-1908. For 3 rather or1tioal
ses p. 506)
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Churchill's letter to Sir John French the same day (October 26)
reflected the rapidly-ohanging situation.
Lttohener is strangely alarmed about invasion, and on the CI.D.
we have witnessed an absolute reversal of the roles — the 1.0.
declaring the country not safe and an invasion of 250,000 a
possibility, and the Admiralty re-assuring hem or trying to.
You know how carefully I have examined that position, and bow I
have never minimised the risks. &it now that we are face to
face with realities, I am not alarmed, and mp policy is that you
should be reinforced by any effsotive division that can be formed
and maintained; and that the Navy will prevent any invasion of a
serious character. The Prime Minister is solid as a rock; but
waves of nervousness pass over others, and may result in some
r.tardation of your reinforcement. ...t my dear friend, I do
trust you realise how daabl. it will be if the enemy settles
down for the winter along lines which comprise Calai, Dunkirk,
or Ostend. There will be continual alarms and .atly added
difficulties.
By now ven th. ebullient first Lord was taldng measures against a German
jnvasiort) Churchill later recalled that "I do not remember any period
wh.n the weight of the War seemed to r ress more heavily on me than thees
months of October and November, l9t4"2Dn October 23rd Churchill informed
Battenberg and Sturdee that
From l.t Nov. begins the maximum danger period for this Country,
ending during January when new armies and terxttoxtale acquire
real military value. During this period, vary likely deadlock
on land enabling Germane to economize troops fox an invasion.
If •ver to be attempted, this t. the time. I am confident of
our ability to inflict salutary punishment if it is tried, but
no precaution must be negl.cted.3
Churchill proceeded to outlin, the probable shape the German attack
would take. The enemy could guard his invasion convoy with "Roon" class
cruisers and "!itt.lsbaoh" battleships, preserving the first line moderi
ships for battl. with the Grand Fleet. Because invasion had come to be
regarded as a serious contingency by the Admiralty only in the months
1, Churchill	 j.pp. 376-77. Churchill to French, 26 October 1914.
2. Ibid. p. 397.
3. Adzn 137/965/98. Poijoy s Antt-Thvaaio 1914. First Lord, to 1SL and
COB 23Octdl)8Xl9l4f;t	 see AJ. Marder. From the eadnoug*it
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itbefore war broke out, no detailed plans againat/ad been worked o ut. Pxe-
cautions and preparations were n hurriedly improvised. Churchill reooninended
an ertension of the existing reconnaisaanoe systems Destroyers end light
cruisers were to push up close to H.ligoland while seaplanes oould carry out
an additional patrol in the evening. In addition, the Admiralty should
ensure that the coast watch "is thoroughly geared up." The second remedy
involved a massive re-deployment of vessels in home waters, The first line
fleet was at Soaps Plow ready to intercept the High Seas Fleet. In addition,
obsolete cruisers and battleships would be organized as a second force which
would engage the invasion convoy and would be based on East Coast harbours.
Also, "the Patrol Flotilla of submarine, ought during these months to be
concentrated as much as possible on the wore vulnerable and important part.
of the Coast, the Tyne, Norfolk, Harwiob, the Thames." Churchill concluded
by urging vigorous action at once from all department. to carry out these
measures.l Battenberg in reply outlined disposition. for various ships along
the East Coast and recommended that an interservice inspection of the coast
watch and coastal defences be carried out by motorcar by senior officers of
both services. 2 On October 27 - the day the battleship Audaciou was sunk
off Ulster by C•rman mines - Churchill outlined another possible version of
a future invasion desigaed "to overhaul our tackle" and recommended that
Adral Callaghan study the problem wits some officers from the War Staff.
His scenario visualised an invasion convoy proceeding under the protection
of 17 cruisrs and fiv. older battleships of the Kaiser class and the
1, Adw 137/965/ 98. Policy Anti-Invasion 1914. First Lord to 151. and COB. -
23 October 1914.
2. Mm 137/965/100 ttsnb.rg to Chuxohill, 26 October 1914; see also Ad
137/965/101 Churchill to Sturdee, 27 October 1914.
- 508 -
general cover of the High Seas Fleet. Churchill assumed that the German.
ould employ numerous armoured lighter, and aruiouxsd barges capable of
carrying 500 to 1200 men apiece (similar to vessels being planned at the
Admiralty for a landing on the Baltic ooast). Given this situation, Churchill
asked:
If the enemy intend to attempt an invasion, oarrying their troop.
partly in ..lf—prop.11sd light draft lighter., capable of self-
definoc by rifle fir• and maohir gun. against torpedo craft; and
partly in transports armed with guns capable of resisting a torpedo
attack; and if they secort this foro. with some or all of the older
vssaels named above; and, in a000rdao. with what seems to have
been the practice in British expeditions agains4he French coast,
they cover the exp.dition from attack by the Grand Fleet by means
of their Hii Seas Fleet; what etepa do we propose to adopt to
defeat the landing of these troops?2
Churchill shot off a barrage of questions. What fcace should attack the cx-
p.d.ition and it. escort? How could the armoured barges be dealt with?. What
use could be made of aircraft? Was it desirable to concentrate more sub-.
marines? Where would the enemy land to march on London? Could the enemy ..ise
Harwioh arid block it from attack?
An Admiralty committee under Admiral Sir George Callaghan considered
the problem and reported four days later on 31 October. The committee deoid.d
that the Grand Fleet should not be risked in operations against an invasion
foro., for it was the sola defence against starvation and blockade. Even
if the main German fleet appeared to provid. an escort to the convoy, it
should be attacked only by British miss and submarine. so that it would
enter an area more favourable to the British fleet. Th. committee reetéed
that th. capture of London was the only contingency brought up by the First
Lord, for diversionary attacks on the East Coast and elsewhere were equally
possible. Only heavy guns would stop the armoured barges, which would
1. Robert RhodesSames. Ga11jpolj.ateford, London, i96. p. 3j
2. Adm 137/965/103-04 by W.S.C. 28 October 1914.
- 509 -
have a short range and would therefore be restricted to landing on the coast
between the Humber and the Thames. Advance warning of the attack could be
obtained by employing reconnaissance aircraft to carry out extended patrols
daily just before daylight and daybreak. Approaohes to Heligoland were to
be mined continuously whil. submarines were to cruise in the vicinity ready
to give the alarm via, wireless or homing pigeons. allaghan'. committee
further recommended that senior naval officers inform the Admiralty 12 hour.
in advanc. of weather oonditions favourabl, for a landing. They called
attention to the fact that officeis with the fleet were unaware of the 1ooa
tion or strength of the military coastal defences and doubted whether the
Admiralty itself was in possession of this information)
Churohill bad firected this general ting up of the naval defences
against invasion as a result of
	 pessimistic forecasts and the
crumbling strategic situation on the continent. Now an additional incentive
reached him in the shape of an alarming series of intelligenc, reports on
German invasion preparations. On October 21 the Foreign Office informed the
Admiralty of a conversation which had taken place between the British and
German naval attaches in St. Petersburg the previous spring. The two men bad
enjoyed a doe, friendship; on one ocoasion the Germn had revealed that he
had recently been employed in the planning department of the German Naval
Headquarters and that
amongst other strategic plans considered by the Staff, naturally
the special one of invading England had also been examined. In
the first place, it was laid dn that to be effective, a force
of not lees than 5 Army Corps must be landed; rsquiring for trans-
port at the very least half a million tons of shipping. The
collection and preparation of the latter alone presented practically
1. Adm 137/965/110-118,
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insuperable difficulties, but the further demand of the Staff
that in order to have the barest chance of success, complete command
of the Noith Sea must be absoluteli guaranteed during three months
so as to safeguard the passage of supplies and reinforoeents, etc.
during the ibsequent operations, as well as the initial landing,
simply showed up the essential and fatal weakness of the whole ides
by "complete command" the Staff meant it to be understood that
not one even of our Destroyers or Sutnarinee was to be at large in
the German ocean.
The Germans had "very clearly intimated" that the attainment of these require-'
ments "was at beet visionary." The invasion plans were therefore consider.d
merely as an interesting academical thesis, and in consequence relegated to
the topmost row of the Office pigeon holes.
Although the Admiralty had no means of ascertaining this, an examination
of the German naval arc ivs confirms that this report was substantially
accurate. (S.. Appendix A.) Naval intelligenc. took it quite seriously, but
noted that one of the'nsuperabls Cifficulti.s" of invasion - lack of
shipping - no longer existed. There were 144 steamers known to be in German
ports, certainly sufficient to convoy fly. Arn' Corps to the British coast.
But the real importance of the report was that it rightfully emphasised the
importance the Germane put on freedom from interception during the sea
crossing. Naval intelligence believed that more sanguinary counsels were
coming to prevail in the high command of the German Navy. Certain prepara-
tions on the Continent seemecf ' to point to plans to block British torpedo—
boat harbours. 2 One report described the preparation of iron barges in
Germany as blockehips by filling them with cement and sinking them at harbour
entrances.3
1. Adm 137/965/79-80 Forel Office to Admiralty, 21 October 1914:
Commander Grenfell to Six George Buchanan, 8 October 1914.
2. Adm ]37/965/82...83 Memo by D.O.D. n.d.
3. Ad.m 137/965/86 "nvaeion. Telegrams." 13-25 October 1914.
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Throughout the last week of October various reports reached Naval
Intelligence from other, ha, impeccable, sources. Then win repeated
rumours and reports of "landing barges", perhaps an echo of the Admiralty's
own secret exertions in this field. An intercepted dispatch from the _____
Teleaph correspondent in Copenhagen reported that the Bowald and Cermania
shipyards at te1 were building 30 armouxed motor lighters, each of which
could carry 500 men maldng nine knots. These wire to make their way through
the Kaiaer Wilhelm Canal to the Soheldt to prepare for invasionj three wer•
believed to be already
	 route.1 The British Minister in Copenhagen
teleaphed a variation of the report the next day.
From 20 to 30 large iron barges ... bullet and machine gun proof
and with Diesel motors capabl, of developing a speed of 8 knots
are to be taken through the canal and thence by sea to
Antwerp.2
Reports of this type appeared with variations until the end of the year. On
December 11 the Consul at San Francisco forwarded a letter which described
the manufacture in German ports of
fifty odd craft designed to carry thoope across the North
Sea to England. Each craft sits low in the water, with
slightly sloping roof; roof and sides covered by four inches
of armour plat, having a sufficient number of air compart-
ments to make it unsinbl.. Each craft designed to hold
2,000 soldi.r., the men being entirely pmmtected, first by
the armotaxed plate and second by being disposed below the
water line. Enough of these will be constructed to carry
200,000 men ... a fairly large sized army is being daily
drilled in handling the;. 3
The informant thought this was merely "Town talk" in Germany, but the D.N.I.
thought the Germans might be contemplating "the seizure of a pied-a-terre by
an advance corps in lighter draft ve8aela which are capable of moving over
and placing men ashore UiCk1y."4
1. Adm 1 37/965/86 . Copenhagen. 20 October. "From Daily T.leaph Cprrespond-
ent intercepted."
2. Ibid. N.M. Minister, 21 October.
3. Adzu 137/965/270 "from P.O. 11 December 1914. Consul General at San
Francisco' German Preparations for Invasion of Britain."
4. Adm 137/965/83-84. D.O.D., n.d.
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Other informants provided news of other ambitious German projects fox
invasion. The Minister at Copenhagen on October 27th provided news of
Intense excitement at Hamburg. A number of large steamers are
being fitt.d out with the rwnoured intention of invading
England. Upon the decks of the largest ships are platforms
fox starting aeroplanes. The interiors axe ready fox transport
of troops.l
On. "Mr. Voigt of London" provided details of an invasion eoheme which he had
gleaned, he claimed, from a l.tt.r be had seen from a Corwetten-Captain in
Iilh.lmahav.n. According to this version, three Army Corps were in readi-
ness at Wjlhelmsbaysn, Cuxhaven, and Eaden, preparing for a landing in the
Tirth of Forth. Following "another decisive success in Prance", every avail-
able liner of the Nord-Deutsch Lloyd and Hamburg-Amerika companies, which
had been waiting for weeks with steam up and all guns and supplies on board,
would cross to England wider the escort of Z.ppeline. Other Zeppellns would
fly ahead to attack points on the East Coast, for German aerial reconnaissance
had
ascertained the whole north-eastern coastline is practically
unguaxded. There are no mine's and few ships. lithin a week
we shall be in possession of the whole of England. The
High Seas Fleet may then risk battle with the British Fleet,
although the plan is for us to return with our convoys, many
of which are 20-22 1oaw steamers. No doubt the unloading of
stores will take a few days, and a meeting with the English
fleet will hardly be avofded.2
Further reports were even more fanciful. A "Belgian Red Cross Sergeant
who bad left Antwerp on Ootoler 13th" bad overheard German officers disoueeing
the invasion of England in a sidewalk oafs.
1. Adm 137/965/88 Copenhagen. 27 October 1914.
2. Ada 137/965/90 "Precia of a supposed letter from a Corw.tten Captain
to his brother a Lieutenant in the army. Said to have been seen by a )fr.
Voigt of London. Wilbelmebaven. September l)th, 1914.
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10,000 German soldiers were to dress jn Belgian Uniforms and
ask the ngliah for transport to &igland. These would form an
advance guard. Simultaneously from other points the main
expedition would leave, apparently in barges which were now
being fitted with engines out of motor-oars.1
Churchill passed the reports to Fisher, who had recently succeeded Batt.nb.rg
as First Lord, with the comment "You should lock at this variegated stuff."2
Although they varied widely in accuracy, the variety and number of reports
•eaohing the Admiralty testify that the invasion projeot was being widely
mooted in Germany, Great Britain, and other countries. They doubtless prov-
ided an additional impetus to the precautions now being prepared against
overseas attaok.
By early November Churchill and Fisher were ta1dng measures against
overseas attack in earnest. ( the end of the month, the Grand Fleet was
given draoonio orders.
The Commanding Offioers of His Majesty's Ships meeting with
enemy transports, which there is reason to believe ar.
carrying troops to British Territory, are enjoined to sink
them at once by torpedo or gun fire. No parley wits, or
surrender by, a transport on the high seas iEoasibl•.3
The next day Fisher warned elliooe that a German naval move wa imminent,
pending the outcome of the fighting arQund Ostend. The full extent of
Admiralty trepidation. is disclosed by a "Most Secret" order despatched by
hand to Jelliooa on November 12. Contrary to usual praotioe, this was
written out in manuscript by Churchill and no copy was kept. (Corbeit could
find no copy of the letter in the Admiralty files while compiling th.
1. Adm 137/965/91 "Precis of a report of a Belgian Red-Cross Sergeant who
left Antwerp on October 13."
2. Adm 137/965/85 marginal note: V.S.C. to 1SL 31. 10.14.
3. Adm. 137/965/118A "Treatment of Enemy Transports." 2 November 1914.
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official history of the naval war in the 19208.)1 Both Fisher and Churchill
were now fully oocmitted to Kitohener'. version of a possible attack, and
"endeavoured to imagine the most formidable and dangerous plan that the
Germans could adopt."
Their Lordship. have considered very carefully the possibilities
of German decisiv, action during the next 6 weeks. If a deadlock
occurs on the line. of battl. in Trance and Russia, ample troops
could easily be spared by the enemy fox a raid or invasion. The
volume of shipping at Hamburg ii sufficient to transport an army
of a quarter of a million men 1 and there is no doubt that this
shipping has been specially fitted with all appliances necessary
for the transport and speedy disembarkation of an army. Wø have
no certain means of kning when a fleet of transports with its
escorts, with or without the High Seas Fleet, has put to sea.2
Their Lordship.' appreciation of the situation leads them to the
conclusion that if the Germane move at all, they will move with
their whole force and that th. naval battl, will be fought as an
inteal part of a concentrated operation of invasion or raid, or
both. Probably the first news will be of a military raid on the
Northumberland, Yorkshire, or Norfolk coasts, followed at a cal..
oulated interval with a more serious descent with an army
The enemy will probably use his old battleships and old cruisers
to escort his transports and to engage our flotilla.. H. will
protect his landing operations from naval interference and
extensive mining. 3
Jellico. was advised to concern hims.lf exclusively with the destruction of
the High Seas Fleet "taking your own time, choosing your own method, and not
troubling yourself at all with what is going on in England." The Germans
would "count on your being hurried by panic in England", but the destruction
of the German fleet would retrieve
at a strok. everything that may have happened in England, and
plaoe. at our mercy every man who may have landed. Nothing there-
fore must distract or divert you from this single and paramount
1. The covering letter is found at Adm 137/965/164 with the following noteu
"No copy of the Memorandum forwarded with this letter has been found
among Admiralty papers or the Grand Fleet records. HISTORICAL SECTION.
6/3/1929".





Jellico., who bad been the successful "invading" Admiral in the 1913 naval
manoeuvrss, certainly needed no reminder of the danger of invasion. His
reply to the Admiralty was even more pessimistic in tone and affirmed that
"within the last month the conditions in the North Sea have entirely changed".
The numbers and activities of German submarines, whose range bad been
tremendously inar.as.d through the use of tenders disguised as neutral mer-
chant ships, ha contended, mad.e it impossible to maintain a watching force
of cruisers to give aayanoe warning of invasion. "Command of the sea" in
the strict sense could not exist in the North Sea. Jelliooe concluded that
there is no alternative but a radical chang. of ideas and policy,
and tb" abandonment of the basis upon which that policy has
hith.rta been framsd. Once it is acknowl.dg.d that we cannot
expect certain warning of a raid ... then it suet be aoIaow1edged
that the fleet cannot atoj, a large force landing. It is true
that the Fleet y make maintenance of the force when on shore
difficult or even impossible, but it cannot do this unless there
is military resistance at the start.
It therefore appears to me that the altered circumstances
should be officially recognised and admitted and that the
necessary steps should be taken iediate1y to meet the new
condition.. It sill be unpalatable, but once the truth is
realised the necessary military force must be provided. I
am awar• that the question of armament may prevent difficult-
ies, but preliminary training of the necessary military force
osa be taken whilst arms an being manufactured. Th. force
required 1. probably not large; some 300,000 men ahould, I
imagine, be sufficient ••,2
Xitohsner's warnin of invasion had now been seconded by the senior Admiral
afloat, to whom the suggestive/incident, of the p1.-war manoeuvree now seemed
to be boxn• out in reality.
Jelliooe urged that a number of measures be taken on shore to frustrate
a landing. A beaoh landing was unlikely in winter weather; "th. tanger
1. Jell .QIL(4899O) 12 November 1914.
	
- -
2. Mm 137/965/166_68 J1liooe to Secretary, Admiralty, 14 November 1914.
- 516 -
points" were therefore the rivers, harbour., and estuaries, all of which
should be blocked to prevent German transports getting through and landing
troops on jetties. In the majority of oases the rivers could be blocked
at their mouths and Jellico. recoinnnd.d that "merchant vessels shall be
placed in position ready to be sunk at a moment's notice by the explosion
of charge. prepared in the bottom of the ship." Emergency measures were
required, for th. crisis period would arrive in lee. than a week.
... the oonditions for a raid or invasion will be favourable on
•bout the 20th of this month ... high water occurs shortly after
daylight on thi. date, and as the majority of the ports under
consideration are shallow at the entrance it is reasonabl. to
asenne that the attempt will be made at high water and at day-
light ... I feel that with the present military wealciese of the
country it is of the first importance to be prepared to meet the
danger of a raid by the date mentioned - the 12th November
There are further steps which could be taken.
(1) The use of large quantities of petrol for creating surface
fires on the water.
(2 Preparations for the rapid demolition of jetties by explosives.
(3 The uss of old battleships to supplement defences.
(4 Effective measures for keeping spies away from these
localities.
(5) Defensive mining.
Jelliooe concluded by' enclosing an elaborate appendix which gave notes on
the moon and tide at various Eastern ports for the "danger p.riod" from 15
November to 31 January, and itemized defence measures to be carried out at
each place.2
Jellioo.'s communication inspired differing reactions at the Admiralty.
Admiral A.K. Risen was quite skeptical and observed that sinldng merchant-
men in harbour mouths "would almost certainly be done prematurely or too
late and in any case would have the effect of permanently damaging our own
ports for the sake of avoiding a very small danger." The destruction of




to lay minefields which could sink transports approaching them. 1 Churohill
and Fisher, however, were not content with half-measures arid almost
immediately (November 16) sent a cipher telegram directing Jelliooe to detach
the 22 battleships of the Kin,g Edward class, half a flotilla of destroyers,
and the Third Cruiser Squadron from his force at Scapa Flow and despatch
them to Rosyth to strengthen the "denuded" naval defences on the coast. In
effect, a seoond—lin• defensive fleet had been created. At the same time,
more detailed orders were sent by courier. Reconnaissance by naval aircraft
was again to be ext4nded and the Admiralty suggested that coastal monitors
could be used offensively against a landing, for the calm water which would
malce an embarkation possible would also make it possible for these craft
to be employed in the open sea.2
Fisher had already warned Jellicos that November 17 was "New Moon Day!"
and that be had a presentiment that "a German Naval move is 	y very
imminent."3 Now he informed him that
ICitchener (who spent a long time with me yesterday) EUALLT
CONVINCED that they are coming AT ONCE! (to—day or November
20) with 250,000 troops we know of as available - untouched
best men of the first fighting line.4
ICitchener was powerfully moved by Jelliooe's prognostication of imminent
invasion , for it confirmed his own premonitions. He accordingly made heroic
efforts to meet it. When Der
	 the fateful 20th November, arrived three
days later, Kitohener had managed to collect 300,000 troops and spread them
along the coastline to repel a landing. This had not been accomplished
1. Adm 137/965/176 manuscript "Memo by Sir A.K. Vilson", undated.
2. Adm 137/965/177-78 "Telerw, Admiralty to CIG, Home Fleets, 16 Nov,mber,
1914; Adm 137/965/206-215 "Orders in event of raid or invasion," 16
November 1914.
3. Jellicoe YSS. (49 006 ) Fisher to Jel]icoe, ca. 3 November 1914.
4. A.J. 3Iarder. Fear	 ad Nout:	 toration, Abdication, and
Last Tears. 19144920. Cape, London, 1959e p. 74. Fisher to Jellicoe,
17 November 1914.
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without some difficulty, as Churchill recorded.
the whole coastal watch, military, aerial and marine, throbbed
with activity. The Army arrangements were complicated by the fact
that some of the divisions which were sufficiently trained to be
used to repel the invaders, bad lent their rifles to those that
were undergoing training, and these rifles had to be collected and
redistributed as a part of the procedur. prescribed for the supreme
emergency. To such expedients were we reduced!l
Fisher cuoted a couplet for the occasion to Jellicos,
'H. who would old England win
At Weybou.rne Hope must first begin.'
I'm told at high water you can put a gang-board on shore from a battle-
ship! 2
The same day Fisher told Beatty that Grey anticipated a landing of 100,000
Germans in Tipperary, but it's a long way to Tipperary in Southern Ireland,
C
which lies 35 miles from the coast. Weybourne Hope, Norfolk, is the eastern-
most extremity of England and thence the nearest point to Cermany. The anti-
cipated Armada did not materialize in either case and Fisher wrote to
Churchill the morning after,
Kitchener's balance of 160,000 men will amply suffice and the
'Ides of March' have passed! The waning moon and dawning tide
will not recur till days following December 10. Do write
him accordingly, or shall I? It has been a splendid 'dress
tell him 1 and very reassuring - his mass of men
and his mobile guns!J
Although the sense of imminent peril had passed at the Admiralty, both
Fisher and Churchill were not prepared to relax their vigilance. Fisher
wrote to a friend on November 21 that "a flying raid on Hull might again be
expected on December 8, as the moon and tide would again provide favourable
1. Churchill. 22 . Cit. p. 451, -
2. A.J. Marder. 22 . Cit. pp . 76-77. Fisher to Jellicoo, 19 November 1914.
3. Churchill. 22.. Cit. p. 451. Fisher to Churchill, 21 November 1914.
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conditions. A similar incursion could be expected on Christmas Day "because
p	 1
of the hop. of the Germans of our being happy at that season.' 4
 Churchill
has described how he succumbed
to the ffilppressed excitement which grew throughout the highest
circles and did my utmost to aid and speed our preparations. We
stationed as described the 3rd Battle Squadron at the Forth,
brought the 2nd Fleet to the Thames, disposed the old Majtic
battleship. in the various harbours along the East Coast,
arranged block ships to be sunk, and laid mines to be exploded,
at the proper time in the mouths of our undefended harbour.... 2
All of Jellicoe's suggestions were carried out, and their implementation
continued throughout 1915. So exhaustive were they in scope that the official
papers make up two entire volumes in the Naval Historical Archives. Secret
ezperlm3nts at Chatham on 5 December provided
conclusive evidence that a mixture of petrol, kerosene, and
Ad.ralty oil fuel can be distributed in a burning condition
overthe surface of the water ... with the production of a
sheet of flame of great fierceness and destructive effect.
which constituted an additional deterrent to future invaders. 3 The Admiralty
worked closely with the ar Office which was informed (again on the 20th
November) that two of Churchill's pet projects, the Royal Naval Division and
the armouxed cr units, would be placed "instantly under the orders of the
War Office in the ev ent of raid or invasion." The War Office assied the
Royal Naval Division to concentration points near Cravesen* and Dartford in
the event of an emergency. 4 Naval patrols were given detailed instructions
for co-operation with the Jilitary on shoxe in repelling a German attempt at
1. 1arder.	 Cit.p. 79. Fisher to kis. Re4nald 1.cKenna, 21 November 1914.
2. Churchill.	 p. 451.
3. Adxn 137/966 Disabling Thames and South Coast Ports, li4-iQ.
Ad.m 137/967 Disabling East Coast Ports, 	 4-l915. See also Cab 12/1
Home Port Defence Committee. Cab 38/28/54 "Report on Experiments with
Burning Oil." 11 December 1914. p.1.
4. Kitchener MSS • PRO 30/57/72 Churchill to Kitchener (247)December 1914;
19 February 1915. Adm 137/965/247-253. "Employment of the Royal Naval
Division in Case of Hostile Raids or Invasion." 20 November 1914.
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landing. The naval authorities were deeply concerned lest the defending
British patrol boats be mistaken for the enemy by the home defence troops
and sunk. The ships' officers were accordingly instructed in these circum-
stanoes to break out and fly the largest red ensigns they had available and
to sound signalling blasts on their fog horns if they caine under fire froti
1.the shore.
On the military side, Kitchener was no longer the only veteran Field-
1rshal worried ever invasion. Like many other authorities, Lord Roberts
had been optimistic about invasion in the War Council at the beginning of
the War, but was now gravely disturbed over Kitchener's mishandling of home
defence and the German thrust to the Channel coast. Hankey recalled that
Roberts called on him on November 10th, "extremely depressed about the
dangers of invasion."
For over an hour we discussed the matter in front of a great chakt
of the North Sea on which I had marked our naval and military
dispositions for home defence. I did my utmost to reassure him,
describing the naval dispositions, the respective roles in horns
defence of the Grand Fleet and of the flotillas of destroyers and
submarines, the minefields, the arrangements at the ports for
watohin the coast, the dispositions of the mounted brigades and
of the central military force, the railway arrangements, the
plans for driving and denuding the country, and so forth. But
he refused to be comforted and left in the same depressed state
of mind in which he had arrived.2
In late October Roberts had returned to the C.I.D. for the sole object of
promoting home defence. Bein, mistakenly informed by Repington that Balfour
was organizing a C.I.D. sub-committee for this purpose, 3 Roberts wrote to
the latter, enclosing a four-page memorandum on the subject. Roberts
acbowledged the submarine menaces asserting "It has been proved by recent
1. Adm 137/965/261-262. "Patrol Flotilla Operations Ordert Co-operation
pith )Ljlitary in the event of a Hostile Landing Being Attempted." 10
tecember 1914, by G.A. Ballard, Admiral of Patrols.
2. Hankey.	 .	 . p. 210.
3. Roberts	 Case X20927 Box Rl R62/71 Repingtcn to Roberts, 22 October 1914.
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.vent. that the ability of the Navy to protect our ahoree and home waters
cannot be relied upon as completely as the country was led to believe by
naval experts." He went on to rsiterat. several of the arguments for in-
vasion being put forward by itohen.r in the Cabinet and Repington in the
Timesi the security of the British Islea as an allied military bees must be
absolute, Germa, aunarinea kept the Fleet at a two days' distance from the
East Coast, and naval warfare had so changed in recent years that no man
alive bew what the result of the expected peat naval battle would be.
Uncertainty was increased by Germany's widespread us• of mines. On the
military side, Roberts rsiterated what was generally admitted in official
circiest the 9fr Territorial divisions in England were inadequately trained
and their command structure was extremely weak, almost lacking. Thers was
no unity of comand encompassing all home defence troops. This would be
absolutely essential in case of invasion; "Hitherto we appear to have been
playing at war in England." 1 Lord Roberto remained consistent to the end.
Within a week he had died within sound of the guns in France while inspecting
Indian army unite. Almost his last conscious words expressed concern over
the chaos at the War Offioe, Kitchener's misdirection of home defence, and
the lack of resources against a German invasion.2
By late November Roberts' warnings seemed to be justified; even the
Prime Minister took extraordinary measures. On November 24, four days after
Jellioo. had expeoted a Ceran landing and Kitchener had assembled hi.
armies along the shore, Asquith held a secret consultation with a select
group of Ministers and experts to disouse the "most critical" naval and
1. Balfour MSS. (49725) typewritten "Confidential" memorandum on "Home
Defence" by Lord Roberts, 6 November 19 14; Robexto to Balfour, 25
October 1914; 6 November 1914; Balfour to Roberts, 27 October 1914.
2. Wjon Diary 13 November 1914.
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military situation. Those invit.d to 10 Downing Stxeet were Churchill,
Kitohener, Grey, Lloyd George, Balfoux, Fisher, Hankey, and Sir James Wolfe
Murray, the C.I.G.S. This new compact organization of 10 men now became
responsible for the higher direction of the war, absorbing the C.I.D. and
displacing the 22 man Cabinet. Although the first meeting of the 'War
Council", as it came to be called, was predominantly devoted to hocie defence,
it made no new inroads into the invasion problem but instead perpetuated
existing procedures and problems.
As before, Churchill opened with a report on the latest Admiralty
measures taken against invasion. A new fleet, entirely independent of the
Grand Fleet under Jelliooe, had been created to defend the coast and comprised
260 warships, ino1udin battleships, cruisers, torpedo craft, submaxine,
and coastal monitors and gunboats recently returned from operations off the
Belgian coast. Eight seaplane stations were now assigned home defence
duties, and submarines and destroyers ware making daily reconnaissance sweeps
to obtain advance warning of an approaching German armada. Churchill provided
a long and impreseiv. list of the various ships at each Eastern port, indi
oa't1n, that the Admiralty had made prodigious efforts to meet the problem.
itchener in turn described his military arrangements on the coast. Three
9.2" guns had been mounted on railway trucks and deapatohed to the Tyne,
Humb.r, and Harwich respectively. Elsewhere
at most possible landing places there were heavy moveable guns
and field guns within reach. The orders to these guns were to
deal with the steam launches first. Even the armouxed barges,
which the enemy was reported to be getting ready, arid whioh
might be proof against rifle fire, wèuld be vulnerable to
artillery fix.)
1. Cab 22/1/3 "Secretary's Notes of a War Council held at 10, Downing Street."
25 November 1914; Balfour 	 (49692) Asquith to Balfour, 24 November
1914.
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The heavy guns would force the •n.my to row into the shore in open
boats and. provide additional timi for naval and military reinforcements
to arrive on the scene.
Churchill oirou]ateci an Admiralty paper which gave a more hope-
ful picture of th. situation. The Director of Transport. bad. worked
out detailed. calculations of th. time required. for the enemy to land
20C,000 troops using a oatured British port. He had aasumed that
the enemy would bring cavalry and artillery irith horses and. gun, and
that larding cranes had been destroyed and port machinery sabotaged
or r.aov•d.. Souttiampton, th. most useful port, was unavailable. Ten
drnys would be required. for the embarkation if the umb.r was seized,
and. fifteen days for the Tyne. ven if the Tyne and Huinber were captured.
and. employed simultaneously with two separate beach eabarkatione, be
judged that five to six days were required. to land 200,000 men and. thur
•quipment, even if no serious interference was offered from land or sea.
ven th. landing of the B..F. in Prance had not been a quick operation.
For a disembarkation in a friendly country, with every
facility, a trained disembarkation staff, and ro hitch
anywhere, tas lowest possibl. estimate is 5 days. In
the circumstances contemplated I consider 10 days the
least time possible.l
The Cabinet had. received convinoing and reassuring evidence of the
difficulty of ar enemy disembarkation from an authoritative source.
ifowever, th. invasion issue continued to haunt the minds of
Fisher and Churchill. Throughout December and. Into 1915, Churohill
campaigned for an "inverted. invasion", contending that the beet way to
1. Cab 37/122/167 "Time required to Disembark a Hostile Force." by
the Director of Transport.. 17 November 1914.
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prevert a German invasion of Britain would, be to ls.urioh a British
invasion of Germany. Although he later in the World Crisis justified.
this plan as a means of forcing the German fleet to action; at the time
he employed almost exclusively the argument of security from overseas
attack. Churchill first introduced hi. imaginative proposal at the War
Council of 1 December 1914; suggesting that
the esisure and occupation of a suitable island might render
possible th. establishment of a flying base, by means of which
the movements of the German fleet oould b. k.pt under constant
observation. It would also enabl. us to k.ep large numbers of
submarines and destroyers, inolud.ing the older as well as the
newer classes, coriatartly off the German coast. We oou].d also
drop bombs ev.ry few days. In these oiroumstanioss it would be
very difficult for the Germans to prepar. for invasion without
our knowledge, or to escape from the north Sea ports. Invasion
could then only come from the Baltic.
Fisher was favourable, approving any offensive move which would bolster
the morale of the Fleet. Balfour stated that while the operation would
not provide a complete substitute for home dsfeno, it wculd release
some of the many troops still deployed within Britair. Throughout December
Churohill kept the Prime Xinistsr informed as to the progress of the
planning and re—affirmed at the Wan Courcil of 7 January 1915 that the
captur. of Borkum or Sylt would render a Gsrman invasion impossible
and •normously reduoe the risk of raids. To reassure itohener,who
feared that "it might prove necessary to withdraw men from the continent"
to obtain the high quality assault troops necessary for the adventure,
Churchill anticipated that a division "would be the largest force that
could be employed". If the enterprise succeeded, "The Army would be
fully recouped by the greater security ot and th. fever troops required
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for Home Defence." Churchill later informed. Jellicoe that a British
landing on German territory also would, have a powerful psychological
eff.ot on the enemy.
In remembering "511t" he would. lose sight of ngland. Our
position there would be intoleraole to him. He would have
to attack us not at any point be chose on our sparsely-
guarded coast, but whir, he would. have to force a very
concentrated. swarm of submarines
The proposal was postponed., however, owing to lack of suitable equipment
arid detailed planning (both of wbioh wore soon to be absorbed by the
Qallipoli project). vident1y rio one fully calculated, to what extent
the factors militating against a successful invasion of !ngland. couli
be overcome in a landing on the German islands, for the plan was cancelled
in the summer of 1915.1
Fisher, evidently impressed by the fighting continuing near
Zeebrugge and the development of the militqry stalemate lred.ioted. by
Kitohener, persisted. in his warnings of invasion. On December 7 Fisher
I
informed Vice-Admiral Sir David. B.attie, his former proteg. in command
of the Third Battle Squadron (now stationed at the Forth against an
invasion attempt) that
the latest German scare from our Xir.xster at the Hague
is that l5O,6O Germans will land, half at Th.indee, the
other half at Oban, and. the feint of 20,000 men at
Norwich 4 days sooner: This i. to be on Christmas Day,
when we are all supposed. to be drunk.2
At the end. of the month Fisher, writing to Jellico. of invasion in a
1. Asquith ISS. Box 13. Churchill to Asquith. 3 December 1914; 29
December 19 14; manuscript memoandumL on esizing Borkum, 31 December
December 1914; Cab 22/1/4 "Secretary's Notes of a Meeting of a War
Courcil Held. at 10, Downing Street, December 1, 1914." pp. 2-3;
Cab 22/1/6 S.or.tarys notes of a Meeting of a War Council
January 7, 1915." p. 6; Jelliooe	 . ( 4P990) Churchill to Jellioou,
11 January 1915.
2. harder. 2• Cit. p. 89. Fisher to Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty,
7 December, 1914.
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sore serious vein, revived th. feara of th. month before.
W• are e.nding every living soul we can to our Army in
France and quit. rightly - hence England is denuded. of
troops against even a big Raid. The lilitary Situation
between the Germans making a t Coup t with their whole
flval resources - the fleet and 150,000 men in Transports
- they also have a numerous flock of old Vessile filled
witzi cement to sink in the channel left open by our mines
and so block our Southern Javal Poro. from coming through
into the lJorth Sea. The two German words used. I forget
but they mean "Let every d---d. thing 	 in"!
Fisher added that the Americar ambassador in Berlin had told his niece
to let someone in England know that "the Germans were contemplating
some big $Coup shook against nglarid" because a large number of German
navy officers were on leave in Berlin in preparation for some momentous
onslaugbt.1
But the invasion menace was deflated. corsierably at the Admiralty
wh•r a secret German appr.ciation of British coast deferoes was captured.
at the end of December. These revealed that the Germane had over-rat
the etrengt of the British dispositions ashore and that they were
decidedly pessimistic regarding the prospects of a raid. At the Thames,
for example, the Germans coneiderei that the land.ng of a sizeable foroe
was possible only after securing complete command of the sea and thi
oothplete destruction of the shore batteri.s. The Germane were much more
defensive-minded than the British had believed. At the Firth of Forth
the enemy held that
A surprise attempt could be made to destroy the Forth Bridge,
but a large quantity of explosives and much time would be
n.c.ssary for t'ie. Th.re is not much ob.ct in such an
1. Jellicoe XSS. (49006) Fisher to Jellico., "just before December
29" 1914.
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undertaking, as even in case of success, it is very
improbable that th. passage would be blocked owing to
the great d.th of water.
Other ports were held. to have almost no objectives worth the risk of
a raidirg force. 1 The captured report was forwarded in the tztmoBt
secrecy on December 30 to Jellicce, who was ordered to make no reference
to them in correspondence, signals, or tel.grame so as to bide the fact
that they were in British harie.2
Xitohener, however, had no such information to guid. him and
re-introduoed the question of invasion at the War Couroil meeting on 7
January 1915. He complained of the diffioulty of obtsinirg sufficient
rifles for the Territorial ?oroe, which he restricted to horn. detsnce
dutiesi only 250,000 rifles were available in the oourtry for 490,000
troops. Rifles for the home forc. r.main.d in short supply throughout
the first half of 1915. Lloyd George wrote Balfour or 6 Karcb that he
had. discovered 130,000 to 140,000 rifles at Cly&esid., not wcrth the
troubl• of fitting new sights to, but "good enough to kill 3.rman. with
in this country." 3 By July, howevir, the probi.. had been solved. by
supplying Japanese rifles and carbines. 4 But even in January, most
authorities were convinoed that th. worst danger of invasion had passed
and when ritohen.r proposed that "for Home Defence it was considered
we ought to work up to the figure of 50C,000 men", with 370,OCO more
1. 1.I.D. XSS. Admiralty Library. S.L. 3038. "German Secret Reports
on British Ports." Berlin 191C/ll, revised, to 1914. Revised arid
reprinted by th. Admiralty Staff, December 1914.
2. Ad.m 1 37/9 65/398 Admiralty to C.I.C.LF., 30 Deeriber 1914.
3. Ba1Fc!. (49692) Lloyd. George to Balfour, 6 Karob 1915.
4. Cab 3/3/13 "Hom• Deferoe." by X.P.A.H. 6 July 1915. p.
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in a special reserve, both Asquith and. Churchill expr.ssed ek.ptioism.
Asquith asked how this figure was arrived at while Churchill observed
that "this figur. appear.d to exceed any estimates made in the oours•
of inquiries by the C.I.D." The Navy was prepared. to protect the country
against invasion therefore why such a large figure?	 reply
was not oouch.d. in terms usually reserved for Cabin.t colleagues.
500,000 was orly a conventional figure towards which the
arrangements aimed. It could not in any cas. be
 realised
b.for. the autumn and it appeared unnecessary at present
t discUss the matter further.
The War Council returned to a discussion of a proposed advano. on
Zeebruga and the important questions of the anticipated scale of attack
and the rieoessary size of the defending foro. were left in abeyance. 1
By January 1915 •ven Kitchener must have recognized that invasion
had. become an •xceedirigly r.mote possibility. The "maximum danger period"
had now drawn to a close, for the New Armies and. Territorial troops
were in th. final stages of their training. The worst period of winter
storms was now beginning in the 2orth Sea and the German advance along
the coast had. long ago be•n brought to a halt. For the reit few months
discussion of invasion virtually disappeared in the supreme command,
which was socn deeply involved in planning the Gallipoli operation.
Oily Fisher, who had. been the most vociferous critic available of "the
invasion bogey" before the war, continued to bring up th. possibility.
Or. March 25th he scribbled hurriedly in pencil to Jellicoe that
I fear that ro one but myself at Admiralty at all
apjr.oiates that Von Fohi may make a dash of some sort
with all bis force ard kerhas a mass of troops ... I
don't see what is to prevert their larding at Rarwich
1. Cab 22/1/6 "Secretary's Not.s of a Meeting of a War Council...
January 7, 1915." pp. 3-4.
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and. in the Thames as we have no force at all in the south
and. as the German Transports would be grounded the English
submarines would be ineffective. And you can't get down
under 36 hours (I don't believe) because of the necessary
detour and. the Germans putting down masses of mines behind
them intendir.g to return via Ire4nd if they sacrifice
their landed Army of 260,OCO menlL
Strategy had. never been Fisher'. forte and. with this •zoeptiori invasion
remained & dead issue for five months.
In the apting, however, itchener's fancy turr.ed once more to
thoughts of invasion. The War Council met on 14 Xay 1915 at a critical
poir.t in the fortunes of the war: the Gallipoli campaign of which so
much had. been ho'ed. was now bogged. down, the Russian offensiv. bad. failed.
in the East, the Fleet had. lapsed. to passivity, stalemate persisted all
along the Western front, arid Repington bad precipitated an attaok on
the war leadership that very morning by revealing that British artillery
in France were woefully short of shells. At Asquith's prompting.,
Kitoher 
€a his views on home defence. Es believed, that Britain was
secure only so long as the row Armies remained ir the cour try. The
Central Force, supposedly the elite unit of the hoD's a'-my, was now
predominantly composed of' second, line troops - owing to the drain of
Territorial battalions to the frort. Its Commander had told him that
hi. nominal nine divisions were no longer an effective military force.
Xitcherier was worried last the Germans break through in !raroe ae they
recently had. in Poland; he t..erefore concluded that "we ought to rmserve
part of our new armies for an emsrgency at home."
It was possible that the Germans might send a force to this
country in order to try and keep our armies in the United.
lCirgdom away from the decisive poirt on the continent. In
1. Mardsr. , .Cit. pp. 170-171. Tiahe to Jellicoe, 25 March 1915.
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his view, tb. Admiralty ought to take euoh steps as would
prevent toe possibility of a landing in order to release
our armies for service abroad.1
H. could. not therefore send. Sir John French the four divisions promised
him.
"When he had finished," Churchill recalled, "the Council turned
to me - almost on me." For the last time, Churchill replied for the
Admiralty, emphasizing that the Grand Fleet had. been gradually strength-
ened since the War Council had last considered the question of invasion
in January. Since tnen German battle cruisers had. ventured out twices
on the first occasion they were nearly caught; on the second they were
oaught with heavy loss. The sigh Seas Fleet came out only after care-
ful air reconnaissance, which showed that they regarded all waters past
Heligoland Bight as in the British domain. With the support of his
professional advisors, Churchill declared that "the Admiralty considered
nothing more unlikely at the present time than an attempted landing."
)ine battleships, as well as the ten cruisers of the Third Battle
Squadron, stood ready to reach any part of the aet Coast in 15 to 20
hours, and in June the first of the new long-range submarines and.
destroyers would come available. All the Admiralty opposed fitcheners
view that German ships oould oome South; "there was absolutely no
reason for anxiety." Churchill onoe again reverted to the conclusion
of the prewar C.I.D.s as long as the War Office kept enough men in
Britain to defeat 70,000 men, no landing would. be  attempted.2
1. Cab 22/1/16 "Secretary's !otes of a War Council Held at 10 Downing
Street, )!ay 14, 1915." pj. 7-8.
2. Thid. p. 8; Churchill.	 . Cit. pp. 35-53.
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ICitchener rejected the C.I.D. conclusioni he had grave doubts
as to whether a 1andiri of even 70,000 mer on these shores would not
place us in a very critical position, as it would tie up a large force
in this country. To meet 7C,000 men we should require 150,000 men."
Balfour, another C.I.D. veteran, intervened on Churohiul's behalf and
asked itoh.ner to adopt the C.I.D. methods
to place hime.lf in the enemys place and to say how he
himself would like to hay, to land 70,0CC mm in this
country in th. face of opposition, with the prospect of
all communication with his own country being out, with-
out heavy gun. (without which th. G.rman army appeared
to be useless), and. with th. certainty of being attacked
from th. s,c as well as from the land. within th. land
within twenty-four hours.
Kitohener was impressed by this line of reasoning, admitting that "it
was a difficult position" but that "if he were the Chief of the German
Staff he would. be willing to sacrific, a foroe in order to keep part
of our ar*y in this country." 1 The War Council •nded. in this atmosphere
of tension and irresolution; th. larger questions of coals of attack
and the sias of th. home defence establishment remained unsolved.
That evening a scene occurred between Fisher and Kitch.n.r of
which only conflicting aocounts survive. Kitoherier t s version was that
he visited the Admiralty with Sir Charles Douglas, the C.I.C.S. to
disouss the "very unsatisfaotory distribution of the fleet for the
defence of the Bast Coast from invasion, which I had mentioned in the
' Cabinet." Fisher wrote Jelliooe the following day that "Kitcherier
came at 6 p.m. last night with all, hi. Staff in Great Majesty and
demanded a power squadron being stationed in the Rumber." Apparently
1. Cab 22/1/16 "Seretary'e Notes of a War Council Reid at 10 Downing
Street, May 14, 1915, p.8. Churchill	 Cit. pp. 35-53.
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Kitchener mad. the same proposal whioh had so aroused Churchill the
previous October: to d.tach two armoured cruiser squadrons from
Jslliooe's force and station them in the Humber. Needless to say, this
suggestion provoked a similar energetio reaction from Fisher, who
shouted threats of resignation. The interservicej consisting of Xitohez.r,
)lurray, the C.I.O.S., A.K. Wilson, Admiral HF. Oliver, ths C.O.S.,
Commodore Bartolom., the Naval Seoretary and Graham Greene, broke up
in disorder. 1 Nothing further came of Kitoheners project.
But more uiomentous events were now moving to a climax. For some
months Fisher bad been at variance with Churchill over the Dardanellos
operation and on 15 May he finally dAd resign, unable to earotion
further transfer of warship. from the Jorth Sea to this distant theatre.
The Tory Opposition, already activated by Repingtori's revelations
r.garding the shell shortags on the Western front, now saw their charc•
to topple the Government and eliminate the hated. "turncoat"Churchill.
At the end of the month the First Lord, left his beloved Admiralty and
was replac.d by Balfour; an all—party Coalition replaced the Liberal
Government which had now been in power ccntinually for almost a decade.
The last Liberal Cabinet passed into history arid. Churchill, the most
decisive arid. active protagonist of the policy against invasion, lapsed
into a. political limbo from which he did. not rsoover for year.. But
Churchill was d.atermined to have the final word on invasion.
On June 1, 1915 Churchill, now Chancsllor of the Duchy of
Lancaster, circulated "A Note on tae General Situation", wbioh in part




S.PRO 30/57/'72. Lttoh.ner to Asquith, 13 May 1915;
	JelU9o.	
.(49Oo6) PiIh.z to Jeiltoos, 13 Iy 1915: Thomas E. Creea.
to Jelliooe, (?) 15 May 1915.
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in 'invasion of the intricacies of the operation, as revea.l.d by the
C.I.D. studies ard. confirmed. by ten months of war.
It is rot a question of evadir.g the lest, but of launching
70,000 men or upwards on the following enterprise, viz, to
cross 250 miles of sea ir. the face of a decisively superior
hostile navy; to disembark the army on an open beach (for
all the ports are mined or otherwise defended); with all
the chanoes of weather and. the certainty of attack at the
latest within a few hours by submarines and. destroyers; to
land. in th• face of oppositior, for a]l the coast defence
is thoroughly organized; to accomplish this and. land. all
the necessary artillery ... with al] the stores, appliances,
transport, and ammunition ... within a period at the longest
of 20 to 24 hours, after which they must with oertainty be
attacked from the sea by a decisively superior force, their
esoort defeated, their transports destroyed, and their
communications irremediably severed.; and then with what has
been landed, and only that, to enter upon the conquest of
Great Britain. That is the proposition, for the sake of
which Germany is inoid.ntally to risk the decisive battle
with her fleet. It was, and I believe is, th. universal
conviction at the Adairalt- that no sane Government will
ertertain it for a moment.
At tb. end of Churchill's administration at the Admiralty, he showed
no sign of the caution or concern for German submarines and. other adverse
factors wbich had so ov.d hia during the previous Fall. But he went on
to overstate and exaggerate the unity of the C.I.D. on this point,
cortenlirg that his view
voull have been agreed to absolutely by every military
authority who spok. for the War Cffioe up to th. outbreak
of th. war. It should be remembered that the body of
doctrine assembled on this subject before the war was the
result of prolonged and detailed discussions extending
over many years and ending in a oomplet. agreement among
all - soldiers, sailors, arid. politioia.ns - who took part
in them. All that has happened during the war has justi-.
fled. and oonfirmed. our conclusions, on which the War
Offioe and Admiralty have, in faot, regularly and boldly
acted.. 2
1. Chuxchill.	 . Cit. Vol. II. pp. 387-89. "A. Not on The General
Situation." 1 Jun• 1915,
2. Ibid.
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Churchill's strategy nay hay, been sound.; his history was grossly
distorted.. fle had indeed. participated in the C.I.D. at a time wh.n
friction between th. two departments was at its minimum. Perhaps he was
unaware of the many previous years of intorservice controversy and.
dissention. Although there had been a policy since l9C3, it was hardly
correct to say this entailed "complete agreement among all". It was
rather the amalgam of grudgingly—surrendered. positions resulting in an
uneasy compromise. Churchill was distorting matters even further in
asserting that all events of th. war had confirmed. the prewar conclusions,
for the events of Fall 1914 compelled nary of the C.I.D. veterans -
Asquith, Balfour, Eankey, certainly Churchill himself - to admit that
the strategic situation was extraordirary and. oeyond anticipation. It
was equally inaccurate to contend. that the War Office and Admiralty bad.
"regularly and, boldly acted" on C.I.D. principles. Xitchener, in
particular, had never absorbed or accepted them.
Yet Churchill perverted the historical record for a good reason.
H. was anxious that the new and. inexperienced Unionist ministers be
fully indoctrinated in sound strategical principles so that continuity
of previous policy might be preserved. In June 1915 home defence was
one area where one could err on the side of zeal and. confidence. The
German fleet h;d marie few offensive moves, none that signified invasion,
and the German army was deeply involved in th. aftermath of the Second
Battle of Ypres. British naval defences had increased and the New Armies
and T.rritorials had completed. their required six months of training
in March. Churchill was justified in masking the alarms of the previous
year.
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But in tb. Fall of 1914 the British supreme command. was agitated
over th. possibility of invasion as it had not been since Wapoleon bad
assembled his Arme. d'Argl.terre at Boulogne in 1805. Eankey, almost
the last surviving participart in the supreme command, defended the
actions of his colleagues almost half a century latert
At the beginning of September, when we wsrs tuning up our
plane for horn. defence the situation on the Continent was
certainly one of almost unrelieved gloom. Who then oould
say that the Government was wrong in keeping a vigilant
eye on home defenoe? Suppos. the French Army had been
encircled., as might well have happened,1 Suppose France
had. collapsed, as in 1870 and later in 19403 What would
then have been our position with the whole coast of Franc.
and Belgium in Germany's hands? Invasion, though still
difficult, would have been appreciably nearer - and the
preparations to meet it must necessarily have required
time. 1
In retrospect it is easy to condemn the alarms and. excursion.. The
urgency of the official preparations is borne out by th.
oovery that roughly half of the British Government documerts dealing
with invasion during the 52 months of the First World War originate in
the 21 month period between September 15 and December 1, 1914.
But in the context of the time it must 'b. remembered. that the
supreme coriii-and. was dealing with the most complicated, operation known
to the art of war, that naval and military technology had been compl.tely
revolutionized since the last great uropean conflict a century before,
and. that there was little trustworthy evidence to indicate the cour.•
of future events. In three months of hostilities, many of th. certain-
ties of nineteenth century Britain had been overturned. The "balance
of power" was thr.atened and. the low oountries wer. occupied. Th. most
powerful military instrument ever seen stood at the Channel, where only
1. Ranky.	 Cit. Vol. I. p. 218,
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a few miles se;arat.d it from riáland, its most powerful and hated
enemy. British seapower, the last defence of the national integrity
for centuries, was no longer secure even in home waters. "Command of
th. sea" had become a meaningless expression. even as the 0eriran armies
advanced down the Channel coast, a single U-boat torpedoed and sank
three British bat-t-leoruisers off Holland on Søptember 22; on October
27 a German mm. destroyed th. battleship Audacious off Ulster. The
opening "white-hot months" of the war provide the authentic olimax of
official anxieties over invaeion eiaultaneouely public Interest revived
arid reaohed its oulmination. The unprecedented exertions of the supreme
command. were interconnected with a series of developments no lees
significant in the realm of public opinion. For the first time since
1900 the activities of the Government synchronized with the agitation
of th. public. sever again in the course of th. war, nor for the next
quarter century, would the possibility of invasion assume such
prominence.
CHAPTER Xi THE IJVASIO1J SCARE 0? 1914 AJD THE PUBLIC
-
Britain's entry into ths war transformed. the domeatio po].itioal
scene. AU. of the oausss whioh bad convulsed. publio opinion in the last
years befor. the war - Ireland. and Home Rule , th. Suffragett. campaign,
the threatening General Stri., the promise of Civil War - were for-.
gotten. Yet while the war brought an end, to the controversies of peace-
time, th. outbreak of hostilities naturally led. to a r•vival of fears
over invasion. The informed public, though it was aware of recent
developments bearing on the invasion problem, had. no clear lead. or inform-
ation from the Government to guide them. Owing to the pressing political
oontroversies of peacetime 1914 and the sudden outbreak of war, the
proceedings of the C.I.D. inquiry had still to be annourced to ths Rouse
of Commons and the country. For that matter, the sub-committee'.
recommendations were still to be discussed by the C.I.D. With the
imposition of censorship and the laoic of hard. information from the fight-
fng fronts, the old anxiety about Britain's eeourity from invasion
recurred.
The prevailing uncertainty, patriotic fervour, and. alarming
reports of the fate of the civilian population in the path of the
Germans in Belgium all combined to bring about a revival of agitation
for a citizen defence foroe against invasion. On August 8th, H.0. Wells,
who had written several fictional desoriptions of the invasion of England.,
and. Arthur Conan Doyle, who bad advocated. home def.noe formations during
the crisis of 19CC, wrote letters to the Times calling for the formation




of a home defence reserve, made up of men over Military age. Wells
later suggested that a uniform could be improvised by Bowing a red collar
and cuffs onto a x.gular suit, with a red stripe added to the trousers and
band added to an ordinary felt hat. Over this, Wells suggested, a belt and
croesband of linen or calico could be addsd. The ensemble would enable its
wearer to claim the full rights of a combatant under the Hague Convention
and it, Wells asserted, could be improvised in less than an hour in any
village in gland.1
It would leave the whole countryside tree to convert itself
inmediately into a bed of stinging nettles against raiders
as soon as rifles and armnunition came to hand. In many places
they are at hand.2
But another Times correspondent pointed out that many Belgian peasants
bad taken up arms and died, yet had not Slow•d th. German advance through
their country by a single day. He warned
If any part of our islands were raided ... and if desultory
attempts were made by local organizations to kill or harrass
th. invading troops, let no one doubt f or a moment what would
be the consequences. We should be tr.at.d to the ghastly and
maddening spectacle of blazing villages, brutal executions,
and .11 the nameless horrors that retaliation of an exasperated
soldiery usually involves.
Nor would improvised uniforms provide a guarantee against atrocities.
The best course was to prepare active armies which could surround and
annihilate the German invader instead of dissipating the national
energies in sporadic defence organizations which would only impede
and provoke him. avery availabl, man should be made available to
1. 'Our Latent Forces' and 'The Use of the Untrained.' Times, 8 August 19]k,




the War Office, then the result oould be awaited with calmness and
resolution) Further letters amplified the debate between the partisans
of a oitisen home defence forc. and the advocates of professional direction
and leadership. 2 veritually, on August 26th, the Times published a leading
article by its Naval Correspondent which pointed out that it might be a
year or mor. before a deeisiv• engagement at sea could take plaoo and that
any attempt at invasion would be preceded by a sassive buildup of armies
arid military equipment on the coast, as Napoleon had, done in l8O3-O5.
The issue was further clarified by an articl, in the September issue
of the I,lnited Services Lgazine which described "The Position and Duties
in War of Local Authorities and Peaceful Inhabitants located within an
area of active operations in this country." The articl, outlined inter-
national law as applied to invasion. The enemy oould not ask the British
populace to .ar allegiance to Germany, but he was entitled to certain
other servioss. Civilians could be compelled to quarter troop., to
demolish houses and fences if in the probable line of fire of an impending
engement, and to quit occupied territory if mal. and of the age of
military service. The Germans could not impose new taxes, but could
regulate the press and telephone.. Hospitals must be kept open. No
citisen, however, could be forced to take part in operations against his
own country, although he could volunteer to do so and receive payment for it.4
1. Foster H.S. Cunliffe. 'Our Untrained terial.' Times. 18 August 1914.p.7.
Ibtd."The Public and the War." 21st August 1914. p . 4.
2. Ibid. 10 August 1914. p . 9.
3. 'The Fleets at Sea. Napoleon 1 . Threat of Invasion.' Misleading German
Rumours.' Times, 26 August 1914. p. 6.
4. Col. H.C.C.D. Simpson. 'In Caae of Invasion.' Unite& Services I.&'zine.
September 1914. pp. 591-604.
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Duxing Septambar references to invasion were sparse, although the
¶ines reported on the 13th that
a Brealau merchant has offered 30,000 reichamarks as a
reward to the German soldier who, weapons in haQd, shall
b. the first to place his feet on British 8011•L
On the 29th, Repington Bounded the first of his many wartime warnings on
the theme
as the hatred of England by Germany passes all bounds we
must never forget that any attempt to invade us at home,
however hazardous, and however apparently impossible of
achievement, is an idea which must constantly recur to German
minds. We cannot afford, either on land or sea, to run a
single unnecessary risk. 2
During the month, the problem of instructions to the populace in
the event of invasion bad come to the notice of the Government. Hankey,
then Secretary of the C.I.D., recalled,
At the time when the war became imminent, I was engaged on
a study of the plans made in 1804, at the time of
Napoleon's threat to invade England, for evacuating the
civil population from the coast districts, driving the
country, and flooding large areas, although no plans had
been worked out when war broke out.3
On September 14th, Hankey argued in a C.I.D. Memorandum that confidential
instructions for the population should be prepared in the event of a
raid, even if invasion was too improbable a contingency to provide
against. This could contain instructions for groups of men to act as
guide8 for British troops, proclamations for the guidance of the civil
population, and orders for the destruction of large food-stocks, forage,
and petrol upon the approach of the enemy. Valuable aid might also be
provided by the public in felling trees and destroying bridges to impede
1. "Tempting the Invader." Times. 13 September 1914. p. 1.
2. "The War Iy by Iy." Ibid. 29 Bep±eruber 1914. p. 5.
3. Hankey. Th Supreme Command 1914-1918. Vol.1. Allen & Unwin, London,
1961. p. 216.	 -
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the invaders' advance, and rosters of men with entrenching tools should be
made up in areas where a stand was to be made. Hankey further advocated
evacuating food supplies inland from the coast during the first few days of
invasion, while the enemy was still preoccupied with landing his force and
heavy equipment.
At the C.I.D. Meeting of October 7th, a newly appointed Sub—committee
presented Rankeys proposals in a paper, "Instructions to Local Authorities
in the Evsnt of Belligerent Operations in the United Kingdom." For some
years previously, General Staff Studies had consiLered proposals for
removing supplies and transport from the cast Coast District. But could a
practicable scheme be prepared secretly without raising public alarm? It
would be difficult to ascertain the proper moment to put the scheme into
action. A general exodus of the population with vehicles and animals might
benefit the enemy by clogging communications and preventing a British advance
or oounter-sttaok. The care and feeding of the evacuated livestock would
prove an additional complication. In the opinion of the General Staff, the
main dilemma facing the German invader would not be his food supply, but
rather whether be could achieve his objective and end the campaii before
his ammunition ran out. Therefore, the removal or d3struction of transport
facilities were of greater importance then the evacuation of foodstuffs, for
this would immobilize the enemy's ammunition supply.2
The Sub-Committee therefore recommended that the populace in threaten-.
ed areas, on receipt of a notice from the local military authorities or
police, should remove to the interior all motor v3hioles, bicycles, arid
horses. All vehicles that could not be moved inland should be destroyads
harness and petrol supplies should be ruined, and all boats, steam launches
and lighters
I. Memo by Hankey. 14th September 1914.
2. Cb 38/28/46. "Instructions to Local aut'orltias in the event of
Belligerent Operations in the United Kingdom." 6 October 1914. p. 2.
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in areas favourable to an enemy landing should either be evacuated or sunk.
Banks should arrange for th. transfer of cash and valuables from threatened
areas. It recoended that the populac. be ready to dig trenches, clear
woods and hedges, and to take orders from the appropriate naval and military
authoriti.., who war, to be given full powers.
Instructions were prepared for the guidanc. of the civil population
regarding their attitude to the possible invader. Significantly, they were
forbidden to fire upon or obstruct enemy troops. The customs of war also
demanded that they should give up any w.apons if called for by the enemy and
should comply with requisitions of food us much as they could. They were to
be warned that Germany in Belgium had not held to the Hague Convention
against forcing civilians to provide information on military movements, so
British civilian. were to be advised not to try to learn details about their
army. Local committees, based on the authority of the Lord-Lieutenants of
Counties and the Mayora of Touns, were being formed and would co-operate
with th. War Office planning. In th actual event of a landing, all enemy
males over 16 and other suspect persons would be put under arrest. At the
eam time, British men 17 to 45 years of age, could be compelled to present
themselves at a designated time and place for noncombatant duties. But no
attempt was to be made to destroy food aipplies, forage, bridges, railway
rolling stock, electric light or power stations, telegraph or telephon.
wires, wireless stations, waterworks, s].uioes or locks, piers or jetties,
boats or ferries, unless specific orders to do so were issued by the police
or military authorities.'
These home defence measuzes having been approved, the C.I.D. deliberated
1. Cab 38/28/46. 6 October 1914. pp . 3-7.
-	 -
as to whether or not these instructions should be made public. Grey advoc-
ated that they should be published as soon as possible, but Asquith, preaun-
ably concerned lest a panic should ensue, decided that they should be
publicized only when invasion was imminent. Th. existence and activities
of the local committees were to be kept as secret as possible, on the ounci
that a public announcement of the preparations for an invasion would increase
the national alarm.1
Balfoux was asked to preside over the direction of th. icheme, ing
to his previous •xperience with the problem of invasion and the C.I.D.
inquiries. Balfoux was in a delicate and embarrassing positionia a former
Tory Prime Minister and recently-reeiied party leader he was deoid.dly
unoomfortabli as a junior administrator of a Liberal Governent. Moreover,
h. was strongly opposed to Asquith's decision to keep the Instructions
secret, to allow the people only a paseiv. role in anti-invasion defence,
and to keep the existence of the local cosinittees uncnown. 2 Balfour unburdened
himself to Hankey on October 13th $
However desirabl. it may be to induce the civil population to
remain in their homes if a landing should occur in their neigh-
bourhood, I have some doubts whether any Proclamation or Polio.
Directions would be sufficient - in many oases at least - to
attain that result. Tbe Germans have a very bad reputation,
but •ven in they were angels instead of devils, I think that
their appearance on our shores should probably produc. a local
panic. If this were so, would it be possible to confin, the
retirement to particular roads, keeping free (by force if
necessary) the lines of maroh most valuable to our defending
troops? To block by force all linss of retreat a..tnat terror-
stricken women and children would probably prove impossibl. in
practice. To direct an exodus through the least injurious
1. Cab 38/28/47. Minutes of 129th Meeting. C.I.D. 7 October 1914. p. 2.
2. MS. (Vol. 49863) Balfour to Cubitt, 28 October 1914.
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channels would be far eaejer.
Events were moving rapidly, which provided Balfour with several allies in
the arena of public opinion.
Although the public press and periodicals had been relatively quiescent
over the issue of invasion throughout August and September, the events of
early October 1914 were to make invasion seem an imminent probability. By
October 10th the Csrmans were in possession of Antwerp, Churchill's hurriedly-
organized and under-.quipped expeditionary force having been defeated. The
Germane now mounted an offensiv, along the coast, known to history as the
last phase of th. "March to the Sea" but described by oontemporqries as "the
German march to Calais". Soon the nearest German-held port was no longer
Emden, 300 miles from British shores, but Oet,nd, only 65 miles away. The
strategic situation was transformed: at the time it appeared that the vic$or-
ious German advance would roll south through to the French Channel port., a.
happened later in 1940. Invasion appeared to many to be mor• likely than it
had been at any time since 1805.
It is instructive to note which organs of public opinion were most
exercized over the possibility of invasion. During the First World War the
British press reached the peak of its political power and influence. Wows-
papers, as yet without competition from radio or television, possessed an
almost oomplet. monopoly of information. In addition, as most politician.
lapsed into a "patriotic" wartijie silence, the press siggeeted alternate
policies as well. 2 The faith of the British people in the printed word was
1. Balfoux	 . (Vol. 49703) Balfour to Hankey, 13 October 1914.
2. A.J.P. Taylor. Eniteb Hletor1 1914-1945. O.U.P., 1965. pp. 26-27
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still unquestioning; skepticism would arise later. The invasion issue in
1914 followed political divisiones it was promoted in the pages of the
Conservative Times, Daily Uail,and Spectator and was virtually iiozed by
the Liberal nchester Guardian, and Natjor. The Times in 1914 was
certainly the most influential newspaper in Britain, and the Daily Mail, with
a circulation of over a million, easily the most popular) Both were owned,
if not controlled, by the invasion-obsessed Lord Northcliffe, who had in 1906
directed that news of the first heavier-than-air flight in Europe be announced,
not with the words 'Man Flies at Last', but with the headline 'Englan4 j
1oner an island.
thi, news means no more sleeping safely behind those 'wooden
walls of old England' with the Channel our safety moat. It
means the aerial chariots of a foe descending on British soil
if war comes.2
Similarly, John St. Los Straoh.y, Editor of the ectator, had been
preparing fx the invasion f England for at least twelve years. Strachey
had been orgenising village rifle clubs and local defence formations in
anti-invasion war game. and menoeuvres at least since 1902 an had advocated
a National Reserve of trained military men since 1900. His wife had been
organizing a system whereby large country houses throughout England, would
be converted into field hospitals in the event of an invasion. Strachey
himself had also been successful in raising and training a paramilittry
the
detachment, /'Surrey Ouide.",whoee duty it was to guide British defence forces
against th. invaders at night or thxoug difficult or unfamiliar country.
i. Th. average daily circulation for the Daily Main during 1914 was 945,719.
(Dajl Mail Records and Information Department). It has been assumed
that circulation during th. five war months were over 1,000,000.
2. Tom Clarke. Northcliffe in History. Hutchinson, London, 1950, pp. 96-97.
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The Guides were chiefly made up of middle-class gentlemen too old for
military service, and affected something approaching a uniform. Strachey
also used his position as High Sheriff of Surrey after 1913 as a recruiting
platform, and delighted in drawing up home defence wax games and planning
staff rides against imaginary invaders.1
But again it was Repington who first brought forward the possibility
of invasion, following the German capture of Antwerp on October 10th. On
October 11th, Repington published a special article under the headline "THE
DANGER TO BRITAIN" which said in part
"A pistol pointed at the heart of England", the Napoleonic
dictum, is recalled here in reference to the fall of Antwerp
whioh is likely to produce a greater effect on Great Britain
than hero2
On October 15th, Repington became more specific, speculating that the "Great
Adventuri" of invasion might be attempted: the war was now reaching "the
climax of its disastrous violence" now that Britons must expect to be
attacked at home, as Germany realized a landing could compel Britain to
sige a disastrous peace. Repington mobilized many of the arguments used
before the C.I.D. in 1913, The military problems of defence against an in-
vasion were many the great length of the coasts, the absence of Britain's
best troops overseas, the lack of a national army which was still in the
process of formation, the submarine menace which kept the Grand Fleet far
from the deoisive point,aa well as the unknown effects of other new weapons,
such as mines and Zeppelins.
1. Strachey MSS* general correspondence and Surrey Guides, 1913-1916.
Amy Straohey. St. Loe Stracheyt His Life and Ills Papex.Collancz, London,
1930. pp. 191-2,0-244, 247-5, 285-.
John St. Los Strachey. The Adventure of Livii. Hodder & Stoughton,
London, 1922. p. 477-78.
2. "The Danger to Britain." Times. 11 October, p.1.
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Repington even went so far as to predict what form the futux.cattaok
would take: the High Seas Fleet would engage the (hand Fleet while German
transports slipped across and landed 250,000 troops behind the prot.cti
of mines, submaxines, and vessels sunk in the fairway. There was ample
shipping in German ports for a quarter million men, or wore. The fighting
thus fax x,vsalid that the German General 5taff aocepted great loss of lit.
in order to attain •trat.gio goal. - therefore a los. of an.-fifth, or
50,000 of the troops in transit, would seem a cheap pric, to pay for throw-
ing the remainder ashore. Repington was convinced that spare troops wire
availabl, for the project. Although the sea passage remained the great and
insurmountable difficulty, the blow against Britain would giv. Germane the
opportunity they longed for. R.pington srmnaxised "It is not strate'-.
It is an adventure, The odds are against success. But still the adventure
may be attempted."
Tber.fore, the British people should be trained in guerilla warfare
techniques. Then, was no unity of command over the Borne Defence Forces in
(heat Btitain, and no Commander-in-Chief, other than the overburdened
Kitchenex, •xiet.d: General Sir Ian Hamilton indeed oonded the Central
Force, but large bodies of men essential for the defence were outside hi.
control. All these matters, Repington demanded, should be put right at once)
Repington informed Lord Roberts privately a few days later that as a result
of'thia article, "many correspondents wrote to ask that you should be
appointed C in C in the British Isles ... I have always said that the public
would ask for you directly things grew warm." He reiterated his personal
concern on the subject of hone defence, regarding the "frightful" condition
l.'Wtll Invasion be Pried. A Great Adventure" Mrnee,15 October 1914, p.4
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of the troops and the difficulty of presenting an alteruiative constructive
olicy around Kitchener. He had attempted to raise the question again in
a later article but the censor out it out. Repington was convinced that
the Censorship is being used as a cloak to cover all political,naval
and military mistakes, and I wish you to realize clearly that I am
muzzled, and that the Press is no longer free.1
The Liberal Press refused to respond to the tocsin of alarm. Massing—
barn's Liberal weekly, he Nation, replied on October 17th that the fact
that Germany was in possession of "the pointed pistol" and might soon be
in possession of one shore of the Narrow Straits was "more a sentimental
than a military event.
	
Both The Ration and the Guardian had been
phlenatio regarding the fall of Antwerp, 3 and now refused to subscribe to,
or even to discuss, Repjngtons theory that the Germans were driving
Southward to establish a spring—board for invasion. 4 The il Mail
was initially skeptical, having already ridiculed a German report that
a pontoon bridge to cross the channel had been secretly prepared for
some months. The Mail derided the project as a "monumental absurdity"
and observed that "Armies since Caesar's oampaiis have pontooned streams.
It will be reserved for Attila (one of the Mall's favourite aliases for
the Kaiser) to bridge a Channel."5
The Times, however, took Repington's theory more seriously. On the
day following, the Naval Correspondent noted that only two causes would send
1. Roberts MSS. Box R.l 262/70-71. Repington to Roberts. 19, 22 October
1914.
2. The Nation. 17 October 1914. p. 56. See Also for 10 October 1914, p.27.
3. "The German Military Plans". Manchester &ardian.
4. The Nation and Manchester Guardian were examined from September to
Dec )rflbeI.
5. "Germany Day by Day." by Frederick M. Mile. Daily Mail. 13 October 1914,
p . 5.
- ,k9 -
the High Seas Fleet out to sea. First, to re-open German overseas
communications and s.00ndly, "the need for some 'splendid Hussar-liks
stroke' to put heart into their people", who were not inspired by the
substitution of Antwerp for Paris. Otherwise, it was quite unlikely
that the German Fleet would be sent out to give battle except as a
desperate adventure, as it was outnumbered by the British Grand Fleet
two to one. Repington's suggestion that invasion could be attempted
while the tøo fleets were engaged was but a forlorn hope, as the crammed
transports would be easy target for British coastal craft. The Germans
had forfeited secrecy by mining their supposed plaoe of embarkation from
Aldeburgh and Loweetoft right up the Yorkshire coast late in August.
But, the Naval Correspondent concluded, there are times when risks must
be taken in war. It was always possible that
when every hope of obtaining decisive victory on the Continent
is gone, that an attempt may be made to throw troops upon
these shores. Such an attempt it is natural to expect would
be preceded by a sea battle rather than simultaneously with
the issue of the fleet from its ports.l
Although the to articles of the Naval and ilitary Correspondents did
not accord perfectly on every detail of the expected attack, they made
a great impression, as the correspondence column of the Times for the
next few weeks attests. One reader wrote that the articles on invasion,
as well as those on German spies, had gone home to every reader, and
Nant on to say
The German Fleet is a military arm. Germany would
sacrifice every ship and 500,000 men to land a foxce
sufficient to destroy London. That is their policy.
It is the paramount duty of civilians to see that if
-	 -r --
	 -a _t --	 -
1. "The Fleets at Sea. Invasions The Naval Point of View. A Desperate
Adventure." Tie
	
16 October 1914. p. 5.
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and when that attack is made dynamite bombs and wr.okag.
shall not cause internal panic and deflect th. undivided
erergies of def.noe.1
From Germany it was reported that the semi-official Wolff Telegraph
Agency had noted that
the articl, in the Times about the danger of the landing
of Germane in England seems to have produced great excite-
mint. In order to allay this excitement the Admiralty in-	 2
struoted the Times to represent a German landing La improbable.
Even in Britain, not everyone was convinced. It was rsported from
Amsterdam that the Battle of the Aisne, which was then raging, would
cripple any project to send. German troops to England, as the health of
the German troops at th. Aims was declining and the situation there
in the trenches must shortly become indescribable. 3
 Another letter to
the editor denounced this "alarmist" agitations if any invasion were to
be undertaken soon, it would be the British invasion of Germany. Why,
then, was there all this talk of arming ".very woman, child, and cat
and.
On October 24th, however, Strachey published a long leader in
th. Spectatowhich elaborated upon Repingtori's invasion hypothesis.
Stachey was in oontaot with Belfour, Grey and Hankey, and publioized
oertain speculations that had taken place within the British Cabinet
1. "German Spies and Invasion." Times, 16 October 1914, p. 9.
2. "Through German gyes." Ibid.26 October 1914. p. 6.
3. "A German Invasion of England. Adverse Influences at Work."
Ibid. 21 October 1914. p. 6.
4. "Civilians in Invasion." Times. 2 November, p. 9.
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less than two weeks beote. He begant
The Germans are nothing if riot philosophers. They do
desperate and unexpected things rot as other races do,
instinctively, or from a Berserkermge, but because they
are th. right things to do logically from certain
premissee
Time being against her, a condition of stalemate on
her frontiers is a hopeless business for Germany. In-
vasion, then, ii a logical necessity ... When the fervent
attempt to expedite attrition has either suoo.eded or
tailed, the Germans would have to make up their minds to
the final dash. Their transports are ready arid, ii. floating
on many a mile of the waters of the E'ms River. First, we
presume, would come the submarines, then the destroyers,
then th. light cruisers, then th. battle cruisers, and last
of all the great battleships. Behind them would march - we
use a
	
word. advisedly - the transports. The
notion is that this vast and mixed Armada oould. make its
dash at our shores, coming on very much like the German
columns which have attacked our positions in mass with
their machine-guns in front. If they were undetected by
our fleet till they reached our shores, they would, it is
suggested, beach the transports while the fighting craft
ornied a protecting iron ring around them, a ring outside
which minelayers would have lain a plentiful store of
nines. In this protected area th. transports would dis-
embark their men and stores with feverish haste. The
horses would be thrown into the sea arid, left to swim
ashore. The men would tumble irto flat-bottomed boats
specially provided. for the purpose arid towed by launches.
Cranes on board. th. ships would. lift the heavy guns into
huge lighters brought from Germany, arid. then by inclined
planes and so forth. The guns would. somehow or other be
dragged up the beach: for it is quite clear that an army
of non-marksmen- if we may, without offence, so describe
the German infantry - could riot afford to come without a
very plentiful supply of powerful artillery.
This, the most detailed wartime statement of the "invasionist" school,
reveals under aralysis many of the fallacious an'! misleading assumptions
of t.ir position. It embodies them all: the military tactical analogies
crudely imposed upon what could only have been a tortuously complex
naval operation, the q,u.sionable assumption that the German Navy was
a military arm modeled on the Prussian Army rather than on other Navies,
and. the dearth of careful analysis arid. surplus of imagination that
1. "Attempt; t Invaaioj"	 455O.See also: 3). October i)14._ p. 5?j9.
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sketched out complex operations such as the landing of heavy German
artillery froM the North Sea in late autuxrn without any reference to the
conditions of time, sea, and tide.
But it must likewise be admitted that the immediate situation con-
fronting Britain in October 1914 was not conducive to dispassionate analysis.
We have seen earlier in the Cabinet how exp.rienced statesmen who had takn
part in the lengthy CI.D. analyses, including finally even the ebullient
Churchill, had finally been forced by the pressure of events to accept
invasion as a serious possibility. Three months of war had seen the over-
throw of many cherished anticipations and careful calculations of peacetime,
and this was unsettling and perplexing. In the background of the invasion
scare may be discerned elements of violence and hysteria natural enough to
a nation which had been on the brink of civil war less than this. months
before. In addition, Britain was now being flooded with Belgian refugees
whose stories, true or not, gave $ lurid picture of the consequences of a
C.r. invasion in one's homeland. Whil, the fighting on the coast contin-
ued, and was being described as the first stage of a German "march on
Calais", it was difficult to regard invasion as a purely academic problem.
Strachey admitted that his version of invasion did not seem likely
to suoceed. But he agreed with R.pington that the Germans might take the
risk, for they could easily spare the necessary 250,000 men, in view of
their tremendous reserves of manpower. Re also publicized Churchill's
theory o an invasion by increment or "driblets", introducing the possib-
ility that "the invading host, instead of coming like a common shell, might
burst in shrapnel on our shores." These, however, he hoped, could be
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hunted down in detail by hom. defence detachments. He wae careful to
conclude that "a oareful survey of the German metaphysic of invasion" still
left zoom for oonftdeno. that British sea—power would prevail and that
though the Germans will probably be driven by their worship of
logioal necessity to attempt invasion, the wisest minds among
them sill consent to it very regretfully.
But the fascinating and appalling picture of invasion continued to exercise
an imperious rule over the imagination of the editor of the Spectator.
The whole British nation must pray, Strachey wrote later, that the German
fleet would come out with the transports behind it and give battle, for
in spit. of what the policy of the Fleet in being has done fox
Germany, her ships and transports will advance upon our shores
as the great German columns advanoed upon France.1
The impression persists that the "logical necessity" which Strachey and
Rspington perceivsd was the imperative force behind invasion was, in fact,
a reflection of their own need to v tneir past arnn , s v..n .c - . If
an invasion did take place the. trieir reputations would be enhanced.
In the fall of 1914,however, concern over invasion was not restricted
to the professional alarmists. Even Strachey's great Liberal arch—rival,
LW. Lesingham of the Nation,granted that invasion was
clearly in the minds of our governors and ... underlies the
Cerman attempt to command the Channel seaboard. What of the
&at,r of a raid on these shores? That is a matter for experts
to discuss with the knowledge that the naval war has brought
and with their eyes fixed on the striking power and general
availability of our fleet. The danger must be small; some of
us who hold firm to the naval view must believe it to be almost
invisible. But it is, I suppose, a possibility, a shape which
need not haunt one at nights, and should not be quit. banished
from our military calculations. All that the averagt civilian
need. contemplate is the spirit in which such an enterprise
should be mat. And on this point the difference btween the
British and the Belgian case is plaiI enough. Germany could
1. "Attempts at Invasion."	 otato. 24 October 1914. pp . 549-550.
See aleos 31 October 1914. pp. 588-89.
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flever land a cbntinuous stream of reinforcements. She might
just oonoeivably slip in a single expedition. There her
resources would stop. Can tkere be any doubt of the reception
with which we are likely to meet any such isolated adventure?
I see none at all.1
The Guardian reported a prophecy of invasion delivered by Baden-
Powell, founder of the Boy Scouts, who had caused a etiz in a similar
mannsr in 1908. (See Chapter Seven.) Baden-Powell warned that England
would be invaded if she did not prepare for it, and asked that the nation
put six million men under arms to counter the 8 to 10 million soldier.
available to Germany. As for invasion, said Baden-Powell,
The German checks are only checks so far; they are nothing more,
Their aim is to get England, and if they have a jumping-off
place in Holland or Belgium that is very nearly enough for them.
They want to get command of the Channel from the shore and if
they succeed - for there are chanose of the navy being held by
stress of weather and so forth - there is a possibility of their
getting over hex.. When they come to a stale-mate, as now -
the next thing may be a blow for the place they want to get at,
and we are now prepared for that ...
Baden-Powell also continuously warned of the invasion peril in the pages
of the official Boy Scout monthly, Headquarters Gazette. In November he
advised his minions that in his investiattons five years before he had
found conditions Ideal f or attack on June 13th of any year. He, quoting
invasion forecasts by Repington, directed older Boy Scouts from 15 to 17
years of age to practice markmanship, train for home defence, and to
prepar, for inobtlination. 2 The Gazette printed detailed instructions to
be followed in the event of invasion.
While an agitation raged in its letter columns calling upon the Govern-
merit to release the invasion instructions to the people, the Times felt
constrained to alleviate the controversy its }4litary Correspondent had.
helped to
1. "H.i.M." The Nation. 31 October %1.
2. Heathivarter. Gazette. October 1914. pp. 290-291; November 1914. pp.
319-322.
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create. Its editorial for October 26th counselled:
Should the Cermans reach Calais, we shill hear much talk of
Zeppelins, and perhaps see them. We shall bear stories of
nionetrous guns, and perhaps the dwellers on the ooa& ea11
hear them. We may 'iear boastful threats of invasion, and
perhaps some X8d8 and desperate scheme may even be attempted.
The sole objeot of all these h roics will be to alarm the people
of these islands, to produce panics, and to induce th. public to
bring pr.eur. to bear upon the Government.
But the Germans did not 1aow the British people: it was the duty of every-
one to remain calm and resolute. The German advance to Calais, like the
"advances" to Warsaw and Paris, would fail, but even if it succeeded Britons
must remain unmoved. 1 A letter on the same page, however, cold-bloodedly
championed "Tb. Right of Civilians to Tight" in event of a German landing.2
The deteriorating situation on the continent, as well as bo the
publicity given to the possibility of invasion, produced fruitful results
in an even more receptive quarter. Northcliffe's Daily Mail, in 1914 th
most widely read paper in Britain, with over a million circulation, bad
overlooked the threat of invasion during the opening months of the war.
and
But now with the Germane in possession of the Channel ooeet,/prophesi.s of
invasion emanating from several sources, the topic of invasion came to
predominate in the pages of the Daily Mail. Th. paper reprinted Strachey's
Spectator leader almost verbatim on its editorial page, 3
 and for the next
three weeks invasion played a role in virtually every edition of the Mail.
On October 27th the second leader informed its readers in half-inch type
1.'The Tight for Calajs"j 26 October, 1914, Pimee. p. 9. -	 -
2. Ibid.
3. "Tba'Sp.otator' on Invasion." Daily Mail 26 October, 1914, p.4.
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2B GERMAN PLAN OF INVASION. STAPEM2'T BY GENERAL BARON VON RDINN.
MINES, SUBMARINES, BOWITZRS, ZEPPELINS AND NEW G1S. • It transpired that
von Ardenne, who had recently been connected with the German General Staff,
had written an article on invasion for the Saxon State Gezette, which was
now translated for the edification of Englishmen. Ardenne outlined a plan
whereby the capture of Calais and Thznkirk would make possible the emplace-
ment of huge German guns, which would provide cover for a large safety cons
for German ships in the Channel. As was envisaged by a later German plan
in 1940,1 a triple minefield would be laid between the French and English
coasts which qould close the Straits to all but German shipping and protect
a Crman invasion flotilla a. it crossed, The German General was represent-
ed as concluding
in spite of all England's minelaying, in spite of her great
fl..t, she is always afraid of a German force landing in the
United Eingdom. When the French north coast is in our hands,
such an invasion - which is now considered a foolish romance
- will be easily possible, especially when England continues,
to send troops away from the island. The preparation made by
Napoleon in 1804 to reach the English coast have been discussed
in military circles for more than an historical point of view. 2
Napoleonic allusions were never lost on Northcliffo and the editorial
of the Daily 1&&t1 the next day, "Bow to Meet Invasion", quoted a Napoleonic
dialogues "I hear that all your people in England are afraid I shall come
over." "Sire, what we are afraid is that you will not come." 3 In following
paragraphs the German press was pilloried for "trying to make our flesh
creep" (an occupation apparently regarded as the exclusive monopoly of the
1. Donald Wheatley. Operation Sea Lion. O.U.P., 1 958. p .37; Telford Taylor.
The Bxeaking Wave. eidenfiTa and Nicholson, London, 1967. pp. 215-
245.
2. Daily Mail. 27 October, 1914. p. 5.
3. Ibid. 28 October, 1914. p. 4.
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Jortholiffs pr.s.) The Germane, it was noted, no lon€er pressed for Parts
or Warsaw, but fox the coast towns of Northern France and their conversion
into a base for the invasion of Britain. But the Daily Mail believed that
this, lik, all German plans, would go astray, and transposed Bismarok's
comment regarding a British landing on the Baltic coast to read
A friendly American commentator on British life and character
once observed that if a German force ever landed here it would
be run in by the police.1
In Napoleon's time, the Daily M41 zecalled, the people had been issued
instructions for the event of invasion, and the Daily Mati now joined. the
agitation towards this end already under way in the letters column and
•ditorial page of the Times.
Th. following day, October 29th, an •ntirs column of the Daily Mail'.
•ditorial page was devoted to a reprinting of 'PREPLx(ATIONS FOR INVASION
IN l8Ol t , and the issue of October 30th reprinted a German cartoon
burlesquing the ease of invasion. 3 A speoia. article in the next issue
c ntained a synopsis of the supposed "RMAN INVASION PLkN", by the Mail's
naval correspondent, LW. Wilson, an expansion of the revelations of General
von Ardenne of four days before, which also for.shadowe many of the
features of the German invasion planning of l940. Th. tremendous enerr
i.TDajly Mail, 2S October, 1914. p. 4.
2. Ibid. 29 October, 1914. p. 4.
3. Ibid. 30 October, 1914. p. 12.
4. The parallels to 1940 were the captur. of the Channel coast, the use of
two minefield. to seal off a German corridor in the Dover Straits. The
differences are the lack of consideration given to air per, the fact
that the Germans planned a feint landing on the East Coast in 1940 and
did not conteisplat. m.etin the Royal Navy, for they had no heavy ships.
In 1940 it was also planned to cross primarily in barges towed by tugs
and medium-sised steamers, rather than pontoon boats. (Wheatley C,Cit.,
pp . 100, 160-162: Taylor:	 pp. 215-245).
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with which the Germane were battling to •.ach Cal&is led Wilson to conclude
that Germany was planning invasion. First, th. Germans would capture
Dunicirk, Calais, and the French coast to Cap. Criz Nez. Then	 lines
of min.s would b. run aoross the Chann.l to close the Dov.r Straits while
hugs German guns would be mounted along the coast to command the Channel.
Sir Percy Scott bad said some years before that th. then existing
German 12" gun would shoot from Calais to Dover, and •v•n ordinary German
guns had a range of between ten and twelvs miles. German coast artillery
oèuld establish a very large area of fire superiority in the Channel and
further protection against British trawlers and mine-sweepers would be
provided by German submarines, which would concentrate in Ostend, Dunkirk,
Gravelines, arid, Calais. Finally, when the preparations were complete,
the High Seas Fleet would emerge and race down channel. While its best
and most modern ships would close and engage the and Fleet, its older
vessels would proceed to the area of the Dover Straits, entering th. German
minefield by a prearranged gap. M.anwhils, flat-bottom pontoons would have
moved through the canal system of Belgium arid Northern France to the
Channel ports, where they would be filled with the invading German hosts,
and then towed by motor-launches arid torpedo boats to the selected embark-
ation points under the cov•r of the German secondary fleet. But the whole
plan depended on the captur. of Ca].ais, for which the Germans had alreafy
fruitlessly expended two weeks of time and 10,000 lives, and appeared no
1
closer to their first goal.
That same day, October 31st, the Times published, and the
	 1j i1
1. Op. Cit. 31 October 1914. p. 5.
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reprinted, another letter from 11.0. Wells, inspired by the Repthgton
articles on invasion, on arming and organizing the peopl. against invasion.
The Times editorial introduced it in these words
We publish today a characteristically interesting letter
from MR. 11.0. WELLS in pursuance of our frequent advice
that this matter should quietly and soberly discussed
and not tacitly iiored.
The spirit of Wella' letter, however, was hardly quiet and sober. Wells
at the beginning made it plain that he did not believe in a German Raid and
that, indeed, to do so was to play the Germans' game. But is then insisted
that the Government organize and prepare the people for "any raid that in
an extremity of German 'boldness' may be attempted". Wells continued with
language which anticipated another time when Britain would face invasion, 25
years later.
Iat the expert have no illusions as to what we ordinary
people are going to do if we find German soldiers in
England one morning. We are going to tight. If we cannot
fight with rifles, we shall fight with Shot guns, and if
we cannot fight according to Rules of War apparently made
by Germans for the restraint of British military experts,
we will fight according to our inner light. Many men, and
not a few' women, will turn out to shoot Germans. There
will be no preventing them after the ,German atones. If
the experts attempt any pedantic interference, we will
shoot the experts ...
And if the raiders, cut off by the sea from their
supports, ill-equipped as they will certainly be, and.
against odds, are so badly advised as to try terror-
striking reprisals on the Belgian pattern, we irregulars
will, of course, massacre every German straggler we can
put a gun to. Naturally. Such a procedure may be sanguin-
ary, but it is just the oouon sense of the situation. We
shall hang the officers and shoot the men. A German raid 2
to England will in tact not be fought - it will be lynohed.
Limes. 31 October 1914. p. 9.
2. "What we Shall Do If they Get flare, by Mr. 11.0. Wells." Daily Mail
31 October 1914. p. 3s "lIT. Wells on Invasion. The Civilian8'
place in Home Warfare." Times. 31 October 1914. p . 9.
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Wells asked from the government certain concessions for the
irregular forces recoiiaed military status, speoifio enrolment,
provision of some form of uniform and supplies of accessible and
e.rvio.able arms, as well as the proclamation of a 1ev4 en masse
by the Government if the Germans were so foolish as to land. He further
augg.eted that steps be taken to convert passenger oars into engines of
war ainst invasion by means of armour plate and trained crews, whioh
could also serve to "guarantee national discipline under any unexpected
stress." The Tjmee endorsed Jells' cal]. upon the Government for
immsdiat• actioni "in the unlikely event of invasion, every man left in
these island. would fight. It remains for the Government to tell them
what they ought to do, without further delay."1
Strachey's two leaders of November 7th on "The Naval Situation"
and "Civilians and Invasion" were inspired by J].].g letter,as well, as
by Cabinet information supplied by Lloyd George ,and supported the
agitation of the Times and the Daily Mail for the release of the home
defence instructions to the people. Strachey, with his penchant for
paramilitary formations, went further to advocate that lads of 16 to
19 years of age as well as older citizens over 38, should be trained in
home defence detachments. He advocated (in full italics) that such men,
above or below military age, should
form themselves into Town Guards and Village Guards, and
enquire, when they can do so without interfering with or
impeding the training of the Regular recruits, (a) the
capacity to shoot straight with a rifle; (b) the elements
of drill and military discipline.
1, l'irnee. 31st October 1914. p . 9. See also "In case of Invasion."
Ibid. 11 November 1914. p. 10.
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Strachey gave various examples of local club. that had airea&y followed
this advice with profit. Jo explicit evidence baa been discovered on
the subject, but it would seam that the re]uotarioe of Asquith's Govern-
ment to adopt the idea of paramilitary formations in Britain was not
unr.lated to their experience with the Ulster and Irish Volunteers in
the last months of so-called peace. Further, it has been seen that
the advocates of formations of this type often had other ends in view
than the defeat of a future invader. In any event, rifles and eçuipmert
were in extremely short supply. In a. home defence rehearsal cr the
coast in early November, participating troops had to borrow their rifles
back from units in training)
On November 11th, Lloyd George, who had provided Straohey with
Cabinet information for his two articles on invasion, introduoed the
topic in the course of a reoruitirig speech at a meeting of the National
Council of Evarigelioal Churohes.
There are men (he said) who mairtain that even if your house
is attacked, if your country is invaded and threatened with
oppr.ssiori, if you had a second William the Conqueror landing
in this island - not a very likely contingency - one or two
accidents that have happened. today bave made that prospect a
littis more remote (cheers) - you ought never to use a deadly
weapon to defend. yoursel' or your country. I am a'raid. I shall
never to attain in this world quit. that altitude of id.alsm,
I maintain it is not the prinoiple of the Christian faith.
Strachey wrote immediately to Lloyd George, congratulating him on this
speech.
Yy only criticism is that this appeal to make it effective
ought to go hand, in band with a very grave statement by the
G*vernment as to the seriousness of the pre8ent situation.
1. "Civilians and Invasion." Spectator. 7 flovember, pp. 626-62P: See
also Ibid. 21 November 1914. pp. 706-7C7; W Churchill. The World.
Crisis 191]-19l4.Thornton Butterworth, 1923. p. 450.
2. "The Weed. for Recruits." Times. 11 November, p.1O.
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The spea1 will use half its force and. may indeed. be a
fiasco if at th. same timejth. Government do not uss the
threat of invasion and. Ui. danger of invasion to drive
it home. If they will only tak. this oour.try into their
confidence on this matter and then make this confidence
th. basis of the appeal for men, they will get all they
want. If you keep the preparations for resisting invasion
secret, as now, th. country will go on sayings "Why should
we bother? There is no danger."l
Strachey repeated this argument ii' another leader on November 14th.2
For the first two weeks of November, Northoliffe likewise coritin.-.
u.d to stress the possibility of invasion. On November 3rd the Daily
)tai]. published an illustration depicting "Row Napoleon Threatened to
Invade England", vhioh represented a strange and fearsome raft n'easur-
ing 350 by 700 feet, loaded with men, horses, tents and. cattle, with
an awesome castle mounted in its centr.. 3 On th. pictux. page, a photo-
graph of a woman lying dead in Belgian ruins, with a presumably orphaned
child looking on, was labeled "What War Xeane to the People Who Ar.
Invaded.' 4
 Another caption was "A lancashire cotton mill as it would
probably appear after a. German invasion. Thee. are the remains o a
sugar factory near Lill.." 3 The Northoliffe' Sunday paper, the Weekly
Dispatch, published a series OP articles which observed. "Can the
Germans land in !nglarA? is a much-discussed and all-engrossing topic
of the moment"z the reader was reerred to an article on the subject
by Robert B]atchford., the military-minded socialist. 6
 On Jovemb.r 12th
1. Strachey )SS. to Lloyd George, 12 Noveinber.1914.
2. Spectator. 14 November, 1914.
3. Daily Mail. 3 November 1914. P. 3.
4. Ibid. 4 November 1914. p. 4.
5. Ibid. 14 November 1914. 9. 1L
6. Ibid. 5 November, /j 45; 7 Ioveinber,/p.2. See also 9 Nov.mber 1914,
9. 4.
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an American's account of a visit to various German waterfronts appeared as
"WHAT I FOUND IN HAMBURG: LINERS FOR INVASION:" WAIT UNTIL THE SPRING
COMES!' te 'escribed three hugs Hamburg-American liners being converted
to the new grey and yellow colours of the Imperial Cerman Navy. It was
reported that it was impossibl. to approaoh closely to the ships, and that
th.soldiers swarming over them w•re forbidden to go ashore. The American
was told that these liners were destined to transport troop. to England
wh•n the time arriv.d. Another issue of the Dajly Mail featured a photo-
graph of a German soldier with rifle zing soulfully from the shore across
the ocean, captioned "So near and yet so far. A German soldier looks long-
ingly towards England's shores.w 1
Northoliffe's press oampai brouit reaction from his rivals. The
Standard published a series of well-reasoned articles by the naval writer
Howard D'Egville, which pointed out the remoteness of invasion and exhorted
young men to enlist for service in France, The articles were re-published
later in pamphlet form, with an introduction by Lord Sydenham. Punch
published, among other things, a cartoon depicting Tennant, the Under-
Secretary for War, on th. beach bayonetting a "Hun" in the surf with his
umbrella. 2
 But the invasion propas.nda was not without effect on the pop-
ulace.
Whil, the Government drew back from maldng its measures known, for
fear of instigating an invasion panic, the people, inflamed by rumours and
reports of German atrocities in Belgium, took matters into their own hands.
In mid-November, Walter H. Long, a former Conservativ. minister, reported
3. Daily Mail. 12 No!ember, p . 5i 13 November, 1914. p.11.
2. Punch. 2 Deo.mber,/p. 461. See also: "Canute and the !aiser." 28




I can assure you that we hear on all sides, more probably in
the oountry than in the town, of German invasion, and all sorts
of definite, well—thought out schemes are being prepared, such
as arming the beat of the local dependents, e.g. Keepers,
Bailiffs, Farmers, o. with revolvers; moving women and children
and invalids to safe places in the hula; and burying pictures,
plate, &o. And if an invasion really takes place the commotion
will be extraozdinry and the hotheads will prevail, because
they will sot while others are talking ... people will b. think-
ing too much of their women and children to trouble about their
cattle. Already it has been circulated in many districts that
the Germans have determined on a raid, and that they mean to
come here and violate every woman over the age of 14.1
Th. rumours and reports being spread by the number of Belgian refugees
arriving in England had a powerful effect on the countryside, and fear of
sexual attack was a dominant factor underlying anxiety in these areas.
Long later testified that "this is the sort of thing one hears:—
"the Germane mean to send 200,000 men, to saorifioe their ftroe
to a man, but until they are exterminated they will wreak their
vengeance upon us and our property and destroy everything in
the ares which they are able to cover. Amongat other things we
axe told, that they mean their vengeance to extend to te next
generation, as they are determined to outrage every girl over
the age of 14, in the hope of raising up a mixed breed of boys
who would be a difficulty to us in the future." This may sound
like the vapouxings of a lunatic, but it has gone deep into the
minds of our country people.2
Reinforced by the anxiety of the populace and the agitation of the
Conservative press, Balfoux presented his complaints to the Liberal Cabinet
on November 9th. Re pointed out that publication of the official home
defence instructions would now allay, rather than contribute to, public
apprehensions over German invasion. Once this question was decided, other
problems called for solution. A general scheme of compensation was required
1. B1four MSS. (49777) Valter 11. Long to Balf our, 13 November 1914.	 -
2. Ibid. 15 November 1914.
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if the Government insisted upon a "scorched earth" policy in the path of
the invading army, and the destruction of food supplies would be difficult
and introduce hardship in such large cities as Norwich and Edinburgh
Fuxther, was it really consistent to discourag. the populace from moving
out of th. path of invasion, while at the same time orders were being given
fOr the deatruotion of their food? Balfour also criticised by implioation
the indecision of the Government regarding the question of civilian armed
resistance. If invasion occurred under present ciroumetanoes, one or two
stray rifle shots would jeopardise the entire population. Surely,Balfoux
remonstrated,
we should not deprive ourselves of help from men of spirit who
from age or other reasons cannot enlist ,.. but until a scheme
has been prepared for providing these irregulars with arms
badges, and some kind of organization, however loose, they
should sdvise those who consult them that no sporadic opposition
by the civil population should be attempted.1
The Government finally adopted Baif our's advice on a number of points
on November 27th, and further action was taken after the German bombardment
of the Yorkshire coast in mid-December convinced Asquith that some publicity
of home defence measures was required. On November 27th it was decided that
the secrecy of the work of the local anti-invasion committee did not
preclude announcement of their organization in local papers. It was also
explained that the Government would provide ample compensation for any goods
destroyed as part of a scorched-earth policy against the invader, but orders,
eiguedby officials, for the destruction of property, should be kept for
claims. Removal of livestock was now made dependent on local conditions.
1. Balfour lASS. (49703) Balfour to Hankey, 27 October 1914 and 23 November
1914; to Lord Harris, 27 October 1914; from Hankey, 30 October 1914.
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As far as the 1ar.r question of resistance was concerned, the policy of
the Government was to encourage every man to take his part in the present
struggle by either enlisting in the Army, or, if unfit, to Join the
Volunteers. The Cabinet had therefore reversed the decision of the C.I.D.
against armed resistance. But Balfour remained unappeased and argued that
while the old policy had been abandoned, no new policy had been put in its
place)
Simultaneously, the war of words with the Reich over invasion contin..-
ued in the pages of the Times. A continuing diversion was provided by the
filtering through of invasion reports from Germany. On November 6th it was
revealed that Count Reventlow bad warned the German press to be more oaxe-
ful of th. topic, and not to speculate, for obvious reasons, as to Germany's
supposed plans.1 It was noted ominously the same day, that the ICzeuz
the journal of the Prussian military class, bad turned its attention to the
issue of guerilla warfare in Britain. It was quoted as sayingt
So people in England continue to play with the mischievous idea
of the arming of the people, notwithstanding the experience for
wioh the Belgians had to pay so heavily. Amori' the ohildxen
of instinct in Belgium who were so shamelessly misled, franc
tireur methods were intelligible, but one would not have expected
such gigantic stupidity from the English with their coldly
caloulatinp sense for facts.3
On November 20th, the Times reproduced a speculation by a Russian General
which had first appeared in a Nice newspaper and then bad been reprinted in
the North German Gazette. This claimed that "the event which is being
prepared at the present moment is the landing of a German army in England."
1, Cab 38/28/53. "Supplementary Instrustions to Lord Lieutenants in the
event of belligerent operations in the United Kingdom. 0 27 November 1914.
3alfou. 1&35. (Vol. 4983) from Rank.y, 23 December 1914.
2. "The Invasion of England" Times. 6 November 1914. p.6.
3. Ii4.
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Why els, were the Germane attacking Dixmuds and Nieuport so heavily, and
with eight Army Corp. where the front only called for one? It was very
lik.ly that the German General Staff had prepared two or three differing
1
schemes for the advance to Calais and the invae%on of England.
On November 2let, Repington again sounded the toosin & alarm, as
invasion report. had been aocumulating fran many varied sources. Some
time before, the Copenhagen correspondent of the Times had reported Bi%9
of activity in the German Navy, while at the same time a report in the
Eil 1.3.1 had warned that troops were embarking on transports. Now,
Repington wrote,
From Zeebrue again have come report. that large numbers of
flat-bottomed motor-driven ba7gee, which might will pass over
a. minefield without touohing the mines, were being collected.
At the same time the writer was compelled to observe that be
had 1.t sight of certain German Army Corps. Putting all these
thin.e together, and considering the constant threats addressed
to us, It is a fair and proper deduotion that an overseas
attack on us has been for some tl,me in preparation and may at
any moment be launched.
It is quit. true that this wonld be a 4esperate adventure
and that it ought not to succeed. With an unbeaten and superior
Fleet, with all Our Flotillas Intact and on their guard, and
with all the considerabl, forces which wi posses. on land, the
chances are all against success. We can admit this freely, and
still believe that the changes and chances of modern war are
so many that the adventure may not prove in practice to be so
insane as it is supposed to be.
Assuming that something of the sort is preparing, we must,
of course, allow that it may only be a device to keep our
troops at home, and again that it may be the intention to
threaten us constantly by crying Wolf so that we may at last
be caught unpr.paied. But on the whole we should do well to
act as though an oversea attack was seriously int.nded, for
on land the German cause begins to be lost, and, if the
German leaders think the same th their hearts, they may be
more willing than before to try a gamble across the s.a.2
1. "Through German Eyes." Tjmes. 20 November 1914. p . 6.
2. "The romised Raid." Ibid.24 November 1914. p . 5.
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On the same day it was reported that the Under—Secretary of State for Var
had been asked in ths Commons if the troops training in the island were
to have Christmas Day leave. Mr. Pennant said no, as th. Defenoe of
Britain depended now to some extent on the troops training in Britain and
observed that "it would be inadmissabl. to name a month and a half in
advance a partioular day when th. whole d.fensiv. forces of the country
1
would be away on holiday."
The Government were finally cornered on the issue of civilian resist-
anoe in both Rouses of Parliament between the 24th and 26th of November.
In the Lords, pr.ssure was applied by Lord Parmoor to have officers of
irregular formations given Crown Commissions. Lord flaldane, who answered
for the Government, undertook evasive action and restricted himself to
observations upon international law as it applied to invasion. 2 In the
Commons, Mx. Pennant declared that the question was still under consider..
ation by the War Office and that all those too young or too old for
recruiting should join the Central Association of Volunteer Praining Corps,
p
althou&i it was still undecided whether or not this would be recoiieed
as a combatant organisation. Pennant then read a rather chilling litter
ft the War Office, which presumably reflected Kttchener's scorn for
amataux formations, and his predominant concern f or the needs of the New
Armies.
No arms, ammunition, or clothing will be supplied from public sources,
nor will finanoial assistance be given ... There may be uniformity
of dress among members of individual organisations, provided that
1. }iansard. (Commons) 20 November 1914. col. 675. Times. 21 November
I914. p . 9.
2. Ibid. (Lords) 26 November, 1914. cole. 192-197.
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the dress is distinguishable from that of Regular and
Territorial units.1
The next day it was announced that the War Office reoogaiaed all
civilian and rifle corps affiliated to the Central Association, but
aseied to them the rather unromantic duti•s of removing livestock,
h.lping threatened inhabitants, and lending cneral assistance to
2
militaxy operations.
Behind the scenes Hankey, perhaps inspired by the Northoliffe
oampaiga against spies and invasion, had turned to the problem of
enemy ali.ns. Although a C.I.D. Sub-Committee had dealt with the
"Treatment of Aliens in Time of War" from Iroh 1910 to August 1913,
the position was still unsatisfactory in the first few months of war.
As early as September 14th Hankey had argued that it was impossible to
be certain that the large number of Cermans and Austr tans in England
were completely harmless.
Arms, for example, and explosives might be concealed for
thur use in the houses of naturalised aliens in sympathy
with th. en.my. Apart from the disconcerting possibility
of a 'Sidney Street' incident in Whitehall, where the
Government Offices are only guided by police, enemy aliens,
in the event of an invasion or raid, might render invaluable
aid to the enemy by cutting telegraphic communications, and.
other acts of sabotage, by s.rving as guides and interpreters,
by spr.ading alarming rumoirs, by acts of incendiarism, and
in a number of other ways.'
In October 1914 the C.I.D. eub-Ccmmitt.e on Aliens was re-activated,
and Aequith reported to the Xing on the 22nd of that month that acme
1. Bansard (Commons) 24 November 1914. col. 941.
2. Ibid. 25 November 19 14. cola. 1112-1113.
3. Cab 38/28/40. "Attack on the British Isles from overseas."
14 September 1914. pp . 6-7.
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23,OCO 0.rmans arid Auetri&ns of military age were still at larg. in
the realm, 9,000 of whom were already in confinement. The entire
number would be interned, when the Army authorities could. find room
for them.
Karikey remained unsatisfied. In •arly D.oember he wrote to
Balfour that 'It really is outrageous to have numbers of enemy aliens
•qual to the Infantry of an army corps, in th. capital of the Empir.2
Eark.y •er.t a. memorandum to Asquith, which enlarged on the problem,
stating that the 25,000 Germans and Austrian. of military age in the
Lordon area could be opposed by only 3,000 police by day and. 6,000
by night. The alieis had been disarmed and their dwellings searched.,
but they could still do a great deal of damage, for example, by firing
grain silos with petrol or short-oircuiting electrical power stations.
Ha.ney then put the question to the Prime Kirister in •ven more
graphic terms.
It would riot requir. a very extensive organization or
very considerable numoers simultar.ously to attack the
houssa of nearly all Xembers of the Cabinet arid of th.
principal Admiriistrativ• of the Stat.. A good deal. of
harm could b. dons even at 10 Downing Street by half a
dosen desperat. men armed with knives or clubs, before
sufficient force was available to deal with them.
Invasion has been dealt with as a contingency not
sufficiently remote to be ignored., arid in most respects
we are now very well provided against it. Is it riot
probable, however, that an enemy possessing such great
powers as Oermany, imbued. with such intens, hatred of
this country, and. with so pronounced a sense of nation-
ality arid a peculiar sense of honour, would. endeavour
to utilize this great army of its nationals resident in
Loridon to paralyze th Administration at the moment of
an invasion or
1. Cab 41/35/54. Asquith to George V. 22 October 1914.
2. Balrour )(SS. (Vol. 49703) Eankey to Balfour aridâZquith,
4 Decemb.r, 1914.
3. tbid.. Hankey had. sent Balfour a copy of the paper arid his coverin
letter.
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Balfour wrote to Harkey, expressing complete agreement but pointing
out that finding a000rnmodation for the 25,000 would be a real diffi-
culty. 1 Asquith, after reading the paper end hearing Rankey's case,
only remarked that he was entir.ly unconvincedP' Hankey believed
that this was only because Kitchener's ew Armies were making great
demands on accommodation.2
Kankey, undeterred, turned to other aspects of the problem of
aliens arid invasion. Earlier, a bird enthusiast had written to
Hankey pointing out that racing pigeons based on British soil could.
be used to convmy information to the enemy, warning that
An aiim enemy with a racing pigeon is far mon
dangerous than one with a. liv. bomb ... my own mind
is clear that many losses and surprises, both on
land and sea, are due to racing pigeons.3
The untining Harikey accordingly instituted a committee which decided
to tak. all long-range pigeons in British territory into oustod.y for
the duration of th. war. Military unite were detailed to remove
alien long-range pigeons from suspiot coops, assisted in their lie-
crimiriation between long- and short- range birds by loyal pigeon-
fanciers.4
The general invasion scare was given a new lease of life by
a series of events in mid-December. On December 15th, the boa].
authorities in the East Coast counties of Liroolr,ehire and Norfolk
1. Jalfour MSS. (Vol. 49703) Balfour to Harik.y, 5 December 1914.
2. Ibid. Harikeygto Balfour, 8 December 1914.
3. Cab 17/1C3. "Carrier Pigeons." September-December: F. Handel Booth
to flankey, 29 September 1914.
4. Ibid.
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puoliehed. the hitherto-secret "Inatnictions .. in the event of
belligerent operations in the United Kingdom" 	 the next day German
battle cruisers successfully bombarded Scarborough, Hartlepool, and
Whitby on the Yorkshire coast. To a generation nurtured on tne theme
of British sea-power, aware that hostile gure had. not been heard. in
England sinoe the 17th century, this was indeed a rude awakening.
Unwittingly, the Manchester Guardian reported th. very day of the
bombardment held forth on the "Invasion of England. as a Ruse", 1 to
the effect that "reports of an intended invasion of England may be
spread by the enemy in the hope of causing a dislocation of plan of
which full advantage may be taken." 2 But the German bombardment of
the tna n the !orkshir• coast a000mpliehed an •ffeat far more
moving than the circulation of invasion rumours. Such was the 'ores
of the public outcry that the Times took the unusual step of devoting
two editorials in succession to the defence of the Royal Navy and
the subtleties of naval doctrine. The first of thee., which appeared
in the day of th. bombardment, explained that the purpose of the
Grand Fleet was not to protect these shores, but to destroy the
German Fleet. The bombardment, it was emphasized, had no military
or naval signifioarc.s it was only to t.rrorise. The Times ezpl&in.d.
Neither raids	 even invasion will deter our Fleet from
the aim for ihioh it was created., and. for which it keeps
the seas. A good. many people in this country still think of
our warships as stationed ilk. a row of sentinels on a line
1. I'lancheste' Uia..riian. 15 Deoember 1914, p.6, and "In Case of
Invasion." p. 7.
2. Ibid. 16 December, 1914. p. 3.
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dxawn before the German ports. Whatever their oocupatione
may be, it 1 not that. The possibility of a German raid upon
the English coast has always existed since the war began, and
will continue to exist so long as a single German warship of
peat speed remains afloat; but the indiant protests we have
received whenever we have pointed these matters out show that
the first principles of naval strategy are still imperfectly
understood even by this maritime race. The duty of repelling
invasion, should it be attempted, rests upon the manhood of
the nation. Perhaps it will now b. more clearly discerned.
The Royal Navy is doing its work, doing it resolutely, and
doing it well.
Th. editorial went on to stress that the situation now clearly required
complete publicity of the home defence instructions "instead of dealing
with the matter in piecemeal and furtiv• fashion."1
The second editorial on December 18th, the day following, explained
'What the Navy is Doings' This emphasized that invasion would involve even
gT.at.r risks than a confrontation between the two fleet.,wIiioh would in
itself bring a disaster upon the Germans. Invasion meant a longer sojourn
for disembarkation which would ensure that the fleet would arrive and
destroy the German forces. The entire German fleet would have to come out
to cover the oper&tion and could not evade battle - "we should therefore
be instantly in the presence of the culminating episod. of the wax." The
Daily News was condemned for playin the enemy's game by demanding anti-
invasion"measures which should render demonstrations against our Eaat
Coast too perilous to be attempt•d." Even if the East Coast were in ruins,
the Times urged, we should not change our strategy of going for the enemy
fleet. 2
 Thi. strategy, of course, had already been abandoned by the
Admiralty.
1. "he Raided Coast Towns." Times. 17 Deusmber 1914. p. 9.
2. "What the Navy is Doing.N Ibjd. 18 December 1914. p. 9. The Nation
disdained to discuss invasion. See 19 Decembers "The Meaning of the
taid." pp. 373-374, also p . 369.
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In the saris issue, the latest instalment of a series on lEngland
In Time of WexW dealt with the coastal areas from Dover to the North
Porelands. The calmness of the local inhabitants regarding invasion was
.izphaeized throughout. The coast of Kent, it was said, was watchfully
waiting for the coming of the invader, but ther. were no signs of nsrtoue-
ness or even disturbance of routine activities. The Kent coast, reported
the Times, "contemplate. raid or bombardment with an equanimity less
vulnerable places in England might p.11 emulate." In Kent alone 50,000
had enrolled in horns defence formations, although, of course, "not one
Kentish man in a hundred will admit that any such landing is remotely
possible." So many of the looal labourers were digging trenches and
defence ditches that farmers between the coast and Canterbury were having
trouble finding hands for the harvest. One of the major difficulties was
that the anti—invasion forces bad no unified ooand, and in one reported
case were r.oeivin orders from four different navy and army commandera2
The public pronouncements of politicians were likewise confusing.
On December 22, following a long and bracing speech by Bonar Law on the
tbem that "the raid has only steeled our resolve," Lord Derby, later to
become Secretary of State for War, made a few comments which could only
have exacerbated invasion anxieties.
Surely Scarborough might have brought the zeal state of affairs
home to people. T.t I am not sure even now that it has. I am
myself somewhat of a pessimist. I do not for one moment believe
that this raid at Scarborough is the last. I go further and say
that I believe Germany will be able to land troops on these
shores. (Shouts of "No," "Never.") Well, they will never get
1. "England in Time of Wax." Times. 18 December 1914, p.5; 21 December,
1914, p.9; 'The Norfolk Coast." IbiA. 9 January 1915, p.3
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back. (Cheers) But n opinion is that is what they may do, and,
t so, you will see •xsotiy the same horrors in this country as
you have seen in Belgium1
Nor win reports of the state of publio opinion in Germany reassuring
to the British pubilo. The Times on Cbzistmaa Eve contained an interview
with "th. manager of an important bank has conn.xions among influential
financial and official circles" in the Reich, who believed that the German
Army would enter London by Christmas.
we will certainly do so, (he was quoted. as saying) nd in a
way which will hav• to be written in thick typo in the history
of that robber nation and uncivilized lot. But in war one
reckons as far as possible in certainties, and we have not got
London yet.
The Times correspondent testified that "iverybody seems to think that it
will be quit. easy for a German Army to land on the East Coast of England.
2
They also talk of 'a walk ovsr the Channel' as a matter of course."
German journals •xploited to the full British fears of an invasion. The
satirical monthly IMstis Bliter printed on its cover a full—page cartoon
of a giant German soldier vaulting th. Channel, compute with hobnail boots
and pjckelhaub, rifle in hand, and supported by $ cloud of Zeppeline. This
cartoon and others of the type were reprinted by the Datly Mail on its
picture page.3
An even more elaborate index to German aspirations was provided by
Hjndenbu gs Einmarsch in London, a novil published early in 1915, and soon
translated and published in English. The story correctly predicted Russia
leaving the war and the massive transfer of German armies to the Western
front. But at this point the story became a wish—fulfilment fantasy which
1. "German Ambition ... Lord Derby's eax of Invasion." Tir,es 22 December
1914, p. 10.
2. "German Faith in the Zeppelin." Ibid. 24 December 1 914. p.7.
3. "Das Sp'rungbrett". Lusttge Blatter. No.12 (November ?) 1914; Daily Mail
30 Gotober 1914. p. 12.
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presented a German version of the invasion of England. fluge fleets of
Zeppelins and submarines destroy the Grand Fleet as the auented German
&imies over-run the Channel coast. An eight day bombardment by huge rupp
guns at Calais reduce Dover and Folkestons. Finally two German Axixr Corps
cross over the Channel under the protection of torpedo boats, submarines,
and mines, and fight their way inland. Britain proclaims a leve	 masse ,
but this only results in the Germans shooting captured sharpshooters on
the spot. Following a bloody series of battles around the North Iowns,
Hindenbuxg enters London at the head of the Prussian Guards and leads th.
German armies, with military bands at their heads into St. James's Park.
The novel ends with a "stately parade march" at Croydon and a ceremonial
entry into London in which }1.ndenbuzg addresses his conquering legions
and assures them that their grandchildren would remember that they had
"camped in front of Buckingham Palace."1
During the latter half of December, the invasion controversy raged
anew in the Times. Following the Scarborough bombardment, one correspon4-
ent had listed historical examples "to show such raids are no new thing
in hostilities against a maritime Power, and that they must be expected
as long as the war lasts." His answer was 1000 recruits for Flanders for
every German shell fixed in Britain. This introduced another long debate
on invaslon,which progressed with that exhaustive erudition peculiar to
th Times correspondenoe column for the next two weeks. A.F. Pollard,
Professor of History at University• College, London, went to pains to point
out that this, 80 fax, had been the first great naval war in which the
British Isles had not been invaded. Raids had been incidental to every
naval war Britain had had: Pollard listed 15 examples from 1338 to 1797.
1. L.G. Redmond-Howard, trans. Hindenburs March into London. Long,
London,1916. I.F. Clark.. Voices Prophesying Was. O.U.P. 1966.pp.].,l6l.
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The Naval Correspondent entered the lists to •xprese agreement, but also to
point out that it was more ooxreot to call these "raids" rather than "in-
vasions." Lord Sydenham intervened to point out that the classification
lists bad not yet allowed fox a raid where a specific limited objective was
attained and the raiders successfully re-embarked, as had already happened
twice in the course of the wax. Sydanham concluded cryptically that these
questions which Professor Pollard raises were "not so simple as they appear
to bei nor do they lend themselves to correspondence in your columns."
Outside such traditional outlets as the Times correspondence column, the
invasion agitation was given added force by the appearance of a number of
invasion films, appax'ently inspired by the commercial success of England's
Menace. (See Chapter Seven.) During the first few months of the war, both
La Quoux's novel, The Invasion of 1910, and Du Maurier's play, An Enishman's
Home, were adapted for the cinerxa as patriotlo propaganda to stimulat•
reoruiting. The film version of the latter does not appear to have been a
great improvement upon its stage prototype, for a contemporary reviewer
noted that it
would have been much more effective in its appeal if it bore
fewer signs of hasty preparation. The acting is mediocre, and
the Territorial forces are not shown to very great advantage.
The story, however, should force home the urgency of the present
crisis.2
If England Were Invaded,ao the film verejon of La Queux's novel was named,
was a more successful adaptation. Although it had been originally planned
"to have two finales - one favourable to England and one in favour of Germany,
thus pleasing everybody", 3 this scheme was evidently interrupted by the out-
break
1. Times. "Raids and Sea Power", 19 December 1914. p.10; Raids, Bombardment
and Invasion." 23 December 1914, p.9; 24 December 1914, p.9; 29 December
1914, p.7; 30 December 1914, p.9.
2. Biosoope. 24 September 1914. p . 118.
3. Ibid. 2 May 1912. p. 321.
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of war and the production appeared instead as a "Great Patriotic Film." The
final version was much less ambitious in scope than the book, restricting
itself to the presentation of a strong German force landing, occupying a Norfolk
village, and defending it in trenches against honie defence troops who came to
its rescue. Bioscope, an early film magazine, commenteds
Some interesting pictures of the mobilisation of our troops are worked
into the italy with telling effect and the battle scenes and fighting
in the trenches are manipulated with a skill which provides some very
realistic pictures ... The story is full of dramatic incidents, and is
sufficiently strong t1 connect the military incidents which form the
purpose of the film.
But the more successful invasion films produced during the first months of
the war owed nothing to prewar prototypes and were original inspirations
designed to stimulate recruiting. 	 Mimic Battle 2L Whale Island appeared on
behalf of the Royal Naval Division and showed
bow a Naval Brigade would cope with an invading force. The enemy'.
vessels are seen approaching the shore, and after a preliminary
bombardment, a force is landed which vigorously attacks the entrenched
defenders. The fight - a most realistic one - sways this way and
that, but the situation is saved by the arrival of an armourqtrain,
which enables the attacking force to be driven off. Throughthe
action is most realistic and conveys absolutely the impression of a
real battle. It forms a valuable illustration of the training and
hardines, of our Tars.2
In December 19 14 the Daiiy Exese, in cooperation with the Wax Office,
produced an invasion recruiting film entitled Wake 3I - A Dream of Totanorrow,
with a cast including 2000 Boy Scouts and 2000 veteran sailors and soldiers.
Wake T embellished the traditional invasion theme with infuriating incidents
inspired by contemporary reports of German atrocities in Belgium.
In the story, the invaders sweep across England with a Teutonic ferocity
which knows no bounds. A village church marked with a Red Cross flag snd used
as a field hospital is deliberately shellid, executions regardless of age or
1. Bioscope. 8 October 1914, p . 174.
2. Ktnematograp	 Film Record. November 19 14 . p . 57.
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sex are relentlessly performed, and German troop. bayonet babies and rap
their mothers. After the small British armies are defeated, guerills war-
fare engulfs most of Britain. The Germane shoot and hang captured guerillas
and burn whole villages and towns which shelter them, while German aircraft
bomb towns to terrorise the populace. Finally, the Battle of London begins.
The p.opl. are drilled in the city parks and served out machine guns, which
inflict terrible casualties on the invaders from barricades built in Rii-
gate. Infuriated, the German Ccunandant of London orders the destruction
of the city, beginning with it. a*tietio treasures and historical monuments.
Soon W•stmineter Abbey, Buold.ngham Palace, and Clubland lie in ruins while
the National Gellery and the British Museum are battered b heavy artillery
and finally break into flames. The dome of St. Paul's is repeatedly holed,
and the bodies of civilian dead are piled high in the streets. As the
destruction reaches its climax, it is suddenly revealed that all the fore-
going is but the dream of Lord Pax, a "feeble Wax Minister" (evidently
modeled on Raldane) who opposes conscriftion and "sleeps while our enemies
seek to destroy us." Needles. to say, he is converted, awakes, and makes
England ready against Der
In order t'at the lesson would not be lost on the public, the Daily
Exree had the film scenario re-written as a serial, which appeared daily
in its pages from January 5th to February 26th, 1915, and later sponsored
its publication in book form. The film, with its highly-charged presentation
of outrages and war crimes, was taken on tour of theatres throughout
Britain. Wounded war veterans and Boy Scouts attended free matinees, while
1. Lawrence Cohen. "Wake	 !" A Dream	 Tomorrow. Everett, London, 1915.
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military bands played and local officials delivered patriotic speechee. A
typical pertormanoe, at the Picture Playhouse in Chelsea, was described by
the Dalg Express.
More than 300 West London Boy Soouts were in the house, and
a more interested and appreciative audienoe it would be
impossible to imagine. Whenever the enemy spy who elgeale
to the invading fleet frog the east coast appeared on the
film the stalls where the scouts were seated hissed Lik.. a.
snake—pit; whenev.r the Territorial. came to the rescue or
the enemy was foiled the beautiful picture palace resounded
to the applause like the patter of a million raindrops on
the roof. Scene by scene, ruthless as fate itself, the horrors
of invasion, rapine, murder, and pillage were unfolded on the
reel. Many of the hundreds of civilians in the audience Went
white with anger and horror
The invasion motif had been harnessed to the war effort. But while the
invasion films doubtless stimulated patriotic resolve and reoruiting for the
forces, they also inevitably irritated and prolonged fears of a German
landing in the country.
Further insight into the temp.r of the time is provided by a game
which appeared on the market in early 1915, called "War Tactics" or "Can
(keat Britain be Invaded?" This was advertised as "a Wax Game of skill
bringing into play both (sic) Naval, Aerial, and land Forces, for the 000upa-.
tion of Naval Bases, the &pire's Capital, and large towns." The game
resembled a paranoid form of chess in format. The instructions issued with
each set explained that
The chief object of the game is to get enough 'Ships' through to
any of the 'Naval Bases' of your opponent and land your Invading
Force' in such numbers that you are able to push 4 land forces
through to your opponents capital.2
1. 'New 'Daily Express' Serial." Dailx Express. 1 January 1915. p..
Se. also 31 December 1914. p. ; 2 January 1915. 'p. ; 4 January 1915. p..
22 January 1915. p
2. Am example may be examined at the British Museum. Reference: N.L. Tab.! 1.g.1.
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More traditional methods of propaganda eM agitation also continued.
On January 7, as soon as Parliament had re-convened, Oureon, leading the
opposition in the House of Lords, delivered a powerful attack on the Govern-
ment's handling of home defence. Curson charged that the public's anxieties
were not relieved and demanded that the Home Defence Army be constituted as
a stable force under a single commander, free from fluctuations owing to
drafts for foreign service. Aliens should be cleared from coastal axea.
Although Germany had failed to achieve her two Western objectives of Paris
1
and Calais, the future was uncertain. The next day, the Times gave full
support to Curon and •xpreseed its severe displeasure over the Government's
administration of home defence.
the dominant idea appears to have been, not to organise efficient
measures, but to avoid causing alarm. The inevitable and unwhole-
some craving for mystery had, full rein. The newspapers, the
simplest and readiest media for communicating instructions to the
people, were debarred from conveying information ... Most of us
think invasion increasingly unlikely, but that is all the more
reason why the Government should cease to treat the public as
frightened children, and should tell them quite frankly and
openly what they have to do. LORD CURZON rightly said that no
mystery was made about these instructions in the days of NAPOLEON
and there is no need for the covert warnings transmitted now in
thøse areas more particularly interested. We agree with him that
publication is necessary.2
The Government continued to be influenced by the invasion propaganda
in the first month of 1915. Hankey, who bad been approached by the Archbishop
of Canterbury on th. subject, reported to the C.I.D. that
phanage schools for gr1s exist at certain places along
near the coast. In theevent of a hostile landing, the
occupants of ordinary girls' schools may be assumed to have
parents or friends to whom they oan go, if they can get away,
1.Hanaard. (Lords) 7 January 1915. cola. 287-3 11. -	 -
2. "The Lords arid Invasion." Times. 8 January 1915, p.10; "The Need for
Forethought." Ibid. p.9,"The Debate in the Lords," Ibid. January 1915.
p.9.
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in which they have ie advantage over their less fortunat. sisters
who have no home to go to. The removal of the latter, therefore,
would seem to be out of the question. It has been suggested that
an institution of this nature might be selected as the special
prey of the libertin, raider.1
Hankey went on to explain that fears on this point were not unconnected with
another issue discussed in his memorandum; the destruction of intoxicating
liquors. Some local authorities had ordered the destruction of liquor
supplies in their jurisdiction on the ground that theBe would prompt the
invading German troops to cocunit atrocities, pointing out that atDcities
in Belgium had usually followed the capture of a brewery or bistro. Existing
stocks in Britain were certainly sufficient to produce this feared result,
but were so expensive tiat Hanke recornaiended that they should be destroyed
only on a written order from the military authorities. He argued that the
purely military advantage lay in keeping liquors stocks intact: 2 intoxication
presumably would add to the atrocities oonmitted by invaders, but it would
also make the job of defeating them easier. Hopefully the Germans would
befuddle themselves and be defeated before they had perpetrated too many
outrages.
These questions were taken up at a C.I.D. meeting on 23 February 1915.
It was decided that orphanage. and girls' schools should be evacuated insofar
as was possible. Irnatea of hospitals and asylums were not so fortunate and
were to be left to tak, their chances with the invader. In connection with
anticipated invasion atrocities, Hankey had received a letter early in
January 1915 from the National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies, which
suggested that
1. Balfour	 (49703) C.I.D. Paper 205—B. "Civil Population and Hoetil.
Lending." by Hank.y. 2 January 1915. p. 2.
2. Ibid. pp. 3-4.
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women should be encouraged to organiz. themselves in case of
invasion, and that their organisation should b. recognized by
the Committee of Imperial Defence.., at each coast town liable
to be raided, a certain quarter of the town should be apportioned
as a kind of sanctuary where women and children left in the place
should be collected. Further, that this quarter should be
clearly defined to the Officer Commanding the raiding force, and
that he should be Invited to plao. a sufficient guard over the
quarter to ensure the protection of the inhabitants.1
In order to head off a formal deputation of Suffragettes, Eankey agreed to
see two of them informally, found the proposal not unreasonable, and promised
to bring it before the C.I.D. That body, however, was rather suspicious of
female agitators and ignored the proposal for a Suffragette sanctuary, but
did assign a role for women in the preparations against invasion. The Lord-
Lieutenants were instructed to employ women for various types of work,
including the housing of refugees.
But this was the last C.I.D. meeting of the war anc Asquith bad opened
it with the observation that "the subject they had to consider was very
academic." After January 1915 Repington was virtually the only writer who
continued to present the possibility of invasion. On February 8 and April
19 he published long and detailed articles which demonstrated his •xoeptiènal
capacity for ingenious inductive reasoning. In February be argued from
history for the likelihood of an attack from across the North Sea, but he was
forced to employ very remote history indeed to provide precedents. Then
remained the well-worn hypothesis of	 Teutoniouss
The madness of the German people, caused by the terrible disillusions
through which they are passing, may very likely affect their strate'
and lead to adventures which no sane leader would sanction in calm
moments. We must expect desperate actions ...
The Gerwane were known to be practicing embarkation in the Baltic; the danger
would pass only "when the war on the continent redoubles its fury in the
1. Cab 2/3 "Minutes of 123rd Meeting, 23 February 19 15 . " p. 4.
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spring."1 Events in April prompted Repington to r.iterat. his warnings the
recent beginning of air raids on England he regarded as "reconnaissance pure
and simple and "the arrival of a new commander at the head of the German High
Seas Fleet" (Von Pohl had replaced Ingenohl following the German defeat at
Dogger nk) pointed to a coup which would "atone for its past failures."2
But Repington was now unheeded and his message was unsupported by leading
articles or published correspondence.
Another philosophy ad finally gained the upper hand in the realm of
public opinion. Where Repington, like ICttohener, had to balance the needs
of the Western front with an intuitive concern for home defence, there were
others who felt no such tension and could consign home defence to a seoondary
priority without a qualm. Convinced "Westerners" of this persuasion were
contemptuous of the invasion scare. A typioal example was Leo xse, editor
of the National Review, who it the beginning of the scare in October 1914
charged thati
divisions have dawdled in these islands. They still dawdle ...
shadow armies for shadow campaigns at shadow dates are a sinful
wast• of en.rgy, time, money, and good material. Meanwhile heaps
of officers and men, whos presenceat the front is vital to the
continued efficiency of our wonderful Expeditionary Force, are
remaining at home in pursuance of these shadows. 3
In April 1915 xse conceded that "it should be remembered in fairness to
those who took invasion seriously that German strate is subordinated to
sentiment and dominated by Anglophobia. Wilhelm II would che.rfully sacrifice
any number of Army Corps to effeot a lodnent in these islands." But it had
been suggested in the trenches that
1. "Home Defence". Times 8 February 19 15, p. 6; See also "Ian Hamilton's
Position." Ibid. 11 February 1915. p . 10; "The Army Debate in Parliament.
Ibid. 16 February 1915. p. 6.
2. "The War Day by Day." Times. 19 April 1915. p. 6.
3. "Episodes of the Month." National view. October 1914. pp. 188-89.
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there was a disposition to "starve" the xpeditionary Force in
Whitehall on account of the "invasion Scare" which many intelligent
men at the front were inclined to regard as a bogey skilfully
organized by agents of Germany in this country.1
This almost certainly was a fabrication. Trained men simply were not avail-
able in any event at the beginning of the war to reinforce the divisions in
France. To the contrary, Kitohener is generally criticized for having sent
trained men to the front that should have been used to train the New Armies
at home.
As January passed into February, the invasion peril began to lose
its hold on the public imagination, and for good reason. The strateglo
situation, which had been more threatening than most prewar anticipations,
had. now stabilized f ox some weeks and had assumed a familiar and predictable
shape. The German advance along the coast had been brought to a halt. At
home, the new Armies and Territoxials were entering the final stages of
their six months' training. At sea, the onset of winter militated against
the success of a German landing. Beatty' $ mauling of German battle cruisers
at the Battle of Dogger Bank on 24 January proved that the enemy' i fastest
ships could be intercepted and destroyed even under the adverse conditions
of the North Sea in mid-winter. The first Zeppelin raids on British soil
the same month directed public interest to a more substantial threat from
a new direction. For all these reasons, the contingency of invasion faded
from the publio consciousness.
While it had lasted, however, the scare had reached an intensity
unprecedented for a century. The German invasion propaganda of th. previous
1. National Review. April 1915. p. 231. Ixse lt.r published an article
which "proved' that the Armada of 1588 bad been a Teutonic conspiracy,
planned solely and financed strongly by Germans, supported by German
crewmen, munitions and invading troops. See: Ian D. Colvin. 'The Germans
and the Spanish Armada." Ibid. July 1915. p. 693
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decade reaped a rich harvest. Old novels were re-Issued and were joined
by the novel and evocative media of the film to bring home the horrors of
invasion to a wider audience than ever before. What was previously
conjecture became gcnmon rumour. Emotional and hateful reports were
disseminated among the public in the vacuum of hard news created by the
censorship, fed by exaggerated reports of atrocities perpetrated in Belgium
and France. Like the Admiralty defensive measures the instructions to
the civilian population had to be hurriedly i.provised in the opening months
of the war, although the need for them was just beginning to be realized
as war broke out. Although they were never required, they provided valuable
precedents for a similar situation a quarter of a century later.
More than ever before, an ostensibly strategic question bad. assumed
an avowedly political complexion. The bulk of the invasion agitation came
from newspapers and journals politically right of centre and opposed to
the Government; the Conservatives had established themselves as the party
of national defence. The second development was newer and more siiftcant.
The violence and invective of prewar British political life formerly
expended upon domestic controversies such as the Suffragette campaign, the
impending General Strike, and, most of all, utah Rome Rule, was now
refocused on an external enemy of the people. The xiit-wtng press,
not the nation itself, underwent a period of temporary insanity in. wbtph
humour, per spotive, and proper ti on were suspended under the menace of
impending attack and encouraged by reports of German atrocities carried
out on the civilian population of France and Belgium.
In the popular conjecture over a German raid and mass rape of English
women in order to produce a race of semi-Teutonic outcasts, in Rankey's
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cool calculations of German terror attacks upon orphan girls, and in E.G.
Wells' incitements to a peopls, war of oowiter-t.rroiisin against the
invader, may be discerned elements of or.dibility and hysteria which rk
a reversion of British public attitudes back to those of the apoleonio
invasion threat more than a century befors. Once again, involvement in
violence was no longer regarded as the prerogative of professional armies
or the state, but was seized upon as a right of the people. The traditional
certitudes and sanctions of nineteenth-century Libeialism - the sanctity of
treaties, international law, and usages of wax - were regarded as irrelevant
and discarded. This was to be a war between peoples, not armies, and tb.
n•ws frcn th. continent seemed to confirm the most sanguinary prophesies
of the sensational invasion novels. It was not an environment in which
Liberalism could long survive. Within four months the laet Liberal
Administration in British history had been toppled against a background
of emerging total war, slowly to be displaced by an alliance between the
representative, of Conservativ, militarism and. totalitarian demooracy.
Invasion, long associated with the themes of chauvinism and xenophobia, had
reached it. natural culmination in public opinion: never again during the
war, nor for the next generation, would it seem so near.
H P I L 0 G U B: 19154918.
After the momentous events of Fall 1914, the history of the
invasion controversy for the rest of the war is anticlimatic. Invasion
again became primarily an int.r—servioe question and .ngagsd the attention
of the suprem. command only incidentally.
The remainder of the war may be divided into three periods. First,
following the flurry of activity in th. first few months of the war, the
situation reverted to that which had existed before 1903. Churchill, the
moat stalwart advocate of a systematic and analytical approach to invasion
as a strategic problem, was removed from political power • Kitchener
remained, to perpetuat. a 19th century approach to home defence, which
inevitably reverted to chaos, whil• the General Staff remained practically
inoperative. But with the installation of Robertson as C.I.C.S. and
French as Commander of Home Defence at the beginning of 1916, Kttoh.ner
was stripped of his responsibility for horns dsf.noe and th. reorganization
of home defence on a rational basis was resumed. The first of several
inter—service conferences on invasion was convened and the scale of
estimated attack was raised from 70,000 to 160,000. Throughout 1916 and
1917 Robertson and the General Staff put increasing pressuxe on French
to traafer divisions from home to France, while Admiralty confidence in
its ability to halt invasion steadily decreased in the face of increased
submarin. attacks. The third period starts at the beginning of 1918,
when younger Naval officers overthrew the timid conclusions of their
superiors and cooperated with the Westerner Generals to decrease the scale
of attack once again to the classic figure of 70,000, then 30,000 and
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final17 5,000. Te West.rn front had finally trtt2mph.d over home defence.
On 6 July 1915, Hankey printed a. 24 page survey of horn. d.tence for
the benefit of the Cabinet. On the baste of almost a full year of wax,
he judged. that a raid, was much more likely than a and invasion, although
hi admitted that this raid might involve more than the 20,000 troop.
previously rsgaxded as a maximum. The first year of the war provided no
pounds for bound],esu confidence in expert sstimat of future possibili-
ti•s. The C.I.D. had incorrectly dismissed the possibility of the Germans
bombarding undeç.nded towns from the sea and air. The Scarborough raid
of December 1914 was only one of a series of incidents which proved that
savagery and "frightfulness" were component parts of German strate v and
tactics. A "frightfulness" raid, Hankey warned, might be launched "in any
one of th. more densely populated areas along the coast." 1 But even
frightfulness would be limited by logistics, and the razing of a town or
port would require much heavy artillery, the landing of which would slow
the Germane considerably. Th. actual strater of home defence was not
to defend the hypothetical objectives of German terrorism, but instead
protected strategic points, such as lighthouses, communications, wir.lese
stations, and axzinunition magazines.
Germany, Hankey continued, could now use Ostend and Zeebrugge as
embarkation ports, but wers unlikely to do so owing to the extreme
hostility of th. local inhabitants and the fact that both ports were with-
in range of British reconnaissance aircraft. A Bolt from Belgium
must therefore be ruled out. But it was still safe to assume that a
eiz.abls expedition could be prepared with complete secrecy in the German
1. Cab 3/3/lB "Roms Defence." by LP.1.H. 6 July 1915. p3. -	 -
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ports in th. Baltic and North Sea. Nor would disembarkation provid, an
insuperable baxri.r, for Hank.ey'e evaluation of the landings at Gallipoli
two months pr.viously did not encourage complacency. In one instance,
with perfect weather but with determined opposition, 29,000 men had b..n
sanded in 13 hours. On this occasion, losses had been so heavy that the
man could not advance, as the enmy bad only to watch ten miles of beach.
But in Britain th.r. wers 120 miles of beach suitable for a landing of
this type. Although thee. could all be watched, it was impossible to
provide a resistance on the scale encountered at Callipoli. There were
many places in the Eastern counties, especially in Norfolk, where the
whole of the enemy forces could be brought ashore in twelve hours.
But this threatening pictur, of dispersed forces and feeble resist-
ancs was balanced by three factors that presumably would make Britain
more defensible than the Dardan.11es. First, the weather in these latti-
tudes was mors oapriolous and the tides of the Noxth Sea certainly
exceeded the 12" difference found at ]rdane1les. Next, British command
of the sea would redress the balance in favour of the defenders. Further,
because much greater distances were involved for a decisive victory on
land, the invaders would have to land vast etores of heavy artillery,
materiel, and transport, which would take from 48 to 72 hours of .xtreinsly
valuable time to land and an appreciable percentag. of an already-limited
forc. to guard.'
The invasion theme enjoyed a slight revival in September 1915. The
Chambers Journal dreaed up the spectre in new clothes by claiming that
the Germans might achieve surprise by building myriads of small ships and




trawlers which could slowly build up strength as it hid among the Frizian
Islands. It was believed that "German shipbuilding resources are better
able to cope with the rapid preparation of a fleet of unarmed small craft
than with warship.."1 In that same month the last of the fiotional in-
eopg
frd.x. - this time at in 1925 - was published and dedicated to Kitchener.
Its moral was implicit in its title "1925" The Story of a Fat 1 Peace.2
If success of invasion was more r.rnot. Repington warned, the
temptation to gamble upon it was stronger than ever before:
It is in the spirit of rage and despair that they conteinpiat.
a stroke against us at horns ... It is not with th. cold clear
•y.e of a Moltke that th. Germans are regarding the problem of
hitting us but with the bloodshot eyes of furious passion...
Repington believed that the Germans still had chances for success owing
to certain advantages, including
the possession of the initiative; the superiority of German
long-d.etanoe strategic reconnaissance by dirigibles; the
removal of our Grand Fleet from the Narrows and the Downs;
the possibilities offered by modirn science to deny us
temporarily the use of certain maritime areas and channels
by an extensive use of ndrs and submarines; the rapidity
with which landings can now be sff.oted if the operation is
adequately prepared in advance; the anticipated inferiority
of our staff, troops, and armament at borne when our beet
armies are abroad; the want of a oe*tra]. authority controlling
British home defnr ashore; and, last but not least, the
chances of war
Having constructed this awesome tableau of future possibilities,
Repington employed the invasion issue to upbraid !:ithner. Re described
1."The German Invasion of England." Chambers Journal. 23 October 1915.
pp . 750-751.
2. Edgar Wallace. "1925" -	 Story 2. a Fatal Peaci. N.wnes. London, 1915,
3. "The War Day by Day." Times. 22 September 1915. P. 6.
4. Ibid.
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the consequences of Xitcherier's failure to institute a proper home defence
organization, and called for a public inquiry into the !natter,to prOduo.
results acceptable to the General Staff. Liany different commanders existed,
Repington charged, but there was no single Supreme Commander on land as
there was on sea. No one man was acquainted with horn. d&t•ncs as a wholet
co-ordination of effort was impossible. This "hopelessly illogical and
improper state of affairs", R.pington remonstrated, "can only be founded
on th. extremely rash and ill-advised assumption that the enemy will n.v.r
corns at all." An actual invasion would involve Draconic measures indeed.
that would be for Lord Kitohener to take the field. H.
wouldn no doubt, act with the gxeat.st vigour, but, not
having had all the strings in his band, be would act with
avs disadvantage. Meanwhile his absence from the War
Office • .. (would produce) a general chaoe which would
affect our campaigns elsewhere, and everywhere injuriously.
What was really required was a Cociand.r-in-Chief of Home Defence with a
good staff and complete responsibility for defence ashore.
At the end of 1915 Repington was far from being alone in demanding
an overhaul of home defences. In November the Volunteer novement was is —
vitalised fo1lowin a long debat. in the Rouse of Commons. 2 Soon there-
after the Government installed Repington's friend General Sir William
Robertson as Chi.f of the Imperial G.n.ral Staff with broader powers than
those of his predecessor, at ICitch.ner'e expense. Robertson was strongly
encouraged by the Cabinet to dxaw up a list of oondition befors taking
th. post, the seventh and last of which read "A C-in-C Rome Forces should
be appointed to coornand all army units in Great Britain. Re should be on
the same footing as a C-in-C abroad, and in the same relationship to the
1. 'Th. War Day by Day." Times. 22 September 1915. p.6. S.. also "The
British Conrnand in Francs." 17 December 1915. p. ii,
2, Raneard (Lords) 16 November 1915. cols. 337-35 8 ; 18 November 1915.
cole. 405-407,
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Then in th. third week of December Robertson became C.X.G.S.,
Field Marshal Sir John French became the first Commander-in-Chief, Rome
FOrCeS2
Both Robertson and French were dedicated "Westeaners" and very early
bad cast covetous eyes upon the divisions assigned to home defence duties
in Britain. Even before their arrival, Major-General Sir laurence K.tggell,
install.& in October 1915 in the new post of Dixeotor of Ham. Defence,hsd
been attempting to •xtxact a statement from the Admiralty giving & fresh
estimate of the ecals of expected overseas attack. 3 The offita1. figure
was still 70,0& - an estimate established in 1902 in vastly different
oiroumeta.nces. Accordingly, the az Office o3ntaoted the Admiralty on
16 November 1915 to request an inter-service conference to discuss "the
number and nature of troops it is necessary to maintain in the United
Kingdom, and their strategical distribution. 4
 After fifteen months of
war, th. invasion problem was again to be subjected to a systematic analysis.
A "General Staff .morandum on the Problem of Home Defence" was
forwarded to the Admiralty. This x.itexated Zitchener's concern of an
attack on Great Britain following a stalemate on the Western front, but
balanced this against against the
heavy disadvantage to us to keep locked up in the United Kingdom,
awaiting attack .that may never come, any forces which might other-
wis• be actively employed elsewhere. It is thexeore one of the
most vital strategic problems of the War to determine, from time
1. Victor Bonham.-Cartex. Soldier True. Muller, London, 1963. p . 138.
2. Times. 16 December 1915. p. 11; 22 December 1915. p. 10.
3. R.pington.	 First World War. Vol.1. Constabli, London, 1920. p.61.
4. Adm 137/835/10 Measures to be Taken in Event of Invasion 2L Bali.
S.crstary, Wai Office to Secretary, Admiralty. 16 November 1915.
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to time, both the quantity and th. quality of the land forces
to be maintained in England. Th. answer to th*s problem
depends primarily on what the Navy consider it possibi. for
them to undertake as regards protection of our shor.s from a
hostile landing •.. there is less risk in acting boldly on
the carefully formed estimates of experts than in relying on
any "hand-to-mouth" system, which is the only alternative. 1
For the first time sinoe Kitchener had come to the ar Office 15
months earlier, the General Staff had finally made its views 1oown and
censored Kitchener. Prom this point onward, aotual responsibility for
home defence was to be taken out of Kitchener's hands entirely and given
to a new regim. of Generals strongly con*nitt.d to the Western Front, who
found their chief problem that of reconciling their first desire to
reinforce Haig in France with the inborn instinct of the professional
soldier to provid, sufficient protection for his homeland. But at least
horn. defence was once again being considered on a rational basia,instead
of the "hand-to-mouth system" which had been the main characteristic of
Kitohener's one-man regime at the War Offios.
The most eminent of the New Regime was Major-General Sir William
Robertson, the only man ever to advance from the rank of private to Field-
Marshal in the British ArnW. Robertson was a bluff and powerfully pLaced
soldier whose ener', shrewd common sense, and gruff humour wore all to
be required. in dealin with the morass o the home d,ferices. More directly
concerned was Sir John French, transferred from the command of t}e British
Forces in France after alleged mismanagement of the Battle of Loos
(September-November 1915). With a consummate, but unconscious, irony on.
of the greatest of the Westerners, strongly skeptical about the prospects
of any invasion, bad been removed from th. premier command on the est.rn
, Adm 137/835/12 "General Staff Memorandum on the Problem of Borne
Defence." undated, but almost certainly November 1915.
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front and put in charge of 1-ome def.nos. Something of the poignancy of
th. move can be captux.d trom a contemporary entry in the diary of Lord
B.rtie, the British Ambassador in Paris: "It is all up with French. H.
will probably become Couixnand.r—in—Chief in England. I am so griev.d for
hini!"1
The essential paradox of the W•eternsr Generals in approaching home
defence was not avoidsd in the General Staff Memoxanthni.Even as appeals
were mads to the Admiralty to establish some fixed stkndard of expected
attack, the General Staff us forced to admit that both the military and
naval situations which affected this scale of attack would fluctuate
almost daily. But the Generals continued to press fox an official estimates
upon which the quality, quantity, amid strategic distribution of the anti—
invasion forces could be based. The memorandum specifically requested
that the General Staff
be told what parts of oux Coast the Admiralty consider may be
regard.d as immune from attack; what parts may be exposed to
raids (and in what strength) but not to serious attack; and
lastly what axe the places where serious attacks may be
posibls from a Naval point of view, and which of these seems
most suitabl, from the eri.uy's point of view.2
However, the Admiralty apparently did not take as serious a view of
the question. The first letter from the War Office went unanswered, and
a second prompted H.F. Oliver, Director of Naval Intelligence, to comment:
This paper is being dealt with, it involves a great deal of
work as there are a great many former decisions to be taken into
a000unt. The W.O. have a new Director of Home Defence who has
nothin,g els. to do wher.ae we only can attend to it in our
i.. kiajor tzie lion. Uralu ±'r.non.




But th. Admiralty were not nigisoting invasion. On 4 Jure 1915, four
days after taking offios, Admiral Henry Jackson, the First Lord, had.
sent Jellico. the following supplemental instruction:
ocoasione may arise in whioh th. destruction of transport.
carrying a large bo&y of the enemy's troops is a more promis-
ing arid, urgent necessity than any other, in which case the
transports must receive prior attention even if th. •nemy's
main fleet happens to be within reach of attack. Unless,
however, a large invading foros is known to be actually
embarked, the main battle fleet of the enemy must always be
regarded as our principal objective...2
Similar counsels of pessimism pr.vailed. in the first of the wartime
inter-service confererioes on invasion, which convened in the first week
of January 1916. The chisf naval delegate was Admiral of the "l..t Sir
A.E. Wilson, who was now on the retirement list but working for the
Admiralty voluntarily without pay. Re, like Jel]iooe, had. drawn very
pessimistic conclusions from the 1912 and 1913 naval manoeuvres. His
military counterpart was Itajor-General F.B. Xaurioe, a close friend of
Repington. The conference began on a completely different basis than
the C.I.D. investigations: where previously the C.I.D. had. calculated.
that the Germans would try to invade with as few troops as possible
owing to the dangers of discovery, interception, and. the difficulties
of disembarkation the inter-service conference began on the assumption
that the only factor limiting th. size of a possible German expedition
was the total amount of shipping available in German ports. This
importart assumption led to oonolu.ions strongly at varianoe with those
1. Ad.zn l37/P35/ll Yargiral comnert, Iated. 1 December 1915.
2. Ad.m ll6J3131 "War Plans (War with Germany) 1914-1916: Extract




The Admiralty oalouiated. that the Germans bad erie million tons
of shipping available, sufficient for the tranaDort of 135,000 troops
together with their trarsport and two months supjly of ammunition and
stores. But the conference judged that the Germaris would not eroumber
themselves with mup;lieo on this extravagant scale, for the Gerrian
General Staff would plari en a much shorter campaign than two months.
The Admiralty then submitted a long and pessimistic appraisal of the
invasion o p.xatien based on experience at Gallipoli. The naval
representatives contended that all of the 135,000 infantry ceuld be
landed •n the spen beach in the daylight hours it a single lay, together
with a limited amount of artillery à.nd supplies, before the Navy oou]d
effectively intervene. About ten to thirteen miles of beach would be
required for the 200 transports required. Admiral A.. Wilson argued,
in contrast to Hankey earlier, tb.at the landings at Gallipoli indicated
the ease of an invasion of rig1and. Although navigational and climatic
conditions were much lees favo4able in the North Sea than in the
editorranean, Wilson fixed upon the scale of shore resistance as the
decisive factor and argued that the Gallipoli landings were successful
in landing large numbers if tr..ps in the face if equal or superier
(cross ashore. Britain could net hops te match the Turkish seals of
coast dsfenne, fir her coast provided oountles. places when, a landing
was possible in oemparis.n to the relatively few suitable sites alerig
the Dard.anelles coast. Wilson disaiised the 1904 Clacton Ianosuvres
results, which indicated the slewnoas of landing a mixsd force en the
beach, as irrel.vant.
1 !QT3/7ll A194C "Note by the General Staff on Rome Defence." pp.1ol3; Report of a Conference betwoon Representatives if the
(o.ntd, next v.)
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aurioe caloulated. that th. Germans o.u]d. collect 101 divisions
or 170,000 men at any time when a vital military •p.r&ti.n was n.t in
pregress,,ancl embark the. without warning. The conference modified this
•stisate to read "10 specially •rganized divisions, or approximately
160,000 men with a strictly limited supply of artillery, ammunition,
and trans port," and concluded. that such a f.roe could appear anywhere
between the Wash and Decor without warning. The ha y7 guaranteed effect-
iv, interruption of s German landing en "24-28 hours after the hostile
transports are sighted from cur shores." 2 At ens stroke th. sacrosanct
figure of 70,000, which had resisted several attaoks during the last
decade, was multiplied by almost two-and-a-half times, to remain the
established standard for twe entire years •f war. But at least a
standard had. been set and inter-service communication had. been re-
established.
As we have seen, the fir$t inter-service conference en invasion
represented only one aspect of a general re-organization of home
defenos. Its o.nolusions were to have a direot bearing on the new
C.maand.er-in-Chief, Home Forces, Field Xarshal Sir John French.
Rspingten visited French shertly after th. latter's installation
as Hercules in the Augean Stable of Home Defence.
December 28, 1915 ... Sir John thinks that the P.L really
wants him, and had told him that home defence was in a state
of chaos... he will only have 300,000 scratch volunteers, at
present unarmed ... a motley crew, but, as over, Sir John
1. (oontd.. from previous p.) Admiralty War Staff and the General
Staff, held to consider the possibilities of Attack on the United.
ing&om i January 1916." p p. 11-12.
1. Oid. p. 13.
2. Ibid.
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dieb.1iesin invasion, and would send all his men to France
if asked.l
In contrast to his naval counterparts, the new Commander of the Home
Defence Forces had not the slightest fear of invasion. In French's mind
2
the necessities of Francs ranked before ths necessities of Home Defenos.
French complained in his diary (28 February 1916) that
lb. Naval people hays been worrying again about the possibility
of invasion and saying that they can't undertake to intervene
in a hostile embarkation for a considerable time. Rightly or
wrongly I don't attach a peat deal of attention to this
Personally I hold the same views as I have always held on this
subject. If I b.li.v.d invasion, at the present junctur, of
affairs, anything but a very remote possibility I should f..l
far from happy, because we are certainly not adequately
prepared to meet a landing on these shores .1.3
It was just as well that French did not take the threat of invabon
seriously, for the state of home defence was not such as to inspire confi-
d.nce, French told Repington be
had found an immense nes of troops, something like a million
and a. quarter or a million and a half, but with no organisation
worth the name, and most indifferently armed. Out of his
Central Forces under Rundle, nominally 170000 strong, he
declares that there are only 30,000 armed.4
Something of the state of home defenc. when French took ov.r from Kitohener
can be gl.aned from the fact that th. number of the forces could be
oaloulated only to the nsaxst quarter-million and that only some 20 of
the elite mobil• force was armed, and then "indifferently". Later it
transpired that the figures that Kitchener had given to French of the home
defence forces were out by haifa million.
	
Robertson agre.d that "affairs
1. Repington.	 . jpp. 97-98.
2. Balfour	 (49704) Balfour to Hankey. 14 April 1916.
3. French. 2 .	 p. 338.
4, Repington . 2j . pp . 109-110.
5. Asguith	 Box 16. altsr Long to Asquith, 16 March 1916.
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in England are in a rare muddle... 1 It transpired that Kitchenex estimated
that there were some 1,600,000 men in England, of whom a. mflhion were fit
to fight. On checld.ng these figures, the Horn. Defend. Directorate die-.
covered the total ration strength in Great Britain was just over a million,
of whom only 540,000 sre combatants. Th. arms availabl, for this force
were about half a million rifles. 2 K.ttchener in addition had attempted to
obstruct French'. appointment of sound officers to Home Defence, until
Asquith intervened. 3
 Sir Arthur Paget, Commander of the South•rn Army besed
on Salisbury Plain, lamented that
of his two 2nd lin. Territorial divisions one has Japanese rifles,
with only 200 rounds per rifle, and no reserve; the other bad the
old Lee-Enfield, and no arinunition.4
By Uaroh, French and his staff believed that matters were improving, though
"They complained bitterly that they w•rs not fighting the Germans, but the
Horn. Office, the Treasury, and the Finance Branch of the War Of floe."5
Rspington'e campaign to have home defence put upon a rational and
organized basis under unified connd had been resliesd. But although
Fr inch had been successful in imposing a system upon home defence and a
unified command over its variegated units, he r.mained hamdioappd by th.
low numbers and poor, quality of hi. troops. Hi. divisions wer. composed
of second-line troops, constantly emptied for overseas drafts, and always
under the establis.d strength. Azmnunition also was in short supply, although
French relied heavily upon the machine gun companie, training in England to
L. Repington. .2 . Cit. pp . 116-17.
2. Ibid. p . 139.
3. Ibid. pp . 145, 178 ; French	 p. 338.
4. Repington.	 .	 p. 121.
5. Ibid. p . 138.
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stiffen the defenoe if invasion occurred. With their help French believed
he could "take on 100,000 enemies." 1 But after the Irish Republican uprising
in Dublin in April 1916, French's fourteen divisions were reduced to eight.
Axing the summer of 1916 friction began to ow between French and
Robertson as the latter transferred txQope 'rom En€land to France to
r.pl.nish diviEions decimated by the Battle of the Somme. French resented
further reductions of his none-too-vigorous force and talked of xesting
unless "allowed to ha.. his own way in Home Defence." ).ttexs were not
improved when Lloyd George and Robertson, in late September, decided to send
five more divisions to France, and to create small divisions for Home Defence
consisting of men rejected f or overseas service for medical reasons.2
The Admiralty had not waited for the conolusione of the inter-sezvioe
oonferonoe to dispatch new orders, entitled "Action to be taken in the
event of an Attempted Invasion" to Jsllicoe for comment. The Admiralty
assumed that
the Germans have sufficient ships in their ports to bring a
force of at least 135,000 with a full complement of artillery,
ammunition, and supply trains for two months supplies. That
they could fit out th ships and put the troops on board
without our laiowledge and might not be sighted before arriving
off our coast. They could land the men without our being able
to prevent ther'. but the quantity of supplies etc. that could
be landed would depend on the time available before the arrival
of our fleet. It Is expected that the enemy will make use of
his whole fleet including destroyers, suhiarines and minelayers
to support the transports in some way.3
The Admiralty outline4 the probable tactics to be employed by the enemy,
as Cbuiohill bad done in 1914.
1. Repington	 . Cit. pp . 178-179, 204.
2. Ibid. 187, 204, 218-19, 275, 292, 319, 347.
3. Richmond S. RIC/2/2 "Anti-Invasion Synopsis." p. 15.
Adm 137/83V43 4 January 1916.
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It is probable that he will use his old battleships with a
proportion of cruisers and d.stroyar. to prevent our light
cruisers from attaoldng th. transports. These will be liable
to attack tram our suiarines, but the risk from these latter
will make him keep his more modern ships of the High S•ae
Fleet some distanc, off and so placed as to intercept any
force they may send to attaok the old battl.shlps. In viiw
of the difficulty which the enemy will ha y, in obtaining
supplies of coal, it is impossible for the High Seas Fleet
to do us any appreciable injury by escaping out of the North
Sea. So no time need be wasted in searching for it, and the
wand Fleet need not be prevented from proceeding with all
dispatch to the place of landing, by any consideration of
what the enemy's Rib Sea Fleet could do by avoiding it. The
main object for the moment should be the destruction of the
transports.'
Elaborate and detailed orders followed for the disposition of submarines,
light cruiser., destroyers, minelayers, aircraft, and the Qrand Fleet in
the event of invasion.2
Jellioo.'s reply of 16 January repeated his txepidatiorexpressed in
October 1914, but be wa scornful of those who argued on the basis of the
Gallipo].i landings that men could be quickly landed on open beaches in
large numbers. Although some 35,000 men had been landed on three beaches
within 24 hours on one occasion naval conditions in the North Sea were
vastly different from those prevailing in the Dardanellee. 3
 Jellicoe'e
arguments on this point closely paralleled those used by Hanksy six months
earlier. 4 In addition, his experience as Commander of the "invading"
Fleet in the Naval kanoeuvr.e of 1913, wh.r. hi was twic. prevented from
landing some forces on the beach, led Jelliooe to a "onolusion that
invasion is much more likely to be attempted by entering into some of our
east coast rivers.5
1. Richmond 1SS. RIC/2/2 "Anti-Invasion Synopsis." p. 17.
2. Ad.m 137/835/43-52 "Action to be Taken in the Event of Attempted Invasion."
5 January 1916. Abstracted in: AJ. )rder. Dreadnought to Scapa F1ow.
	
(II) p . 411.	 - _____ ____
3. Adm 137/835/61 Je]liooe to Secretary, Admiralty, 16 January 1916.
4. tb 3/j/1.	 11-
5. Adm 137/835/62.
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J.11iooe stressed, as he had in 1914, that river estuaries, especially
the Rumber, were the most likely spots for future German landings. In the
absence of adequate land defences (which were stronger than Jellicoe
believed) 1 simultaneous landings could be made at the many wharves along
th. rivers whil. small boats could ferry troops from the transports to the
shore. Th. only local forces available to impede such an audacious ttaolc
were foux euarines which would take six hours to reach the scene. But
within 12 hours 16 additional subnarinss would be available, in addition
to the d.stroy.;s based at the Humb.r. After dealing with other river
outlets where he felt invasion might be attempted, Jel]iooe predicted that
the Germans would expect that there cwould be such a scare in
this country as a result of attempted invasion that the Grand
Fleet might be directed to proceed to sea imm.diately without
any preliminary minesweeping...
and ended with a plea that additional mineswe.pers be provided for the
Fleet. 2 Re bad made only passing references to the military defences against
invasion, substantiating R.pington's charg. that the relations between the
naval and military halves of horn. defence constituted a dialogue of the deaf.
On the broader front, the mid-year of 1916 brought the conjunction
of several important events 'which bore on invasion. In both Lords and
Commons, a massive d.bat• was proceeding on the Government's conduct of
the war for th. first time inci the outbreak of hostilities. In the Lords,
an auxiliary force of' volunteers was proposed for home defence and welcomed
by !itchen.r. 3 The next day, Colonel Winston Churchill delivered his first
public speech in the Commons sine, his return from eight months in the
1. Adm 137/835/63 A marginal note on J.11icoe's letter reveals that there
were foux 9.2" guns at the Humber, when, he believed there was only one.
2. Adm 137/835/66-67.
3. Hanssz.d,. (Lords). 30 May 1916. cola. 2O5-19.
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tr.noh.s, Churchill attacked the retention of a la.rgs hom army and,
demanded that additional troops be sent to the front. Everything since
1914 had consolidated Britain's position against invasion. Britain's n&v&l
and military forces had increased enormously. But most of a1, Churchill
oont.nd.d,
the Idnd of warfare which has developed in this War is that
least well suited to an army throwing itself hurriedly on a
shore and maintaining itself with a precarious line of over—
Bias communication. That is the form of warfare? It has
been shown in every theatre. In a few hours with trenches,
with barbed wire and tntciin. guns, a. position can be created
to force which you must bring up not field cuns but peat
masses of very heavy guns, and of all the ariries who rely on
this method, Germany is th one which relies most and which
would be the most helpless without it.l
But Churchill bad fajlsd to reooizI that military stalemate had been
imposed on the Continent only after several weeks of advance and manOeuvring,
by which tim. any campaign in England would probably have been successfully
concluded. Rowever, such were the force of his remarks and his estimate
that there were a million men in Britain who had "never heard the whistle
of a bullet", that Asquith himself was moved to reply. Asquith pointed out
that this figure included many wounded, sick, and convalescent, as well as
men training to go abroad, 2
 Robertson, he said, would be glad to liquidate
any existing surplus "to utilize it for fighting purposes abroad.
Kitchener also defended himself on this point before the Commons on
June 2nd, three days before his mysterious death at seas stating that
in th. early days of the war, the efficiency of the Rome
garrison was a matter of vital importance, for a raid of
a desperate nature, though obviously doomed to failure as
1, Harsarj, (Cocmnons) 23 Ltay 1916. col. 2021,
2. Ibid. 31 May 1916. ools. 2771-72, 2779-80.
3. 1.13. 23 May 1916. ools. 20l92O l J1anaar	 31 May 1916,
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an att•mpt at conquest, might certainly hays paralys.&
our industrial powers which are now playing so decisive
a part in the struggle.1
words w•re hardly a honest reflection of hi. own policies
sarly in th. war, for his concern had not been with a small raid as
here described, but with a massive invasion of a auarter-million men.
Es alluded to the continuing necessity for keeping the Territorial
Divisions at home "intact and at their War Stations in day and. night
radinsss for an •.ergenoy." To the end Kitohener took seriously the
msnaoe of invasion.
ven as the unprecedent.c debate over the conduct of the war
continued., the G.rman and British Fleet. met in a series of unresolved,
confrontations biown as ths Battle of Jutland. After half a century
Jutland still iniire. controversy. To those lik.e Balfour, now First
Sea Lord, who believed invasion impossible, the Jutland experience
appeared as a confirmation of that belief. Balfour told the British
Imperial Chamber of Commerce the week after the battle that invasion
remained the unsolv•d. problem of every power striving to dominate the
Continent. Jutland. was the crushin g proof that this problem was still
unsolvedz for the German. "one of the many unfulfilled dreams which
this war has dissipated forever. 2
 po Hankey also it seemed that Jut-
land sjna1l.d th. end. of th. invasion threat. 	 On the other hand,
"invasioniets" were inclined to see in the battle the confirmation of
their theories. Bad not Jut].and proved the difficulty of locating
1. Haneard.. (Commons).Z )u .- e. V?IG,,
2. "Mr. Balfour on the Battle." Times. 8 June 1916. p. 6.
3. Hankey. The Supreme Command. Vol. II. Allen and. Unwiri, London,
1963. Diary, 3 June i5Ti-
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and. following a hostile naval force and the eas. with which the
Germane could •vade the British defenders? On the same day that
Balfour buried in!-asion as a possibility, Lord Crew, exhumed it in a
speech to mayors of British cities, warning that "it would be folly
to ignore the possibility of a descent on the coasts of the British
Isles by a force which could not be described as altogether trivial
or 3ontemptible. (hear, hear)".1
At an Admiralty conferenc. at the end of June it was decided
that the Grand Fleet would see a decision with the High Seas Fleet
under only two contingencies: a German attempt to bombard the coast
or invasion. 2 )I.anwhile, an article in the Contempora Review noted
that the battle had justified. the Admiralty's polioy in regard to
invasion. 3 Ironically, the inner counoils of the Admiralty were not
as confident of their cap,bilities as their public defender..
It was in this climate of re-assessment which followed the Battle
of Jutland, Parliamentary debate on the direction of the war, and the
death of Kitohener, that a second inter-service conference On invasion
was convened. This time the inquiry was initiated by Lloyd George,
who had remarked in Cabinet at his surprise at seeing the figures of
160,000 rather than 70,000, quoted as the expected scale of enemy attaok,
Although Balfour as First Lord offered a guarantee against invasion for
a month _ presumably the tine needed by the Germans to repair their
1. "Home Defence." Times. 8 July 1916.
2. Paul Guinn. British Strate 	 and Politics. 1914 to i18. O.U.P.
1965. p. 5.
3. "Blue Water School". "Admiralty Foresight in regard to the Great War."
CoritemporaZZ Review. August 1916. pp. 158-59.
4. Cab 22/39. "Itinutes of 104th War Committee Meetin g." 1 August 1916.
p.12.
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warships — the matter again went forward. to the two servioes. The General
Staff mad• a second at tempt to have the scale lowered so that more
troops Light be sent to France and sent a memorandum to the Board of
Admiralty,which asserted that the Germans could not at presint detach
enough ttroop. for an invasion owing to the fighting at Vsrdun.
Admiral A.K. Wilson, again representing the Admiralty, replied
that the Germans' ex periences on the two occasions they bad gone out
to sea since the last conference "would on the whole tend. rather to
increase than to diminish the Girman estimate of the risks" involved
in invasion. Th. second of these occasions had resulted. in Jutland., and
had led to heavy damage among that class of ships which must act as
escorts to any futur. invasion flotilla. Additions to the Grand Fleet
would enable the Third Battle SQuadron to be brou ght further South,
but this would decrease the risks of invasion only in the vicinity of
its Thames base. The two services agreed to inform one another of any
changes in the naval or military situation that would be of interest
to the sist•r service in the joint defent,. against invasion. 2 This
undertaking, however, remained pretty much a dead letter. The con-
clusions of the conference were virtually unchanged from those of the
previous Januarys the expected scale of attack remained at 160.000 and.
the Admiralty still could not guarantee interception until 24 to 2
hours after the first alert.
1. Adm 137/835/2C3-206 "Notes by the General Staff for the Confernoe.
aeseuibling at the Admiralty on Saturday, 5th August 1916."
2. VO 33/771 "Correspondence betasen the Admiralty and the Amy
Council..." 11 Au gust 1916. p. 9.
3. Ibid. "Report of a Conference of the Admiralty and. the General Staff
to Consider the Possibilitiss of Attack on the United Xingdom."
August 1916. p. 8.
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Robertson •zplain.d in a paper before the War Committe. that the
70,000 figur. was a prewar estimate which had been largely abrogat.d by tb.
exp.ri.nc. of the last two years. H. called upon th. War Committee to
d.termin. whether Britain was retaining more men against invasion than she
really needed. Of the nine divisions in England, three were almost r.ady
fox despatch abroad and two others were located in dispositions better
suited for training than th. demands of national defence. As the Germans
were now heavily committed on the Continent, especially at Verdun, Robertson
r.comm.nd.d taking 24,000 of th. better troops from home defence to replen-
ish under-strength divisions abroad. H. suggested replacing the nine
existing divisions in Britain with five new divisions, foxmsd entirely of
Volunt.ers and men whos. age or medical condition debarred them from over-
seas s.rvio..
Robertson's paper was discussed by the War Committ.. on August 30.
French agreed to the proposals, providing that he could have 170,000
Volunteers for home defence, and extracted a promise that this number would
be fully armed by the following November. Although Asquith believed that
Robertson's conclusions were "over-cautious", the War Committee approved
the proposals. Th. numbers involved in home defence went up, but the over-
all quality of troops went down. Overage men in the Volunteer movement
2
would replace the regular troops now being sent abxoad. French, in
preparing th. public for this change in the composition of the home defence
force, now began to deliver speeches declaring that the country must look
1. 10 33/771 "Notes by the General Sta on Home Defence." 23 August 1916.
2. Cab 42/18/8 "Vnutes of 110th War Committee Meeting.' 30 August 1916.
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forward to th. day when its defence would b. .ntir.ly entrusted to th.
Volunteers, stressing that "not on. man who oan serve in th. trenches should
be lift at home." 1
 He promie.d the Volunteers that the Gov.xnment would
find them arms and equipment, including gr.nad.s and machine guns, which
would compensate for their inf.rior numbers and conditions.2
Otherwise, th. invasion issue virtually disappeared from the public
domain during the winter of 1916-17, in the face of more momentous events.
Lloyd George replaced Asquith as Prime Minister in D.c.mber. In February,
Germany resumed unrestricted submarine warfare: by April one out of four
ibip. leaving British ports tailed to arrive at its destination. The full
cons.qu.noes of the U—Boat campaigu were known only to a small oup within
the supreme coum*nd, although some intimation of the Admiralty's anxietiea
filtered through to the public.3
Therefore, fears of invasion revived in the spring of 1917. The Navy,
disheartened by the inroade of the German submarine campaigu, had diminished
faith in their ability to intercept an invasior.	 A similar pessimism
enveloped Britain's military defnders. Repington, visiting French at the
end of February, was told that little could be done if the Germane succeeded
in getting into the country. Hie Chief of Staff said he had forces sufficient
to oppose only "about 450" inkraders. A week later Repington wrote Lloyd
George, warning him that he was "dangerously weak on land at home, and a
blow may be dealt at you i4 this direot1on	 Fisher also was again worried
1. Times. 30 October 1916, p.9; 16 October 1916, p.8; 23 October 1916, p.5;
6 November 1916, p.5; 4 December 1916, p.5; 15 December 1916, p.5.
2. "The Arming of the Volunteers". Ptmes. 20 November 1916, p.3.
3. "The Admiralty and Invasion." Times. 13 March 1917. p. 10.
4. R.pington. 2 . 2j. pp. 469, 474-75, Repington to Lloyd George, 3 March
1917.
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about a C.rman landing. In •axly F.bruaxy he had warned. C.P. Soott, the
Editor of the Manchester Guardian, that "an moment a disaster to the Grand
Fleet means th. •aey and sure invasion of England and th. ravishing of oz
wive, and daughter
Fieh.r, not oblivious to tb. fact that Lloyd George was considering
appointing him as First Lord to strengthen his political position, pinned
a long j.r.miad to the Prime Mtniet.x on invasion, which Lloyd George read
to the Cabinet. Fisher warn.d that
the Invasion of these Islands is now, at th. present moment, a
fax greater menace than starvation from German subtnarin.e,
bioauss I. Sir John J.].lico. is no longer in command of the
Grand Fleet. II. The isins. production of German 'long-distance'
submarines renders now feasible what we formerly impossible is
invasion ... it may lead to a Trafalgar for England, but it gives
the wax chance of a German Austerlits on the banks of the Thames,
whili the Battle of Tralalgar i. proceeding off Jutland or further
north. Germany, I am assured, has never had so many troops as at
the present moment, and 40 p.r cent of the whole mercantile high-
speed etiamere is in the North Sea, instantly kept ready for trans-
portthp half a million German soldiers to the Thames before the
Grand Fleet from its Trafalgar off the Soaw could prevent it - for
our military force in England is admittedly totally inadequate
Pleas. remember Aust.rlits immediately followed Trafalar. 'I1rafalgax
did not stop Aust.rlitz! And Pitt said, notwithstanding Trafalgars
'Roll up the map of Euxope', and be died of a broken heart. You
are a second Pitt! I pray you won't have a second Austerlitz,2
It is probable that Fish.r was using invasion for political puxpos.s, 3 but
the stratagem backfired. Lloyd George took Fisher at his word and initiat.d
a ful], cabinet inquiry into invasion on the etrsngth of Fisher's letter.
Th. General Staff and the Admiralty War Staff were requested to "press Lord
Fisher to explain fully the ground on which his apprehensions were based."4
1. AJ,	 rder, Fear Cod and Dread Nought.Vol. III. Cape, London,l959. p.427.
2. Ibid. pp . 438-39. Fisher to Lloyd George, ca. 14 March 1917.
3. Ibid. p. 449. Fisher to Mc!anna, 11 April 1917.
4. Cab 23/2 "Minutes of Wax Cabinet No. 97." p.2.
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Th. third inter-service conference of the war convened th. following
day. Admiralty confidence had decreased even further in their ability to
halt a German landirg.	 Jellico., now First Lord, postponed the Navy's
commitment to interrupt invasion further, from 24-28 hours to 32-36 hours.
The War Office was more optimistic. French stated that th. military side of
th. question bad actually improved in th. year since th. last conference,
especially ein. machine guns had become available for horn. defence. But
French was still concerned over the numbers and quality of his troops. He
estimated that h. required 60,000 additional men to defeat th. official
standard of 160,000 invaders; what troops he had were untrained and in poor
condition. Th. two services •ventually d.oid.d to refer the responsibility
back to the politicians, for it was concluded that the central question was
an. of "balancing the advantages of strengthening our oversea forces as
against the risk of invasion" which "could only be d.cid.d by the War Cabinet
l
after periodical review of the general situation."
It was in this atmosphere of general apprehension and despondency that
French decided to hold a mobilization exercise for the entire home defence
army, and sent out th. code sial that an invasion attempt was iminent.
As a result, a rumour circulated that the Germane had landed, which spread
with surprising speed. Northoliffe telephoned Repington with the news that
all the wires wer. blocked last night and that there was a panic
at Broadatairs, Margate, etc. caus.d by a schoolmaster and a
squire, and that all the population and schools had taken wing
the rumours ... appear to have penetrated to the W•st of
England. Later there came other inquiries from all sorts of
quarters. What will it be like if one Boohe lande?2
1. Adm 137/865/253-54. "Confsr.ncs •.. held in room of the Secretary of
State for War." 16 March 1917.
2. Repington. _Op, Cit. p. 497.
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A few days later in tb. Commons, Bonar Law,asksd if there were any found-
ation to the rumours of invasion at Lowe stoft and. in Scotlar4, explained
that French's alert was responsible and observed he bad heard "a great many
rumours of that and" himself.1
At the same time, the Wax Cabinet considered th, report of the third
inter-service conference. But Lloyd George insisted on bearing Fisher's
views on invasion. Fisher was reluctant to appear before the whole Cabinet,
for he had regarded his letter as a. purely personal appeal. 2
 But he none-
th,Jese appeared at the Cabinet meetin of 28 Maxoh. Fishsi gave seven
reasons for believin.j that invasion was imminent, but his testimony provided
was
nothing new. His confid.ncs/diminIshed because Beatty had replaced Jelliooe
and
as Command.r of the Grand Pleet,/b.oause German suxines were more numer-
ous, larger, and had greater s.a-k..pin,g capabilities. Callipoli bad
demonstrated the praotioability of landing, and supplying, an expedition
in th. face of fire. Th. fact that the C.znn f].et was under the ooiimind
of a. military man - H1nd.nburg - meant that it might be ordered "to take
risks which no naval officer would contemplate." The risk from mines, the
recent increas. in the size of the German army, and the fact that ampi.
transport was available: all had converted him from his fmer strong
skepticism regarding invasion.3
Robertson replied that previous conferences had been much influenced
1. Ransard (Commons) 26 March 1917. co].. 39; "Invasion Rumours." Ti!nee.
27 March 1917. p . 9.
2. Marder.	 . Cit. Fisher to Lloyd George, 20 March 1 917. pp . 441-42.
3. Cab 23/2 "Minutes of War Cabinet No. 107." 28 March 1917. p. 2.
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by the consideration that the enemy would not be able to maintain his line
of supply and cotniuuriioations. Fisher referred ambiguously to "the
impossibility of maintaining surface craft in particular localities for
any length of tim under modern conditions." However, in a later flattering
letter to Robertson as "the chief Military Authority in this Realm", Fisher
expanded on this remark and sketched the path of futuie invasion.
Hindenbuxg will order out the German fleet to the farthest Northern
limit to a possible Trafalgar ... In the progress South, after the
Battle, of our (in any case) diminished Fleet, the Germans will
assuxedly strew mines and dispose submarines and destroyers in its
path, so that (as Jellicoe wrote to me) the British Fleet would be
greatly diminished on its arrival south - there again to face an
innumerabl, company ot German submarines and destroyers and German
submarine mine-layers. That would necessitate the retirement of
our Fleet into a protected harbour.
So (and we now come to the point you raised) our surfac. vessels,
in their endeavour to interrupt the German communications, would be
utterly destroyed by the prodigious available number of German
submarines ... So, in case of invasion, the German communications
will be kept open and Hindenbuxg, to gain that end, will send out
the German Pleat just as Napoleon sent out Villeneuve, against
every naval consideration? The Gallipoli landing (and its shores
never free from hostile gunfire till its evacuation) has tumbled
dt,un the Walls of Jericho of the Blue Water School, of whioh I was 1
formerly Chief! I've been to masoua, like St. Paul, and converted.
Fisher's reference to Gallipoli inspired French to compose a letter for the
Prime Minister on Callipoli, which was circulated to the Cabinet. French
pointed out that only two, of all the landings in the Dardanelles, were
opposedi "the system of defence beare no kind of analog' to that which ii
in force by us at the present moment all along the whole of our East Coast."
The Turkish system of entrenobmenta in the cliffs above the beaches gave
great advantages to the attaokere, who took advantage of dead ground the
1. Robertson	 . I. 13 Fisher to Robertson, 30 roh 1917. The night of
his appearance before the Cabinet, Fisher erote again to Lloyd George
that England would be invaded if any disaster befell the Grand Fleet




defenders could not cover. The British had also undermined these trenches
by shelling the cliffs from ships. Trench stressed that there was "no
sound ana10 between a coast defence properly arranged and conducted" and
those at Gallipoli. Th. British home defence system differed in having the
valu*bl. support of various naval installations along the coast. Another
aspect of the Dardanelles experience was positively encouzagtng: whenever
the British landed and pushed inland, they were halted by concentrated enezi'
artillery. French was now organizing a new aeoond series of trenches set
back from the coastline with 6" howitzers and 60-pounders to frustrate a
German penetration inland. 1
 Where the Admiralty had earlier dzawn a rather
pessimistic pictuxe from Gallipoli regarding invasion, 2 the Chief of the
military force providing against it was more optimistic.
Fishex's presentation before the Wax Cabinet met with resistance from
other quarters. Balfoux, Fisher recalled, had been "very nasty, as was
French," although Cuxzon and Mimer were impressed and Lloyd George and
Bonar law were "affectionate and sympathetic." 3 The spectre of invasion,
Fisher wrote Beatty, was "absorbingly appalling." 4 Lloyd George, however,
was unimpressed and promised Repington that he would eat a sausage for
every German landed in England above the number of 50,000.
The reversal of the position of the two services, begun in 1912-13,
had now come full circle. The pre-wax invasion agitation had been sponsored
1. Cab 21/14. "Difficulties of our landing at Gallipoli, and of an enemy
attempt to land on English Coast. Comparison between by Lord French."
pp. 5-6.
2. WO 33/771 "'Note by General Staff..," pp. 11-12.
3. Mardex. 
.2k._Cit. p.443. Fisher to the Duchess of Hamilton, 28 March 19fl.
4. j4.. p. 444. Fisher to Beatty, 29 March 1917.
5. Repington.	 .	 p. 501.
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by peers and retired army officer. who wanted a larger army for home
defence. Now that army existed in Franc. and its very size served notice
that the Navy was no longer the Senior Service, It was fighting continually,
while the Fleet bad had only brief and inoonclu8ive engagomants. The
Admiralty under Fisher had guaranteed that it could handle invasion alone.
But for several months the Navy had been steadily trying to diminish it.
responsibility to intercept or impede invasion. Fisher, the chief of the
former aggressive policy at the Admiralty, was now the most affeoted by
the submarine menace. The War Office now had the large army it had wanted
and was making diligent efforts to get as much of it to France as possible.
The Censrals were caught in a trap somewhat of their own making. They bad
done little to contradict the message of Roberts and Repington that a
large army was required for home defence. Now thexe would be a great public
outcry if it became brown to what extent this army was diminished by over-
seas drafts. The War Cabinet found it difficult to pare the Home Defence
any further in the face of the Admiralty's retreat from earliei guarantees,
but did so on the basis that risks had to be accepted somewhere and could
more readily be accepted at home than in France.
Repington, for his part, continued to crusade for a better home defence.
In a visit to Beatty's Headquarters in August, be discovered that th Grand
Fleet was not in direct touch with a single military authority. Beatty
knew nothing
about home defence ashore or whether we have ten men or an Army
Corps at one place or another. This after three years èf wan
Beatty has no real intelligence service of his own, and has to
trust the Admiralty to keep him informed. Beatty hopes, how-
ever, that he will bear automatically if the Cerman Fleet comes
out. I am sure I hope he may. It might interest him.'
1. Repington. 
.2 .	II. p . 15.
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Repington found inter-service communication was also lacldng at French's
Headquarters. Tyrwh.ttt, the commander of the cruiser force ,had no direct
way of alerting the home defence army in the event of invasion. Moreover,
Pyrwhitt revealed, the home defence flotillas tFernselves did not enjoy the
unity of command that prevailed on land: there were "lots of Rajahe along
the coast each with his own domain." Tyrwhitt advocated that a single
Admiral be given charge over the entire East Coast. As far as the defence
ashore was concerned, he know nothing and reported only to the Admiralty
by telephone. Repington next visited Paget, Commander of the Southern Arzy
where simi1ax conditions pzevaileda Paget was "not in touch with th Jaq
in any way" and knew nothing about so elementary a naval operation as the
minefield in the North Sea	 Repington mounted an agitation for inter-
service cooperation on the tactical level, and extensive plans finally were
worked out between the two services. 2 Robertson assigned a liaison officer
to Beatty and the Admiralty established unity of command on the East Coast.
But elsewhere in the Fall of 1917 the credibility of invasion was
disappearing. The last division of first-line troops in Britain was broken
up in September. 3 A House of Commons committee called for an inquiry into
the large number of troops allegedly being retained in England. In November,
when French delivered a/other speech warning of invasion, he was denounced
in the House of Commons for alarmism. The Government was asked first to
diamlee French, and then to censor his speeches on the ground/they would
cause public despondency. 4 Similar criticism was expressed within official
1. Repington.c.	




.2 .	 p. 55.
4. Times 8 November 1917, p .5; Hansaxd. (Commons) 14 November 1 917, col.381.
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c.cte6.
frev4.e.. Corbett, who had been commissioned to write the official
history of the war, complained, to Richmond of Je]liooe's (his usual
epithet was "Jelly") awe of th. German.
But invasion is worse still. It makes e mad. to see the
soldiers giving wild exaggerations of tue German man power
in order to frighten us into giving up men essential to
the vigorous life of the country and then keeping a vast
force id].. at hone. It is awful hard. to fell any enthusiasm
for writing the story of the war...1
The Admiralty performance at the inter-service conference of
March 1917 proved similarly onerous to Beatty, Commander of the Grand
Fleet, and a member of his Staff, Rear Admiral Roger Keyes, who had
been second-in-command of the naval forces at the Dardan.11es (later
to attain fame as the leader of the Zeebrugge raid and as a theorist
of combined o perations). These two offio.rs discovered in oonvsrsation
their mutual antipathy to the invasion bogey and. Beatty asked Keyes
to write a paper analysing his experience at Gallipoli.2
Keyes welcomed the taak nd began by questioning th. main oon-
elusion of the inter-service conference: that 160,000 enemy troops
could ooas ashore within 32 hours. Keyes pointed out that no allowance
had. been made for opposition to the landing, nor for any of the probism.
assooiated, with landing on a beach in the North Sea,evciif unopposed.
Keyes attacked the arguments advanced by Jellicoe for the feasibility
of a capture of a port.
In the 1913 Naval and Military Mano.uvres, a few transvorts
were rushed into the Humber; and the operation was held to
have been suooesstul by some Naval and Military Authorities
1.. Richmond MSS. RIC 9/1 Corbett to Richmond, 24 April 1917.
2. The Naval M.moirs of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes.
Thornton Butterworth, London, 1935. Vol. II, pp. 101-02.
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All the experience of thi. war has amply prov.d this
conclusion was entirely erroneous. It is inoonceivabla
that the enemy would, attempt to rush crowded. transports
into a port before the opposition had been overcome
Th. capture of tb. port ooul& probably only be completed
by Military operations undertaken after a landing had
been effected on neighbouring b.aohes.
Keyes, like Pzench earlier, argued. that experience at Gallipoli had.
proved. the diffioulty of a b.aob landing.
On one occasion a few machine guns had. held. up a landing for
24 hours and. •,sn heavy bombardment from guns up to 15" in calibre
bad. failed, to end resistance. The lesson bad not been lost on the
Germans, who bad witnessed th. entire op.ration.
Since it was possible for tb. Turk to organize suob a
formidable defence in the .arly days of the war, how
easy it should be for us, in the light of our added
experience, to maks, with a comparatively small force,
•very available beach absolutely impregnable with the
aid of deep trenches, yell concealed and protected
machine guns positions, and a few guns and howitzers.
veil inland., registered on the beaches. Our experience
showed bow difficult it is to deal from seaward with
guns so plaoed, though we were able to attack them from
much more favourable positions than will be available
to the enemy ships.
Keyes oonoiuded. that the Germans also appreciated the grossly unfavour-
able conditions of a North Sea landing: they would not be "so mad aa
to undertake such a forlorn hopeless enterprise2
In September l9l Key.. was appointed Dixector of Plans at tb.
3Admiralty, and was enabled to count.raot the conservatism of his
superiors. Ono. in London, Keyes found powerful allies, including I(aor-
General F.B. Maurice, the D.LO., Rear-Admiral Rosslyn Wemyss, th.
seoond Sea Lord., and. Rear-Admiral William R. Rail, Director of Naval
1. Ada 137/865/275. "Notes on a Conerenoe Reid. at the War Office on
16 March 1917." by Roger Keyes, 3 December 1917.
pp. 276-77, see Also Keyes, Q .	p. 103.,
3. Cecil Lspinall-Og]and.r. Roger Y.!.!. aogartb Press, London 1 1951.
p. 210.
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Intelligence. Contact was quickly established between younger ottioers
of both services who were oonvinosd, that the established oftioial
•stimats of the invasion danger was overly diffident and another intsr-
servins conferenc. was arranged between them for December 1917. Xairioe
wrote in advance to Wemyss that the 160,000 scale was unr.alistio and
suggested it might be undercut by stressing the uses of increased air
reconnaissance and other means. 1 £.y.s, commenting on this communios-
p
tion, notect that improved reoonnaissanoe would permit an interruption
of a German landing within 12 hours and recommended that submsrin•s,
and even the Orand Fl..t itself, could be deloyecI toward this •nd.
H. further asked that a determined attack by British aircraft be
organized as an additional defers. against invasion, whil, the station-
ing of sight American battleships at the Humb.r would provide a furthsr
deterrent. 2
 Tb. Home Defence Direotorats bad come to similar con-
clusions simultaneously. All pr.vious studi.s had been undertaken on
the basis of evasion: how large a foro. oould. •lude the Grand Fleet.
But the far more important element of time had been almost completely
overlocked.3
Wemyss and. Keyes, enoourag.d. by the.. argum.nte, recast the
whole frame of reference of the forthcoming inter-service conferenoe.
It was to consider invasion, not on the basis of the great. number
of troops the Germans could embark, but rather on the basis of "the
1. Ada 137/865/268-9.
2. Ada 137/865/270-73. "Notes on General Maurice's Ltter." 1 Dsc.mbsr
1917.
3. Ada 137/865292-65. "Notsa on Invasion." Lt. Col. W.T.C. Jonss.
2 December 1917.
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largest number of ship. that are likely to sail in one convoy from the
German port.'. This was a more realistic recognition of the existing naval
conditions of l9l7. It was calculated that the Germans could organize 160
ships in five convoys of 32 ships apiece, but that tnt. would require long
practice, which would attract attention to the •nterpris.. Only one short
portion of th. coast (Aldeburgh to Southwold) could be used for a beach
landing for a foro. marching on London. The defender. would command the air
over the invasion beaches, which would in any case be "strongly defended with
barbed-win, and machine-guns with mobile troops close at hand in r.serv.."
Even were the landing successful, the victory march to London would not be
rapidi it had taken the Austrian. 16 days to cover 65 miles after Cepor.tto
unopposed, and the German advance to London would be heavily contested.2
The fourth inter-service conference on invasios met on 17 December
1917. The military representatives, headed bzr nxioe, maintained that the
Germans could still assemble and land 160,000 troop. in the 32 to 36 hours
before the Admiralty would arrive in force. The only new factors on the
military sid. wire the expansion of the air services and the continual
improvement of the shore defences. The naval officers established themselves
as the real activists, and argued that several factors had developed during
1917 to Britain's advantage. America's entry into the war had added ne
ships of all typie and brought an increased supply of mines. Further
1. Adm 137/865/276. Xeyes to lemyss. 4 December 1917.
2. Ada 167/53. "Official Copy of )e.tings of the Board of Admira1ty
Appendix to Minute 149. Report of a Conference between Representatives
of the Admiralty War Staff and the General Staff, Held to Consider the
Possibilities of Attack o the United Kingdom. December 1917." pp. 5-6.
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extensions to submarine patrols and minefielde meant increased chances of
advance warning of invasion. Both services agreed that the most promising
factor was the development of the British air forces, which meant increased
facilities for reconnaissance, but moat importantly, overwhelming air super..
iority over the British coast) The conference, however, was most strongly
influenced by Wemyss' argument that invasion would by neoeseity come by
convoy.
It. conclusions, eign.d by Wemyss, Keyes, and 1uxioe, were as follower
i. In view of the amount of preparation required, the size of
the convoy and the length of the sea voyage, warning of an
attempted invasion would be obtained, thus enabling the
n.oeeeary naval dispositions to be taken.
ii. The difficulties of as.emUp and moving the number of
ships required to traneport/o' 160,000 men within the time
which would be at the enemy's disposal are so great as to be
practically insuperable.
iii. Although an absolute guarantee cannot be given against the
arrival of one convoy - zimum size 32 ihips - the Conference
oonaider that it is impossibl, for abaequ.nt convoy, to reach
our shores without euch action on our part as would ensure the
oomplet. failure of the expedition.
iv. The me.ximum force with which the land forces may have to deal
is therefore limited to that which can be carried in one such
convoy, 1... 30,000 men, with a strictly limited proportion of
transport and artill.xy.2
The conclusions were a direct challenge to the standard of 160,000 which
had now been in force for almost two yearez the new standard of 30,000 was
indeed a radical r.duction. It was also a challenge to the men who had
framed the previous standard, a revolt of the younger officers against their
superiors, the significance of which did not escape them. One General, whils
signing the report, remariced laughingly that there were "lots of lamp-poet.
in Whitehall." Keyes replied he was willing to swing, if only to release
100,000 men for th. army in France.3
1. Ada 167/53. "Official Copy of Meeting, of the Board of Admiralty:
Deoember 1917." pp. 5-6.
2. Ibid. p. 4.
3. Keyes, 22..	 . p. 150.
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It now remained to obtain the consent of the General Staff and
Admiralty to the revised scale of attack. This was not forthcoming. The
Board of Admiralty considered the question at its next meeting, but were
generally of opinion that, without further consideration of the
matter, they could not commit themselves to a definite view that
the land forces might not have to deal with an enemy force
amounting to 70,000 men before the Navy could effectively inter—
vine ... before enemy forces in •xcess of that number could be 1
landed, •ffeotiv. intervention by the Navy might be relied upon.
Howevsr, "having regard to the great importance of the subject", the Board
d.oid.d to continu, the discussion at a Special Meeting held Sunday, 23
December 1917, which would have th. advantage of Beatty' ideas. The reports
wsre forwarded to Beatty for his consideration, who presented his views in
writing. On this occasion the Board hedged even more, refusing to giv, any
guarantee whatsoever against any hypothetical number of invaders, or to
say how many could land before they could effectively intervene. Tb. Board
commented only that if a great reduction of the Home Defence ariiy was carried
out, the Southern Battleship force would require strengthening. Mining of
the Heligoland Bight must increase and additional suarine reconnaissance
patrols be mounted. But the initiation of such steps was largely determined
by the efficacy of advance warnings from the Intelligence Department.2
At this point Hall, the D.LI., saw his chance. Hall had been among
the more stalwart caiipaigners against the inflated, estimate of invasion
and guaranteed fivs days' notice of any enemy preparations for embarkation.
Meeting with skepticism from the Board on this point, he prepared a dossier
of the reports received by the N.I.D. of the German attack against Riga
in August 1917. On that occasion he had had warning of the attack a month
1. Ad.m 167/53 "Board Minutes of 20 December 19 17." p. 54.
2. Ibid. "Board Minutes of 23 December 1917." pp. 55-56.
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in advance and. had detailed reports on different aspects of the attack
weeks in advanos) Hall was confident that Naval Intelligence could give
early and accurate warning of any German preparations to invade England.2
The two services achieved a compromis. on the classic estimate of
70,000. The War Cabinet was advised at the beginning of 1918 in a papr
signed jointly by Wemyss as First Sea Lord and Robertson as C.I.C.S. that
The Board of Admiralty and the Ismerial General Staff are also
of opinion that, in view of th. •xp.rience of landing operations
gsined during the war; of the Admiralty statement that an attempted
landin,g between the Wash and the Straits of Dover can be effectively
interrupted by naval action within 32 to 36 hours; and of the fact
that we may expect to receive warning before a landing is &ttempted
a landing by a force of 70,000 men with such a limited time at its
disposal before interf.r.nc . takes place should be defeated,
provided that the possible landing places are suitably entrenched
and held by sufficient Military Forces to oppos, the landing
until naval intervention can take •ff.ot.3
The inter—service role in defeating an attempted landing was fully apparent.
Robertson prepared a paper for the War Cabinet on "Troops Required
for Horns Defence" which admitted that the two scales of 30,000 and 70,000
bad bein in competition. But nos French was willing to accept a smaller
horns defence force if it was comprised of bitter quality troops, with
increased mobility and better equipment, including machine guns for coast
defence. He would accept the reduction of his force from eight to five
divisions, which would transfer 38,000 of his beat mobile troops to
Flanders. Robertson and the General Staff, however, wished to send four
1. Adm 167/54 "Possibilities of an Attack on the United Kingdom. Report
of C.I.D. called for by Board Minute 153. Note of Intelligence Received
Prior to German Attack on alf of Rigs." N.H. Hall. 27 December 1917.
2. Adm l673 "Board Minutes of 10 January 1918." P. 64.
3. Ibid. "Appendix to Minuti 161." p.2.
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divisions of 50,000 troops abroad, leaving 140,000 troops in Britain,
Robexteon considered this an ample force to defeat 70,000 invaders, but
French pointed out that the bulk of his troops were made up of men who
could not be sent abroad, having not yet reached 19 or judged medically
unfit to go abroad. But he would accept reductions and rely on his coastal
trenches and machin guns, backed up by reinforcements of mobile troops.1
The Westerners had triumphed almost completely aver the advocates of
home defence. Russia was known to be on the verge of making terms with
Germany and this would free the German Armies in the East to CrOss to the
West, where they would achieve numerical superiority for the first time in
the war. It was imperative that Haig's worn and under-strength divisions
be reinforced. How.ver, Repington and Paget were beside themselves when
they learned of the decision. Paget had visions of 30,000 Germans landing
in a smoke-screen with steel shields to foil French's machine guns and
believed "30,000 Boche would be in faidatone by the third day." Repington
thought only 15,000 Germans could take Canterbury and destroy the dooka
nearby, vital for the provision of the BIE.F.2
The devaluation of the invasion contingency by the General Staff
and Admiralty in January 1918 bad its counterpart in the careers of those
who had been most alarmed over the possibility of a German attack. Even
as the Board of Admiralty deliberated, Jellicoe resigned as First Lord,
one of the reasons being that he could not accept the new estimate of th.
1. Cab 3/3 90-A. "Troops Required f or Home Defence" by C.I.G.S, 3
January 1918.
2. Repington. 52 . Cit. pp. 171, 188-89.
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invasion danger. B. was replaced by W.rye., who was the most eminent of
the naval officers behind the new standard. Shoxtly therafter Repingtcm,
the oivilian high priest of invasion, joined Jellioo. in limbo. The	 j
had not been in sympathy with Repington' s views on invasion for some time
and was u finding him generally intractable. Repin3ton's last warning
on invasion, and almost his last article for the Times, was published on
January 3rd) The bitternes, of the rupture was recalled later in the
official	 Tires.
H. transferr.d it once to the Morning Poet, with which he had
previously concerted terms advantageous to himself ... Ther. he
spent the rset of the war industriously destroying the reputation
for int.11igenoe which ]kwson had preserved for him whil, he
worked for the Times.2
French likewise thought the new estimate "absurd" and wanted 500,000 men
for home defence. But before the month was out, both he and Paget had
been replaced..3
Even as invasion receded as a probability during the last months of
the war, it continued to be stressed in official propaganda. One advert-
isement for National War Bonds in the Morning Poet pictured a pretty young
woman holding a child in one hand and a shovel in the other being herded
along by an armed German aoldi.r for forced )aboux • The accompanying t.xt
rhapsodised on the consequence of invasion.
The Bun. would lord it over us - England would become another
Belgium. With what glee would the Germane train their gwls
upon London! With what unholy delight would they se• our peat
city laid in ashes! And not only London but also Birmingham,
Liverpool, Newoasti., Manchester, Bristol, and •v.ry other of
our cities and towns would be burned, looted and ravaged.
IN THE T(NS BELGIUM THEY RAND UP THE CIVILIAN POPULATION
II FRONT ' THE CHURCHES AND kED THEM DOWN WITH M&CHINE GUNS.




1920. Times Publishing Rouse, 1952.
p. 232n. R.pington's view of the parting is given in The First World
War Vol. II. pp. 180-81, 187-88, 195.
3. T. pp. 176-177.
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Fancy such a scene in front of Westminster Abbeyl They herded
the Belgian civilians and under the lash made them dig German
trenches. Imagir the citisens of London driven along the
lanes of Essex and Buckingbamshire to labour under German task-
masters!
THEY ROBED THE BEL.AN BANKS.
Think of the joy with which they would loot the Bank of England.
The ad went on to explain how these horrors could be avoided by th. purchase
of War Bonds.
But by far the most ambitious variation on the theme for patriotic
purposes was undertaken by the Ministry of Information later in 1918 when
a "Great National Film" entitled The Invasion of Britain, was planned and
produced. The project had been conceived by Lloyd George and sponsored
by Beav.rb.rook as Minister of Information. Famous actors of the period
were featured, such a. Ellen Terry. Thomas Hardy and Rudyard Kipling wrote
anthems for the epic, which were set to music by Sir Edward Elgar. Sir
Rail Caine, a popular novelist who wrote the ecenario,explained that the
purpose of the epic was
to show the British working man that his home is in peril from
military force, military tyranny, and military brutality. We
have brought the war home to his own hous• and asked him to
consider what he would do if the war came to England.2
Under the leadership of the American director Herbert Brenon, scenes were
enacted based on reports of the German performances in Cambrai and St.
Quentin in 1914. Caine reoountsd that the local population became completely
involved in the making of the film.
When our imaginary German army came riding into Chester the
inhabitants ran into their houses in fear as before a real
invasion, and when the brutal Runs were flung out of it, they
Lornjng Post. 25 April 1918. p.2. See also tk. ad "The Siege of
London." Ibid., 14 y 1918. p. 2, and the recruiting appeal "Shall
We Be Invaded?" Deily Express. 17 December 1914. p. 6.
2. "Sir Hall Caine on the National Film." Ltnematoa ph and Lantern




shouted with joy as at a real deliverance.
Although the film was never publicly shown and no print appears to
have survived, some appreciation of the plot and treatment of the subject
can be gained from contemporary descriptions, which stated that
it is a story of what would be likely to happen were the
Germans to invade this country. It is a chronicle of evnts,
or rather crimes, that have made history duzin the last four
years - crimes for which the perpetrators can never atone,
Try to recollect if you oan all the foul deeds to which the
buns have stooped, and you will have some idea of the incidents
which have been reproduced to the minutest detail and woven
into an enthralling drama.2
Scenes included the women of the city going down on their bees to sing
"Nearer, y God, to Thee" while the Germane bombard the city as a
preliminary to its occupation. Eventually the Runs arrive on horseback
with bayonets and drawn swords, with which they disperse the women "in
their most hunnish manner." A sub—plot featured a variation of the Nurse
Cavll incident, in which a beauty is shot by order of a German officer
who secretly loves her and thereafter becomes "a monster without a soul."
Further vignettes featured the women of the city being dragged from their
homes to be deported via cattle—car for forced labour.3
Despite the peat effoxt and multitudinous talent expended in the
making of	 Invasion of Britain, the film was never released. The end of the
war came before its completion, and the Ministry of Information was already
under severe criticism in the Commons. But the first major film effort
by the British Government featured invasion as its theme. A private effort,
1. "Sir Hall Caine on the National Film." Kinematoaph and Lantern
Weekly. 24 October 1918. p. 67.
2. "Making the National Film." Ibid. 12 September 1918. pp. 76-77.
3. Bioscope. 12 September 1918, p.l5; 19 September 1918, p. 61.
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entitled t Warrior Strain, produoed in 1918, depicted an English off jeer
cadet foiling invasion by stealing the aeroplane of the German advance
party, who are then trapped and imprisoned.1
A similar use of "continue the war" propaganda i. found in the last
of the invasion novels, published in September 1915 by Edgar Wallace. The
mesge of the novel, which was dedicated to Kitchener, was implicit in its
titles "1925" - The Story of a Fatal Peace. It was designed "to bring home
to readers the inevitable consequences of ending the present war in any
other way than by the complete subjugation of Germany and the destruction
of Prussian .iilitarimn." Wallace outlined a story of future Prussian
perfidy as propaganda against a negotiated peace. After a decade of peace,
British war veterans are lured to Germany under th. pretence of a "Peace
Festival" and are imprisoned; the Germans also torpedo 83 ships of the
Royal Navy sent to Hamburg for a friendly joint review while a hidden
invasion army crosses the North Sea. As the book closes, 250,000 Germane
have landed in England by night and are deploying across the British country-
side, where only two British army corps are available to oppos. them.2
While invasion receded as a military possLbility, it had not lost its hold
completely on the pubio imagination. Th. British Government, ones scornful
of the exploitation of the invasion bogey, by the last year of the war was
the chief manufaotuxsr of invasion propaganda.
Some concern still remained at the higher levels whether invasion was
such a remote contingency after all. Would the Germans use the divisions
now being transferred to the Western Front to mount an attack on Great
1. in.matoapb	 Lantern Weekly. 19 September 1918. pp . 83-84. The
Warrjor Stra in was viewed at the National Film Archivs.
2. Edgar Wallace. "1925" — t	 2	 Fatal Peace. Newnes, London, 1915.
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Britain? On January 8th the War Cabinet had a lengthy meeting with Maurice,
Director of Military Operations, to discover whether the German divisions
allegedly concentrating at Holstein were being prepared for overseas attack.1
At the same time, the Admiralty were trying to suppress or postpone the
publication of the full report of the rdane1les Commission oh the ground
that excerpts of the landing orders and descriptions of the operation would
be of great service to the German General Staff. 2 When the Ludendorff
offensive began in March, it appeared for a time that the Germans might
achieve their forgotten objective of 1914: a break-through to the Channel
Ports. Keyes, now Admiral in charge of the Dover patrol, prepar.d for
demolition of the French Channel ports should the Germans advance that far,3
and invasion rumours began to se-appear • Hai g' B famous )r der of the ty
of March 21st ended with the appeal that "the safety of oux homes •.. depenEs
upon the conduct of each of us." The War Cabinet continued to send home
defence troops to France and considered mobilizing the Volunteers as a reserve
Privately, Repington and Robertson, convinced that home defence was non-
existent, discussed the possibility of withdrawing from the continent entirely
and waging a maritime war. 6 But the Ludendorff offensive did not inspire
another invasion scare. The main explanation is that by the spring of 1918
1. Cab 23/5 "War Cabinet Papers." January 1918. No. 318.
2. Adm 116/1769 "Memoranda sent to War Cabinet: rdane1les Commission Final
Report." 1 Jahuary 1918.
3. Repington.	 . Cit. p. 290-91.
4. Ibid. p. 276.
5. Cab 23/5 "War Cabinet Papers." Meetings of 25-26 March 1918. pp. 182-83.
6. R.pington.'. Cit. pp. 264-65.
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a fairly sophisticated aerial defence against invasion had been evolved.
As early as August 1916, provision had been made for the training formations
of the Royal Flying Corps to undertake reconnaissanc. in the .vent of
invasion. In January 1917 the role of aircraft in home defence was consider-
ably expanded by fitting training aircraft in Britain with bombing equipment
for use against enemy transports. 1 Bomb dumps were established at different
point, on the East Coast. By the beginning of 1918, the role of air forces
in home defence had expanded to include
(a) Reconnaissance. (b) Bombing arid machine gun action against
Transports befor• and during disembarkation of troops and
bombing for destruction of jetties, etc. which would be aide
to disembarkation. (o) Bombing and machine gun action against
troops who have disembarked. (d) Contact patrols. (e) Prevention
of •ff.otive action b Hostile aircraft. (f) Co-operation with
Coastal batteries. (g) Photography.2
When the enemy were reported to be within ten miles of the coast, recormaiss-
anos aircraft would boat, the approaching armada and provide rough estimates
of it. size and the strength of the force aboard. If the landing was already
in progress, they were to report its location and the disposition of British
troops in the area. 3
 Every effort was to be mada to bomb enemy troops while
they were still concentrated in the transportsi success on this point would
decide th. fate of any German enterprise against England, presumably b.oaus.
the land forces were so weak. Where trained troops were lacking, British
superiority in the air would provide the decisive factor. Both Army and
Navy bombers would take part, with fighter escorts to deal with any aircraft
the Germans might launch from the sea or the decks of ships, or fly over
1. R.A. Jones. The War in the
	 Vol. V. O.U.P., 1937, p . 144.
2. Ad.m 137/866/366 "Invasion Schemes Co-operation of 6th Briad., R.F.C.,
Training Division, R.F.C. arid R.N.A.S. with Home Defence Troops in the
Event of a Hostile Invasion. To Come into Operation January 1st, 1918."
3. Ibid. p. 374.
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from Northern Belgium. Desperate improvisation oharacterised many aspects
of the schemes at one point, eli different types of planes constituted
the bombing force. Standards of performance between the various types
differed considerably and twoof the types had ceased to be first-line air-
craft by this time. 1 But even trainers wer. fitted with bomb racks and
eights, ready to be uaedt the shortest notice" 2
 for duties which surely
would have carried them be'ond their capacities. The aircraft and pilots
used for the scheme were the training brigades of the two air services,
which could hardly have een in oombat-rea&y condition. Their employment
in such a demanding operation as the precision bombing of ships with
obsolete aircraft and half-trained pilots reflects a desperate expedience.
At two of the advance airfields in Zent, plans were made for the evacuation
of all aircraft and personnel and the systematic destruction of all build-
ings with petrol. Demolition parties would be left behind to deal with
the wireless and repair machinery with "sledges and mauls." Once their
work was complete, they could leav. by seaplane or escape overland to join
up with advance British unite.3
Each squadron of military bombers would be led to its target by a
naval bomber, whose pilot had been trained in precision bombing and was
more conversant with various types of ships. The Navy was deeply oono.rned
lest Army pilots, in the stress and confusion of a German landing, sink
British defending warships by mistaks. Because of this the written orders
emphasised repeatedly that bombers should attack transports only, and these
1. Adm 137/866/361.
2. Ibid.
3. Ada 137/866/530-31. "Raid by Enemy Naval Forces on East Coast of
Englandi Action by Aircraft." 5 July 1918.
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only when led by a naval pathfinder aircraft, which would fir. a red flare
and begin it. bombing run. The bombers were then to bomb the enemy trans-
ports continually until all the ships were sunk or the bombs had given
out, while the fighter esoorta would strafe the ships end beaches onoe
German fighters were ea1t with. Fighter pilots were warned to select
their targets ashore carefully, ae "the opposing forces are likely to be
.nged at short range on an irregular and badly defined front" for which
experience in France provided no guide.
The official British estimate of German capabilities at this time
seem more evocativ. of 1940 than 1918. Th. scheme in force throughout the
last year of the war assumed that "Courses open to an enemy oarrying out
an invasion" included
Aeroplane Raid. by 1y or Night, and Airship Raids by night
combined with or fo]low.d by landings of smarl bodies of
troop. at s.veral points widely distant, such as simultan-
eously on West Coasts of Scotland, Ireland and England with
the hope that troops will be dispatched to deal with these
landings, then after an int.rval or simultaneously, a landing
in force ... covered by ship. and submarine, and it is also
possible that an extensive mine field would be laid to
protect the transports from our warships. In addition to thi.,
sea-planes or land machines might be launched from the deck
of a ship with the object of 8-
1. Reconnais.ance of movements of our Warships and troops.
ii. Prevention of reconnaissance by our aeroplanes.
lii. Prevention of bombing attacks by our aeroplanes.
The question of the number of hostile aeroplanes with which
we should have to contend would depend to a very great extent
upon the locality chosen by th. enemy for the attempted
landing. If the venue should be North of the Wash it is
highly probable that the only machine. he would be able to
put up would be sea-planes or land machines flown from the
deck of a ship. South of the Wash, however, it is to be
expected that other hostile aeroplane. would co-operate with





It was believed that a landing on the coast of Norfolk or Essex would be
the beet from the German point of view.
It is highly contentious wh.ther Imperial Germany could have delivered
an attack of the abov. complexity j lieu of the Ludendorff Off.nsiv. in
the spring of 1918. The most interesting aspect of the plan is that it shows
the extent to which command of the air had largely displaced manpower in
British home d.fenc. by the last two years of the war. Its tactic was to
destroy the German Expeditionary Corps while it was still imprisoned within
the confines of vulnerable troopships. It is noteworthy the extent to
which the defenders were preoccupied with maintaining air superiority over
th. area of invasion. Frankly improvisatory measures had been moulded
into a plan of complexity and sophistication to meet a situation for which
no precedents were available. Even as these preparations against invasion
r.ach.d their fullest stage of development, the R.A.F. became a separate
ssrvl.oe in its own right. Thus the air force made its own contribution
in the defence against invasion, at a time when the Army was short of troops
and the Navy was fully committed elsewhere.
Other modern weapons were adopted for home defenos late in the war.
In october 1918, as the first signs of German collapse began to appear, a
scheme came into operation to use tanks against German invaders. Base
depots for 48 tanks were established at Coloheater, Canterbury, Dorking,
and near Norwich, each of which had two days' supply of amnition and
petrol. If the Germans were sucoeseful in breaking through the British
d•fenoes, the tanks were to drive into the enemy and relieve British
strong-points still holding out. They were also to be used to attack enemy
- 634 -
concentration, preparing an attack and to strengthen weak British defensive
positions. But their rol. was offensive and their proper place among the
enemy troops sowing discord and despondency. Tanke were always to withdraw
in the tao. of •nemy field guns. But littl. allowance seems to have bean
made in th. tactical pana for British conditions of closed country.1
But by now it was apparent that any German overseas attack would
shorten the war rather than prolong it, as it would siphon off German troop
strength from the continent, where it ,&. desp.ratsly needed with the
Americans now arriving in strength. In reooiition of the., changed condit.
ion., th. Army called for the fifth. and last of the intsr—servioe conferences
on invasion. Th. meeting, on September 30th, was mainly conducted by the
military. Th. naval rspresentativee saw no changes in the situation since
the beginning of the year, but the General Staff represented that th. enemy
no longer had troops available ven for a large raid, owing to insistent
demands upon her menpow.r by her allie, and the exigencies of the Wssteru
Front. The military representatives estimated that no more than 5,000
troops, without supplies or artillery, could be landed. This was aooept.d
by the Conference and became th. final standard of attack of the wax. 2 Sir
Henry Wilson, now C.I.C.S., forwarded tbis report to the War Cabinet
observing that no gain a raiding fore. could achieve would be worth th. lose
of the necessary troop.. Wilson recommended further reductions among the
1. W0 33/899 "Scheme 'T'. .rgency Arrangements for the Mobilization of
Tank Companies..." 12161 October 1918.
2. 1dm 137/866/342-3. "Report of a Conference Held in D.C.N.S. 's Room on
30 September 1918, Between Naval and Military Representative., To
Consider the Question of Invasion in the Light of Most Recent Experience."
by C.I.G.S. September 1918.
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100,000 defence troops in the island, especially the 6800 cyclists who
were of the top physical standard. 1 By the end of the war the risk of
invasion had been proessively discounted by both services to almost an
imperceptible uantity.
The problem of borne defence and the invasion question during th.
First World War has been almost completely neglected by the historians, in
strong contrast to the abundance of material produced on the question for
the Second World War. 2
 The various official volumes - Jones'
The	 and Corbett's Naval Operations - dsvote only a few disjointed
paraaph. to the subject, while Professor Marder's thze. published volumes
contain only a few pages on the earlier inter-service conferences. Military
histories of home defence between 1914 and 1918 do not •ii.t. What inform-
ation is available is found in sparse and scattered sources.
Y.t the wartime bitory of the invasion controversy embrace, several
eigaifioant issues. The one which has inspired he moat controversy has
been the allegation that large numbers of men were kept at home out of fear
of invasion who could have brought decisive results in France. This charge
1.Adm 137/866/336-340. "Troops Required for Home Defence." by C.I.C.S.
September 1918.
2. Besidee the interesting general information in Churchill's 	 Second
World War, Volumes II and II (Caseells, London, 1949-51), Basil Collier's
Official history The Defence of the United Kingdom (H.LS.O., 1957)
provid.s exhaustive 0information on home d•f•nce whil• eschewing con-
troversy; Ronald Whqtl.y's pration Sea Lion was an early and sound
account of Hit1er' invasion projects, while Peter Fleming's Invasion
1940 describes both British and German preparations on a popular 1.v.1.
A more recent study, Telford Taylor's Th.	 Wave (Weidenfeld
and Nicholson, London, 1967) places the German invasion plans in their
strategic oontext and analyses their importano.. Where the invasion
theme once inspired alarmist prophesy, it has in recent years prompted
retrospective speculations. The earliest of these was C.S. Forester's
"If Hitler Bad Invaded England", serialized in the	 Itail in 1960,
which had the invading Generals decimated by British snipers and the
German Pansers halted in confusion before they reached London. Contemp-
orary treatments have been more pessimiatios life in a Nazi England has
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seems to be wuoh exaggerated, for it appears that sizeable forces were
retained in Britain only for a limited period. This was between February.
March 1915, when the first of the new Armies completed their training until
the beginning of 1916, when Robertson and French discovered over a million
troops in England and began transferring theR overseas. Yet statistics ax.
misleading, for only half of these were fighting troops, the balance being
made up of rear echelons. The question is additionally complicated by the
many training and supply cadres, headquarter unite, and divisions undergoing
training, all of which existed in widely varying numbers in Britain thzougb-'
out the war. Throughout 1916 and 1917 the General Staff sucoe.ded in
sending most viable combat troops abroad, and by the benning of 1918 what
troops remained in England were, as contemporary inspection reports attest,1
almost militarily worthless and would certainly have proved a military
liability abroad.
The Admiralty bears a heavy part of the responsibility during 1916
and 1917 for exaggerating the possibility of invasion, in setting up the
160,000 men standard, and cutting its coimitment to intercept and imp.de a
landing. During these two years the General Staff was anxious to devalue
the possibility of invasion; for better or for worse, the Admiralty hindered
them in this. This timidity on the part of the Admiralty cannot be
explained solely in terms of strategic developments such as the U-boat
campaign. After the departure of Churchill, the Admiralty seems to have
undergone a crisis of confidence in its capabilities under a series of less
2. (oontd. from previous page) been described in Cues Cooper's play,
Othet Man (also available in book form) and in Revin Bxownlow's grim and
harrowing film It Happened Here.
1. obertson S. 1/26. "Inspection Reports in U.K. 1918-1919."
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than dynamic administrations. There certainly was no momentous change in
the strategic situation at the end of 1917 to account for the sudden
revision of the scale of attack downwards from 160,000 to 30,000 (later
changed to a compromise figure of 70,000). The decisive element was a
change in leadership and the displacement of war .wsary older men by a more
vigorous and confident coup of younger naval officers.
Thit the most significant and arresting development during the later
years of the war is th. sudden emexgenoe of air forces in Britis national
defence. By 1918 both the military and naval arms had delegated a sizeable
portion of their responsibility for the defence of eat Britain to the new
Royal Air Force. The new concern of British planners for "command of the
air" over Britain represents a watershed in the history of the invasion
question. The development of air power and an aerial defeno• against
invasion in the last two years of the war transposed the invasion problem
to a new dimension. The recoiition of air power as the new decisive
factor in home defence brouit an end to the long history of invasion as
a two—dimensional strategic concern. From the dawn of history Britons had
looked to the sea and sea power for their first defence against invasion;
now they were beginning to look to the sky and air power. It was the end
of an era, for the perspectives of 1940 are implicit in the preparations
of 1918.
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C ON CL U I UN
Few projects preoccupied the pre-l9li European military
imagination more than the invasion of England. French and German
General Staffs spent years in considering the means of successfully
conquering the British Isles, while British naval and military
experts were even more diligent in their search for means to
frustrate 8UCh an attempt. Rulers and statesmen took a personal
interest in the project far beyond the call of duty. Kaier
Wilhelm II inspired the German staff studies on invasion, and
directed that periodic reports be made directly to him regarding
the progress of the planning. Civilian authorities in England,
including Balfour, Asquith, and Churchill, personally studied
which
the problem in great depth in memoranda/are still rearkaole for
their depth and power of analysis. Civilian atrate ;ists such as
Corbett and Repington analyzed its complexities in exhaative
detail. the possible invasion of England was an enigma which
fascinated a wider constituency than the professional military
planners, the statesmen, and the civilian experts; it was also
a preoccupation of the populace.
Novelists and journalists in France, Germany, and especially
Britain, turned to the theme of possible invasion repeatedly.
Britons especially, mindful of the growing naval, military, and
industrial power of their potential rivals, purchased millions
of pamphlets and novels describing the perils of a future enemy
landing in their homeland and suggestin' how these might be
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prevented. rhe very breath and quantity of source materials
which survive confirms that fear of German invasion was a major
preoccupation of Edwardian England.
Invasion, as the central problem of British national defence,
inspired the foundation of the Blue Water School of naval strategy
in 1888 and fostered that heightened appreciation of the mechanics
of sea power which characterized English tbouht in the quarter
century before l9l+. The various navalists were united on this
basic point. That invasion was a naval problem, preventable only
by supreme sea power, was the unifying doctrine of the Blue ater
School, the one point that admitted no debate nor allowed subtle
distinctions. ris emphasis upqn the overwhelmingly naval
character of British national defence was the first principle of
all British navaliaVwriters and thinkers for a generation.
The history of the invasion controversy in the thirty years
from i688 to 1918 is closely related therefore to the rise and
decline of the Blue ater School. Its appearance in 1888 meant
that invasion, the fundamental problem of British defence, the
most complicated of all military operations, could for the first
time be subjected to the methods of modern scholarship, based on
painstaking analyses of historical precedents and exhaustive
studies of its tactical components. The intellectual rigour which
characterized navalism won influential converts among that
important minority of Englishmen who thought critically about
defence problems, and encouraged a growing skepticism regarding
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invasion which diffused downward through British society.
But the pedagogy of the navaliats was a political liability
as well as an asset. The Blue Vater Schoolmen over-estimated th.
power of logic to overturn the deeply rooted and intuitive fear of
invasion which affected the general public. The process of
converting the nation to navalism proceeded slowly for over twenty-
five years, and with many setbacks. Powerful vested interests
associated with the military establishment, such as the Volunteer
movement, national defence associations, and advocates of con-
scription, conducted a vigorous and skilful counter-attack. But
i.in the last years of peace, riavalist teaching on inva8ion reigned
supreme in British public opinion. Those who still believed in
invasion were an isolated and discredited rump, whose sole
remaining activist of intellectual stature was 1epinton, Military
even
Correspondent of the Times. Yet,/as navalism reached the peak of
its public influence, it was rapidly becoming obsolete as a
strategic system.
"Invasionist&' who for various reasons asserted that overseas
attack was not a remote naval contingency, but rather a military
probability, argued that the navalists relied too heavily upon
logic and historic precedent and had discounted the element of
surprise, the accidents of war, and the accelerating pace of
change in military technology. All these factors bore directly
on the invasion problem, and in time the "invasioniste" were
substantiated by events. The initial premise of the navalista
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was that steam had not invalidated the principal of naval
strategy that had evolved in the age of sail. This statement was
true, but its corollary - that naval strategy could not be over-
turned by technical 4evelopmerit - was not. As Professor Gerald
Grahams noted in another context,
It is an interesting commentary on human affairs that
Mahan's exposition of the influence of sea power on
the course of uropean and American expansion should
have occurred at the very time when new instruments
of the Industrial Revolution were beginning to erode
principles and theories upon which his doctrines were
based. Under the impact of scientific and technological
advances, British command of the sea ... had already
begun to disintegrate. 	 ith the coming of the aero-
plane ... control of the sea was no longer possible.
Battleships and cruisers were not sufficient of
themselves to maintain maritime communications. Mahan's
dictum had lost its validity within two decades of its
pronouncement •l
The outbreak of war in 191k revealed what a few had ss-
pected: that technical rievelopments undercut the validity of many
. strategic arguments based on surface seapower. Almost overnight
assumptions were overthrown which had prevailed in British public
opinion for a generation and which had been the foundati,n of
government defence policy against invasion for twelve years.
Incidents such as the sinking of three British cruisers by a
single U-Boat on 22 September 191k had a traumatic effect on
the formulators of British British defence policy. (Churchill makes no
reference to this event in fhe horld Crisis.) The pre-war strategic
principles and reference points appeared to be swept away, and the
1. Gerald S. Graham.	 RQitic.A of Naval Supremacy. Cambridge
UP, 1965. p. 12k.
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security of the home island threatened by the submarine and torpedo,>
a combination of weapons for which no suitable defence then existed.
British statesmen and strategists were suddenly made aware that the
arguments of navalism no longer corresponded to the real strategic
situation, and with great erier'y sponsored all kinds of programmes
and experiments to cope with a possible invasion.
rhis sudden awareness of vulnerability accounts for the
severit of the invasion scare of 1914. rhe discovery that the
surf . ce fleet was susceptible to submarine attack inspired
prodigious efforts on the part of the Government to prepare for a
hostile landing. Only slowly did the realization dawn that German
invading craft would be subject to the same liability, and by the
spring of 1915, both the Cabinet and the press had recovered their
original skepticism regarding invasion. It was in the Admiralty,
which for a generation had been permeated with ideas now suddenly
clouded with uncertainty, that professional confidence never
completely returned. Only in the last year of the war, after
eo,-di rnal
oontinemtal. prodding by the Cabinet anti the military, did the naval
authori;jes downgrade the official estimates of overseas attack.
Caution and a healthy respect for the submarine replaced trie
spirit of initiative formerly associated with the traditions of
the Royal Ndvy.	 fter the departure of Churchill in May 1915, the
Admiralty reacted chiefly t Dutside pressures regardin its
invasion policy. The r les of the two services were reversed: now
the military authorities wished to downgrade official estimates of
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the likelihood of invasion, while more timorous Admiralty rep
resentatives strenuously resisted them.
By 191k, Blue hater doctrine, based on surface naval
etrength, had become a dancerous anachronism. Its weakness was
its two-dimensional basis, its superficiality. Events soon
indicated that invasion, as a strategic problem, had been raised
to a third dimension. Britah could no longer be guarded by war=
ships floating on the surface; rather, these "guardians of the
deep" were themselves increasingly vulneruble to attack from the
heights and depths, by submarine and aircraft. rhis marked a
strategic revoLution of the first magnitude: for the first time
in 3ritish history, surface seapower in itself was not sufficient
to guard against invasion. The key o Admiralty timidity for most
of the war is expressed in the classic query 	 iscustodiet psos
custod6? Only at the end of the war was a partial solution
found for this strategic imbroglio. By 1.918, air power was
displacing seapower as the first line of British defence, and an
elaborate system deploying fighters and bomoers against a possible
3erman landing indicated the passin of seapower as the decisive
element in British national defence.
Although the alleedly iinnutable principles of naval
strategy remained valid for only a generation, this does not mean
that the Blue ater School left no permanent achievement. rhe
development of an internally consistent navalist doctrin, educated
the general public in the fundamentals of national defence strategy,
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and later provided a theoretical. framework for the Committee
of Imperial Defence, the first British official body to concern
itself exclusively with higher strategy. The insistence of the
Blue iater Schoolmeri upon starting with first principles lifted
the invasion issue out of the realm of intuition and prejudice
into the sphere of modern strategic analysis. I2he navalists imposed
their methods arid terminology upon even their opponents, and their
methods and conclusions were adopted arid upheld by successive
British governments of both parties. One of the 'reater achieve-
ments of the Committee of Imperial Defence/ — to construct a
national defence policy and to impose it on both services - is
inconceivable without the pioneering work of the Colomba and their
associates. The Blue 'ater School was no partisan philosophy; it
was a climate of opinion accepted generally by all, men who thought
critically about british defence.
Blue hater insistence upon the insuperable difficulties of
p
..invasion had perhaps even greater consequences outside o 	 nland.
or a decade after l95 Jrench and German eneral taffs were
actively wei;hing the problems involved in invading _nlarid.
Whether euch a project was ever pnysically possible invo..ea the
pursuit o intangibles beyond te disciplines of hLtortc I research.
But what is evident is that invasion had become psycholotcaily '1fl..
possible for nland's potential adversaries. Ithe influence and
prestige of the Blue 'ater School predominat.ed not only in the
higher counsels of the British defence establishment, but also in
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the Reichsmarineamt and the German 3eneral Staff. Ihen German
policy makers began to construct a Righ Seas Fleet in imitation
of Britain, they also emi1oyed British strategic concepts to guide
them in their use of it.
Invasion Was rejected by the Reich as a feasible military
operation, in spite or the Kaiser's enthusiasm for the project,
because rirpitz folLowed the ideas of Mahan and the Colomba. rhe
message of seapower nd invasion ruled imperiously over the minds,
not ly of Englishmen, but olso their enemies.
Yet invasion was not purely a naval issue, as some service
partisans asserted. Jor at least twenty years after 1.888 it etood
at the core of a bitter and unrelenting strug-le for predominance
between the British army and navy. Almost all other defence
responsibilities coull be rihtfully climed by one bervice or
the others te	 oulJ not defend the orthwest J'rontier of
India, nor the Army the imperial trade lanes. But invasion, owing
to its complexity as a combined operation involvinç both services,
was by its very nature anbivalent, and the natural prestige
associated with defending the home island intensified internal
competition. Both services initially regarded defence against
invasion as their own eminent domain. Sinc 1860 t ie var Office
had been inspired by a fortress mentality which visualized military
bastions dotting the coast, surrounding the naval ports, and, above
all, protecting London. But the prestige and influence of the new
navalism slowly displaced this view, even within the War Office
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itself. Ii1itary officers studied glue /attr doctrines in order
to refute them, arid ended by beiri. converted to them. By 1895,
we can see even the very army officers engaged on planning the
fortification of London doubting the wisdom of this policy and
turning to the Blue Water Scho3l.
But only ignorant extremists claimed a monopoly for their
service in the invasion controversy: what was really at 8take WaS
the proper proportion of responsibility between the two departments.
Admiral Colomb quite earlyia 1889—)C), worked out a formula which
eventually 8erved as the basis of reconciliation. Colomb die-
ttinuished between invasion, as a naval responsibility involving
art expedition that could not evade the fleet, and a raid, as a
military responsibility involving smaller expeditions which could.
This was an important strategic distinction which also had great
political value: it justified limited 'iar Office preparations
against invasion on land, but at the same time subordinated
these to the predominant and more active role of the fleet. Fifteen
years later this soLution was adopted by the Committee of Imperial
Defence and imposed upon the two departments.
But this devaluation of the military approach to invasion
was bitterly opposed by powerful elements in the Iar Office, and
even more implacable interests closely connected with it. Additional
invasion inquiries after 1903 saw attempts to overturn official
defence policy and enlarge the army's responsibility açainst
invasion. Military interests made their target the official
estimate of 70,000, the largest possible raid: the enemy force
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which could evade the fleet and land in Britain. This figure governed
the extent of the military defence establishment in Britain, and
these repeated assaults upon it were largely motivated by military
ambition.
However, War Office zeal for attacking the navalist-iñepired
official policy faltered appreciably in the decade before 191 1$, as
can be seen in a study of the invasion inquiries. The first in
,1902 -03, witnessed strong and consistent opposition on the par
of the military authorities to Blue ,Vater principles. After the
government's conclusions were announced, both Nicholson, Chief of
the General Staff, an4 Brodrick, lecretary of State for dar,
personally prepared long papers in protest.	 ith the passaçe of
time, however, military officials of this mentality were slowly
displaced by a new group of youn'er officers who saw a more promising
role for the British army. Men such as Griersort, Wilson, Haig and
4-French, fillin important staff positions from 1905 to 1911$, became
enthused by the possibility of British military intervention on
the Continent, in alliance with trance and against Germany. rhe
impact of this Continental Strategy upon the War Office is apparent
by the time of the second invasion inquiry of 1907-08, when the
active opposition to the government's invasion policy is led by
Roberts and Repinton, both retired officers outside the war
office. Divided counsels are apparent within the ar Office, as
these "invasionists" receive official cooperation from only a few
low-ranking officers. One of the official military witnesses at
the inquiry, Wilson, believes invasion to be an issue beneath
contempt and much of his testimony is instead subtle propaganda
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for the Continental Strategy. The last pre-war invasion inquiry of
1913-1k was apparently inspired, not by any army source, but by
Churchill at the Admiralty, concerned over the ramifications of
the torpedo. The wartime inquiry late in 191k followed a perplexing
series of blows which undercut navalist assumptions. Overall, the
decade saw the military transferring its interest from invasion to
the Continental Strategy, while the outbreak of war found Kitchener
tryin to fulfil both commitments. Concurrently, the Admiralty's
official attitude moved from belligerent confidence to doubt and
perplexity.
The very success of the navalists in convi'ning authoritative
opinion of the remoteness of invasion led directly to the great
expansion of the rival service in World War One. Navalism, in
emancipating War Office planners from their obsesbion with invasion,
encouraged them to develop a new interest in military interveation
on the Continent. The Continental Strategy became the military
4_corollary of the Blue Water School and the navaliet critique of
invasion was inverted to become the initial premise of the inter-
ventionists: if a lesser naval power could be prevented from
conveying a decisive military force from the Continent to Britain;
the supreme sea power wotld succeed in carrying over a decisive
expedition in the opposite direction. Once committed, the initial
British force naturally expanded in size and power to contend with
the relativel,y*ast armies of its allies and enemies. The fleet,
already undeniably supreme, had no need to expand further. By
the latter staee of the war the British army was the chief military
- 649 -
force of the allies, while the hoyal Navy reiained relatively
inactive in its sheltered anchoraea. By this strange process of
Cau5atiOn the Blue hater School, oriçinally conceived as an
argument for a supreme Britisn navy, resulted in the subordination
of the navy by the army in the British defence establishment.
The roots of this reversal in the position of the two
services can be seen in the last years of peace. The emergency
meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence held on 2 August
+1911 during the Agadir Crisis saw the Continental Strategy take
precedence over naval plans for British strategy in a possible
European war. This development led to the tinal decision for
military intervention art the Continent in August 191k, after the
Admiralty gave elaborate assurances that Britain was safe from
invasion. rhe commitment, once made, saw the British army exrand
from a small professional field force to a mass army sustained by
conscription, while Great Britain itself for the first time became
a true "nation in arms." Blue dater predominance in the British
defence establishment was only temporary: the e areness of the
naval defence inspired the development of the military offensive.
rhe policy-makers had other concerns beyond the manoeuvree
of servicc partisans. Outaide the official defence establishment,
the invasion isue apea1ed to many alert and sensitive elements
of British ublic opinion. Supporters of both services, home
defence ertthuiasts such as the Volunteers, and conscription
campaigners exploited the invasion issue artd exerted a continuing
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pressure on the political leadership. Cabinet records testify that
public reaction to official invasion policy was a powerful in-
fluence upon' the evolution af tiat policy, the close relationship
between public concern and official policy can be seen in the
parallel htory of the invasion scares and the various Cabinet
inquiries. the agitations of i68e, 1 9 00 , 19 09, and l9l either
inspired or paralleled exhaustive Cabinet studies into the
possibility of invasion.
Invasion agitation never assumed a strongly partisan
character, though most "invaeionist&' ravttated naturall..y to the
Conservative party, which had a traditional interest in defence
questions. Bipartisan accord on invasion policy, symbolized by
the close collaboration of Balfour and Asquith in t e C. I. D.
inquiries, prevented the agitation from becoznin a narty isue.
£he "invasionicts" instead were isolated into small roups outside
the Parliamentary .power structure. It was te Coaservtive press,
tterefore, which played the central role in focusing and develop-
ing their case and bringing it to the notice of the gerteral public.
A powerful editor, such as Strachey of the Spectator, (tie nost
influential Eciwardian weekly) could exert pressure on the rovern-
ment by publishin hio own proramrne for dealiri with invasion in
a serie8 of leading articles. Strachey's personal friendship
with Cabinet ministers gave I ixn additional influence uton invasion
policy. A shrewd an 4
 well-placed military cDrrespondent like
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ke ington could lorce a lengthy and exhaustive re-exatination of
official defence policy from te Cabinet and sabota;e the careers
of ministers through disclosures of ne1ience. Pepinton's
articles on invasion inspired repeated outbreaks of contentious
correspondence in the Times letters column, which became the chief
platform of public debate on the subject.
rhe new journalism, represented by Northcliffe's Daily Mail,
also publicized the possibility of invasion. 3ut where the
traditional journalism, such as that of the Times, atternpted to
instruct its middle-class leadership in the subtleties of national
defence, the new journalism frequently exploited public fear of
invasion for less noble ends. Invasiou articles and prophesies
were used to boost circulation or to mount a.itations br
increased defence expenditure. Iany of these journalists also
wrote invasion novels, and the flood of their oitput helped to
foster irrationality re-rarding invasion. some of tre invasion
propagandists later became their own victi'ns. Northcliffe spent
the last months of his life under the care of a psychiatrist,
• sleepin r with a gun unier his pillow to protect him from imaginary
3ermans. His acolyte, the novelist Le 'ueux, persuaded Scotland
Yard to assign him a bodyguard on the outbreak of war and carried
a revolver day and night. hepington, the intellectical leader of
the "invasionists", saw his influence diminish after l9l+ and the
soundness of his judinent was comin, to be questioned even before
he severed :.is relationship with the rimes in 1918. Even tiTe more
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uprignt Strac ey suffered a breakdown in health in 1915 owing to
his over-exertions on behalf of home defence, and was forced to
resign from the Editors).ip of the Spectator.
But thebe invasion propagandists were hi.çhly successful in
their immediate object. The extent of Rrltih public concern with
invasion, especially luring the Edwardian years, is apparent in
tne variety of the surviving source materials. Jesides the
volumes of official documents, learned articles, books, serial
stories, novels, films, poetry, drama, satire, - even parlour
games - centering on the invasion theme testify to t e fact that
it was a subject of widespread interet. Over a hundred invasion
stories were published, many with repeated reprintins, inJicatin
that novelists re.carded it as a literary subject with a broad and
lucrative aopeal. Invasion, therefore, was not only a preoccupation
of the governin elite, nor a concern of tre military ani naval
authorities: it was a que tion of compelling interest to the common
mart.	 or t e pre-war generation, a possible invasion was nothing
less than a national obsession.
APIEI4DIX A: GER}
	 STAFF C0hSI1ATION OF
THIS IAIO OF ENGLAND
1896 - 1901
IL'onioall, officials or the Imperial German Mvy and the German
General Staff turned their attention to the conquest of England at a
time when British planners and public were almost exclusively
preoccupied with an attack from Prance. By the time that the German
"menace" hed become an important theme in British political life, both
the Gerinen army and navy had rejected invasion as sri operation far
beond their capacities, out of the same considerations for sea power
and naval strategy which were to prevail later in the C.I.L). German
naval planning against ngland was first taken up in 1895. Offensive
projects were first considered and when it was clear that these were
impracticable, defensive operations against the British fleet were
worked out.1
The audacious project of the invasion of i.ng1and was first
studied by the Staff of the Covianding Admiral of the avy, with the
full knowledge and patronage of the Kaiser, cgairst a background of
Gernin naval expansion and diplomatic tension between Britain and
Germany. The Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, which joins the North ea and the
Baltic and effectively doubled the strategic strength of the German
fleet, was conpieted in Yune 1895, while the first great increase in
the German Navy was foreseen in the Budget announced in the eichstag
1. Acts betreffend Operationsp1ne gegen ng1and. Cap.III. Tit. 1. Vol.1.
iiicrofilmed for the Admiralty, London, 1960: hereafter cited as
Gernun Naval Archives. teel XIV, "J.legemeine tbera1cht fiber die
Biaherigen des Operations-vor rbeiten." von AbekCfl. 30 November 1901
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in December 1896. At the same time tension between the two countries
was high owing to the Kaiser's deapatch of a telegram to President
Kruger of the T:ans'v-aal followinc the 1Tanson said, congratulating him
on having reniained independent "without appealing to the help of
friendly powers."1
Consciousness of rapidly-growing economic and political power is
implicit in even the earliest German official studies of an attack on
.i.ngland. In January 1896 Baron von Luttwitz of the General Staff
published an article on "The Invasion of ngland" in the semi-official
Lilitr-*ochenblutt. He declared that the only way ngland could halt
invasion was through destroying the approaching erniy during its passage
or emb*rkation. Ella aim was to destroy the illusion of Britain's
invulnerability, as steam and the telegraph provided for the rapid
asseiibl, and transport of an invading force. Luttwitz's article came
quickly to the notice of the British military, for It was trnslated
and reprinted in the .1Y.E.I. Journal the followlxg month, with the
comant hat this misreading of British history was sjmptomatic of
thought in mllItar circles on the Continent.2
But, unkuownto the British, similar Ideas were circulating
officially in the German levy. In Lay 1896, a naval staff captain
examined possible alliances which would provide a framework for war
between Britain and Germany. He argued that it an alliance could be
effected with France, this would constitute a serious menace to
1. For British reactions to the Kruger telegram, see . 3. }arder.
British l.aval ?ouicy. Eutnam, London, 1940. pp. 256-57; 2869.
For the German side, Grand-,.dm1ral von rirpitz. _Meznoirs. Hurst &
Blackett, London 1 1919. pp. 65, 68, 93.
2. "The Invasion of England." LtJ.3.I. Journal. February 1696. pp.198-202.
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Britain's existence. It would also r cilitate the. occupation of
Belgium as a preperatton for -tn invsion of r..:glond. Antwerp Would
provide a convenient base foz' the Geran Fleet ani the invasion army
which would already be there in a state of :eadtness. However, if
France were hostile, he stated, tats meant Gerr.ii:n naval operations
would have to be completely defensive, as the focal point of effort in
aLch a ar would be the defeat of France on lrnd. Once this was
accomplished, however, the surrendered French fleet could be
requisitioned and used as a bargaining point wth Lnland. Other staff
officers expressed agreement with these points: one remarked that
although a landing in .ngland was certainly 'adventuresone enough", its
results would certainly be more decisive than a German raid on British
shipping in the Thames, an riternative project then under consideration.1
The basic features of an offensive ainst tnglind were presented
to the Kaiser on kay 31, 1897 by von Knorr, the Gonxnanding Admiral of
the Imperial iavy. This plan was based on a pre-emptive strike on the
British Fleet on the fifth day of mobilization, for it Was believed th8t
the small but efficient German Navy could reach full battle
effectiveness long before the more ponderous toal rivy would be fully
mob1lizd. If this attack proved successful, it v.ould be immediately
followed b a German landing in Angland 1
 end Dutch and e1gien ports
might be conaiuered	 embarkation pouts. But there were cor.8lderationa
opposing the forcible capture. of Larbours In the LoiN Countries: Germany
-
1. German iva1 Archives. Fr. 63, Sette 58. "Grundztlge fr einen
)peratiouspian: )eutecbland allein gegen ngland allein. May 1896,
- 656 -
was a guarantor of belgian neutrality, and the occupation of the
ietherlands might tempt England to annex the Dutch overees Empire.
The Kaiser approved these points and authorised von Knorr's staff to
study the following questions:
a. hezin.ngland are the troops to be landed?
b. Where are the troops to be embarked?
c. Which units, how many troops, end whet transport will be neoeseey
d. .diat manner of cozzniunicatlone are to be mainteined with Germany?1
Th. order of the questions is instructive as to the wishful and
unanalytical thinking of the Kaiser and the naval staff: they are not
posed In the logical order that would follow In the actual invesion
operation (concentration and embarkation of troops, the tran8pOrt across,
and the l'nding), but rather they begin with the assumption that the
German troops are already approaching the x.nglish shore and work backwards
from this point. But the work went forward, under the patronage of tke
Kaiser, who receivec regulax periodic reports on the progiess of the
planting.
ihile this paper *FS forwarded to the General Staff for their
coents, the naval staff continued their studies. ? pper of eptembar
1897 argued that an alliance was almost Indispensable in a war against
.ngland.
Should we be forced to war against England without allies
our chances of overthrowing the enemy are extremely
untavourabl.. Only if particularly favourable conditions
coincide can we strike at the, heart of the British Jtate,
i.e. bring over a large invasion army to 2ngland.
1. German aval ArchiLves. 35. 86-99. "DexikschrIft zum Inrnediatvortt'ag
betr. Grundztige ffl.r elnen Operatloneplan: Deutschland allein gegen
£ngland alleIn." 31 }iay 189?.
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In a war involving Germany alone against Britain alone, GermAny should
go over to the defensive in the }orth Sea nd pursue a policy of
"watchful waitir ": a fleet of transports should be prepared while one
awaited a favourable chance for Invasion. 1 Another study worked out the
occupation of the chief L)utch and belgian harboure as a preliminary for
the invasion of England. The staff captain responsible argued that
invasion would have the best chance if the length or the sea voyage
could be minimized for maximum security and surprise. e calculated
that the shortest voyage from a German port to a British port,
elihelmahaven to Great Yarmouth, involved a crossing of about 270 sea
miles. But it Germany seized the chief harbours of the Low Countriee,
the distance, and implied risk, would be reduced by two-thirds.
The distance from Ylissingen to Dover or Sheerness, both useful
points for large-scale troop landings, is approximately 80-85
sea milee,in other words, less than one-third of the time
would be required. The distance from Ostend or Nieuwport Is
even less, only 60 sea miles, but because of the military and
hydrographic conditions of these ports...they would be less
su.itable...(Yet) the chances of launching a successful
invasion of England are improved in the number of jumping-off
places which are available.2
Other staff officers did not receive this plan with unreserved
enthuaiaa. The officer in charge of tactics pointed out that secrecy
would be impossible in such an operation; another said that the
preparations would take weeks, and dissented from the main contention
of the plan that "the nearest place to the .nglish coast was necessarily
the best place to launch an invasion." The author of the scheme replied
1. German Naval Archives. Fr. 169; 3.160. 'OUfl .um Operetionspian gegen
.ngland." September 189?.
2. Jonathan Steinberg. "A German Plan For the Invasion of Holland and
Belgium, 189?." hlstørical Journal. Vol. VI. No.1. pp. 107-119. See
translation of Memorandum: An Operation against Antwerp."
November 1897. p. 116.
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that the invasion could be launched from several ports simultaneoualy,
which would increase surprise, and pointed out that the General Staff
shared his opinion that Antwerp wa the best base of operations against
England. he adMtted thet surprise and secrecy remained the moat
important problem of the plan, but thought this might be covered by
holding frequent end ostentatious amphibious manoevres near the Dutch
border. This inspired a coninent that the only sure result of such a
move would be to send France into the ranks of the enemy)
hile these various schemes had been evolved by von Knorr's staff,
the anticipated comments of the Ge ,neral Starr on the offensive plan had
not been forthcoming. Although the plan had been sent in early Tune, 1897,
it was only after the Navy had sent a reminder in November that Grat
3chuieffen, Chief of the Army General Staff, supplied his comrrAents on
December 14, 189?. Because six months transpired between the Navy's
first request for military reactions to the offensive plan and their
reply, it is safe to sa that tht General Staff hardl, considered the
invasion of nglnd a priority project at this stage.
Schitetfen, in reply, worked on the as3uription tlit the British
fleet would be hit on the fifth day of mobilization, and that troops could
be landed in i.ng1and up to the fifteenth da., when the rena1nder of the
british Fleet would appear on the scene. he advised that the best place
for the linding of German troops would be in the Thames Estuary or
1. Steinberg. Op. cit. pp. 108-109.
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}ortherly, in view of the fact that Anglish reinforcements would come
from the Channel. .a for the best embarkation port he recoumended
Flushing, on a near-island in Southwest Ho11nd, for it could be
captured quickly without the need for a siege that would prove
expensive in time and money. However, this port was connected to
Germany only by a single railway line, which would not suffice for the
concentration end embarkation of an entire army. A better alternative
would be to employ a number of German ports simultaneously, in spite of
the greater distance, such as Emden, Bremerhaven, Cuishaven, Hamburg, and
the Kaiser i.ilhelin Canal. As for the number of troops re.uired for the
project, Schileffen emphasized that every available soldier should be
sent, as success could only come through the total defeat of ingland.
•	 The limiting factor here was not the number of troops, but rather
the transport arrangements to ferry them to Englnd. Schlieften said:
Transport should be created for as many troops as possible.
It would be an inexcusable mistake to leave behind even one
Battulion if a single ship is still available for transport.
The number of available troops will be limited only by the
amount of shipping and the potential of the railways.
He went on to suggest that further studies be set up to determine which
herbours should be used for the embarkation, taking into account their
respective capacities. Calculations must determine how many troops could
be moved to and embarked from these harbours ir the available time,
remembering that the crossing of all the ships end the landing itself would
have to be completed b the fifteenth day of mobilization, when British
command of the sea would again be aserted. Schlieffen believed that the
intervention of the British fleet would be only temporarily effective,
for he wrote
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After the landing, communications with Germany should be broken
only for a short period. If the ?evy is not in a position to
maintain communications, then the enemy country must be subdued
with the utmost speed allied with a greet show or strength.
In this nner the enemy will be forced to accept peace.i
But the Chief of the General Staff was not blind to the perils of
the inveeion operation, end snarieed the project in the following words.
The Goveriiment or Great Britain will not be easily forced to issue
an order for the Fleet to surrender. Yet this is the sole means
of bringing the undertaking to a successful conclusion. It we
set ourselves any lesser target than the capitulRtlon of the
British Fleet, then there is no knowing how we, even as victors,
could return to our homeland. As long as the British Fleet exists
and keeps command of the sers around her coast, the victorious
Cerznn Arny is a prisoner in the land it bee conquered...Its
position will be similar to that of a surrounded fortress. It
will be starved out, not through lack or food - as long se the
British have food, the army will find enough to eat - but because
no replacements in men and material will get in. when the last
round has been fired, the conuerors will have to lay down their
irma. Only one thing can prevent this and that is the defeat of
the British Fleet, before our aimnunitlon is completely exhausted.2
The naval coizmezit at the bottom of Schlietfen'a letter by the naval Chief
of Staff was that this confied his views regarding war with England for
the next ten eers; only if the countries of Europe moved against
ngland would such a war be possible, but for this very reason the matter
must be studied In advance.
Other considerations had appeared which revealed the difficulties
of invasion and during this same month - 4.iecember, 189? - the Iavy
informed the Kaiser that all offensive planning bgainst iritain was being
abandoned, owing to the sending or ships to the Far Last end the British
reinforcing their Channel Fleet	 rhi cryptic statement reveals that
after two years of visionary projects and discussions, von Knorr's staff
1. Gerven Nav'l Archivs. ?. 1o9. ,.lôu iotu um Operationspl3nf..."
2. rnnn1\avaL ArCiivea. Fr. 11.3.
3. bj4, Fr, U2.d. 109. December 1897.
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was getting to grips with reality. The Channel Fleet had indeed been
strengthened in later 1897. hen the German offensive planning had
begun in 1895, the British Channel Fleet numbered only four first-class
battleships. But following the inagnificent display of British sea-power
at the Jubilee ba'ml ieview at Spithead in June, 189?, this number was
doubled. The Channel Fleet was given eight first-class ships of the most
modern and homogenous types, andwae in tact the moat powerful aiid
effective 8lngle naval squadron in the world. 1 At this time the entire
German Fleet had no more than five first-class battleships, and these
were all smaller tian the new British craft.2
The second, end more 3rcetul, collision with reality, had been the
experiences which bid followed the Kaiser's decision to send a Battalion
of German marines to seize the Chinese port of Kiao-Chow in August, 1897,
which was graced by the Kaiser's famous 'xnailed fist" speech. This had
provided sobering lessons in the complexities of co:L.bined operations and
had shown conclusively that an expeditionary force could not be fitted
out quickly or secretly, for news of the German preparations had filtered
out and attracted international notice. Even more important, the modest
operation of equipping and sending a single Bettallon bed exhausted
German transport facilities and weakened German naval forces in Europe.3
This experience augured ill for any project based on surprise and secrecy,
and in fact was cited as evidence against the plan to seize harboure in
1. Li"dr. Op. cdt. p. 2d0
2. Jonathan teinerg. "The Copenhegen Complex". Journal of
Contenporary history. Vol.1. No. 3. P. 42.




A third factor behind the abandonment of the offensive planning was
the rising por and influence of Admiril Alfred von Tirpitzwho became
State 3ecretry of the iteichsmarineaxnt in June, 189?. The ejchsmarineamt
was a rival to von Knorr's 8taff organization, end Tirpitz himself, the
forceful creator of the future German Battle Fleet, was very much von
Knorr's personal competitor. Tirpitz, who was fluent in English, had
read ahan and the other writers of the Blue uater School, and subscribed
to their doctrines, especia11, the one which taught that transport of
troops over contested seas was at best a hazardous operation. In his
inenirs Tirpitz castigates the "reckless advice" given by von Knorr's
staff to the Ka1aer and his own attitude to the invasion issue is caught
in e diary entry written by the Rejcha Chancellor shortly after Tirpitz
had visited him.
The idea of an invaion of England is insane. Even If we
succeeded in landing two army corps in England, it would
not help us, for two corps would not be strong enough to
hold their positions in England without support from home.
Tlrpltz concludes that au. hostile activity towards England
must wait until we have a fleet as strong as the English.3
From the beginning Tirpitz refused to hear of any military attack on
England for the reason that the German force would never return.4
1. Jteinberg. "A German Flan..."p.l08.(Coninents of"t.V."on Operational Plan)
2. Tirpitz. Op. Cit. p. 68.
3. DIary entry of 24 October, 1898. Ptrst Chiodwig zu Hohenlobe-
3chil1Ingsfrst, quoted by Steinberg. "The Copenhagen Complex."
4. udo1ph Stadelmann. Deutachiand und .esteuropa. Steiner, vQrttenburg,
1948. p. 101.
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Yet in spite of these strong reasons, staff considerations of the
problems involved in jny sjon still vuent forward, 88 there was still
hope that the German avy might .ttin a strength that would make the
operation feasible, and the ever-shifting diplomatic scene gave promise
tlit a powerful el1 might someday appear. Several detailed studies,
moreover, were still uncompleted, and it was deenied best to complete
these as preparation for that policy of "watchful waiting" which the Blue
Water School assigned to the inferior naval power. The pinuing
therefore continued throughout 1898. In January the German Naval Attache
in London forwarded plans or the fortifications end miriefields of
viitious British harbours, including Cardiff, Liverpool, Portsmouth, and
the Thames. But von Knorr doubted the accuracy of these reports and sent
one of his staff officers to find out what he could. This officer
received contradictory information, as it later transpired, from the
same informant, who j85 thus revealed es unreliable.1
Ia February a study made by one of von Knorr's staff noted that
SChliefien had assumed that the British Fleet would be hit on the fifth
day and that invsion troops could be sent up urtil the fifteenth day of
mobilization. But now a leter study had indicated that unless Germany
had all preparations in readiness by the outbreak of war, no troops could
be landed In England until the eighth da of mobilization. Schuleffen
had also requested that studies be made as to how many troops could be
eiberked train German harbours.	 Zkre the naval staff felt two separate
studies were required: first coisidering the German merchant fleet alone,
1. German Naval Archives. Fr. 112; 3.105. "Zu A.l. 440 III Zum Vortrag
bet S. Exoelleuz." ebr*ri 18SEI.
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and secondly, the merchant fleet plus ships under foreign flags. One
neval staff officer warned that no plans should allow for the seizure
of all shipping in German hfrbours on the outbreak of war, e this tould
be against international law: only vessels of allied or enemy
nationality could be so employed.
In ery event, statistical surveys of German harbours indicated that
the embarkation of the invasion army would tike three dabs.' It was
established in April 1898 that 145 ships and 2 Arriy Corps would have
been available or such a project at that time in the event of a sudden
mobilization. 2 But the General Staff estimated in Lay ti-at at least six
to eight Army Corps, or from approximately 240,000 to 320,000 men, were
necessary for the subjugation of bn€lazid. 3
 This Lstimate carried some
important implications. Such was the size of the army deemed necessary
that the possibility of surprise and secrecy was eliminated. It as
equr lLy obvious that it would be many years before German harbour end
merchant marine facilities could cope with the landing and transport of
such a force. It was also U1ikel j
 th t such a formidable force could
be spared from Gerxpany in'the event of r tnO front attack b France end
ussia in a war against the Dual Alliance.
The question of i*vasion was taken up by von Knorr during his
private audience with the Kaiser on February 21, 1896, and the Admiral
1. German Iaval Archives. Fr. 112; 	 . 105. "Zu A.I. 440 III Zurn Vortrag
bet ,. .kcel1enz." Februrr 1898.
2. German Naval Archives. Fr. 309; 3.65 ft. "Allegemeine fibersicht.."
3. Jteinberg. "A Germin flan". p.109.
hitVY: Adm.iralstab 0/Sache. 1GFA-:2Q15. PG 65956. ALC 3.-8
Vol. 4 "Denkscr1ft zum Iximdiatvortrag betreffend Immediatbericht des
Admjral v. Koester." 2b-2? February 1900. p.6.
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emphasied that only close cooperation between the two services could
assure success. The itulser thet empowered him t3 contact Schliaffen
to arrange combined m.noeuvres focusing on "regular, full-scale
practices in loding nd unloading troops." The Admiral wrote to the
General Staff and suggested that an interservice comIxLission be established
to work out the administrativd side of the manoeuvres, asking how many
troops and ships would b- re juired for t e exercise and ahere it sho id
be held,	 chlieffen's reply i3 not known, but the exercises took place
later In connection with coast defence preparations. On another port
of the invasion conl5ld rations, Von Knorr's chi e f of staff lnforxrd the
General 3t ff (25 March 1898) that as the exp nslon and w val bull -up
of l)over Harbour would soon mike an large scale lndlns In the Thames
or the Channel out of the question, he planned to m ke a survey of the
Lnglish coast from the Thames to tie Eumber, using 3..3. 3lga. But
later this plan fell through. $
 The more detailed end exacting the
Inquiries, the more abtinuant the evidence was that the invasion of
nglend wrs virtually impossible under prevailing conditions. Finelly,
in }.ay 1898, von Knorr's staff was ordered to prepare contingency plans
for e strategic defensive.
But by now the General Staff was interested in the probler of the
invasion of nglend, for it was in this sa.e month that a LI1Itary attache1.
after a lapse of several years, was gazetted to the German zibassy in
London. the officer chosen was Baron von Lttwitz, who bad achieved a
1. German I aval Arci-ives. Fr. 183; 5. 173. "An den Chef des
Generalstabes der Armae." 25 Larch 1898.
4. Lrdvr.. yp. Cit. •. 139-i
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certain notoriety the enr before by publishing an article on "German
Navijl Policy and Strategy" which in part contended that
The uxiassailability of nglnd is a legend. Through the
introduction of steam and electricity the situation has
much changed since 1805, to the disadvntage of ugland.
The assembling and the rapid surprising transport of invading
armies ims, in consequence, been essentially facilitated.1
LQttwitz had gone on to E4gue that the only obstacle to such an attack
was the British fleet: therfore Germany should build a supreme and
powerful havy.	 hen these facts were brought to the attention of
Beaumont, the .)irector of 1.ava]. Ir1telligence at the Adniralty, he
coimtated:
The appointmar.t of this ptrtiaular officer cannot be mere
coincidence - his attention having been so recently directed
to showing how tht invasion of ng1and can be made possible,
he will now hve full opportunity of judging the practical
aç11cation of his theories - There is, in my opinion, more
fer of an attempt at invasion from Germany than from any
other nation - their home fleet is eventu ily to be 17
Battleships - their transport resources will be abundant,
and tiey will, pass their troops through Belgium.
The lest phrase of this is interesting; had i3eaumont got wind of the
project to seize the lowland port9 for en invasion? IC is also
significant that at a time when most nglishmen anticipated an invasion
from France, if at &U, that the	 foresaw the German threat in
their ambitious naval prograrma. ichards, the First 3ea Lord, termed
Lflttwitz's ppointment "an offensive procedure but one which cannot be
noticed." .bor him the uestion of real concern was the German naval
z
eipansion. Goshen, the First i.ord, could not understand the German
attitude, which seemed to him to overlook the simple fact that a
trdeX.	 ,	 p. 2'?g
7.. Adm 2J738?A "As to rppointment of Fl Military Attache to the German
mbassy in London." 21 Lay5 .Tune 1898. Published in Yarder, Op.Cit.
pp. 298-99.
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powerful Britain was in the German interest.
By September 1898, von Knorr's staff had finally reduced the
question of invasion to its elemental state: was a landing possible
I
at all? A long study entitled "Nar s trategy Against England" stated:
Germany on her o#in simply cannotconsider a planned naval
offensive a.çainst England. i'he chance o1 carrying out an
unobserved invasion is even less, i.e. it would be impossible
to carry out preparations in secret. Our better war preparation
should be used immediately war broke out for an offensive
sortie and if this was sccesstul, it should be follo.ed by
immediate invasion ... The landing should be carried out by
the Lth day at the latest. Any later tie command of tie sea
would be lost,...I1, as i8 at present maintained, an army
could not be embarked by the evening of the bth day, the
whole plan falls tnrough.2
Von Knorr went on to enumerate three basic factors which would deter-
mine whetier the project could ever be carried out. First, there was
the possibility that the fluctuating international situation might
throw up allies in the future nd in this context various combina-
tions aainst England were examined: the L'riple Alliance of Germany,
Austria, and Italy: a Russian aliiance, al•one or supplemented by
agreements with rrkey or )enmark, etc. But the coalition of krance,
}useia and Germany against England seemed to offer the brihtest
prospect of all, for it was asserted that Turkish neutrality could
be ignored while the armies of the allies met with successes in
Egypt and India.
ability to
A second and more mundane consideration dealt with Germany's /
provide a transport fleet of sufficient size for the invading force.
1. erman Naval Archives. r. 185; S. 175. "Kriegsfhrung gegen
En." 12 September, 1888.
2. Germafl 'aval Archives. Fr. 19 1 ; s.186.
3. Ibid. Fr. 168-17k ; S.159-165.
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This question was still being studied: one officer wrote that it could
now be assumed that the merchant fleet wcs large enough for the purpose,
but this as3umption was uestioned from several quarters. The role of
the Fleet against £ngland, however, was dependent on many factors: the
situation of the harbou.rs and the transport of the army and its ability
to use the harbours. All depended on whether Germany could aaaeble and
prepare a transport fleet quickly which would carry over troops as well
as mteril. At the moment this was undoubtedly ba3ond German
capabilities (a marginal note at this point read "Impossible") as the Kiao-
Chow operation had shown. The preparation of this expedition bad caused
much conmiotion abroad end surprise attacks would have to be reconsidered
in tha light of this experience. In any event, planning of this type was
really more the concern of the Army than the Iav, which was only the means
to the end.1
If a clear-cut operationel plan against .nglend is ultimately to
be drawn up, then direct cooperation between the higher
authorities of the army end navy is essential. As long as this
cooperation does not exist, there would be little point in one
side preparing such a plan.2
The third problem of vitil importance was to decide on possible
landing-points on the English coast. Von Knorr's staff hrd prepared en
18 page survey of the .ast coast of xigland which noted the hydrographic
features of various ports and beaches. A landing Jouth of Dover was
rejected out of hand, for most of the British coast defences against
invasion were already concentrated here. But Iortb of the Thames, the
1. Gernin Naval rchfvee. Ir. 1J-7l.
, German ha ys]. Archives. Fr. 202; 3. 189.
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studies were more detailed and dealt with the capacities of various
harbours and their proximity to various British forts in great detail.
Harwich, for example, was especially recommended as a disembarkatiQn
port, for it could accoinnodate ships of almost 15' draft, was
unaffected by tides, could be closed off from the open sea by a mine
1field, and was out of range of any defending forts. rhis study was
based partially upon reconnaissancea of he English coast from
Orfordness to Scarborouh, the second and final of which had involved
two officers of the Great General Staff. Landing places and stretches
of beach were chosen for ernbarkations, being determined from "special
maps", 2
 which were almost certainly Admiralty coastal charts.
On the basis of this reconnaissance von Knorr's staff chose the
following stretches of the Enlish coast as the most suitable for a
landing for technical reasons, such as ease of anchorae, and beach
approaches:
1. Flamborough Head, with Bridlington Bay to the South,
and lucy Bay to the North.
2. The Humber Estuary, below Grimsby.
3. The Southwold Coast as far as Lowestoft or Yarmouth.
4. Orfordness to Southwold.
rom a technical point of view, these areas were the most suitable for
a landing, but this was at variance with the 3eneral Staff's stipula-
tion that a landing must take place as near to London as possible but
the Naval Staff were set against any landin r in the South or Southeast,
for British defences were concentrated here, which made it impossible
hundred
to land an army of several ,thousand men. Even if the British Fleet
1. German Nava]. Archives.S. 206. "Chef des Generaistabes der Armee
an den Kommandiereriden Admiral der ?arine." 17 November 1898.
2. German Naval Archives. Fr. 226; S. 212.
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were contained by Germany or her allies in the Irish Sea, the rittsh
still had adequate patrol and guard ships available to prevent a
disembarkation, not to mention her home defence forces.l
This memorandum was put before the Kaiser in hovember 1898, who
agreed to discuss the possibility of embarkation exercises with his ar
Minister. At the same time the paper was forwarded to the General 3taft
for their conmients, and Schlieff'en replied on November 17th. To him the
distance of the sea-voyage remained the most critical aspect of the whole
operation, and he agreed with the Iavy's conclusfon thet British coast
defences were too strong to periit a lending South of Ortordnesa. He
also critic1sed the Navy's choice of landing-points orth of the Humber,
because these were too far from any worthwhile objective. Schiteffen
recozm.ended that future pLnn1ng be concentrated on the third of the
avy's choice;,the stretch of coast between Great Yarmouth nd Aldeburgb,2
which had the advFntege of being closest to Germany even if conditions
for lending were not as favourable as those found further North. This was
later to become the stretch of coast where British defence planners thought
a German invasion most likely during the First vorld ar.
A nav1 comment on Schlieffen's letter directed that no further
studies were to be undertaken until the results of the transport exercise
were evaluated. On 10th January 1899, von Knorr wrote to the General
3taft, enumerating the important arguments against an Invasion attempt
as follows:.
1. The impossibility of assemblirg a transport fleet urobeervad
1 German Naval Archives. .3. 206. "Chef des Geueralstabee an den
Kommandierenden Adhiral der karma." 17th November 1898.
2. German laval Archives. Fra. 228-229.
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and quickly enough to exploit the advantge of Germany's
rapid mobilization.
2. Neither now nor in the foreseeable tutu.re could Germany
without allies hope to achieve unlimited command of the
North Sea even for the es entia]. minimum seven days.
3. Gemeny alone must for the time beitg abandon all idea
of attackir .ng1and on her own soil.
But therI were still some theoretical studies to be worked out in
cooperation with the General Staff and it was hoped thiit these could be
completed in the course of the winter in order to prepare for a maeting
with the Kaiser, 1 who still maintained a thp interest in the invasion
project.
Acco:ding to Professor iitter, both staffs recognised the
impossibility of a project rgainst England in 1899,2 but General Staff
interest in invasion revived as a result of the Boar ar, £.ieutenant-
General Colxnar Freiherr von der Goltz, who cormmnded the ngineer Corps
of the Prussian Army, was one of the stroncest edvoctes of invasion end
wrote in his diary just before the Boer dar broke. out (24 3eptember 1899)
that
we must be ready and prepared in al1iiace with Holland to
launch out from her coast at a favourable moment toward the
coast o Albion, like .illiam the Conqueror or the Third of
Orange.
In the tolJowing months, s the British Army met with a series of
defeats in the field and as the transfer of British guns and troops to
South Africa reduced her ho defences to the lowest level in aodern
times, other General Staff officers began to reconsider the invasion
.-1 Germzn ava1 Archives. Frs. 228-229.
2, Gerhard j tte.r. 3t.at8kunst und Krieghaudwerk. Vol. II.
1. Oldenbourg, Iiunchen, 1960. p. 195.
3. Generalfeldmarscha11 Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz. DenkwflrIigkeiten
Littler u. 3ohn, Berlin, 1929. p. 221.
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project.
In March 1900, *hen only tour battalions of British aegulrs
remained in the home islnd, von dey'Goltz published an article in the
L)eutsche undscheu which noted tht there was practical1 no military
force on the other side of the Channel. He contended that a clever and
quick sea commander could gain temporary command of the Channel end land
troops in 1nelend. Similar ideas were being considered betind the scenes.
Two General Staff officers took pert in an interservice conference on a
North Sea offensive and overseas operations on 1.larch 20.1
leven dabs later, von der Goltz forwarded to the Admiralty taft
an invasion plan based on th use of sea-going brges towed by tugs. Goltz
contended that these shallow-draft vessels could be run ashore directly
onto i..nglish beaches, thus expediting the hazardous embarkation operation.
The Admiralty Staff, in the p€rson of Admiral .hler, replied that this
plan at first seemed to have several advattagee. But these disappeared
on a clo3er examination of the problem. It was true thm t barges could
approach 4uite closely to the enemy coast, but the tugs which were
necessary to tow them could not. L!ither rowboats or paddle-wheel
steamers would be necessary for this task. Bares had several other
disadvFntmge8. The ' were utterly deperdent on tus for teir motive
power, which meant doubuine the number of vess€Ls used it. the invsion
operation. The precariousness of the connection - the toi' rope - was an
1. Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz. "3eemcht und ...andkrieg." i)eutsche
tundschau. Lrz 1900. 3. 33-352; rUtter.
	 p. Cit.3. 365. hote 51.
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additional factor of risk. Barges were also linited to a low speed, bad
a relatively small size and hence an insignificant troop capacity, arid
were completely dependent on favourable weather.1
The Admiralty Staff estimated that 85 large sea barges and 85 tugs
would be re4uired to transport a sixile mobilized division. Did von der
Goltz still believe that this was a suitable means of launching a surprise
ettack on a superior sea power such as Greet Britain? The Adxuiraltj Staff
offered some comraerta on his plan. First, ha had plannad to land an
Advance Division before command of the sea was obtained. 'iet it was
uncertain that Germany would ever go to war with jngland. Von 3chlieften,
the Chief of the General Staff, had estimated that tour to six Army Corps
were necessary for the conquest of angland, so this Advance Division would
have to be uickly reinforced by seven to eleven others to fulfil this
task. This was obviously impossible without cornmar1d of the sea: the
Advance Division ould be wiped out before it could be reinforced. It
was also erroneous to assume that the bres could be loaded with troops
witiout prior preparation, especially ii. view of the great numbers of
tugs and barëes required. All the barges would require special internal
fittings, such as horse atalls, arid the indispensable ventilation Just
didn't exist.2
If a rapid and secret attack on nglarid was desired, the best
method was tc, employ tie l rge Trans-Atlantic liners ihich lay available
1. GEi1AN 1&VY.	 Ldmiralstab "C". Operationen gegen Lngland. LGFA-DZ: Faci
2015. PG 65957. I. 3.-S. Vol.4 "benkschrift zum Iminediatvortrage ber
den 'ericht der General - Inspektton des Ingenieur - und Pioneerkorpa
und der Festuren be*ffend die Verwendung von Seeleichtern zu




at Bremerhaven and Hamburg. These had double the five to seven knot
speed of the barges and lay reidy on 8 permanent stand-by basis. Six
steamers could convey a division of troops in any weather at a speed of
13 to 14 knots. If barges were used, 170 vessels would be required,
which would take two to three times the time and would be utterly
dependent on good weather. In short, the Admiralty Staff did riot hare
the opt idetic views of von der Goltz and his staff, but his work and
suggestions had at least served to clarify the cuestion. An intended
trial, scheduled for the Fall of 1900, would confirm the views of the
dmiralty Staff. 1 This presumably was the	 heard of a barge project
in German official circles, although echoes of the idea are very strong
in a 1903 invasion novel written b the Irishman .e.rakine Childers,
entitled The idd1e of the Sands. 2 british naval uthorities were equally
scornful of the barge plan.3
The German authorities did carry out further studies to confirm
their theories. In the Fell of 1901 several modest amphibious eercisea
were carried out by the combined services. In the largest of these,
Prince Henry of Prussia led a group of 1700 marines in a lending on the
Viatula from the sea during the annual nanoeuvres. The British attache'
who witnessed this operation was not impressed with Its magnitude or
1. IAN NAVY. dmiralstab "C". Operationen gegen .ng1and. ?dGFA-DZ: Zach
2015. PG 65957. I. 3.-8. Vol. 4 "Denkschrift zum Inmiediatvortrage Uber
den Bericht der General-Inspektion des Ingenieur- und PIoneerko.rpe und
der Festuxzgen betrefThnd di Verwendung von Seeleichtern zu
Truppentz'anspoz'ten Uber Seej berraachende Landungen." 31 kLz 1900.
S. 48-50.
2. arakine Childers. The Uddle of the Sands, uIth, London, 1903.
3. Mark Kerr. Prince louis of Battenberg. Longmans, London, 1934. p.176.
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authenticity, and described it as a theatrical advertisement for Gerzna
sea power in which the defending forces were held back for effect.1
appeared in
Further evidence as to thinking in the Ceneral Staff/in 1901 when
another Generel Staff Officer, Lieutenant Baron von Edlsheim, published
a technical treatise entitled Overseas Operations. The leaflet, which
was almost iiimiediately suppressed by the German authorities, reproduced
several of the arguments used in the earlier official considerationE;
a usso-German alliance would prevent a German dtfeat; a Franco-German
alliance would seriously menace 1ngland's existence. because .ngland'e
weakness in troops was Germany's strength, Germiny's best chance lay in
throwing an army into Jxiglend, thus circumventing British naval strength.
To £.delsheim, the invasion of .ngland was a simple operation: there were
m-ny stretches of British coast that were only thirty hours by sea from
Cermmn ports. He foresaw a German ixpeditionary Army of four infantry,
and on cavalry, divisions living off the country and advancing upon London.
Its first objective would be the destruction of the British field force,
and the fall of London would probably follow its surrender.2
Eowever, similar ideas had long been swept into limbo in the
guiding counsels of the German lavy. Tirpitz was not dissembling in his
memoirs when he stated that he had made no plans for the invasion of
L.ngland, for these schemes had been sponsored b his rival, von Knorr.
L.oreover, Tirpitz ws as avid a partisan of the Blue ater School as his
1. .0 32/225 "kanoeuvres in Austria-hungary, 'France, Germany..l901."
I.J...O., 1902. pp. 29-34.
2. Freiherr von hdelshim. perations on the 3ea. Outdoor Press, }.Y..,
1914. OperationenUber3ee was first translated into xiglieh the year
it appeared, 1901.
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counterpart Fisher, and he steadfastly refused to consider an overseas
attack over contested waters. An excerpt from en official paper of
October 1908, when British fears of a German inv'sion were at their
height, expresses the true spirit of the Tirp1.t era of the German
This nxaintaired that
..large-acale landings on inlish Joil are impossible, so
long as the British Fleet still exists, end these would perhaps
be completely superfluous in the almost inconceivable event
that the enemy fleet would be destroyed, and the uncontested
command of the sea fall to us.1
In other words, the German Navy would sooner launch a blockade in the
approved Blue nater School st i le than attempt the military conquest of
the British Isles. It is ironic that Germany should be the first of the
principal uropean powers to examine the invision of _ngland as a
strategic problem, and then to reject it even before the British
Government analysed the invraion operation. It is likewise noteworthy
that the German studies were completed long before Germany had a
formidable fleet and lone before most 3ritons se a threat to their sea-
supremacy from German.
)ivided counsels persisted throughout tLs evolution of the planning,
and paralleled somewhat the personal rivalry of von Knorr and Tirpitz.
But the real motivating force behind the studies was the Kaiser himself,
for whom the project of an invasion of Britain seems to have held an
appalling fascination. .hen a novel appeared in .ng1and in 1906 which
gave a detailed prophes) of the Gernan conquest of England, the Kaiser
1. u€rifl I'Eaval archives. eel LV. Fr. 150-151. ")er Krieg nit ngland
2* Oktober 1908.
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ordered both the Army and Navy staffs to take formal eva1ution of each
instaiLnent.' This may explFin nn of the cross currents in the German
considerations of te problcii, an poaibly tha revival of interest by the
General Staff after the havy had rejected th operation. But this wes no
aove and hawk debate, for tnere were no counsels of moderation. The only
limiting factor was Germay's inferior position at sea, and the debate
centred around how the limited means at the disposal of the German
Imperial avy might be mploed most effectively in a war against Britain.
The German offensive planning in the imzediate context of actual naval
power, seems extremel unrealistic If not visionar, in cuaracter.	 ut
these discussions and studies nl8nitest a spirit of determinstion which
artici)atas a future time, when Germany would be a very considerible sea
power indeed and when the policy of perpetually watching for favourable
chances for irvasion might indeed find fulfillment.
1. 3teinberg. "The Copenhagen Conplex." p.40.
APPENDIX B: FRJNCH STAFF CON3IDt.ATION5 OF THE
INVASION OF ENGLAND 1897-1907
Naval and militry orriciels of the Third epublic also gave
serious consideration to the possibility of mounting an attack upon
the British Isles. A French General Staff study of June 1897 proposed
that France detach some 60,000 troops from her field forc. even in the
midst of a general European war, if these could effect some relief by
attacking £ngland. This French k.xpeditionary Force was to be composed
of three infantry divisions, reinforced by 1,500 cavalrymen and possibly
some cyclists, served by some 19,000 horses and 3,700 transport vehicles,
roughly half of which would be appropriated from the hnglieh countryside.
It was further reoommer4dad that an additional Division of 15,000 be
kept at the beach-head to keep the line of retreat open. As in the
German p1na, it was emphasised that the actual assembly and
disembarkation of the force would have to take place before the 2.5th day
of mobilization, when the British }.avy would be fully embodied. After
this it would require a transport fleet of double or treble this size
to accomplish the same Lad.1 The force would be landed in England by
nightfall of the ninth day of mobilization, provided British forces did
not interfere with the operation. The actual crossing would be screened
by a light squadron of cruisers and destroyers. A landing South of the
Thames was considered most aupicj.o for French fortunes, as this
I
1. htat-Major de l'A.ruiee. 3e Bureau, Carton 148, dossier 2.




involved the ahortest poesibls see-voyage and could land the French Army
in that area of .ngluid where livetock, horses, and means of transport
were most abundant. A detailed study of all possible lending places
from Land's end to the Themes singled out the beaches near Dover and
}lewhaven.
A landing at Newhaven was examined in detail. The guns of the
escorts would first silence I.whaven Tort and rake,the beach, it
defended, and then screen the landing from intervention by the British
fleet. Three regiments of cavalry would be embarked as an advance
re co nnai seance torc and occupy ewhsve n and the surrounding area.
One detachment would occupy Brighton and a second would push inland into
the countryside as far as possible. Meanwhile, the main force would be
landed, form up on the beach, and begin its march for London as soon as
convenient.It was remarked 'what follows depends on the enemr." In
addition a fourth Reserve division would be landed at the mouth of the
Cuckm.re, a small river ten miles 'ast of }ewhaven, to cover the right
flank of the landing and later to guard the coast after the departure
of the main fore. for London. It was calculated that the entire
operation would take 36 hours from the fitting out of th. transports
until their return to Trance.2
But it' was admitted in the sunmiary of the plan that
The greatest, perhaps insurmountable, difficulty, is to obtain
either by force or ruse, the freedom of the sea for the necessary
tim	 In our present situation, the cooperation of an allied
/
1. Etat-kajor de l'Armee. 3C Bureau, Carton 148, dossier 2.
'barquement d'un corps expeditionxiaire en Anglsterr..w Yuin 1897
pp. 14-15.
2. Ibid. p. 23.
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fl.et would appear to be almost indispensb1e, In any case,
tb. only chance for sucossi from the viewpoint of both land
and sea operations, would be to attempt the enterprise ten
days after the beginning of preparation for war. In order
to be prepared in time, it will be necessary to plan long
in advance. This will follow through a silent perseverance
of research, defonos preparations, arid the necessary
op.rations.
The entire plan depend.d on speed, as the British Fleet could intervene
in force after the fifteenth day of mobilization. Once this was
accomplished, the strategic dimensions of the operation would be
•nttrely changed. Nsw decisions would have to be made as to the landing-
place, size of the force, and the possibility of diversionary landings. 2
The plan does not seem to have allowed for th. proximity of a British
fleet at Portsmouth nor for the presence of the Channel 7l..t.
This plan, or something similar to it, was parent1y circulated
to the chief Admirals of the Trench Mvy during the Yashoda Crisis of
September-A). camber 1898. Admiral Journier, the Coalnender of the French
Mediterranean !l..t, 1nveighsd against the proposal in a long letter to
French Naval Headquarters on October 2, 1898. burner pointed out that
British cruisers and destroyers would wipe out any such expedition.
Even if by en off-chance, a first landing can be made, would
not the lines of coninunication and retreat of troops thrown thus
on English soil be undoubtedly cut? I do not fear to say such an
operation appears to me chimerical in the present circumstances,
which are quite different than those which inspired Napoleon the
First •
I	 I
1. Jtet-1iajor' de l'Arme.. 3S Bureau, Carton 148, dossier 2.
"Dbarquement d'un corps sxp.ditionnaire en Angl.t.rr.. Juin 189?.
p. 24.
2. Ibid. p. 13.
3. Archives Marines. Conseil Superleure de la Marine. 3sci4t. Striotment
personnel. ,L. Vios-Amiral burner 3, Commandant en Chef, l'Escadre i. la
Medit.rranee, a M. le V. A. Chef d'Etat-General de Ia Marine.
20 Octobre 1898.
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lournier added thot even to simulate preptarationa for invasion would not
meke any impression in Britain; it certainly would not prevent the
junction of the British squadrons from the Channel and Mediterranean.
1-10 awmiarized:
to carry out this operation today would be a folly which would
lead only to a naval disaster. Its preparation would only waste
our time and money, paralyze our Fleets, end inmiobilize our Army
in the North by useless concentrations of troops and riverboats
in our Channel ports.
Furthermore, the plan would expose the transports to the bombardments
of the British fleet, which would incontestably remain mistress of the
sea • .1
However, becaus. the Fashoda crisis had revealed that the French
!avy had no war plans against 1.ngland, 2 a two day meeting of the Supreme
aval Council was convened early in January 1899. This body was called
only for questions of the highest importance and met very infrequently.3
The Fashoda crisis was still not completely resolved, and it was thought
advisable to determine the role of the French Fleet in the event of war.
tournier had modified his position to the point trAat he now considered
a siu1ated invasion the "moat efficacious means of intimidating
ng1and, it all measures were taken simultaneously and openly to make
them fear a landing." A demonstration for the benefit of English public
1. Archives Marines. Conseli. Sup.'rieure de la Marine. Secret. Jtrictmeut
personnel. La Vi ce-Amiral Fournier, Cojimandarit en Chef, l'1.scad.re do
la 14diterrane'e, ' IZ. is V. A. Chef d'ttat-General de la Marine.
20 Octobre 1898.
2. Theodore aopp. .i)evelopmert of a Modern lavy: French Naval Po1ic
1871-1904. unpublished PhIl). dia8ertation, harvard, 1937. p. 443.
3. Ibid.
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opinion which included a massing of troops on the coast and the
concentration of the Northern Fleet off Brittany would have a moat
salutary effect. The greater part of the British public, ignorant of
naval doctrine, would be terrified of invasion, and "the fear of a
landing of our troops would produce such en effect that knglieh would
perhaps hsitate to push matters to extr.mee'
But most Admirals were agreed that the surest result of such a
manoeuvre 'would be an .nglish declaration of war the next day. The
uncertalaty of Germany's attitude in event of war was another source
of concern. It was pointed out that the plan implied an alliance with
Germany or Russia and many Admiral. and most Generals were agreed that
this possibility should be examined. Nothing hAd bean prepared for this
eventuality becaus. of the 25-year-old delusion that France would never
declare war on england. Admiral Gervais pointed out that 60,000 were
hardly sufficient to attack nglend, which hnd 200,000 home defence
troops. The difficulties of the operation were ixinenee; only if France was
victorious at sea could invasion be contemplated and then only efter it
had been prepared in advance down to the last detail. One ehould not be
hypnotissd by invasion.
Only one Admiral opted for an actual attempt at invasion as opposed
to a demonstration. Broun de Coulston asked if a purely naval war, in
which millions of French soldiers would do nothing, was really acceptable
to France. The Minister of Marine, Lockroy, replied that the army was
completely prepared, should the occasion arise, to help the Navy. The
only question was how. The Minister of ar promised to concentrate troops
on the coast as part of a demonstration, but beyond that he was skeptical.
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A. serious operation such as the transport of troops to an enemy coast
and their subsequent supply raised great difficulties. Could the Navy
guarantee the almost daily revictualin.g of such a force?1
 It wag no
secret that the Irench Navy was in an advanced stage of disorganization,
so the matter did not go beyond the planning stage. But at the sane time
the French Army became interested in amphibious operations. In the Fall
of 1898, combined manoeuvrea were held for the first time under the
conmiand of Colonel (later Marshal of France) Ferdinand loch, and the
I
institution of a course in Combined Operations at the Eoole 3uperieure
de ].a Guerre in 1898-99 was an indication of continuing interest on tb•
parts of both services.2
The coming of the Boar ar brought a great revival of French public
and official interest in the project, for British military power •t home
had sunk to an unprecedented low owing to the demands of th. war in
South Africa. In March 1900 the entire issue of i.e Monde Il1ustró was
given over to an illustrated prophesy of a Franco-usaian conquest of
Great Britain. Captain Houette of the French Navy, in the course of a
public lecture in Paris in April, hoped to use tugs and fishing boats to
throw 90,000 French troops into ngland, with artillery 1 baggage,
ammunition, and tour days' supplies. All that was required was 16 hour's
command of the Channel. Another journal outlined a similar project based
on a transport equipped with a rem which would sink its British
adversaries. In August La Patrie proposed the lending of a French force
1. Archives Marines. 1898-99. Conseil. Superleure de la Marine: Politique
liarine (Fashoda). Minutes de Ia 3ance de LI Tanvier 1899.
2. Ropp.	 . Cit. p. 355.
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in the Thames £stuary, which would then be mined to prevent tnt.rferenos
by the British Fleet, while the invading flotilla glided into the city of
London on the crest of the tide. The Revue des Deuz Mondes outj1ed a
scheme involving the mass production of ariaoured landing craft which would
be impervious to any shore resistance. In December, General )1.rcier, a
former Minister of Wa.r, rose in the Senate during a d.bat• on the Trench
naval •stimat.s to propose an invasion of England and to describe his
personal plans for the operation, which would constitute "a Danioclee sword
to be drawn or not at discretion" over England.1
Official considerations of an invasion project evidently continu.d
throughout the Boer az'. In anuary 190]. the 3uprsme Naval Council, in
&tsouaeing cooperation with the Army in the •vent of war with England,
hoped to determine the principle points of agreement between the two
departments regarding invasion. It suggested that the Navy appropriat.
the merchant marine for such an attack in time of war,while concentration
points were fixed for the troops and trensporte in the period of political
tension preceeding the declaration of war. A bonus was proposed for
vessels which fitted themselves out in advance for troop transport. 2
 Thee.
activities did not escape the notice of the British naval attache', who
compiled a special report on French preparations for invasion for the
Director of )ava1 Intelligenc, at this time.3
I
1. "La Gu.rre Anglo-Frakioo-Russe." Is Monde Il]ustr.. Mars 1900; "sow to
Attack Lngland." Public Opinion. 6 April 1900. p.427; "A Trench Plan of
Invasion." Deil,, Mail. 13 August 1900. p.4; Ibid. 6 December 1900, p.5;
18 December 1900, p3; "Lea Descents en Anglst.rr.." Revue des Deux Iondes.
Mare 1898. pp. 408-09.
2, Archives Marines. C.SM. 1900-04. ".3esaion de Janvier 1901."
3. *dm 1/7444 "1ava1 Policy of tronce; Report by Captain Gamble, Navel
Atteob." 17 February 1900.
It baa proved impossibl, to locate Gamble's report, but it was sent
between February 1900 and Dscember 1901.
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French interest in invasion led to a series of amphibious exercises
in the course of the French army manoeuvres in the Fall of 1901. It seems
likely that these operations were organised for propaganda as much as for
military purposes, for the promotion of an invasion scare in England was
an avowed part of French policy at this time. 1
 A French Colonsi published
an article in en English magazine on the manoeuvres, comp]et. with pictures
depicting French cyclists rushing through surf, "hastening to meet the enemy",
He described a series of rapid practice landings, designed "to show our
neighbours on the other side of the Channel that we are thinking about them,"
and quoted a Trench Admiral to the effect that "to lend in England is the
work of a moonlees night," 2
 But the British virtually ignored these
significant exercises, presumably arranged for their benefit. 3 A
confidential report on the menoeuvrss by British military intelligenc, was
suspicious and skeptical.
The disembarkation appears to have been more theatrical than
practical, and the chief instruction to be derived frocn it is
to regard the experiment as en example of how a thing should
not be done. No effort was made to carry out the operations
under conditions that would prevail in war. The disembarkation
was not covered by the fleet; there was nothing in the way of
surprise; the troops were very slow in getting ashore; and
there was great contusion in the way they were landed, th. boats
coming up haphazard, without any system.
About 6,000 men had bean disembarked in four hours, without reserves of
eunition, food, or transport. Tb. troops had landed and planted flags
1. aopp. Op. Cit. p. 538.
2. Lt. Col. Delaunay. "Is the Invasion of England Possible?" Pall Mall
MaKezine. Iovembe: 1901. pp 395-98.
3. Only the Daily Mail took notice. S., "The Invasion of England." Ibid.
5 September 1901. p.S.
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in the face of point blank fire from the defending troops on the beach.1
In short, the exercise had failed to have any propanganda valu, in
Britain and it held out little promise of operation.el aucoess for the
French.
A. later study undertaken jointly by the French Army end Navy during
the Doer *er, established that sufficient steam-ships were available in
the Channel ports to embark an army of '15,000 men with horses and
corresponding supplies at short notice. This, it was said, was "a force
quite superior to that which vbould biar the road to London to us, et lea5t
in the case where England, surprised at the beginning of a war, could only
use her active army against us." encouraged by this preliminary atudy,
the kinjater of War ordered the study and prepnration of an expeditionary
project, complete down to the last detail. It was decided to prepare an
improvised concentration of an expeditionary corps at a point along the
French Channel coast which could be carried to any area of the Znglish
coast. Speed and surprise were stressed, and the entire operation was
designed to be carried out "at a stroke of the pen". The expeditionary
force, composed of troops withhold from the Reserve, would be first
concentrated in inlend garrisons which lay adjacent to railways leading
to the Channel ports. Their transfer en masse to the coaat was designed
to be completed in one night. The force of approximtoly 48,000 men,
5,200 horses, and 24 batterIes of artillery, could be transported to the
1. 0 33/225 "Manoeuvres in Austria-Hungary, Irene., Germany, Holland,
Roumanie, Russia, Servia and 3wttzerland. 1901. "I.D..0., April 1902.
pp. 20, 22.
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sea in six hours, arriving at midnight. It they were all on board trains
for the coast at six in the evening, it was estimated that the army would
be on ng1ish beaches selected as suitable for a landing the following
morning. Previous experiments had ascertained that lendings could be mad.
without piers directly onto the beach and with sufficient speed to avoid
the intervention of the British Iavy against the French screen of
escorts.1
The French General Staff agreed that such an attack would succeed
only in certain circumstances, such as those which prevailed during the
Boar ar. But a comparable opportunity might occur again. France must
be prepared to profit from any difficulties in which nglend would find herself,
until Britain had a truly national army on the scale of France and Germany.
For the moment, England's army, made up of mercenaries and replacements and
without seriously orgaxiis.d reserves, was only an imperfect provision
against an adversary with a powerful Navy and a solid Army. The French
suspected that the Germans bad also recognised this Achilles' Heel of
British power end saw many indications that they too were considering
"the possibility of attacking ngland at hou, as it is there alone that
she is vulnerable." The French concluded, however, that they were much
better placed to launch an attack of this type and noted that "it is well
that w• should be prepared, in the event of a naval war, to use all the
resources of our military organisation."2
F
1. .tet-è3ajor de l'Armee • 3 Bureau, Carton 123. las cicul. 8. "Plan XV:
£)iscusaion de obi1isation Jduit." De'c.mbre 1902.
2. Ibid.
- 688 -
Little reference, however, had been made to the reality of British
seapower. i.e a further example of official French interest intheproblem, the
General .Staff commissioned a massive study of the 1*sepoleouio invasion plane
which eventually ran to four volumes under the titli Projete St Tentativ.s
de De'barquement Aux 1ee krittaniQues. The first volume, which appeared
at the end of 1900, concluded significantly
These studies confixw once more that historical law that the
result of a war depends essentially on the precision of
preparations for it, on the moral and material value of tb.
adversary, as well, as the degree of preparation of the forces,
which must be continually such that the policy-siakers can choose
the moat opportune moment to begin hostilities.1
The French did Indeed oontinue their study of the invasion operation
for some time. Ironically, when the French military attache in London
returned to Paris in January 1906 with the important news that the British
were willing to begin staff conversations, tie found his colleagues on the
General Staff
deeply engaged upon the elaboration of an academic plan for the
invasion of England, and when be told them of the friendly British
invasion which some of us contemplated, their jaws dropped, their
pens fell from their hands, ad they war. positively transfixed
with, surprise.2
Some details of this schem. were later presented as evidence before the
C.I..). inquiry into invasion inhovember 1907. 1epingtondescribed material
/
which he said had been passed on to him by the French ).ilitary Attache.
According to him, the French hoped to pack in men and horses more tightly
than usual for the short voyage across the channel. With this system they
I
1. .Edouard Desbrieres. Projets et Tentatives de D.berquement Aux lies
BntttRniquea. Librarie Militatre.	 . Chapelot, Paris, 1900-1902.
Vol. I. pp. viii-ix.
2. Charles Court epington. The First world P,ar. Constable, London, 1920.
Vol. I, p. 10.
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bad found. it pos8ibl. to unload 1,000 men on a pier from on. ship in four
hours, to be joined by 200 horses and 11 vehicles in another hour-and-a-
half.
The plin, based on surprise, involv•d. the landing of 100,000 troop.
on the open beach on a southern beach early one 3unday morning. All t•
•quiment required for a rapid embarkation had been collected and. stored
at the trench Chtnuel ports. The transports used were to be considered
•xpendabl.; their ultimate fate was regarded as unimportant. But by the
end of 190? the trench )avy was allegedly proposing ew uses for this
embarkation equipment,which had been mode redundant by the changed
diplomatic situation.1
The British Government was somewhat skeptical regarding Reptngton's
testiiiony, and letters were received from past and present attaches in
Paris indicating that no such stores existed. 2 At any rate, that section
of th. trench planning which dealt with the tnvoaion of England. Was
officially suppressed in .Tuly 1908 for the reason that "in th. present
stat. of our foreign relations such a p1n no longer oorresponda to any
pleusible hypothesis."3
It is remrkab1. that both trance and Germany began their serious
1. Cab 16/3&. "deport and Prooe.dinga of a 3ub-Coitte of the Coltt.s
of Imperial Defence Appointed by the Prime Minister to Reconsider the
uestion of Overseas Attack." pp. 53-34. L yidenos of Rspington,
27 November 190?.
2. Cab 16/38. Appendix IX. p. 28. Letter of 7 auuary 1908; p.41
Appendix XXIII. Letter of 23 January 1908.
/
3. .tat-tLajor de 1'Armee. 3 Bureau. Carton 133. "2ots au sujot d.c la
Mobilisation dduit." Plan ZY. 7 Tuillst, 1908.
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consideration of the problem of invading .ngland at about the same time.
References were frequently made in both sets of plane to the value of en
alliano•. In this contest it is noteworthy that either of the G.r!nan
operations - the early plan for a lauding in the Thames and the later one
for a lending on the Norfolk coast could have been run simultaneously In
concert with th. trench descent on Newhaven. But all suggestion of
collusion between the two countries must be discounted, as Franco-C.rman
relations at this time were severely atraiu.d by the r.pexcusaions of the
Dray fus Affair. It was also extremely unlikely that the two nations
would 000perat. as long as Germany held Alsace-Lor:aine.
It is noteworthy that German planning was brought to a halt in 1901
owing to an appreciation of British sea-power and the requirements of
nval strategy; but most of the French planners, like the contemporary
British "invaaioxiists", calculated with only a few casual references to
the British fleet, the moat decisive strategic factor bearing on the
invasion problem. Both trench and German plE'ns were initiated in the
stormy uropean diplomatic climate of the lat• '90s and were acoelerated
by specific diplomatic crises involving Great Britain: the Germans by
the Traneveal Crisis end the Kruger telegram; the French by lashoda.
Both countries were inspired by the British home defence crisis of 1900
to re-examine the project more exhaustively, and both carried out
amphibious mauosuvres in 1901. Ironically, Germany ceased planning an
attack on England at the time she was beginning to be regarded as a
future enemy in British public opinion. lpanc., the future ally,
continued to plan an invasion of .ng1and for three years beyond the
conaunination of the Eritente Cordiale of April, 1904.
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The invasion of England was a project as fascinating to the
strategists, amateur and otherwise, of the Continezt as of those of
J!.ngland. The French and German invasion plans reveal that British
fears of invasion during 1900 and 1901 ware not without foundation.
lxi these official considerations of the ooxiquest of Britain,
continental hostility to ng1and stands revealed in concrete form.
APPENDIX Cs INVASION A1D THi CHA}EL TUNNL, 1906-1916
When in the early 1880'., it first appeared that the Channel Tunnel
could become a conmrcia1 possibility, opposition to the scheme was led
by General 3ir Garnet tolseley, who argued in an 1882 Meaorendum that
the project would constitute a virtual invitation to the French to
invads Zand, as th. mouth of the tunnel could easily be seized by a
treacherous coup de main. A petition against the tunnel was signed by
such disparate notables as Herbert 3pencer, the Duke of Cambridge, Thomm
Huxley and ueen Victoria; and the project died as an effective political
possibility when an inv.stigating commission from both Houses of
Perliement voted against the continuanos of the project in 1883.
By 1906, however, the tunnel advocates believed that conditions
were ripe for a re-opening of the question. me Entente with France bad
eliminated the possibility of a treacherous attack from that country, and
a Liberal. Goverrmient had recently been voted into office under the
leadership of the aadical-and peace-minded 31r Henry Campb.11-1annemcan.
The tunnel enthusiast, therefore mounted a powerful propaganda offensive,
publishing tracts and'pamphleta and sponsoring public discussions and
speeches in favour of the project.
Simu1taneous1, th. battle behind the scenes began in Yune 1906
when George 3ydethain Clarke, Secretary of the Conmiittee of Imperial
Defence, introduoed a memorandum to that body. Clarke had been an
advocate of th€ project for m..ny years and, as a Navy man, pointed out
that the Coninittees of 1882 and 1883 which had condemned the scheme, had
not included a navel representative for what was essentially a navel
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question. Re demonstrat•d that during the first thirteen years of the
project, the government had failed to oppose the project and had
intimated their general approval, even entering into an agreement with
Franc. for joint develomient. Furthermore, th.re had never been a
government inquiry into the possible economic advantages the tunnel. might
confer upon the country. 3ince the heated controversy of the 'eighties'
had subsided and because "our relations with France have been placed on
a satisfactory footing, and the idea of French aggression no longer haunts
the imaginetion of the public", conditions were favourable for a
dispassionete review of the question. Previous arguments brought against
the tunnel were very involved.and frequently irrelevant. But it was futile
to consider every imaginable contingency and the Coninittee should
distinguish between what Was feasible and what was .pu.rel.y visionary.1
The coup de min theory of a sudden seizur, of the tunnel without
warning could be unhesitatingly rejected, as its proponents had never
seriously thought out the nture of the operation this involved. EVen
io1seley, its most eminent supporter, had in evidence testified that
fifty men at the tunnel mouth could prevent an army of ten thousand from
emerging from it, so it was obvious that the question of risk reduced
itself to one of time. The arrangements which olae1ey proposed for
guarding the works against an invasion attempt were, Clarke thought,
more elaborate than was justified by reasonable requirements. Forts with
drawbridges would conmand the entrance of the tunnel; a portculli. or
iron grating could be lowered from Dover Castle onto the railroad tracks
1. Cab. 8/12/3l. "The Channel Tunnel." 19 June 190?. p.2.
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direct1 beneath. The line could be cut , at the exit and the fortress
garrisons would be in a position to drop explosives on trains passing
directly underneath. The tunnel ventilating mechanism could be stopped,
and hordes of invaders aephuxiated. he tunnel would dip for S mile at
the British end, nd this could be flooded with water by means
independent of the L)over fortiticetjons, in the unlikely event that these
had been over-run by the invader. As a last resort the tunnel could be
destroyed by fitted explosive charges. If all the above measures proved
ineffective, the railway line issuing from the tunnel might cross a bridge
which could be destro,ed by naval gunfire from ships In the channel. A
further precaution not dependent upon strictly local and military means
of defence would be to construct a light-house tower which would serve as
a ventilating shaft in the sea. If ll else were lost, "A few rounds of heavy
naval gun fir* at low tide, or a torpedo, would wreck this tower and admit
the sea."1
Clarke reasoned that if the above measures were taken and the normal
working conditions of frequent trains in both directions were remembered,
it would be impossible to suggest a reasonable plan for seizing the tunnel.
No exces8ive expenditure would be required, since existing fortifications
could be employed with only small modifications and no increase in the
garrisons. He pointed out that be did not really contend that all the
measures were necessary, and that some were justifiable only on the basis
that trance would attack without warning in a period of profound peac•,
an assumption beseles8 in experience, but one which exerted a certain
fascination on the military mind.
1. Cab. 38/12/31. "The Channel Tunnel." 19 Zune 190?. p.6.
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In reference to the argument that the existence of the tunnel would
produce panic among the populace, which wee then quite freueutly used,
Clarke retorted that it was "impossible by ny measures of precaution to
prevent alerui.s on the part of uninstructed persons. The possession of a
wvy about two and e-lmlf times the strength. of Germany does not suffics
to prevent attempts to raise the scare of German invasion." 3uch pan
campaigns had only temporary effect; once the public became accustomed
to the tunnel, panic would diminish and disappear. The project would
onl trengthantk good relations with France. Italy bad not been afraid
to construct e tunrel to France. The project created no new military
risks which could not be obviated by simple measures of precaution)
Cirrits's detailed catalogue of defence precautions apprently made
little impression upon his naval and military collesgues on the Conmiittee
of Imperial 1)efence. Major-General .T. S. ,wart, Director of kilitary
Operations, agreed after a long conversation with Clarke on the subject
that the tunnel-would indeed be of great aid in a war of alliance with
France, but wrote a "frankly hostile pAper" on the idea. Ewart expressed
in his Diary what many other soldiers presumably felt.
I have an insular prejudice against it, not on kilitery grotands
for it is easy to exaggerat. the danger - but on sentimental
grounds. I am prepared to admit that with Prance friendly or in
alliance it might be a 1&i1itar, advantage - but its completion
will Eu.ropeeuise us. I hate Conopolitanisin. I stick to my
insularity.2
1. Cab 38/12/31. "The Channel Tunnel." 19 .Tune 1907. p.7.
2, £wart Diar. B 'anuary 190'?.
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wart later slaboreted on this point.
I really do believe that the construction of the tunnel
would destroy some of the splendid characteristics of our race
and hasten our gradual deterioration by a still larger influx
of undesirable ali.ne.
The Admiralty also remained unconverted, stating that nothing at the
present time had changed their point of view first expressed in Admiral
Cooper Key 0 . letter of January 1882 - that the bash, of British defence
was her insularity, defended by the supremacy of the oyal Navy. Indeed,
the dev.louent of Dover as a war port since that time had emphasized the
dangers of the project, which was a threat to national security. Bridging
or tunnelling the sea separating Britain from the Continent would
introduce her to the military burdens of the Continent: the tunnel would
increase the Army is,timete. while it should not allow one penny to be taken
off the Naval ones. It would increase the riationri liability to raid or
invasion and 'iould require forces to be kept at home that were urgently
required elsewhere.
The Navy EldsLttted that a vast improvement had been made in relations
with Prance, but argued that
the tunnel once made will be made forever, while all history
goes to prove that international friendships are not based on
such secure foundations that they are able to stand the shock of
a conflict of international interests or a wound to national pride.2
Also, France was not the only possible enemy. The Duke of Cambridge bad
1. i.wart Diar., 13 January 1907. ve know only of Fwart'a paper through
his diary reference - it does not appear in the ar Office 'A' papers
li.t. The Admiralty menio of 1907 was reproduced in 1914 and the
citations are from this veraion.
2. Cab. 38/26/15, ".itrategic Aspects of the Channel Tunnel." 23 April, 1914,
pp. 1-2.
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pointed out a ua.rter-centur earlier that Calais was closer to the
Low Countries than to Paris and that any Power which could invade Trance
could invade hngland vie the tunnel as well. The Admiralty, tearful of
Gerixiany, believed in 1907 that this was a stronger poasibility than it
had been previously.1
Turther, once the tunnel was made, it would prove exceedingly
difficult to destroy and it would be very haM -or a single officer to
make the terrible decision to do so with the necessary promptness to
prevent invasion. This argument, of course, betrayed the Admiralty's
ignorance of the latest devices which would close the tunnel without
permanently damaging it. The Admiralty revived all the older arguments
against the tunnel. It v.ould introduce new sources of danger which would
not be compensated for by commercial gain. The Admiralty summed up: the
defence of the channel had been for centuries the duty of the aoyal eevy,
but the construction proposal would introduce
divided responsibility, increased danger, and diminished
security...in the opinion of the Admiralty the balance is
altogether in favour of non-interference with the netur'l
sea frontier, which has been or of the main factors in
the creation and maintenance of the British 1.mpire.2
Clarke prepared another paper outlining the legal steps that should
be made if the Channel Tunnel Bill were passed, providing for the building
of defences at the expense of the Company, conferring upon the government
powers to close, block or flood the tunnel at any time without liability,
end granting powers to take over the installation for national purposes,
such as passage of troops.3
1. Gab, 38/26/15, "Strategic Aspects of the Channel Tunnel." 23 April,' 1914,
pp. 1-2. The ectu'l situetion in June 1940.
2. Cab. 58/26/15, p.2.
3. Cab. 38/13/4 "The Channel Tunnel Bill" 31 January 1907.
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Simultaneously, anti-tunnel propiganda revived in reaction to the
efforts of the Company publicity. In February 1907, Sir ames Knowles,
'ho as editor of the Nineteenth Century had led public opinion against
the project in the 1880's, reprinted in that journal a 136-page supplement
which embodied the earlier protests against the scheme by various.
authorities and notables. The old emotive appeals to British instincts
of insularity and isolation were predominant. Knowles protested that
To un-island ng1and and join her Boil to the soil of the
Continent while .L.urope is seething with unrest end
complexities and perplexities and to do this at the invitation
of privrte company-promoters for their own (problematical)
profit, sounds like the plot of a comic opera.1
ajor General Joim Frederick kaurice, an old anti-tunnel warhorse,
provided the military point of view
hen once the Channel Thnr.el is mide, the defence of the kingdom
passes over from our supreme nvy to our wholly inadequate army,
The further advantage which our fleets beve always given us, that,
even if a force landed on our shores, it could not maintain
itself, will be gone.2
Laurice resurrected holseley's vision of a sudden attack without warning,
arguing from mi1itar, htstor. The Russian fleet at Port Arthur showed
the dangers of trusting to the perpetual vigilance of the defenders of a
vital point, nd the actions of the British Government immediately before
the Boar ar broke out, showed the difficulty of a democracy taking
precautions in an atmosphere of impending danger. The public would argue
that an preparations for an attack would only serve to irritate the enemy
end precipitate a war.
1. "The rtevived Channel Tunnel Project." Nineteenth Century,
February 1907. pp. 174-5
2. Ibid., p. 175.
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Or British officer wrote a play, which featured great historical
figures debating on the merits and dangers of the Channel Tunnel scheme.
Not surprisingly, Hannibal, uliue Caesar, Frederick the Great, and
Lapoleon all applaud the scheme, while Nelson and ellington reject it on
the grounds of insular sentiment. 1 Knowles, while claiming that public
opinion on the issue had changed but uitti. in the last thirty years,
used arguments calculted to appeal to the pacific - and economy-minded -
Liberal Cabinet.
•..et a time when every effort is being made to limit our
defensive forces, both naval and military, to a point which
many consider too risky, these promoters have the assurance to
ask for a serious and quick voluntary increase in them. Nobody -
not even the promoters themselves and their syizapathisers - denies
that elaborate and costly and permanent precautions.., must be
teken...To avoid the public panics alone and their ruinous
expenditures, such precautions would be indispensable.2
..hen a United States of £urope existed, then i.ngland r&ight be willing to
modify her reliance on a sea frontier and adopt conscription.
1aurjc. echoed these sentiments. In his mind, all that had
happened since 1882 showed the increased danger of the scheme. It u1d
introduce ng1and to the grievous perils of Continental militarism and
conscription, and prove the graveyard of ..ngl13h liberty. 5 The
political argument was set forth b Herbert Paul, a Liberal. k.P.
If the Channel were tunnelled, the Army and Zavy zstimates
would speedily gro beyond the control of the most resolutel
prudent finarcier, old-age pensions would dwindle out of
sight, and a shilling income tax would soon be regarded as a
diatnt dreem of an Arcadian past. Do the Labour Party want
to exchange old-age pensions for conscription? If so, let them
3.. i.11js Ashxnsad-Bartlett. The Iiinortale end the Channel Thnnel. (190?)
2. Nineteenth Centu. Februory 190?. p. 175.
3. Ibid. p. 178.
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vote for the Channel Tunnel Bill, and they will soon be
gratified... But we do not want to become a Continental
nation, with compulsory service end taxes that crush.1
This was the argument that carried the de. Although the C.I.D.
never discussed the problem, to Clarke's regret, 2 Campbell-Bannerman
decided that polic) on the Channel Tunnel should be governed by its naval
and military espectse 3
 1oting that both the General 3taff and the
idmirslty were opposed to its construction, the closing of the question
was announced to both Bousea on 21 March l907 on the rather curious
grounds that the completion of the project might lead to increased
armaments expenditure.
I.ven supposing the military dangers involved were to be amply
guarded against, there would eziat throughout the country a
feeling of insecurity which might lead to a constant demand
for increased expenditure, nevtJ. and militar, end a continual
risk of unrest and possibly alarm, which, however, unfounded,
would be most injurious ix its effect, whether political or
commercial. On the other hand, there has not been disclosed
any such prospect of advantage to the trade nduetries of the
country as would compensate for those evils.
Lord Lanadowne amploed the same line of reasoning in the Upper House.
.e may be able to convince ourselves that we should run no
risk, but I do not believe that we shall ever convince the
public that is so.	 And If that is true, it follows that
we should, b, allowing this tunnel to be built, occasion not
only a new source of anxiety in time of peace but a grave
additional cause of anxiety when war wee going on, or when
war wee ininiment.6
1. Nineteenth Century. February 190?. p. 183.
2. Clarke. y Norking Life. p. 206.
3. Cab. 38/13/12. "Minutes of 96th Meeting", C.I.D. 2.8 February 1907.
p.3.
4. Hansard. (Ccxinons) 21 March 190?, col. 1203.
5. Ibid.
6. IbId. (Lords) 21 1erch 190?, cols. 1210-li.
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The Liberal government rejected th. project in 190'? becauee, in
Gladstone's earlier words, it was not afraid of the tunnel but because
it was afraid of thoie who were afraid of the tunnel.
The "tunnelites" kept up a last-ditch fight in the House of Coone,
a8king the government whether it would ly out papers bearing on their
adverse decision and whether or not coxnaunicatione had bee received
from the French government expressing their surprise and disappointment:
Could the House be assured that the Entente could remain unimpaired after
aucn a manoeuvre? 3ir ialter iunciman, Financial Secretary to the Treasury,
replied for the government that the French wholly ampathized with British
reluctance towards the idea. 2 The tunnel pressure group, conceding the
battle but not the war, withdrew their Bill after its second reading in
April 1907.
The next year their cause gained an ally in the unexpected shape
of te French General Staff, which conm.tasloned Georges Viernot to Write
Un 4rand prob1me internationale at militeire: La Tunnel sotis La L.ancha.
(Paris, 1908). This was a long and detailed resume of British siilitary
thought and public opinion on the issue. Viernot reported that the French
General Staff had thrown up tnair hands at the prospect of transporting
150,000 men through the tunnel if it was defended and that they felt,
even with british cooperation assured, tLat such an operation would take
fifteen das. o1se1ey had estizüeted that 20,000 troops could pass
through the tunxel in four hours; Viernot calculated instead that this
1. Hansard.(Gozimxns) 26 .arch 1907, col. 1673.
2. Ibid., 8 April 1907, cola. 15-16.
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would take two entire days, observing that "the noble lord was not
conducting a campaign in the Sudan against the Puzzles" and had
neglected to allow for the transport and equivnent required for the
invading host.1
The French General Staff marvelled that anyone could seriously
fear a campaign conducted at the end of a single railway line, in th.
light of the horrible confusion that had followed attempts to do so in
the FranOo-Pruesian and uaao-Japanese pare. The French General Staff
was quoted as saying
in all truth, we give up trying to understand how any competent
man of good faith and sound judent could have any doubt as to
the fatal results of truing to invade E.ngland by the Channel
Tunnel.2
1t all the public agreed. During the German invasion scare of 1909 an
.nglish tourist wrote with alarm to an ngllsh paper that during a visit
to hamburg his attention had been arrested by "a heavy and regular noise,
such as that made by a tunnelling machine, com.tr.g up from the depths of
the ocean." He asked if it v.ere possible tht the Gertana were in the
process of diging a tuzixLel under the orth 3ea, presumably for the
tnveion of ngland.3
By 1913 the tunnel lobby had organised itself into a Channel Tunnel
Coumiittee of 90 I..P.'s. A deputation from this group called on .euith,
the Prime kinister, in August 1913, and extracted from him a promise that
the C.I.D. would reconsider the sck.eme. (in this occasion, the issue did
1. arnett and Slater. The Channel Tunnel. p. 98
2. Ibid., p.99.
3. Louis C. Fictions guerrfres anglalses. (1909) p.8.
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not cause as much public debate as had been the case earlier, but the
official inquiry and the manoeuvrtng ueuii.&d the scenes was as intense
it had been in the original government considerations of 1880-1883.
The Mneteenth Centur r , while recording Its "hereditary opposition",
printed only one new article hostile to the project and admitted that
many military and naval authorities had been converted to the scheme.1
.ven the writer, an enemy of the tunnel, admitted tku 't many new factors
had come into play. French friendship, the possibility of using the
tunnel to send the xpeditionary Force to urope and for receiving food
supplies Imposed new conditions in discussing the iuestion. But the
fetal result of the tunnel ultimately would be to weaken the Royal Navy
without strengthening the Army. Certain officials were .ccused of using
the tunnel as e scare device to foist conscription on the country: first,
the nation would be sold on the tunnel and then would be panicked into
accepting conscription once the tunnel was complete, to, the advantage
of the military. 2 Fisher shared this suspicion, noting that the scheme
"would piFy into the hands of the Major-Generals, who want our army in
Flanders" and was an "artful dodge towards conscription."3
Lord Sydenham (the former Sir George Clarke) spoke to the Channel
Tunnel Coninittee in the House or Commons in June 1914. lie attacked
nolseley's hypothesis that the tunnel could be seized by surprise attack
in a time of profound peace; this was iot a milit&ry operation but a
1. .. . Framantle. "The Channel Tunnel Once More." Iiinetaenth
Century, January 1914, pp. 1?-224.
Ibid, p. 222.
3. Marder. Fear God end Dread Nouht. .ears of Power. pp. 495, 504, 509.
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political forecast. Such F-fl operation was not the simple action
o1eeley had thought it was.	 ith the defences now propos.d, the enemy's
task was now to capturs instantly and simultaneously two strong fortresses
and an electrical power station some distance from each other. He could
not regard as serious the proposals that hordes of men could hide in the
hotels of )over and uddeu1y appear to capture extensive fortific4tione.
Likewise, it was plainly preposterous that boue "tourists, ith rifles
end ammunition under their waterproofs, will arrive by stomr, and
proceed to attack the eover forte."1
Clarke demonstrated that warnings of danger would always be
fortheoxni ;
 In 1914, the danger was always to exaggerate threats, not
minimize them. 3urpriee would be impossible, owing to telegraphic
communication with Calais and the presence of many British subjects In
France. On any declaration of war, traffic would cease as it did across
borders in previous wars. If necessary, the tunnel could be cut off, much
as -the bridges across the ahine had had one span destroy.d as the opening
act of war in 1870. Io surprise descent from the sea was possible unless
the !MBVy were completely destroyed. Besides, the tunnel rout. could only
be used by the French, a possibility he characterized as peculiarly
improbable". In all other cases, a long warning would of nscessity be
provided.2.
3ir Arthur Conan .)oy]e, one of te fe' men before the war to take
the Subm8rine menace to shipping seriously, artaed in the Fortnightly
aeview tut the tunrel would provide an unassailable food supply: "Is
1. Clarke. The Chann.]. Tunnel. (1914) p. 14.
2. Ibid., p. 19.
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tap (via arsei11ea ad the tunnel) the whole food euuply of the
Mediterreneen and the Black Jea." The .xpedit1onary Force could be rushed
to France in a much shorter time and Franoo-3rttish reinforcements could
pour beck through the tunnel in the event of a German raid. Because the
Germans had made great works like the Kid Canal in 8fltiCipQtiOfl of
Britain's answer, Doyle argued, must b	 annel Tunrel, linking us
closer with our French ally.1
3o, for much of the last year of the Great Peace, the Committee of
Imperial 1)efence reconsidered the merits of the Channel Tunnel estiori,
It soon became obvious thet the Admirelty had chenged their ground
considerably since the 1907 Inquiry. A memorandum of February 1914
claimed the tunnel would offer "various important strategical advantages,
including a great assurance for our food supply", although insisting on
the condition that it should be destructible by naval, gunfire without
military essietance even if both ends were already controlled by en y
troops. 2
 Ainston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty since 1911,
ickly emerged as t strong protagonist of the scheme, arguing that even
if strategic conditions bad not changed in favour of the tunnel, piblie
opinion had, ann that the general improvements in mechanical contrivances
postulated nei conditions.
1. Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. "Great Britain and the Next oar."
Fortriightly eview. Febru ry 1913, pp. 2l9-36.
2. Cab. 38/25/9, "Channel Tunnel" 27 February 1914 p.2.
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In a memorandum of June 1914 Churchill outlined the }avy' a version
of the ideal Channel Tunnel, capable of betrg destroyed by the fleet alone.
The tunnel, he suggested, should be brought to the surface of the sea not
less than a quarter-mile from the shore, where the railway line would rise
to rur along a bridge to the shore, then to turn and run parallel to the
shore for a half-mile, so ca to be open to ships' fire. Tho bridge would
be equipped with a drawbridge.
In attained relations, or on any sign of danger, the lifting
of the drawbridge, coupled with a warning to suspend traffic,
wr)uld ,fford bsolute security for the time, and the question
of the flooding of the tunnel could be considered at leisure.
It by treachery the drawbridge was rendered inoperative, or
the L.ngliah end of the tunnel seized, there would be no
difficulty in outting the coxsnunication. The guns of a single
amtll cruiser could break down the bridge and absolutely prev.nt
the passage of trains or troops along the railway line by night
or day.1
However, in the more likely case of a friendly France, the conmiand of the
see gave Britain the power to keep the tunnel open. The Navy believed
itself to be able to sink and destroy any enemy ships that would dare
traverse these waters, and in fact, would welcome any attempt on the
tunnel as a preliminary to the great naval bat tie that vould destroy
the enemy's fleet.
Because Churchill ended his memorandum with an implied challenge
"to hear of any combination of circumstances not covered by the above-
named precautions", it is interesting that none of the eminent naval and
military figures 'who criticized his scheme on other grounds did not
consider the possibility of an enemy submarine surfacing at night aud
destroing the' projected bridge with its deck gun.
1. Cab, 38/27/28 "Channel Tunnel; Note by First Lord of the Admiralty."
27 Tune 1914. P.1.
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Critics of Churchill's scheme were rxt wanting, however. Yield
Larshal Sir bLlliam 4cho1son observed caustically that the proposals
implied that no other nations possessed war vessels, 1 and could use
them for the same purpose as that proposed for the aoyal 1avy - in a
surface raid on the bridge. The ar Office pointed out that
If a few shots at a tower, bridge, or viaduct are to
suffice to destroy communication by tunnel, and it i.
t	 interest of the enemy to destroy, overwhelming
ava1 force will not prevent those shots froii being
firea.2
Any viaduct or bridge destructible by sea was destructible by air, and
the German air forces had made considerable progress. It was certain
that part of this force would be despatched to destroy the bridges and
installations leading to the tunnel on either the French or British
side, or both, once it became obvious the tunnel had military value.
J.icho1aon had doubts about an enemy naval raid using surface ships,
stating that "so long as the enemy had ships, and a temporary command
of the Channel waters, he could also destroy the tunnel, and that, too,
at a time when it might be most necessary to us to maintain it intact..."3
The Board of Trade sounded a chilling note on the possibility of
the tunnel providing an extra sourc. of food supply in time of war.
icoordizig to their calculations, only France, Belgium, Holland and
Switzerland could supply Britain through this rout., countries that at
the present time provided no cereals and little meat for British markets.
1.. Cab. 38/26/11. "Minutes of 125th Meeting." CI.D. p.?
2. Cab. 38/28/29. "Channel Tunnel: Memorandum by Col the t. Hon. Z.f.B.
3eeley." 2 Yuly 1914.
3. Cab. 38/27/23, p.5
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Their memorandum conceded that practically all the nation's food could be
brought in through the tunnel on the condition the tunnel was devoted
solely to this purpose. But it was doubtful if the French railways could
provide for this tonnage, especially during war conditions. It would be
an expensive arrangement and one that would save little time. The
Board concluded that th. effect of a tunnel on the food supply in time
of ar was likely to be small.1
The Army's argument against Churchill's scheme was that if it was
justifiable to assi.mie that the avy could destroy the railway line at
any moment, the enemy could seize the tunnel for his own use by sinking
ships detailed to guard it. It was doubtful that the Admiralty would
expose a number of ships in this manner, especially in the early stages
of a war. 2 Asquith thought this "a formidable reply" to the Admiralty
proposal.3
The C.I.D. reaffirmed its former conclusion that the possibility
of a surprise attack in a time of profound peace was not too remote to
be Ignored. If treachery would make the difference between a success
or a failure in the enemy's attack, he would resort to it. It therefore
followed that "any scheme designed to remove the objections to the
Channel Tunnel must provide against the po8sibility of a surprise attack
during normal diplomatic relations."4 In actuality, this was a
misreading of the earlier conclusion.
1. Cab, 38/26/1. "Economic Aspects of the Channel Tunnel Scheme" 27
jranuary 1908.pp. 20-21.
2. Cab. 38/28/33. "Uiannel Tunnel." 6 uly 1914. p.1.
3. Cab. 38/28/5. ")p,intes of 128th Meeting.", C.I.i). 14 .Yuly 1914. p.9.
4. Cab 3828/..3. p. 1.
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Critics of the Churchill version or the tunnel were not wanting
on the naval aide, either. Fisher flirted briefly with the idea of a
tunnel as a means of bringing oil for the fleet into the country, but
he gave it up, as he thought the conception would work to the detriment
of the navy. 1 Sir Juflan Corbett shared this view.
I feel the tunnel - either as a line of supply or attack -
could hardly be a factor that would change the course of
a war. The new element - concerning passing an hxpeditionary
Force through - also had little weight with me. To do that
would fix its line of operations...that is the last thing we
ought to do with it. As soon as its line is known, half its
power Is gone.2
In response to an inquiry from Asquith, Fisher wrote that he considered
the Admiralty position of 1907 "impregnable", a line of reasoning that
was evidently influential In Asquith's final decision.
The issue had therefore split both services, with advocates of
the scheme In both camps demanding a different version of the proposal
to meet the requirements of their service. The soldiers in 1914, as
a rule, were more lukewarm to the idea. Their ambivalent position
might be suinin rized in Major-General Sir Henry nil8o' a comment; "If
we are going to take part in .uropean wars, the more tunnels we have
the better, if not, then the fewer we have the better." 3 Nicholson and
the General Staff submitted memoranda that ere mil4ly favourable to the
project. They were prepared to accept the argument that a railway tunnel
to France would provide a quick passage of the Expeditionary Force to
europe, a convenient means of supplying that force iR future campaign,
1. . J. Iarder, Fear God and Dread Nought: Years of Power, 1904-14
pp. 499-500.
2. Ibid.
3. wilson Olary. entry of March 1914.
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and en unftiling source of food for Britain in the event of a future
blockade. But, militarily, these adventeges would be more than offset
if the tunnel could be interrupted. The Admiralty condition of
deetruotability would mke the position worse, as this would enable the
.nemy to cut oft' the food aupply or maroon the Lxpeditionary Force at
the worst possibi. ment.
Churchill countered that the principle underlying the Admiralty
condition of destructability was the maintenance of I3ritish insularity.
The Navy's responsibility for mainteining that insulErity was evidently
zealously cherished, as he "was wholly opposed to the tunnel it it was
made indeatructable from the sea". 1
 Mcholson, speBklng for the Army,
noted thet the Admiralty had ebandoned its undertaking to guarantee the
safety of commerce at the C.I.D. meeting of February 1913, owing tO the
possibility of submarinea operating off merchant ports. Th Channel
Tunnel appeared to him to offer nother possible source of food supply
under the new conditions.2
Owing to interservice rivalry end suspicion, the discussion on
the tunnel project in the C.I.D. hung on the unresolved points of view
of the two services. The Admiralty wnted a tunnel that could onl y be
defended or attacked by naval means; the er Office would only accept
a tunnel that was impregnable from the sea and which could be defended
by orthodox means. 1ven in the twilight world of contingency, neither
service was ready to surrender responsibility or prerogative.
The inordinate affection of the soldiers for an impregnable tunnel
found its ultimate expression in a paper by Field arshal Siz' ohn trench,
1. Cab. 38/27/23. p.6.
2. Ibid. p.?.
- 711 -
who would be coiimisnding the British ixpeditionary Force in Prance a
few we.ks later. In a revolutioniry memorandum, French predicted that
the advent of submarines and aircraft would completely change the
conditions of British national defence.
...the Straits of Dover, regarded as a military obstacle
to the invasion of this country, will in the not tap.-
distant future altogether lose their maritime character,
and the problem of their successful passage by an invading
force will present features somewhat resembling those
involving the attack and defence of great river lines...
the only reliable defence against a powerful attack by
hostile aircraft and submarines in vest superior numbers,
is to possess a strong bridge-head on the French coast with
an effective means of passing and repassing across the
Straits, which would only be secured by the projected
Channel Tunnel.1
The tunnel bridgehead, completely fortified and secure from any sudden
attack, would serve as a French rallying point nd would prevent any
French collapse. Because France was alwa,s interested in completing
the tunnel, the Field Marshal believed that it might be possible to
negotiate with Prance to obtain permanent control of the French end
of the tunnel, which would allow a strong British fortress to exist
permanently at Calaia. 2
 ith such an installation France would never
b. disastrously overwhelmed. In retrospect, one wonders whet role this
installation could have plyad in the debacle of Spring 1940, first as
a means of threatening the flank of the German advance into France and
also as a means of extricating the British Army without abandoning all
its heavy equictent, both of which had been foreseen by French as
possibilities in a future Continental campaign.
1. Cab. 38/28/34. "Channel Tunnel: Memorandum by Field arahal Sir
J. D. P. French." 9 July 1914. p.3.
2. Ibid.
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However, the scheme assud a perpetually friendly Prance. It
was difficult to conceive of a France reconciled in any age to the concept
of a British bastion permanently established on her sacred soil. The
Field darahal admitted that the install'tiort would have to be rendered
ineffective in the case of an unfriendly France, but did not suggest bow
this was to be accomplished.
kicholeon found himself unable to agree with French on this issue,
on the ground that if the French coast were occupied by en ene in
possession of the French fleet and air force, a fortified bridgehead of
this type would be very dangerous unless it was held by a huge garrison,
which would be impossible under the hypothetical conditions postu1ted.1
Aaiuith agreed 111th French on the point that if a tunnel were constructed
for the purposes of state security and for sending a force to Europe,
the less destructible it was the better,2
Kitchener was mo • pessimistic, and there is reason to believe
that Piaherwas responsible. Hankey recalled that
The first time I ever saw kitchener atrongl, moved was
was in 3uly 1914 when he called to see me on his return
from i.gypt and for at least half an hour inveighed against
the construction proposal.3
Kitchener registered his opposition to the tunnel unless it could be
shown that it offered a safe route for food supplies through Prance in
time of war, and expressed all the insul8rlty and conservatism of the
military profession.
1. Cab. 38/28/35. v%inutes of 128th Meeting.", C.I.D. 14 Ju1y 1914. p.9.
2. Ibid.
3. Lord Rankey. Tha Supreme Coxranand. (1961) p. bc; A. .T. Marder. Years
of Power. Fisher to Spender, 9 Yuly 1914.
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when considering the desirability of altering artificially
a geographical feature which, once altered, could not be
restored again, it was essential to take account, so far as
was possible, of what the future might have in store.1
This was not a completely accurate presentation of the case, for all.
of the suggested tunnel defence schemes provided for the Arestorationw
of British insularity by the destruction of the tunnel in the last
resort. But, to Kitchener's mind, it was unthinkable that a private
railroad concern should embark on an enterprise which would endanger
the safety of the nation and give Britain a bud frontier. Once it was
constructed, the tunnel would have to be completely destroyed on
intimation of an attack, because partial damage could be quickly repaired
by zealous invaders. In his opinion, it was folly to talk of sending
the ipeditionary Force through the tunnel, for he doubted whether the
country "would ever feel sufficiently confident to send the xpeditionary
Force abroad" once the Channel Tunnel was constructed. Zitchener's
arguments showed be was unaware of the many new conditions affecting the
problem and his viewpoint was not reat1y different from that of
.iolseley in 1882.
At a meeting of the Conxnittee of Imperial Defence on 14 .Tuly 1914,
the various officials had their final discussion on the question. Between
the }avy, which wanted a destructible tunnel, and the soldiers, some of whom
wanted an indestructible tunnel, one who wanted fortifi.dbesch..b..ad in
France, and some who wanted no tunnel at all, affairs had reached an
impasse. Asquith judged that the Admiralty had not presented a strong
enough case to reverse their negative verdict of 190?, as the
destructability of the tunnel would constitute an additional and
1. Cab. 38/28/35, p.9.
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unnecessary danger. The army's case for the tunnel as a source of
food supply was weakened by the fact that the tunnel could possibly
be destroyed, nd if ll arrangeenta had been made to feed Britain
in this mnner, the result would be chaos.
Therefore it was concluded that 'stretejc conditions have not so
altered as to justify a reversal of the conclusion reached by Her
Majesty's Government in 1907." On this occasion, however, the decision
was not unanimous, Churchill, French and Bettenberg, the First Sea Lord,
recording their dissent from the verdict.1
Three weeks lAter Britain entered the First orld ar, and the
campaign for a Channel Tunnel was eclipsed by more momentous events.
But soon promoters of the scheme realised that the war had introduced
conditions naturally fcvourable for a revival of the scheme. Britain
wa allied to Frnce and nu'inteiued a lArge army upon her soil which could
be supported only over a long end precarious 8uppl( line which led across
the ChLnnel and employed 1-rge ruantities of valuble British shipping.
Taking advantage of the wartime atmosphere of patriotism, friendliness
towards France, end increased interest in better cross-Channel
coninunications brought on by the war, the tunnel advocatsa r-op.ns
the question in the summer of 1916.
The Chairmen of the Channel Tunnel Committee of the House of
Conmons deciF red in reviving the project 1 that
krad it existed during the war they could have trrnsported 30,000
troops and 30,000 tons of mterial per day...At home the
opposition of military authorities hfd almost entirely disapjeared.
Shortly before his death Lord Kitchener declared to Sir Franie
1. Cab. 38/28/35. p. 11.
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Fox thet he was keenly in favour ot the tunnel. Lord
ioberta came to the same opinion towards the end of his life.
end the same view was held by Lord French.1
Sydenham supported the lobbyists in a pamphlet, noting that the oyal
)avy had
proved perfectly able to guard the country against invasion -
effectually prevented the lsnding of a boat's crew on our
shores, end the views of the Blue ater 3chool which were based
on the teaching of war, have been triumphantly vindicated...
it was inevitable that "like the baseless fabric of a vision",
the alleged military objections should have disappeared into
the limbo of loose thinking from which they emanated.2
Shortly thereafter, the Tunnel advocates had a huge dinner to mobilise
support, in the course of which it was announced that the construction
of the lrge naval base at A)over eliminated all previous military
objections to the scheme.3
In October, Asquith greed to convene the C.I.i). to'reconaider
the problem in the light of wartime experience, in the face of
representations by the lobbyists that the Array, their French allies,
and the whole country wanted the tunnel. 4 Howeve	 officers in fact
reiMned opposed to the project. epingtou and kaurice, Director of
i1itary Operations, agreed in conversation that tlaeunnel should not
be built until, the politicians had promised to provide the nation with
an army on the continental scale in peacetime. Robertson, however, had
not mde up his mind, Balfour believed the Admirals would now be happy
to have a tunnel, as they "were so upset by the German submarines."
1. "The Channel Tunnel." Times 13 July 1916. p.S.
2. Cab. 17/139. "The Channel Tunnel. 1916." proof of pamphlet by
Sydenham, October 1916.
3. Times. 27 July 1916, p.9; 29 July, p.5.
4. Ibid. 2? October, 1916. p.5.
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aepington, to his horror, met one experienced naval officer employed
at the Admiralty who thought the tunnel should be dug, as it had beme
a disadvantage to be an ialand. l s wa usual in matters invo1vlrg
invasion, epingtou's views were at variance withtboaeof the Times,
which printed several articles and letters favourable to the tunEel
project. 2 epi21gtOn prepared a detailed article showing the dangers
of invasion the tunnel would bring, but the Times refused to publish
it.3
Asquith appointed Hanke to examine the possibility of the project.
t letter from the General Staff, probab1 inspired by epington, argued
that the tunnel would be advantageous for ou.]. one set of conditions: a
friendly France. The General 3taff was not willing to saddle itself
for the responsibility of national defence on these terms. 4 At the same
time, kIankey warned Asuith privately that to publish the results of the
inquiry of 1914 would be to reveal that Churchill, Battenburg, and
French ctually were in favour of the tunnel's construction. 5 Ilankey
suixed up the arguments for audagainat the project in a C.I.D.
Memorandum lte: that ,eer. It wa conceded that the tunnel offered
strategic advantages, as it gwranteed the nntional food supply and
would releaae ships now engaged in cross-channel trade for trans-Atlantic
1. epington. orld ar I. 298-99, 308-309, 311, 467.
2. Times.? August 1916, p.?; 11 Augst 1916, p.9; 25 August 1916.
1.ngineering Supplement, p. 131a.
3. epington. *or1d Iar I, 313, 322. ho trace of the article appears in
the Times or is mentioned in the index.
4. Cab. 17/139. Secretary, ..ar Office to hankey, 2 September 1916
5. Ibid. flankey to Asquith, October 1916
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service. This ws a very telling point, as Britain now was really
beginning to feel the full fur) of the German U-boat campaign against
British trade. On the other hand, Eankey continued, it was not
certain that the abnormal conditions which bad prevailed during the
war were really a safe standard upon which to judge the economic
advantages of the tunnel. Hankey thu8 neatly sidestepped the main
argument of the tunnel advocates regarding its advantages in wartime,
by pointing out that war conditions were not permanent.'
But Ilankey was being coutselled by bodies essentially
antagonistic to the project.	 epington's Ideas had prevailed in the
Gencral Staff, for the Army Council informed the Cabinet that the
proposal could not be considered until the Government's postwar military
policy was established, especially regarding the size of the peacetime
arm. epington hid earlier advised the General 3taff to make eozmnon
cause with the Admiralty against the tunnel, as "united opinion was a
great strength." 2 This was now forthcoming. The Board of Admiralty
advised that the project be examined in peacetime in the light of the
experience of the entire war. This proved the prevailing counsel, for
after reiterating some of the traditional military arguments against
the project and predicting tht Germany would always be sufficiently
treacherous to 8eize the tunnel unless the entire nation underwent a
moral regeneration, Ilankey wrote Asquith that
In view of the unanimous opinion expressed separately and
independently by the Admiralty, the ar Office, and the
Board of Trade, it is submitted that the time is not ripe
1. Cab. 3/3/2. C.I.D. Paper 88-A. "The Channel Tunnel." December 1916.
2. Ibid. p.9 ; -tepington. orld ar. I, pp. 308-309.
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for the reconsideration of the Channel Tunnel Project.1
Three times within a decade the tunnel had been defeated on the
grounds of insulir insecurity. The tunnel uetion was essentially en
extension of the inva8ion controversy, for it aroused the same
prejudices. Those disinclined to believe in invAsion - 3ydenham, .sher,
attenberg, ilaon, French, end Churchill - were p.rtiaans of the
tunnel; whereas those who took invasion seriously - .lepington, Fisher,
Hankey, Kitchener, and Nicholson - constituted its most powerful
opposition. Although the tunnel scheme Was to be revived periodically
in the years after 1918, the issue of invasion was never again to be
associated with it in such force. The advent of airpowar and other
str tegic developments was to give the issue of the Channel Tunnel, as
well s that of invasion, a new dimension.
1. Cab. 3/3/2. p. 10.
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